TELOS

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

NORBERTO BOBBIO is a leading Italian Marxist scholar and teaches law at the University of Turin. A frequent *Telos* contributor and one of the best known members of the Budapest School, FERENC FEHER has left Hungary and now resides in Melbourne, Australia. TIM LUKE is a member of the St. Louis *Telos* group and a graduate student in political science at Washington University. ANDREW ARATO is doing research and other interesting things in Paris. Another *Telos* editor, ROBERT D'AMICO teaches philosophy at the University of Florida in Gainesville. SHARON ZUKIN teaches sociology at Brooklyn College. JOHN FEKETE, the journal review editor of *Telos*, teaches English at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario. DAVID WIECK teaches philosophy at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. JAMES A. OGILVY teaches philosophy also, at Williams College. MICHAEL SCRIVENER teaches English literature at Wayne State University in Detroit. MARK POSTER, a *Telos* editor, teaches history at the University of California at Irvine. JEFF HERF is a sociology graduate student at Brandeis University in Boston. MILDRED BAKAN teaches philosophy at York University in Toronto.

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INTRODUCTION

*With this issue, the journal enters into its eleventh year of publication. A product of 1968—our first issue, purely by coincidence, appeared in May of that year—*Telos *has not suffered the fate of most of the dreams of that period. Yet, our steady growth and at least partly successful attempt to develop a serious Marxist, neo-Marxist and perhaps at times even anti-Marxist theoretical discourse has not been as easy as originally projected. Not only have we been forced at every turn to re-examine fundamental assumptions, but, after ten years, we are still far from developing a coherent, shared perspective: the various* Telos *groups remain as heterogeneous as ever. All of this came out very clearly in the February conference on "The Totally Administered Society," which is described in this issue in detail and which, it is hoped, will give the reader a general idea of some of the internal positions and conflicts among the journal's staff.*

Much has been written about the *Marxist theory of the state and Marxist political science, especially in France and England, where fads usually tend to be substituted for serious, historically informed analysis. In this issue we publish two of Bobbio's penetrating analyses, which demystify most of the pompous [usually structuralist] nonsense written on the subject. Bobbio concludes that not only is there no such thing as a Marxist theory of the state, but that Marxists have no viable alternatives to the "old and discredited" representative democracy. In future issues we will publish additional contributions to this subject.*

To the extent that discussions concerning the nature of bureaucratic centralism have been polarized within the Cold War logic of outright dismissal or uncritical defense, there is very little in the way of systematic analyses of how *these societies with bureaucratic centralist regimes have come into being and how they continue to function. Feher's and Arato's article respectively investigate crucial aspects of these systems. Feher reconstructs the basic assumptions of what he calls "dictatorships over needs" and shows how, beginning with an unwarranted solution of socialist values, professedly "socialist" regimes developed into manipulative systems within which all fundamental options are ruled out and the resulting paternalism produces a society of people reduced to the status of permanent adolescents. After preliminarily rejecting most recent efforts to understand bureaucratic centralism, Arato argues that broad theoretical efforts in this direction must be tempered by painstaking studies of the particular socio-historical conditions within which these regimes developed.*

In the attempt to come to grips with post-1968 events, recently there has been much internal discussion concerning "artificial negativity." In this issue, two articles attempt to outline what it is all about, as well as to provide some idea of how it proposes to synthesize many hitherto unrelated baffling social, political and cultural phenomena. Again, traditional Marxist analyses and New Left variations turn out to be wholly inadequate for this task of grasping the latest thrust of advanced capitalism—so much so that they have even ceased to function as cannon fodder to rationalize further that very system that they have hitherto indirectly regulated by means of sustained internal critiques. In this context, it becomes necessary to recreate artificially the previously destroyed free space within which new regulatory critiques can be developed to help regulate an over-bureaucratized system too successful for its own good.

Again, focusing on the increasingly more important theme of the relation between needs, desires and labor, D'Amico traces recent French discussions of these themes. The emphasis is no longer primarily on the reproduction of objective conditions, but on the subjectivity needed to sustain them.

Last but not least, closing the article section are two classical essays by Adorno, no longer readily available even in German. In "On the Social Situation of Music," Adorno

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reveals a side of his early thinking that he himself later sought to repress. As such, it provides an important document that will answer many questions concerning the genesis of critical theory in the early 1930s.

In addition to the extensive conference report, the "Notes" section includes a recent "Manifesto" by the Belgrade Praxis *group, discussing human rights in socialist societies, as well as a discussion by Fekete of some crucial problems in Benjamin's thought, which at present is enjoying a somewhat uncritical fashionable popularity.*

In the "Review" section, Wieck provides a long-overdue general evaluation of Paul Goodman's philosophy; Ogilvy challenges Breuer's pessimistic analysis of advanced capitalism and revolutionary theory; Poster questions some of the major points in Lasch's recent book on the family; Scrivener reconsiders E.P. Thompson's work on Morris; Herf summarizes the main themes developed by the Budapest School before its recent "diaspora"; and Bakan relates some of Kosik's concerns to the Husserl-Heidegger phenomenological tradition.

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IS THERE A MARXIST THEORY OF THE STATE?*

by Norberto Bobbio

Marxism's Vitality and Scholastic Disputes

In an essay published a few years ago, I presented a few considerations on the much bemoaned non-existence or inadequacy of a Marxist political science, understood as the "lack of a theory of the socialist state or socialist democracy as an alternative to the theory, or theories, of the bourgeois state and bourgeois democracy."[1] Apparently, things have not changed much if recently Colletti must decry "the weakness and the sparse development of political theory in Marxism" and conclude that "Marxism lacks a true political theory."[2]

In my initial essay I presented two arguments which were meant to explain the underdevelopment of Marxist political theory: 1) since the theorists of socialism have been so concerned with the problem of gaining power, they have tended to emphasize the role of the party rather than that of the state; and 2) since these theorists also believe that, once power has been attained, the state will become a "transitional entity," i.e., it would sooner or later disappear, it follows that the form of government particularly appropriate for its transitory nature would be a dictatorship (i.e., an extraordinary

*These two articles "Is There a Marxist Theory of the State?" and "Are There Alternatives to Representative Democracy?" were both originally published in *Mondo Operaio*—a journal of the Italian Socialist Party. Bobbio's articles have precipitated a crucial debate which will be followed in future issues of *Telos*. Discussions concerning democracy and socialism, of course, are not exceptional and have been a part of daily Italian life as a result of the rejection of Stalinism or any other kind of authoritarian socialism, as well as of social democracy as a way of overcoming the historical failure of liberalism.

This is not the first time Bobbio has generated a broad debate among Italian intellectuals. In 1954, he published an article in *Nuovi Argomenti* dealing with the question of freedom under socialism. ["Della Libertà dei Moderni Comparata a Quella dei Posteri," *Nuovi Argomenti*, Nov.-Dec., 1954]. And in 1973, his article "Socialist Democracy?" appeared in *Omaggio a Nenni*—a book that, unfortunately, received little circulation, so that Bobbio's article was given little attention. (This is a book of essays in honor of Pietro Nenni, a socialist leader who is at present the president of the Italian Socialist Party).

The debate articulates central questions involving democracy and socialism and helps to explain how Italy—a society threatened daily by "mysterious" terrorist forces—can retain its democratic cohesion without having to resort to authoritarian measures. Today, it is difficult to imagine what other society could withstand such a high degree of provocation without precipitating social disintegration. It also shows how democracy is not under attack primarily from the Italian left. On the contrary, it is clear that without the Socialist and Communist parties in Italy, democracy in that country would have long ago ceased to exist.

The selection will be somewhat arbitrary and incomplete, since the debate went far beyond journals such as *Rinascita* and *Mondo Operaio*, extending even to newspapers such as *Corriere della Sera*, where Lucio Colletti himself contributed an article. This debate will continue in the pages of *Telos* in future issues, with additional American as well as foreign contributions. English translation by George R. Alkalay.

1. "Democrazia Socialista?" in *Omaggio a Nenni*, appearing as originally published in *Quaderni di Mondoperaio*, (no date, but 1973), p. 431ff.

2. Lucio Colletti, "A Political and Philosophical Interview," in *New Left Review*, n. 86, July-August 1974, p. 15.

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government for extraordinary times and events). In order to further explain the problems of Marxist political theory, it is necessary to consider the phenomenon of the proliferation of a variety of Marxisms in the present era, and the significance of the differences dividing the various Marxist "schools."[3]

The fact that there are so many Marxisms is not a scandal. On the contrary, it is a sign of vitality, as the multiplication of sects at the time of the Reformation was a sign of Christianity's vitality. Even the "neo" is a good sign: I am suspicious of philosophical systems which are not reborn under that sign. Had there remained only one Marxism, one would have to think that it died or is dying, and I would keep my distance from it, advising others who still believe in the critical function of reason to do the same. But one must not close one's eyes to certain consequences of this pluralism. Foremost among these is a certain waste of intellectual energy in the controversies between the various tendencies—energy which would be better employed in more carefully studying the branches of knowledge which remained outside the interests of the founders and their disciples and, most important, the increasingly complex reality of the surrounding world.

The dispute among Marxist philosophers concerning historicism provides a good illustration of the doubtful value of much of Marxian scholastic discourse. In the eyes of a few of today's leading Marxist philosophers (Althusser in France and Luporini in Italy) to continue to claim that Marxism is historicism, as was said for decades in Italy and was rashly proclaimed even by Gramsci, amounts to being intellectually destitute. Marx's philosophy,

3. We no longer have any inhibitions in talking about the "Frankfurt School" or the "Budapest School," i.e., to use the term "school" which earlier would have appeared senseless and inappropriate. Not that there were not various Marxisms even then. Yet, while one can legitimately speak of a Marxism of the Second and even more of the Third International, it would make no sense to speak of a Marxism of the 'fifties or 'sixties or 'seventies. There are many reasons for this proliferation, especially if compared with those that could have been adduced a century ago. A few are of a merely philological nature, e.g., the discovery of Marx's early writings and his unpublished works. This discovery has brought about a split among interpreters into those who consider them of great significance, such as the Budapest School, and those who repudiate them, such as Althusser and his school—thus giving rise to the contraposition between humanistic and nonhumanisitic (theological?) Marxism. Others are of a more openly philosophical nature, and are to be seen in relation to the recurring tendency of Marxism to ally itself with other philosophies. Thus, there have been various attempts to wed Marxism and existentialism (Sartre), Marxism and phenomenology (Paci in Italy, the *Telos* group in the United States, the Budapest School), Marxism and structuralism (Althusser and various offshoots). The occasions for these enrichments (or confusions, depending on one's viewpoint) have increased in recent years: at the turn of the century there were only two possible contaminants, positivism and neo-Kantianism. Other reasons for poly-Marxism are of a political nature. Thus, today one can distinguish a Western Marxism from a Soviet or Chinese or Yugoslav Marxism—something which was impossible before the advent of socialist revolutions. Also, for the first time, there has been talk of "neo-Marxism" in regard to the problems of the Third World—problems which classical Marxism had never addressed directly. Nor can one forget that among the various causes of dissent within contemporary Marxism there is also the differing evaluation of Engels' conribution to the common heritage. The debate about Engels which was unknown to classical Marxism, or at least had never reached today's intensivy, has been increasingly aggravated by those who claim that Engels vulgarized or corrupted Marx's thought, and for them, when something in Marxist theory does not fit, "la faute est à Engels."

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they claim, is not historicism but structuralism. But it seems to me that not enough attention has been given to the fact that all of these philosophical "isms" have acquired in the course of their many uses the most varied meanings, and are labels that can be stuck to containers of the most varied contents—hence the scholastic character of the dispute. If "historicism" has been frequently associated with reactionary philosophies, no less can be said of "structuralism."[4]

Secondly, philosophical "isms" are worth more for what they criticize than for what they claim. This is particularly applicable to "historicism" which has always had an enormous polemical charge: historicism against enlightenment, against abstract rationalism, against natural law and consequent eternalization of human nature, against every theological and providential conception of history. Structuralism, until proven otherwise, has nothing of the sort. To deprive Marxist philosophy, which has been anti-enlightenment, anti-natural law, anti-theological, etc., of this polemical significance would indicate a lack of astuteness.

Finally, the importance of these debates for our present problems remains to be shown. To be more precise: what is the political or practical significance of the thesis that Marx is more structuralist than historicist? This question can only be posed in reference to Marx. Marx is neither a Kant nor a Liebniz for whom a purely theoretical discussion can even be an end in itself. In a discussion of Marx the problem of theory is inseparable from that of praxis. The relation between theory and praxis, however, is much more complex than it is thought by pure rationalist, i.e., that a certain kind of praxis can be deduced from a certain theory, since most theories are generally posthumous rationalizations of a praxis which has already been completed or is in the process of being completed. Is it possible that Pareto, with his theory of derivations, has not upset the projects of the new rationalists who deduce reactionary practice from historicism and revolutionary practice from structuralism? Instead of using Marx for such disputes, (which amuse philosophers and baffle the uninitiated who do not suspect that in order to be revolutionary it is necessary not to be historicists) would it not be wiser to use Marx's work in order to obtain conceptual tools appropriate to the analysis of contemporary society?

The Abuse of Authority

In a nutshell, the lack of a socialist theory of the state is the result of the abuse of the principle of authority. In face of this shortcoming, one would think that the first step would be to study more carefully the present state of affairs in both the capitalist as well as the collectivist states in order to discover operational defects and clarify desirable objectives. Instead, too often

4. How else should one consider Talcott Parsons' theory other than "structuralist?" This explains why he is considered by progressive sociologists to be the prince of the reactionary sociologists. And was not Nietzsche both anti-historicist and a philosopher of the "reaction" if not actually of imperialism—as Lukacs argued?

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Marxists feel obligated to go see what Marx (and Engels, and even Lenin) said and to persuade the incredulous or misinformed that, notwithstanding everything, there is a complete theory of the state in Marx which has hitherto been misunderstood, or unjustly underemphasized. It would not be exagerating to claim that many people think that the lack of a socialist theory of the state could be remedied by erudite and subtle exegeses of Marxist texts rather than by a study of the political institutions of contemporary states. This approach perpetuates a bad academic habit foreign to Marxism of favoring the history of political doctrines (which is easier to study), over the history of institutions. It is like attempting to understand the classical liberal state by reading Kant, or the Restoration by reading Hegel. Thus, we have first-rate books on what Marx or Lenin or Gramsci thought about the state[5] or on a theme of such little contemporaneity as the withering away of the state,[6] but we have neither excellent nor terrible ones dealing with the political systems of states defining themselves as socialist, or with the alternative state of the future—assuming one is not satisfied with those existing today.

In a recent book, Cerroni devotes a full chapter to "democracy and socialism," i.e., on the theme which I consider as the most and crucial problem of our time.[7] It is crucial because no one has hitherto managed to solve it other than rhetorically, while the fate of society seems to increasingly depend on its solution. Those seeking enlightenment from this chapter should immediately forget it. The chapter begins as follows: "It is time to reassess the position of the critique of the state in Marx's thought, etc." In other words, it is another "reading" of Marx (as it is fashionable to call it today). Cerroni seeks to demonstrate not only that there is a political theory in Marx, but also that this political theory is, against all the rightist and leftist distortions, the only one providing a solution to the problem of socialism through democracy, and of democracy in the socialist state.

I do not question whether Cerroni's analysis is accurate, even though I have long been convinced that the over-emphasis of Marx's meager references to the transitional state in his discussion of the Paris Commune indicates the paltriness of discussions of the state within the socialist tradition—especially when compared with the rich liberal tradition which includes the works of Locke, Kant, Constant and Tocqueville. Rather, I question whether such an analysis is worthwhile, i.e., what benefit to the solution of the problems of our time can be derived from the umpteenth gloss (even if more ingenious, more intelligent, and in greater conformity with the spirit—or the letter?—of an extremely difficult text) of those twenty odd pages of Marx, already picked to the bone. Although Marx may have wanted to write a critique of politics alongside the critique of economics, he never wrote it. Given this state of affairs, it may be worthwhile today to study social science rather than Marxology.

5. Cf. Christine Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci et l'Etat* (Paris, 1975).
6. Cf. Danilo Zolo, *La Theoria Comunista dell'Estinzione dello Stato* (Bari, 1974).
7. Umberto Cerroni, *Theoria Politica e Socialismo* (Rome, 1973).

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Marx and Hegel

In a certain sense, continuing to read and reread Marx may even be harmful since it reinforces the belief that a good interpretation, indeed a better interpretation, relieves us of the need to think. This characterization applies not only to the crude Marxism inundating universities—a Marxism which all too frequently is a pretext for ignorance, and favors laziness with a good dose of presumption and sometimes even opportunism—but also of the serious Marxisms. One of my favorite maxims is that today one cannot be a good Marxist if one is only a Marxist. But Marxists have an irresistible tendency to be only Marxists. They tend to isolate Marx and Marxism from the rest of the world and to isolate themselves. They comment on Marx with Marx or with a few authorized writers such as Engels, Lenin, Lukács, Korsch, Luxemburg, Gramsci etc., i.e., with writers securely in the Marxist tradition. They cast an inattentive, fleeting, suspicious or even disgusted flance at non-Marxist culture lumped together as "bourgeois," or pre-Marxist (the "pre-" always has a slightly pejorative meaning as in "pre-Christian," "pre-industrial," "pre-classical," and naturally "pre-historic"). When they cast an "attentive" glance they are full of condescension, not unlike idealists who already knew from the start that all that did not fit into their systems was wrong and considered it only in order to demonstrate their own superiority.

This is a somewhat harsh portrait with such broad strokes that no one will want to be recognized in it. An example, however, should drive the point home: the Marxist interpretations of Hegel. They are all distorting interpretations whether they tend to reduce the distance between the two, either Marxizing Hegel or Hegelianizing Marx, or whether they consider Marx to be the one who turned Hegel upside down and Hegel as having his head where his feet should be. First of all, if there is any value in studying Hegel well in order to better understand Marx (what comes later in terms of what came first), far more doubtful and questionable is to study Marx in order to understand Hegel (what comes first in terms of what came later). Secondly, reading a work with such world-historical complexity as Hegel's through only one of his exegetes and critics amounts to carrying out an *a priori* reductivist operation and precluding the possiblity of undertaking serious philosophical historiography, which would entail placing Hegel in an historical context.

Among the Marxist deformations of Hegel's thought, two seem particularly serious. First, since Marx and Engels use "civil society" in the strict sense of economic relations in contraposition to political relations, it is customary among Marxists to limit the discussion of "civil society" in Hegel to that moment of the "system of needs" where Hegel treats a few fundamental problems of political economy. Now, all non-Marxists know that the system of needs is only the first moment of civil society which also includes the two moments of the administration of justice and the police state, i.e., "civil society" in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* does not refer to economic society contraposed to the state, but to a first manifestation of the state (which Hegel

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himself calls "state of the intellect or of necessity."[8] One of the most original and problematic characteristics of Hegel's theory of the state eludes those who reduce the Hegelian civil society to the sphere of needs: why is one of the three fundamental functions of the state, the administration of justice, delegated to civil society and not to the state? The answer, which can be found only by comparing Hegel with Locke (certainly not with Marx), requires the knowledge that civil society is not the sphere of needs, but the state in one of its inferior forms. This, of course, is in full accordance with the commonly accepted meaning of the expression in immediately preceding philosophers such as Kant and Fichte. Secondly, since Marx criticized Hegel's theory of the state and Marx was a critic of society and of the bourgeois state, it is assumed that Hegel must be the greatest theoretician of the bourgeois theory of the state. That the Hegel of *The Philosophy of Right* is the greatest theoretician of the bourgeois state is a totally groundless assertion. The fact that bourgeois economic theory is English (or French) and political theory is, instead, German, already arouses suspicion. It is strange that the English (and French) bourgeoisie formulated an economic theory corresponding to their ideals and interests, and assigned the task of formulating the theory of the state by proxy to a Berlin professor, i.e., from a state economically and socially backward in regard to England and France. Marx knew very well what certain Marxists no longer know: the philosophy of the bourgeoisie was utilitarianism and not idealism (the target of *Capital* is Bentham and not Hegel). Furthermore, one of the most fundamental and truly innovative aspects of the French Revolution was the proclamation of juridical equality (or equality before the law), the so-called formal equality ("political emancipation")! This principle is incompatible with that state comprised of estates still partially surviving in Hegel where individuals have no value in themselves, but only in so far as they are members of a corporation. An individualistic, atomistic theory of society was the basis of the principle of formal equality. Hegel explicitly rejected this as well as the mail theses of the natural law model, beginning with the contract doctrine which had inspired "bourgeois" political reforms.

The liberal-bourgeois theory of the state outlined in a famous passage by Adam Smith on the limits of state power is the exact antithesis of the Hegelian conception of the ethical state. In making this error, contemporary Italian Marxism simply follows Neapolitan Hegelianism which knew nothing of English political philosophy and considered Hegel the greatest theorist of the liberal state. Anyone who has read the writers in the liberal tradition from Locke to Spencer, or the great Italian liberals from Cattaneo to Einaudi, knows that their main preoccupation has always been to restrain the state, to

8. I want to call the attention of Hegel scholars to an old but not outdated essay by Solari, "Il Concetto di Sociatà Civile in Hegel," in *Rivista di Filosofia*, XXII, 1931, pp. 299-347, since republished in *Studi Storici di Filosofia del Diritto* (Turin, 1949), pp. 343-81. I have illustrated the historical origin and the theoretical interest of this essay in "Lo Studio di Hegel," in the volume *Gioele Solari (1872-1952). Testimonianze e Bibliografia nel Centenario della Nascita*, in *Memorie dell 'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino. Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche*, series IV, n. 26, 1972, pp. 37-47.

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save civil society (in the Marxian sense) from excessive state interference. This has nothing to do with the ethical state.

The "Hard Lessons" of History

The first consequence of the absue of authority is the dulling of the critical spirit. If something was said by Marx or can be deduced from what Marx or an authorized interpreter said, it is taken as valid and is not scrutinized in light of actual events. Of course, Marx's greatness as a critic of classical economics, as a historian, as a philosopher, and in general as a scientist, is beyond dispute. Unfortunately, instead of being a first-rate tool for understanding reality, Marx's work becomes a shield between reality and researchers and thus not an aid but an obstacle. If this were not the case, the *incredible* dispute between two Marxists such as John Lewis and Louis Althusser, concerning whether it is men or the masses who make history would be inexplicable. Lewis has written that "man makes history." Althusser unleashes a pamphlet at him maintaining that such is not the case: "*Ce sont les masses qui font l'histoire.*"[9] I challenge anyone to find a social scientist outside the Marxist camp who can seriously pose a problem of this type.[10]

Another example of the dulling of the critical spirit concerns the problem of the state. It is a matter of life and death today for socialism to recover the democratic appeal. Here "democracy" refers to a system in which certain rules are in force and are respected, permitting the majority of citizens to participate directly or indirectly in the deliberations which at various levels (local, regional, national) and in the most varied places (school, work, etc.) are of interest to the collectivity. However, since Lenin and others argued that the democratic republic is "capitalism's best integument" many feel obligated to claim that the democratic republic cannot be the integument of a socialist state. In so doing they think they are injurying the democratic republic, whereas they end up rendering an excellent service to capitalism and a terrible one to socialism. Here, one is tempted to ask: "What is the best integument for socialism?" Dictatorship?[11]

I was sorry to have found Lenin's judgment recently repeated without suspicion or hesitation by an author of a very interesting book on the institutions of the capitalist economy. Having to explain how capitalism emerged out of a system of extremely restricted suffrage to reach one of

9. Louis Althusser, *Résponse a John Lewis* (Paris, 1973), pp. 24ff.

10. Of the two assertions, Lewis' at least has the merit of being clear, even though general, and of having a precise polemical aim: that history is made by men means that it is not made by God, providence, etc. Althusser's claim, on the other hand, which pretends to be a scientific proposition, is likewise general but unclear. Indeed, one need not be an admirer of analytic philosophy to consider the proposition meaningless, since to give it meaning would require defining what the masses are, what "making" means, and what history is—an extremely simple undertaking!

11. This question brings to mind a quip by Gobetti, which has not lost any of its polemical vigor: "The representative regime no longer has popular support. But what is to replace it? Theocracy?" Cf. Piero Gobetti, "La Nostra Fede," in *Emergie Nuove*, series II, n. 1, May 5, 1919, now reprinted in *Scritti Politici* (Turin, 1960), p. 76ff.

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universal suffrage—the institution of which did not even begin to tax all of their energies—he finds no better way than by means of the "fox" argument of the "calculated challenge." According to fable, the fox turns a defeat into an act of the highest wisdom.[12] The outcome of this kind of historiography is that, in order not to be naive it ends up bestowing undeserved honors on the adversary. Thus, all the victories which have cost the labor movement tears and blood, from the right to strike to universal suffrage, from social welfare to the labor acts, are interpreted as adept strategic moves by the capitalists to retain their power. This is reminiscent of the fascists who labeled every defeat a "strategic retreat," so that through a series of retreats and strategies the allies arrived in Sicily. But they were saying it, not their adversaries. Lenin could deride representative democracy and defend the greater and more perfect democracy which Bernstein had realisitically called "doctrinaire" or "primitive," perhaps because in good faith he held that proletarian revolution and new democracy were two sides of the same coin. Now we can no longer allow similar derisions and defenses also because of what has occurred after Lenin. We cannot privilege authority, even Lenin's, over what Hegel would have called the "hard lessons" of history.

Marx and Weber

The second consequence could be called, on the contrary, an excess of critical spirit. Since Marx is always right, his adversaries or simply those whose statements do not coincide with those of Marx and of his authorized interpreters are always wrong.

May Cerroni, who is not a schematic or dogmatic Marxist, forgive me if I use him once more as an example. Yet, in one of his books he writes that Max Weber is only an "attentive scholar" of bureaucracy and C. Wright Mills a "great sociologist."[13] Such a visible absence of any sense of proportions is an indication of a preconceived judgment based solely on the writers' distance from Marx. This explains how a few of the young Marx's undeniably sharp pages dealing with a criticism of the bureaucracy, i.e., the critique of Hegel's universal class, can be considered a full-fledged theory of the bureaucracy to be contraposed to Weber's. Thus, of Cerroni's "Two Analyses of Bureaucracy," one is the gigantic and in many respects still unsurpassed work by Weber, and the other is that discussed in the few pages of one of those early writings which Marx willingly left to the gnawing criticism of the mice. In this early work Marx criticizes primarily the identification in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* of the governing power with the bureaucracy which he was to subsequently elaborate in his lucid and implacable analysis of the constitutional consequences of Louis Bonaparte's *coup d'état*. But today no

12. I am referring to the article by F. Galgano, "Capitalismo di Stato e Democrazia Rappresentativa," in *Il Mulino*, n. 236, XXIII, November-December 1974, p. 880. (The article reprints excerpts from the book *Le Istituzioni dell 'Economia Capitalistica. Società per Azioni, Stato e Classi Sociali* (Bologna, 1974) which has already aroused an important debate in *Sociologia del Diritto*, n. 1, II, 1975, pp. 143ff.).

13. Umberto Cerroni, *La Libertà dei Moderni* (Bari, 1968), pp. 191 and 202.

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one still believes, and least of all Max Weber, what Hegel believed, i.e., that functionaries constitute the "universal class." Thus, no one should be very impressed by catch-phrases in the Young-Hegelian style (so characteristic of the early Marx) such as "the corporations are the materialism of the bureaucracy and the bureaucracy is the spiritualism of the corporations." The undeniably important contribution of Marx's reflections on bureaucracy is elsewhere: in the *18th Brumaire*. But it is difficult to understand why these pages, in which one reads that the bureaucracy developed under the absolute monarchy was reinforced by the nascent bourgeoisie and became an instrument of domination for the bourgeois class at the height of its power, constitutes an "alternative" analysis to Weber's. I am worried primarily by the conclusions which must inevitably follow. If, in fact, the Weberian analysis of bureaucracy is "totally opposed" to Marx's, the good Marxist does not have to pay any attention to it. But is this not the way to turn Marx's immense *opus* into blinders, i.e., an instrument for looking in only one direction?

Finally, elaborating a passage from the early Marx explaining the development of the bureaucratic state as consequence of the separation of state and society typical of bourgeois society, Cerroni seems to long for the age in which economic and political power, private and public power, were not yet separate. He does not realize the tremendous historical importance of the transition from traditional power based on personal relations (whose bad historical residue is patronage) to legal-rational power allowing the institution of impersonal relations between citizen and bureaucrat. This is possible only if one still seriously believes that, in an increasingly mastadontic state increasingly overburdened with necessary functions, the problem of the separation of public and private can be resolved through the institutions of the small archaic society, or guild, or community of utopians, prefigured in Marx's notes on the Paris Commune and by Lenin in his incandescent writings of the revolutionary period.

Although Lenin later had to change his mind, it is understandable how, in the heat of the battle for the conquest of power, he could promote the idea of the citizen-functionary (created in the image of the citizen-soldier). To repeat it today, after all the water and blood that has passed under the bridges of history, is unpardonable. Among other things, this erroneous posing of the problem, i.e., that the bureaucratic state was born from the so-called "separateness" of civil society and the political sphere following the ascent of the mercantile bourgeoisie rather than from the growth and technologization of state functions, leads to the conclusion that the elimination of the bourgeois state suffices for the elimination of the bureaucratic state (as if this has occurred or is occurring in socialist states).

Of course, there are differences between Weber and Marx. To be sure, Marx and Weber differ in regard to their prediction of the advent of the bureaucratic state. Marx believed that the socialist state would gradually eliminate the bureaucratic apparatus. Weber, on the other hand, believed that the future socialist state, of which he saw only the beginnings and not the

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later developments, would have been as bureaucratic if not more so than the capitalist state. Which of the two was right?

The Discovery of the Obvious

The third consequence of the abuse of authority is the discovery of the obvious. Those who read and reread the same book ultimately suffer a certain dullness in perceiving changes. When they become aware of them, they think they have made a great discovery. But it is the "rediscovery of the wheel." Or, better, there are Marxists who never have crises and always succeed in finding a phrase in Marx or Engels or Lenin (earlier even in Stalin) to make refractory reality coincide with docile theory. But there are also those who confront a crisis. This crisis is almost always resolved by a discovery that is announced with a certain triumphant air. Now, these discoveries are usually a rediscovery of things that non-Marxists have long since known and were astonished to find that Marxists did not know them.

One of these extraordinary discoveries is that power, when left uncontrolled, can become corrupt and that against possible corruptions of power remedies must be prepared, barriers raised, and effective defenses erected such as, e.g., democratic control, the protection of certain civil liberties (such as that of expressing one's opinion), an antagonistic plurality of social forces and their organizations, etc. But it is a discovery that, although bringing many changes to theoretical Marxism during the last 20 years, has discovered nothing. The entire history of political thought is dominated by this problem, so much so that this history can be considered a commentary —sometimes bitter and sometimes confident, sometimes resigned and sometimes combative—on the problem of power and its possible corruption. One of the human types whose character has been most frequently described is that of the tyrant: and how they all resemble one another! That the two founders of historical materialism or of the philosophy of praxis never devoted their full attention to this problem is no good reason for ignoring the fact that the problem is as old as the world—even if it is a good explanation of the fact that Marxists have ignored it as an irrelevant problem. Marx and Engels (and, in their footsteps, a revolutionary leader like Lenin), were convinced, and rightly so, that the sphere of politics was the sphere of power. Thus, they always posed the problem of the historical subject of this power, located in the dominant class of the time, rather than the problem of the various ways in which this power can be exercised (i.e., the problem of institutions).

Those familiar with the classics of political thought know that every political theory has always had two fundamental problems: the problem of "who" governs (on the basis of which the typology of the three forms of government, by one, by few, and by many, has been carried down through the centuries); and the problem of "how" (according to which, on to the merely descriptive classification of the forms of government, has been superimposed the prescriptive classification of good and bad forms). Undoubtedly, the most important of the two problems has always been the

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second one. Of course, Marx and Engels had their reasons for claiming the opposite. Since they had a negative conception of power, they held that all forms of government, in so far as they were "political" were, as such, bad. Having defined the state as the instrument for the domination of the ruling class, they only drew the logical consequence of their premises. The fundamental criterion on the basis of which the previous tradition had distinguished good from bad forms was whether the holders of power governed for the good of all or for their own good. But if every government is always guided by the interests of the ruling class, according to the traditional distinguishing criterion it is always bad, and it is no longer possible to distinguish between a good and a bad government. For these reasons, Marx and Engels did not solve the problem of good government by substituting a "good" for a "bad" form, but by eliminating every "political" form of government, i.e., the withering away of the state and the end of politics.

Marx and Engels, and even more so a revolutionary leader like Lenin, had good historical reasons for placing more importance on the problem of subjects than on that of institutions. But that does not exempt us from noting that their observations on the problem of institutions have always been general, summary and, more seriously, unrealistic. Therefore, their theory of the state is incomplete, lacking precisely that aspect leads many to recognize correctly that a real socialist theory of the state does not exist.

Marx and Political Realism

In order to avoid equivocation, it should be pointed out that one of the reasons for the backwardness of a socialist theory of the state is "also" the excessive credit given to the political writings of Marx, Engels or Lenin, in the search for what never existed in these writings. I do not mean to deny the importance of Marx in the history of political thought. In speaking of abuse, I have not excluded good use. Thus, there are at least two aspects of Marx's political thought that merit the greatest attention.

First, Marx's political thought follows the great current of political realism that strips the state of its divine attributes and considers it as the organization of power available to and enforceable by any particular social group. In opposition to Hegel, Marx had an instrumental conception of the state (i.e., the state as an apparatus serving the ruling class). This is a radical reversal of the ethical conception of the state according to which the state power is first of all a moral and spiritual power. The anti-Hegelianism of the young Marx is unquestionable. Marx's originality consists of the fact that he was perhaps the first political writer to combine a realistic conception of the state with a revolutionary theory of society. The realists have usually been conservatives who, departing from a pessimistic conception of man, have justified the "power-state" as a necessary evil. The two major Renaissance political writers—Machiavelli and Luther—are both realists and pessimists: the state must be founded on power (or deceit) since it has to deal with recalcitrant and deceitful subjects. Marx is a realist: he shares with the realist writers the idea

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that the state is the domination of power. But he does not have a pessimistic conception of either human nature or history. Whether the state is good or bad depends on who holds the reins. This is why he can use a realistic conception of the state, i.e., the state as a necessary evil, as one of the props for a revolutionary theory of society.

Secondly, Marx is the only realist writer who takes the realistic conception of the state to its extreme consequences, with an awareness that makes him the follower and, in a certain sense, the one who completes Machiavelli. The idea of the "power-state" had never been separated from the idea that in any event this power was destined to realize the "common good," "the general interest," "justice," etc. A state that does not pursue these noble ends was considered corrupt. For the first time, Marx denounces with extreme clarity the ideological character of this presumptuous theory. The state is not only an instrument and an apparatus serving the exercise of the monopoly of power, but it is also an instrument serving not the general but particular class interests. Marx could reach this conclusion only by overturning the previous conception of the relations between society and state. From Hobbes to Hegel the pre-state society (a state of nature or civil society, the place where passions or interests are unleashed), results in the state elevated to the position of the highest form of rational society among men (the state as Hobbes' "rule of reason" or Hegel's "rational in and for itself"). On the other hand, far from being the supersession of the state of nature, for Marx, the state is in a certain sense its perpetuation in so far as it is, like the state of nature, the locus of permanent and insoluble antagonisms. The result is that, because it is too radical, it leaps outside of reality. When the radical does not stop in time, he becomes a utopian: in order to abolish the state of nature, it is necessary not to perfect the state but to abolish it.

Even if Marx never wrote a critique of politics in the same way that he wrote a critique of economics, his political theory constitutes a necessary stage in the history of the theory of the modern state. On the other hand, Marx overly famous observations concerning the Paris Commune, which have had the fortune to be exalted (but never realized) by Lenin, are not equally relevant. The truth is that Marx had no intention of issuing prescriptions for the future through these few formulations. Only by abusing authority have the five or six theses been transformed into a treatise on public law. This is aggravated by a fact that should not be attributed to Marx—i.e., that in the last 100 years the problems of the state (above all, the problem of the relation between the organization of the state and democracy) have become more and more complex and hence increasingly difficult to fit into such catch-all formulas as "direct democracy," "self-government of the producers," and the like. These, however, are issues that would require considerable attention, and are outside the scope of this essay.

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ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES TO REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY?

by Norberto Bobbio

The Rules of Democracy

The problems of politics—understood as the total organization of a complex society—have become more and more complicated. Consequently, satisfactory solutions have become rarer, explaining why the temptation to take shortcuts sometimes becomes irresistable. Clearly, good solutions are rare for those who do not want to give up any of the fundamental institutions that distinguish a democratic state from those that are not.

However much it is reiterated that "democracy" is a term with many meanings (like all other terms in the language of politics), which one can interpret in his own fashion, it does have one predominant meaning—a meaning fully accepted by all those who invoke democracy and who are concerned with realizing socialism through it so that, once realized, socialism governs democratically. According to this predominant meaning, "democracy refers to a cluster of rules (the so-called rules of the game) permitting the broadest and surest direct and indirect participation of the majority of citizens in political decisions, i.e., in decisions affecting the whole collectivity. The rules are more or less the following: (a) all citizens who have reached legal age, without regard to race, religion, economic status, sex, etc., must enjoy political rights, i.e., the right to express their own opinion through their vote and-or to elect those who express it for them; (b) the vote of all citizens must have equal weight; (c) all citizens enjoying political rights must be free to vote according to their own opinion, formed as freely as possible, i.e., in a free contest between organized political groups competing among themselves so as to aggregate demands and transform them into collective deliberations; (d) they must also be free in the sense that they must be in a position of having real alternatives, i.e., of choosing between different solutions; (e) whether for collective deliberations or for the election of representatives, the principle of numerical majority holds—even though different forms of majority rule can be established (relative, absolute, qualified), under certain circumstances established in advance; (f) no decision taken by a majority must limit minority rights, especially the right to become eventually, under normal conditions, a majority.

I have no difficulty in admitting that this meaning of democracy, which I have called predominant, is also a restricted meaning. I would have some difficulty, however, in admitting that when one speaks about democracy *tout court*, without any qualifications, one means something else. Those referring to something else should declare so in advance. Still more: I have no difficulty in admitting that, in order for a state to be "truly" democratic, it is not sufficient to observe these rules, although the violation of one of them is sufficient for it not to be democratic.

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I do not think that we need to confront the problem of the relation between means and ends, i.e., the problem of whether the judgment of good or evil can be made only for ends or whether it does not also have to be made for means, and once it is agreed that there are not only good and bad ends, but also good and bad means, the problem of to what extent and under what conditions is it desirable to pursue good ends with bad means.[1] For now, I only want to point out that the fact that there is a very close connection between results and the means used to obtain them is never sufficiently taken into account. Above all, not only can results be evaluated on the basis of criteria permitting us to distinguish desirable from undesirable results, but procedures also are subject to value judgments. Thus, it is possible to distinguish procedures that are good *per se* and procedures that are bad *per se*, independently of results. To take an extreme example, a judicial procedure that allows for torture is a procedure judged bad by those who regard torture as bad, regardless of the result of applying such a procedure (even if one admits that through torture one can obtain a desirable result, such as discovering the truth). The same holds for democracy understood, as it is understood here, as a totality of procedural rules in technical terms, "laws") aimed at the attainment of certain results, the most important of which is the approval of decisions of interest to the whole collectivity. Those who hold that democracy so understood is a good thing also hold that one cannot be indifferent to the selection of one procedure over another.

Naturally, taking into account the goodness or badness of procedures by no means entails disregarding the results. Of course, the ideal would be to obtain the best results through the best procedures. But what are the best results? The difficulty of knowing what the best results are and in having them agreed to by a number of persons (which can be even tens of millions) compels us to consider the methods carried out to obtain such agreement and to accept that the best result is that which is attained with the best rules, of which the most important is certainly majority rule. Here lies the enormous importance of rules and the necessity of agreeing on them in order to reach an agreement as to results as well. The example of divorce is instructive. The fact that the decision of whether indissolubility or divorce is better was left to a series of agreed-upon procedural rules, such as those provided for by the referendum law, presupposes a judgment concerning the merit of those rules and the conviction that, whatever the result, it is good so long as it is obtained through a good procedure. Contrary to what is commonly believed, in this case it is not the good end that justifies even the bad means, but it is the good means, means considered to be so, that justifies the result—or at least makes the result acceptable as good even to those who voted against it.

The Paradoxes of Modern Democracy

I have drawn the example from a case of direct democracy precisely

1. For a broad discussion of this theme, see the recent work, which has almost gone unnoticed, by Giuliano Pontara, *Se il Fine Ginstifichi i Mezzi* (Bologna, 1974).

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because direct democracy is exalted (and rightly so) by those who are not satisfied with representative democracy and who consider it a type of panacea against the defects of the "system." But if democracy is difficult, direct democracy is even more difficult. Let me add: it has become progressively more difficult. This can be illustrated by referring to just a few of the problems that all existing political systems confront, and which can be called real paradoxes of contemporary democracy.

No doubt, perfect democracy, ideal democracy (if democracy means government by the people and not in the name of the people) is direct democracy—which led Rousseau to state that the English people were free only at the very moment when they deposited their ballot in the box. It could have been objected—as it was a thousand times over—that other people were not free even at that moment. Rousseau, however, knew, as Montesquieu, that direct democracy, the democracy of the *agora* in contrast to the democracy of the parliamentary chamber, was a regime suited only to small states: states whose size permitted the citizens (who furthermore were only a small part of the city-state's inhabitants) to assemble in the square. Where are the small states today? States continue to grow, and the squares are now only useful for mobilized crowds, not for participating citizens. [2]

To reinterate a well-known distinction, the first paradox of modern democracy, contraposed to ancient democracy, arises here: we ask for ever more democracy under ever more unfavorable conditions. We have not been told only yesterday that nothing is more difficult than ensuring respect for the rules of the democratic game in large organizations: and, beginning with the state, organizations are becoming ever larger. Those who have touched upon this sore spot (which has been called the iron law of oligarchy) have always posed the problem in regard to representative democracy, let alone direct democracy. From the viewpoint of the correct functioning of the previously mentioned rule, democracy by assembly, as revitalized by the student movement, has almost always been deceptive. On the one hand, there is an assembly limiting itself, far worse than the worst parliament, to the ratification (frequently by acclamation) of the executive's decision. On the other hand, there is an executive whose investiture is charismatic (in the technical sense of the word, i.e., in the sense in which "charismatic" is contraposed to "democratic"), and whose power is considerably more stable and irresistable than that of any executive of a representative body. I am not saying this in the form of a facile polemic (even if the 'assemblists' " pretense of giving lessons on democracy is rather irritating): I mention it in order to reiterate that democracy (no matter whether direct or indirect, assembly or representative) is an extremely complex "practice," resisting innovations, and is moreover a very delicate mechanism, which breaks down under the slightest impact.

2. Montesquieu also said that the principle of democracies was virtue, understood as the love of one's country: but only small countries could be loved. In fact, in the large country of France, in order to save the country, Robespierre had to conjoin virtue with terror.

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Bureaucracy and Technology

A second, even more embarrassing paradox arises from the fact that the modern state has grown not only in size but also in function, and every increase in state function results in a growth of the bureaucratic apparatus, i.e., of an apparatus structured hierarchically and not democratically, with descending and not ascending power. If one recalls that in Cavour's time there were seven or eight ministries in Italy, and now there are more than four times that number, and that every ministry needs its own army of functionaries, one realizes how strong and, moreover, natural is the tendency of the modern state toward an essentially anti-democratic bureaucratic organization of power. Of course, during roughly the same period, in these states there has been an advance of the process of democratization (extension of suffrage, the slow or violent death of the second non-elected chamber, decline or disappearance of monarchies, development of decentralization, etc.). But it is likewise true that the process of democratization and the process of bureaucratization not only keep even pace with each other, but that the second is the direct consequence of the first. As the extension of the suffrage allows the demands of new masses to surface and since these demands almost always request the state to take on new tasks and hence new burdens, the state is compelled to expand its services and hence its apparatus.

Once more, I am not saying this so as to resume the old polemic of liberal writers against the extension of the public sphere to the detriment of the private sphere,[3] or to repeat Max Weber's often cited and anything but fantastic prediction of the "iron cage" destined gradually to imprison the citizens of the new legal-rational (but only formally rational) state. The parallel growth of the bureaucratic and the democratic state is an old idea of all those who, some with satisfaction and others with concern, saw the modern state grow in front of their very eyes—so much so that the idea has now become a commonplace.[4] I say this so that what those writers knew very well so long ago is not forgotten, i.e., that more democracy (and more socialism) mean, or at least have so far always meant, more bureaucracy. Only by remembering this can we remain aware of the enormous difficulties of our discussion, and distrustful of ready-made solutions.

A third paradox—the most macroscopic—is the effect on democracy of technological development in industrial societies, regardless of whether they

3. Recall the battle waged day in and day out by Luigi Einaudi against all those, both socialists and conservatives, demanding new types of state intervention in matters that, according to the principles of classical liberalism, were not its concern.

4. To provide a forceful quotation, Silvio Spaventa wrote the following nearly one hundred years ago (1880): "A democratic society, in which you have proclaimed the juridical equality of all before the law, has certain requirements which impose upon the state an ever greater number of services and offices, having as their purpose the attainment of conditions and means by which every individual can, through his own action, reach a status corresponding to his rightful equality. Hence, the necessity to continuously expand the limits of common administration, which continuously creates new relations between the citizens and the representative of this common administration which is precisely the state." Cf. Silvio Spaventa, *Discorsi Parlamentari*, (Rome, 1913), p. 556.

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have a capitalist or a socialist economy. In these societies, the number of problems requiring technological solutions and which can only be tackled by skilled personnel has rapidly increased. Thus, there is the recurrent temptation toward government by technicians, i.e., technocracy.

It does not take much insight to realize that technocracy and democracy clash. Technocracy is the government of those who are competent, i.e., of those who know only one thing but know it well, or who should know it well; democracy is the government of all, i.e., of those who decide not on the basis of their competence, but on the basis of their experience. The protagonist of industrial society is the scientist, the specialist, the expert; the protagonist of democratic society is any citizen, the man on the street, the *quisque e populo*. It is impossible to compare the difficulty of the problems in archaic societies with those of our own. To give only one example, how many are there who have mastered the economic problems of a large state and are able to propose correct solutions in terms of certain objectives? Or worse, how many are there who can indicate objectives that are attainable, given certain resources? And yet, democracy stands on the limiting idea that everyone can decide everything. The paradox can also be put another way; according to the democratic ideal, the only one competent in political affairs is the citizen (and in this sense the citizen can be considered sovereign). But as soon as decisions become more technical and less political, doesn't the citizen's sphere of competence shrink and as a consequence also his sovereignty? It is not therefore contradictory to ask for increasingly more democracy in an increasingly more technological society?

I am not apologizing for a technocratic society, since I also claim that no matter how much the number of problems demanding technologically difficult solutions grows, such problems will never completely displace traditional political problems. Indeed, technological development always creates new political problems. Yet, one thing is clear: to ask for more democracy means to ask for the expansion of decisions requiring competence from those who, due to the objective conditions of the development of modern society, find themselves increasingly incompetent. This has been true especially in the productive sector—the very sector that has hitherto escaped any type of popular control, both in countries with a capitalist economy and in those with a socialist economy, and this is the sector in which the democratic challenge is either won or lost. To ascertain facts fairly and without too many preconceptions is the only way to be in a position to devise practical, sensible remedies.

Culture Industry and Political Industry

I consider as a fourth and last paradox (last only in the present discussion) the paradox between the democratic process and mass society. Democracy presupposes the free and full development of human faculties. The effect of massification, from which all large societies suffer, is generalized conformity. The indoctrination typical of mass society tends to suppress individual

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responsibility, which is the foundation of democratic society. Well organized propaganda seeks to diminish the space reserved for personal and rational choices, i.e., for convictions not based on momentary emotions or on passive imitation of others. In al countries where it is no longer possible to govern without a mass consensus (i.e., where a process of democratization is under way) there exists a culture industry alongside the political industry. As the culture industry results from the access of an increasingly larger number of individuals to the possession of the means necessary for the enjoyment of cultural products, so the political industry results from the expansion of the power base. It prospers and grows with the institutions (from universal suffrage to the formation of organized political powers) that translate the abstract principle of popular sovereignty from myth to reality.

Of course, no large democracy can do without the political industry in one form or another. And it would be ridiculous, in addition to being unrealistic, to hypothesize, at the present stage of social and intellectual progress, a society in which all adult citizens have the right to influence directly or indirectly the formulation of political decisions, and who must therefore be taken into account by those who hold power—at least more so than in oligarchic society, where the overwhelming majority of subjects is politically irrelevant. In other words, it is unrealistic to hypothesize a society in which the employment of more or less extensive and intensive technologies of consensus-organization is not necessary. It is important to realize the consequences implied by the employment of these technologies in regard to the ideal of democracy defined as *participatory* democracy and distinguished from *participated* democracy. Certainly, one of the characteristic aspects of participatory democracy is the so-called mass demonstration, such as public assembly, marches, etc., that takes place on the occasion of historical anniversaries, celebrations or events arousing public opinion. Those in the habit of taking part in such demonstrations (I personally consider it under certain circumstances to be a civic duty) are aware of their value as a stimulus and their function of promoting and preserving group cohesion and solidarity. But it must also be recognized that their effect is not long-lasting, because once the demonstration has broken up, the original excitment rapidly disappears, and along with it the will to act (without which politics is not possible—politics being not sentiment or opinion, but action).

Furthermore, the habit that this type of demonstration supports (the obsessive repetition of slogans, the display of slogans on placards, rhythmic gestures, the substitution of agitated screaming for calm reasoning, etc.) is one of the many forms of alienation typical of mass society that affects even those who condemn it (and who are its unwilling victims).[5]

5. Every time I enter the university lobby and see new writings on the wall, devoid of fantasy and polemical vigor, I melancholically measure the distance still remaining between mass-man and the citizen (I use this word in the Rousseauian sense).

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Democracy is Subversive

I have dwelled upon these so-called paradoxes of democracy—all the more evident the more one moves from "participated" democracy to "participatory" democracy—not in order to discourage the good fighters for the cause (who, among other things, are not readily discouraged by those wrongly considered chronic pessimists), but to counter the increasingly evanescent and general discussions concerning democracy and socialism. Certainly, today the conjunction of democracy and socialism is once more part of the program of the large Western labor parties—so much so that a man like Cunhal, who at least initially believed he could recycle the dictatorship of the proletariat, has appeared as a ghost from the past.[6] But it is not enough that everyone talks about it. It would be useful to get to the bottom of the problem of why there is no democracy where socialism has been achieved (democracy at least in the sense in which the concept of democracy is clear and does not lend itself to equivocation) and why, in those countries where the rules of the democratic game have been observed, socialism has hitherto not arrived and does not even seem imminent.

Above all, it would be useful to begin to recognize that, as in the case of the relation between democracy and liberalism, the relation between democracy and socialism is also not unproblematic. Today we are so accustomed to using the expression "liberal-democracy" that we are inclined to forget that, up to the beginning of the century, liberals had always considered democracy (and only simple formal democracy) as the road to the loss of liberty, the revolt of the masses against the elites, or the victory of the man of the herd over the shepherds of the people—not much different from how today the pure democrats (the liberal-democrats) consider socialism. It is not an unproblematic relation, because democracy is subversive. And it is subversive in the most radical sense of the word because, wherever it goes, it subverts the traditional conception of power, (so traditional as to be considered natural), according to which power—be it political or economic, paternal or eccesiastic—descends from top to bottom. In a certain sense, it is much more than socialism itself, if "socialism" is understood, as it frequently is, as the transference of the ownership of the means of production from private hands to the state, i.e., as another institution of a form of power descending from top to bottom. Democracy is so subversive that, were it truly realized according to the Rousseauian limiting ideal, it, and not the hypothetical classless society, would be the end of the state: the society without any state (because all the states which have existed so far have never been able to exist without relations of descending power). Notwithstanding Marx, and one hundred years of practical and practiced socialism, the fundamental problem of modern man, an unresolved (unresolvable?) problem, is the one posed once and for all by Rousseau: how can the individual alienate his own freedom to

6. One of the central themes of the well-known book by Giuseppe Vacca, *Saggio su Togliatti* (Bari, 1976), is the so-called "inseparable nexus of democracy and socialism."

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the political body, to the whole of which he is a part, and be..."freer than before."

Secondly, it is necessary to recognize that an alternative model of political organization does not exist—i.e., an alternative to the parliamentary state, a model that could be called "democratic and socialist" in contrast to the traditional "democratic and liberal" model; an alternative in the sense that, in regard to certain values such as individual freedom and diffused power, in which all socialist must believe, it is more advanced than the preceding one, but at the same time feasible. At least, such an alternative does not exist in the full detail with which the "bourgeois" political system has been developed through the centuries.

Beginning with utopian socialism and including Marx, socialist thought has for a long time turned its own attention more to problems concerning the renovation of all of society than to those concerning state organization. It has offered us many models of non-political society of which no one has hitherto seen the like. These are alternative models in the most radical sense of the word: in the sense that they propose a form of social life different not from the representative state, but from the state *tout court*. The form of state implemented in the socialist countries *is* an alternative to the representative state, but it is an unacceptable one. Were this truly the new state, for which the apology was made before the discovery of its degeneration became public and thus no longer retractable, then we must be satisfied with the old one. With all its defects in formulation and with all its faulty delays in execution, the republican constitution is still, when compared with the vast majority of regimes that either do not have democratic constitutions or else do not take any account of broadened constitutions, an advanced trench from which we can no longer go back. The convulsions of Portugal, which has not succeeded in producing a democratic constitution, are an admonishment. Those who believed and continue to believe that the knots can be cut rather than untied with a military dictatorship commit an enormous error which reveals a serious lack of historical memory: in the eye of the masses who are subject to it, a dictatorship, even if socialist, always become nothing but a change of masters.

The reinterpretation and the re-evaluation of the concept of dictatorship are at the center of Marxist political thought. What in ancient and modern political thinkers (up to Rousseau, Babeuf and Buonarroti) has distinguished the institution of dictatorship—not only classical but also revolutionary dictatorships—has always been its exceptional character (with regard to the historical situation legitimating it) and its temporary nature (with regard to its duration). In the case of classical dictatorship, of course, there was also the singularity of the person invested with dictatorial authority. Even for Babeuf and Buonarroti, who are rightly considered the most immediate historical predecessors of the Marxian and Engelsian terminology, the revolutionary dictatorship necessary for radically changing existing society is always an exceptional and provisional government. Only with Marx, Engels and Lenin does the concept of dictatorship lose its original connotations. As class

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dictatorship, it no longer has any technical meaning and simply comes to mean "domination." In fact, if every state *as such* is a dictatorship, dictatorship is no longer either an exceptional or a provisional regime. It becomes the permanent condition for a political society, i.e., for a society where, in order to contain and regulate internal conflicts, it is still necessary to hold political power ("political power" understood as a monopoly of the use of force). But in the traditional language of political philosophy a dictatorship that is neither exceptional nor temporary has always been called by a term far more loaded with a negative connotation: "despotism." In other words, a dictatorship whose aim is not to render itself superfluous either by re-establishing the threatened order (classical dictatorship) or by establishing a new order (revolutionary dictatorship) is not a dictatorship but a despotic state. The characteristics of such a despotic state have been consistently identified, from Aristotle to Montesquieu, as its conformity to a natural state of things (hence, its non-exceptionality) and its permanence in time (hence, its non-provisionality).

The Alternative Models

When I say that a real alternative model of a socialist state does not exist, I mean a complete and finished model worked out down to details, as in the case of the model of the representative state formulated and perfected by the great liberal tradition. The efforts of socialist political thought, especially Marxist, have concentrated primarily on the critique of the representative state and have neglected the projection of the new state. But even this critique never went very deep, and it often appeared either too obvious or sterile. It should not be forgotten that the only fatal critique of the representative state is that developed by reactionary writers. They have specialized in destroying the very principles upon which democracy, representative or not, is founded: primarily the principle of equality. But I do not think that left critics want to be confused with the critics from the right even if, perhaps without realizing it, they adopt a few of their arguments.

Those familiar with reactionary writers (a familiarity that I recommend because it is so instructive) know that the anti-parliamentary literature is immense. But let me quote at length at least the prince of the reactionary writers, especially today when he is being rediscovered by a sophisticated progressivism: "the herd man in Europe today gives himself the appearance of being the only permissible kind of man, and glorifies his attributes, which make him tame, easy to get along with, and useful to the herd, as if they were the truly human virtues.... In those cases, however, where one considers leaders and bellwethers indispensable, people today make one attempt after another to add together clever herd man by way of replacing commanders: *all parliamentary constitutions, for example, have this origin.* Nevertheless, the appearance of one who commands unconditionally strikes these herd-animal Europeans as an immense comfort and salvation *from a gradually intolerable pressure,* as was last attested in a major way by the effect

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of Napoleon's appearance."[7]

To criticize the representative system from the left is much more difficult and also more dangerous. For those who hold that men constitute in their great majority a drove or a herd and cannot be governed by anyone but a man of destiny such as Napoleon, it is extremely easy to be anti-parliamentary. It is more difficult for those who do not want to throw out with the bath water of parliament the very delicate baby of civil and political liberties. It is so difficult that I have not been convinced by what Colletti said with his usual sincerity in his well-known interview. In order to have his cake and eat it, too, Colletti distinguishes between parliamentarianism (which the future socialist state could do without) and civil and political liberties—such as freedom of the press and the right to strike—without which, in his judgment, there cannot be socialism. According to him, in order to combat the "monstrous confusion" between a police state and democracy "every socialist must be continuously reminded that civil liberties...are not the same thing as parliament."[8] I ask myself, how can Colletti really believe that the liberties that he values can be defended and maintained without a central organ in which the various parties comprising civil society are represented, and in which the discussion and deliberations which follow are upheld by the previously mentioned rules of the democratic game. In support of this doubt, I will limit myself to recalling the historical argument: parliamentary system and guarantee of the rights of freedom were born at the same time in the context of one coherent conception of the state which is now usually called "constitutionalism." As far as I know, no one has seen a regime that has simultaneously suppressed parliament and maintained freedoms, nor one that has maintained parliament and suppressed freedoms. In Italy, for example, parliament and the rights of freedom were born together with parliamentary monarchy, they died together with fascism, and they rose again together with the democratic republic.

The Fetishism of Direct Democracy

I do not overlook the fact that, while the right-wing critique of the representative system is anti-democratic, if anything, the left's critique seeks to be hyper-democratic since it sees the representative system as not being democratic enough rather than too democratic. In short, I do not overlook the fact that the critique of representative democracy is made by the left in the name of direct democracy. The idea of direct democracy is in effect the central idea—I would almost say the only central idea—in the socialist theory of the state. Even Colletti, going back to Rousseau and to what Marx owes to Rousseau, does not seem to find any other way out even if, on this occasion, he makes the "provocative" admission of the "weakness" and the "fragmentary development" of political theory within Marxism. The

7. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1966), p. 111 (my italics).

8. Lucio Colletti, *Intervista Politico-Filosofica* (Bari, 1974), p. 51.

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"weakness"lies procisely in having made a fetish out of direct democracy, without ever asking not only whether it is possible, but also what it consists of, and above all what its relation is to indirect democracy.

Many things are meant by "direct democracy." I will immediately rule out plebiscite or "acclamatory" democracy, according to which fascist and Nazi regimes have been considered democratic. Direct democracy today refers primarily to institutions such as the referendum, through which all citizens with political rights are called on to express their opinion on issues of special national or local interest. No one today would think of questioning the importance and the utility of such a method of obtaining collective decisions, nor its democratic legitimacy, notwithstanding reservations concerning the atomizing conception of the electoral body on which the institution is based, and the difficulty of attaining coalescence through public discussion. It is not clear, however, how, in an increasingly complex society, all the questions that have to be resolved through collective deliberation can be submitted to a referendum. Thus, for example, in recent years the Italian parliament alone (not to speak of the regional laws and the various provisions of local bodies) has passed about 300 laws a year—approximately one every day. One way to solve this problem (and I do not exclude its possibility some day) would be through an immense computer by means of which every citizen either staying at home or going to the nearest terminal could transmit his vote by pressing a button. Today, however, the referendum system cannot replace indirect democracy. One should understand, then, that within the limits in which direct democracy is attainable, representative democracy and non-representative democracy are not in fact incompatible. Rather, even if the latter can usefully integrate the former, it still cannot replace it.

The most relevant historical meaning of direct democracy is undoubtedly the Rousseauian one. Although Rousseau is anything but precise in the technical details of the institution, direct democracy for him coincides with assembly government, whereby assembly refers to the place in which all citizens, and not only their representatives, gather for discussion and deliberation. As indicated, such an institution is applicable to small and not large numbers. It is not altogether out of the question that in large states (but even the small and the smallest are too large for an assembly government) one might attain, by successive efforts at decentralization, i.e., by constantly pushing the discussion of collective problems from the center toward the periphery, a small unit, such as the neighborhood committees, in which the citizens themselves discuss and deliberate. It is superfluous to point out the importance of this disarticulation of the abstract and mythic sovereign people into so many concrete and real units of participating citizens. In the same way that ancient political writers, who described political power as descending power, said that the family was the *seminarium reipublicae*, so today it could be said, with a largely ascendent conception of power, that the neighborhood committees are the *seminarium* of democracy. Yet, it is likewise evident that the size of the problems cannot but correspond to the size of the group: the

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problems that the neighborhood committee is competent to tackle cannot be, I won't say the great national problems, but not even general city problems. Thus, even in this second case, once the serious limits of the Rousseauian ideal have been pointed out, direct democracy can be a useful corrective to indirect democracy, but not a substitute for it.

Finally, the element of direct democracy appreciated the most by the tradition of Marxist thought is not so much the Rousseauian one (which for Marx or Lenin is a chimera). Rather, it is the institution of the binding mandate which, even if imperfectly, implies the possibility of recall, in contrast to the classical parliamentary system. There would be much to say on the reasons for and against the binding mandate. First of all, this prohibition had its *raison d'être* in a system of restricted suffrage and single member constituency, where the personal connection of a small group of constituents with their particular interests (the street, the bridge, the railroad station, etc.) and their representative was inevitable. With the formation of the large mass parties the relation between constituents and representatives has changed, even if part of the reasons for the prohibition has remained since, in addition to party interests, the representatives of the less ideological parties tend to look after the interests of their own constituency which remunerate them with their votes. The party functions, or should function, as a collector of non-factional demands which, by mediating between constituent and representative, depersonalizes the relation. Above all, in so far as it determines the election of one candidate rather than another, it conditions their behavior through party discipline which becomes the functional surrogate of the binding mandate. It can and has been said many times that in a system of organized parties, where the party and not the single constituent is entrusted with the mandate, the binding mandate already *de facto* exists—at least within the limits in which it is useful.

On the other hand, the principle of the recall of the mandate is certainly not unquestionable. An often-parroted formula such as the Leninist one, "revocability at any moment and without exception of all functionaries," must be interpreted and stated precisely if it is not to be confused with the quintessence of despotism. Over millenia, the tradition of political thought has seen in despotism the exercise of arbitrary power, one manifestation of which is the recall "at any moment and without exception of all functionaries." The institution of the recall of the mandate cannot be judged good or bad before answering the question, "recall by whom?" Obviously, by those who entrusted the representative. But who are they? That is the point. If it is the prince or a limited oligarchy, the recall of the mandate is an institution which the state should rightly have abolished and extirpated forever. If it is a small gathering of people such as, e.g., a citizens' committee, a student assembly, a workers' council, the danger of the recall lies in factionalism—a factionalism which, in the context of a limited electoral body, has led to the prohibition of the recall. If, on the other hand, it is a matter of a large group, the recall of the mandate cannot take place without a

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movement or a party or an association mediating between those entrusting and those entrusted with the mandate. Abandoned to the spontaneity of their own impulses, large unorganized assemblies such as those promoted by the student movement have never, so far as I know, revoked a mandate.

Limited Sovereignty

I have no intention whatsoever of making the representative state the alpha and omega of political wisdom. It was a point of departure, even if it is not a point of arrival (but, then, are there point of arrival in history?). It was a turning point, even though it is certainly not the final turning point (but, then, do we really have to believe in the final turning point?). At any rate, it is a better system than those that preceded it and those that have hiterhto followed it.[9]

At any rate, the representative system has never existed in its pure form. Except for England, the parliamentary regime in other countries has been brought in from outside, into states where centralized and centralizing administrative apparatuses were already strongly developed. What, for the sake of brevity, we call the representative state has always had to reckon with the administrative state. The latter is a state obeying a completely different logic of power: descendent and not ascendent, secret and not public, hierarchical and not autonomous, tending towards immobility and not dynamic, conservative and not innovative, etc. The submission of the latter to the former has never been entirely successful. Once people spoke of the difficult relations between politics and administration. Today, with a catch phrase, we speak of separate bodies. But the truth is that these separate bodies were never unified.

I have never doubted that in a capitalist society as savage as ours, the representative system has real and insurmountable limits. The citizen's sovereignty is limited by the fact that major decisions regarding economic development either do not reach representative bodies, or if they reach them, they have already been made elsewhere—where the vast majority of sovereign citizens has no say in the matter. But here, too, the system's defect is not that of being representative, but of not being representative enough. In a capitalist society, the citizen's sovereignty, (in the sense that everyone, in addition to being capitalist or worker, bourgeois or proletariat, is also a member equal to everyone else in the political community), is limited—at

9. Here, I am not speaking about Italy, whose political system leaks from all sides. But it leaks from all sides not because it is a representative system but because it is not representative enough. Apart from the defect of perpetual centrism, i.e., the absence of rotation, to which Giorgio Galli has many times called attention—cf. his latest book, *Dal Bipartitismo Imperfetto alla Possibile Alternativa* (Bologna, 1975)—the sphere of control of the representative body *par excellence*, parliament, keeps contracting every day, beyond the *de facto* limits of strictly political power in a capitalist society where major economic decisions are made by a power which is partly private and today is also partly trans-national. For a precise picture drawn from the events of the Italian Parliament in the last thirty years, see Alberto Predieri, "Parlamento 1975," in *Comunità*, n. 174, pp. 1-72, and the ensuing discussion, now in the book *Il Parlamento nel Sistema Politico Italiano* edited by Alberto Predieri (Milan, 1975).

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least as long as the separation between civil society and political society remains. This realization, shared by the various socialist critiques of the democratic bourgeois state, does not detract from the fact that the sphere of the citizen's sovereignty coincides with the sphere of power at the disposal of the various representative bodies. It does not detract from the fact that citizens are sovereign to the extent that they succeed in influencing decisions concerning them. Hitherto, whenever this occurred, it occurred through the main road of the representative bodies.

Self-Government by the Producers?

The only two alternatives to the classical parliamentary state that I can recall, guild socialism and the "soviets," although different, express the same fundamental need to extend democratic control from the political to the economic system. The logic followed by both proposals is the same one that gave rise to the representative state, i.e., it is the logic of the struggle against the king's absolute power, which moves first from a compromise between the two opposing forces (constitutional monarchy), and then to the liquidation of the king's power (democratic republic). As Karl Korsch schematically demonstrated in tracing a parallel between the evolution of the state organization and the evolution of the organization of work, on the one hand there is the sequence of absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, democratic republic and proletarian democracy, and on the other, that of the despotic organization of work, industrial constitutionalism, and industrial democracy.[10]

The error that the theorists of industrial democracy have always committed is that of believing in the possibility of resolving political democracy into economic democracy: the self-government of citizens into the self-govenment of producers. The error stems from the belief that the citizen has no problems distinct from those of the worker (or the producer). But these problems do exist. They are precisely the problems of civil and political liberties, whose underemphasis, sometimes mixed with derision, mockery, or downright scorn, is unfortunately one of the undesirable inheritances of Marxist thought. The basic text of this tradition are a few pages from *The Jewish Question*, which has become a convenient license for all aspiring dictators (with or without the proletariat). The abuse is all the more serious in that the current interpretation, which turns a few pages of that writing into a kind of counterdeclaration of the rights of man, goes beyond the intention and deep meaning of that essay whose central, incontrovertible thesis is that political emancipation is not all of human emancipation.

It is an incontrovertible thesis so long as one does not forget that although political emancipation is not sufficient, it is nevertheless necessary. There can be no human emancipation without political emancipation. This demands the development, extension, and reinforcement of all the institutions from which modern democracy was born and it does not gain any advantage even from their temporary suspension.

10. Karl Korsch, *Consigli di Fabbrica e socializzazioni* (Bari, 1970), pp. 170ff.

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THE DICTATORSHIP OVER NEEDS

by Ferenc Feher

To understand the structure of East European societies as *systems of dictatorships over needs*, it is important to see them as anti-capitalist formations. They are the result of anti-capitalist revolutions or of the military-political expansion of once victorious revolutions, and they represent a response and challenge to capitalism. Thus, they cannot be described in terms of present capitalist societies and, as such, they can be regarded as socialist experiments. Analyses such as the Trotskyist mythology of a "Thermidor," concerning the advent of a new bourgeoisie, would only confuse the issues and prevent an understanding of the new type of alienation these societies have generated. Of course, this does not mean that there are no *socialist critiques* of East European societies. Critiques of this type compare East European social formations as specific realizations of some aspects of socialist theory with socialist values. This, of course, amounts to the self-criticisms of socialism, since the conclusion usually is that some of the possibilities envisioned in early varieties of socialist theory and practice have been realized and have produced a horrible new type of alienation. History is merciless to all ideologies. Since Marx was used to legitimate the Gulag, the chickens have come home to roost: we are now in the midst of a crisis of Marxism.

Today, the whole ideology of "distortion" of something originally "immaculate"—so much in vogue during the Krushchev period—is no longer tenable. More convincing are accounts dealing with how those trends within the socialist movement that later came to power consciously or unconsciously made a preliminary selection from the arsenal of socialist ideas. Thus, this selection plus the backward social milieu in which these experiments were realized resulted in societies of dictatorships over needs.

The following factors played a crucial role in the selection and the subsequent realization of socialist experiments. First of all, the working class paid a high price for the perhaps inevitable division between intellectual and manual labor within the 19th-century socialist movement. As a consequence, both theoretical elaboration as well as the movement's leadership were in the hand of radical intellectuals. From the very beginning, the movement prefigured what was to come in the future: a growing passivity of workers in whose name intellectuals tend to become increasingly the only historical actors.[1] Secondly, the movement's radical factions were from a Jacobin tradition that sought redemption through an iron-fisted dictatorship. This vision shaped their moral principles and was eventually realized. The small and at that time insignificant radical groups prefigured what was eventually generalized on a broad social

1. For a fuller elaboration of this problem, see Alvin W. Gouldner, "Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals," *Telos*, 26 (Winter 1975-76), pp. 3-36; and Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, *Toward a Class Power of the Intelligentsia* (English translation forthcoming).

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context. Thirdly, these Jacobin elements operated in countries lacking strong traditions of formal democracy and "civil society." Consequently, although the "masses" actually fought for formal democracy, the radical intellectuals already felt a secret contempt for that "sham" freedom. What these radical intellectuals selected from Marx turned out to be especially fateful: the *factory* as the model of social relations for the new society. The choice of the model implied that goal-rationality became the leading principle of the radical social projects. From a socialist viewpoint, however, this already entails a degradation of other values. In a concealed and never openly admitted way, it anticipated the dishonest and ideological political economy of the dictatorship over needs. The choice also meant that in the very model relations of personal dependence were intertwined with the universal network of hierarchical relations—a typical feature of capitalist factory life that is unacceptable from socialist perspectives.[2] Finally, the choice of the factory model implied that even in the future society human beings would be important only as labor power. All their other needs thus become either secondary or entirely negligible.

Societies that came about as a result of anti-capitalist revolutions and in the wake of their military and political expansion are *political societies*. It was the realization of the original Jacobin attempt to transcend the primacy of civil society over the state. *State and society become one* under the exclusive direction of the state. This was a Pyrrhic victory of *citoyen* over *homme*, since it meant that all social life was subjugated to and devoured by the political sphere. This also meant, from the very beginning, the constant presence of hidden explosive elements in the new society.[3]

These societies are also ideological societies. The principles of the state-party are far more effective than those of any constitution in capitalist countries. Bourgeois constitutions are *subsequent* summaries of *prior* developments (mostly of an earlier and gradual growth of civil society), not *projections* for the future. On the other hand, the constitutive character of the ideological principles of the dictatorship over needs consists precisely in that they are not actually realized. Rather, they are typical products of false consciousness gradually turning into sheer hypocrisy.

In the ideological society of the dictatorship over needs there are three fundamental principles: *the abolition of exploitation*, a *rationality* guiding social life (and superior to capitalist market rationality), and *the leading role of the planning elite*—the depository of "public welfare" and the embodiment of working class rule. The revelations of the Gulag have long since exploded the

2. For a fuller analysis of this problem, see Frederic J. Fleron and Lou Jean Fleron, "Administration Theory as Repressive Political Theory: The Communist Experience," *Telos*, 12 (Summer 1972), pp. 63-92; and François George, "Forgetting Lenin," *Telos*, 18 (Winter 1973-74), pp. 53-88.

3. Of course, the theoreticians of the political society were not consistent with Marx's position, according to which the abolition of the state had been a *conditio sine qua non* of socialism. Marx had sought a third solution between the two rigid poles of *citoyen* and *homme*, and not the subjugation of the first.

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myths of that abolition of exploitations. The same could be said of the supposedly higher type of rationality or for the alleged rule of the working class. Yet, it would be a serious blunder to describe these slogans as simple "lies." They are constitutive principles of the whole social system *as products* of false consciousness or of outright manipulative hypocrisy. This is why a complete de-ideologization of the system is inconceivable. But precisely because of the constitutive role of the fundamental principles from which the planning elite "deduced" the whole system, the structure of the dictatorship over needs must be analyzed in terms of the *problem of the perverted radicalism of the political economy of the planning elite* and not in terms of *problems of the market*. The abolition of the market within the system is a derivative element: a necessary consequence of the perverted radical political economy.

But even in their falsity, these constitutive principles contribute in constituting basic social relations. First, they embody the supreme principle of legitimation of the dictatorship over needs: unlike capitalism, which developed in a spontaneous and "natural" way, this is a *consciously created* social formation, deduced from allegedly scientific principles. Secondly, the new society so deduced can only be kept running if the planning elite remains constantly vigilant over the "purity" of the principles and their correct application. That is precisely the social function and legitimation of the power of the elite. Lastly, those constitutive principles guarantee a competitive relation to capitalist countries abroad. Of course, competition is one of the most important aspects of the self-legitimation of the dictatorship over needs both in domestic as well as foreign policy. In order to evaluate this ideological society realistically as something other than the outcome of a "conspiracy" of the radical intelligentsia, it should be kept in mind that it is a response to the capitalist crisis and is made possible as one of the alternatives of modern industrial development. Vajda has pointed out why, during a critical phase after World War I, modern industrialization required new forms of statist regimentation such as the New Deal and Fascism.[4] The ideologically created and deduced system of dictatorship over needs is a third version of the same phenomenon.

What is the perverted radicalism of this political economy? In a miserable travesty of Marxian radicalism, the planning elite approaches social problems *at their roots*: workers and their system of needs. In so doing, and led by the proud ambition and rationalism of an allegedly superior type, it reaches a correct conclusion and realizes the unity of two especially dangerous principles. The correct conclusion is that once human needs are granted *some* freedom of articulation, conflicts and dysfunctions cannot in principle be averted. Here we are confronted with the age-old dream of hyper-rationalistic social theory: *guaranteed society*. This had been a recurring utopia of certain Enlightenment tendencies where a key role is played by Sarastro, the educator, and the

4. Cf. Mihaly Vajda, "The Rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany," *Telos*, 12 (Summer 1972), pp. 3-26.

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philosopher king. Guaranteed society in which dysfunctions resulting from people's "empirical frailty" are ruled out, is based on a voluntaristic conception of freedom and on a deep anthropological pessimism. All revolutionary leaders have combined radical voluntarism and anthropological pessimism.[5]

A dictatorship over needs developed on such a basis is a complete system entailing all three of the regime's constitutive ideas. Its basic features are these:

(1) All of society is transformed into a conglomerate of wage laborers. Marx was entirely correct in formulating wage labor as a social relation and his description holds true for the overwhelming majority of the population living under the dictatorship over needs. People in that society have no possession other than their labor power and what they can obtain through their wages as determined by the planning elite.[6] Workers cannot determine the proportions, the preconditions, the social objectives and the results of the process of production, nor do they have any say in the most important relation of one's life: that between the time spent in labor and the time dedicated to free activity. Also, they have little opportunity to choose what they do, i.e., to change at will their place in the social division of labor. As separate groups of workers, they have *no collective rights whatsoever.* This is what critics of the regime call "the lack of proletarian democracy" and regard as a historically conditioned distortion. Far from being a distortion or dysfunction, however, this is one of the system's constitutive traits. Basically, the universalization of wage labor has two functions. The planning elite claiming to have access to a superior rationality quickly realized that the easiest way to mobilize human energies for the "rational" fulfillment of centrally prescribed economic tasks, i.e., without the slightest resistance or hesitation, required the *complete* submission of workers in all aspects of everyday life to the commands of the planning center. What is important here is the systematic practice of the planning elite. After more than a half-century of development, it is difficult to claim that such a "harsh discipline" is a result of the "requirements of industrialization." The reduction of everyone to the level of wage laborers is a result of the planning elite's effort to approach people at their very core: at the level of working activity, at the cross-roads of work time and free time, and of the needs originating from and related to both. Only in this way can the overall regulation of a universal system of needs be achieved or, in the terminology of the planning elite, can that society be protected from the dysfunctions typical of capitalism.[7]

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5. Lenin, who spoke of the inevitable though lamentable mercilessness of the revolutionary and of the necessity of beating men's hands, for, as he stated, we have "only these men" with which to realize socialism, and Trotsky, who in his polemics against Kautsky unhesitatingly stated that man is basically a lazy animal who should be forced to work, are typical examples of this radical voluntarism and anthropological pessimism.

6. This is where even a superficial similarity between workers under capitalism and under the dictatorship over needs ends: the latter are in a constant "war economy," given the regularly short supply of a considerable number of commodities. This is an additional restriction on what can be obtained by workers.

7. Marx once described this state of affairs as the *negative abolition of private property* and related it to *despotic communism.* He did not deny the *socialist* origin of such enterprises but, in

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(2) Once labor power is fully subjected to the planning elite, the state can authoritatively define what human needs in general may be and what structure they may assume in order to fulfill the system's goals. Contrary to its official materialism, decisions are *followed* by acts of production, not vice versa. Governmental decisions are no reflections of the development of the productive forces, but constitutive principles shaping all of social life. All the sterile debates concerning the "objective laws" of production that, for mysterious reasons, once favor the sector producing the means of production, while at another time (albeit rarely), favor the sector producing consumer goods, only confuse the real issues and are part and parcel of the regime's ideological camouflage. The final result of the universal and authoritative definition of permissible human needs is that production is allowed only in order to satisfy those needs that are sanctioned by the state. The primacy of political decisions adds a new dimension to the problem of rationality. It leads to the hidden substitution of the leading role of goal rationality (planning) for socialist values: while the primacy of political decisions is inevitable for the functioning of the dictatorship over needs, it can only be voluntaristic from the viewpoint of any goal-rational logic of economic development. As a consequence, even the ideologically hidden predominant goal-rationality of the system can be carried out unhindered.

(3) Workers within the dictatorship over needs are completely deprived of any opportunity to articulate their needs for freedom. Principles of pluralism, representation and contract are banned from the regime and all needs expressed with regard to them are declared to be illegitimate and illegal. Again, this is not a mere "distortion" as was claimed by both Krushchev and Mao. The absence of the possibility to express legitimate needs for freedom is a positive constitutive principle of the system of the dictatorship over needs: civil liberties, pluralism, contract and representation are incompatible with the hyper-rationalistic determination of needs prior to their actual "empirical" appearance.

(4) All social objectifications must be planned out in the dictatorship over needs in such a way that they fully fit in the authoritative determination of the system of human needs. Science is tolerated only if it does not interfere with the logic of the planning center and its decision regarding the only possible (i.e., only "rational") structure and objectives of the production process. Art and ideology are tolerated only to the extent that they are conducive to an indoctrination in harmony with the outlook of the planning elite at that particular time. Finally, the only modes of everyday life tolerated are those that "reflect" the state's prevalent ideological outlook.

Planning is the ultimate principle of rationality of the dictatorship over needs. It amounts to grasping social rationality at the level of the needs of people, to declaring despotically that these needs are non-existent, and to substituting for them the theoretical prescriptions of the planning elite. This is a hy-

terms of his own philosophy of history, he regarded them as a new and dangerous form of alienation.

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perrationalistic elitist dictatorship that denies the ultimate conviction of all democracies: the famous Cartesian formulation *"rien n'est mieux partage que le bon sense"* as well as the primacy of living people and their needs. Its overambitious claims to exhibit the "only correct social knowledge," its voluntaristic social "design" and its pessimistic anthropology amounts to perhaps the greatest fiasco of rationalism in this century.

A significant number of rationalist doctrines had constantly vacillated between admitting rationality as a general ability of all human beings and ascribing a privileged role to professional intellectuals. While the planning elite correctly criticized capitalist irrationality and took over the legacy of modern rationalism, the Marxian version *confiscated even the right of critical common sense* from those outside the elite itself.[8]

The second feature of the crisis of rationalism generated by the dictatorship over needs is even more complex. The planning elite departs from the values presupposed by its three constitutive principles and creates all of society through a conscious "deduction." This rules out in advance the possibility of having its own values generally accepted. Thus, some of them are rejected by the majority as untrue ideological statements while others, especially those of the predominant elite, are seen as correct descriptions of the situation, but as incompatible with the will of the majority. Yet, every form of domination needs a legitimating ideology, and the planning elite is no exception. Accordingly, they identify their social position with various projects, e.g., forced industrialization, the advancement of military technology, etc. The vicious circle becomes a real maze of contradictions. Because of the ideological and constitutive premises of its own existence, the system cannot openly admit that its logic is that of instrumental rationality.[9] According to the self-created premises of his own regime, not even Stalin could openly admit the primacy of instrumental rationality. Even he had to uphold the appearance of a society guided by value rationality. On the other hand, instrumental rationality was not only hidden, but also constantly hindered by the system's perverted value rationality.

As a consequence, both value as well as goal-rationality emerge debased and crippled by hyper-rationalistic reason. Nothing proves this more convincingly than the increasing irrationalism within the opposition.[10] During its early

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8. This could be seen as a "distortion" since Marx *never* separated those able to think critically from those unable to do so.

9. A good example of this is the famous 1952 "debate" concerning Stalin's so-called "economic" writings. In these writings, Stalin outlines hypocritical and infantile views according to which the "objective law" of a socialist economy aims at the "maximum satisfaction" of all human needs. A young and fairly naive economist, Yaroshenko, thought that Stalin could have been criticized, and in a letter to Stalin and the Politburo, he advocated the much more realistic position that the actual motive force of socialist industrialization is "production for production's sake." This fellow was, of course, immediately arrested, providing a brilliant opportunity for Stalin to rail against the "anti-humanists" and to speak on the system's own humanism.

10. In spite of his great deed of unmasking the martyrdom of *all* strata and nations in the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn the ideologist is perhaps the most frightening example of this spreading political and theoretical obscurantism.

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stages of the Soviet regime, when it had driven instrumental logic mercilessly to the limit, industrialization appeared as the irrefutable proof of the triumph of rationality (i.e., "planning"). The radical Western intelligentsia, bitterly disillusioned by World War I, accepted the victorious industrialization as a token of the rebirth of rationality in a proletarian uniform. They did not realize that the force behind the apparent triumph of emancipatory reason was their arch enemy, instrumental rationality, which could achieve whatever social goals the planning elite sought by using labor power as raw material, thus debasing all the democratic principles of rationalism. The planning elite gained respectability during the Great Depression, when the dictatorship over needs alone remained unaffected by the crisis. The causes of the crisis then were found in *overproduction*—a state of affairs foreign to the economic life of the dictatorship over needs and a relatively free articulation of needs, which resulted in purchaser and producer failing to meet on the market.

The history of the last 25 years reveals the secret of the smooth functioning of the system of dictatorship over needs: the regime simply channeled all economic problems directly into the political sphere, which exhibited the lowest degree of articulation of human needs. All attempts at such an articulation fomented the most cruel repression and major crises, such as outside threats, the approaching war, etc., provided legitimation for a permanent state of emergency. At that stage, economic problems as such did not even arise. However, when labor power simply could not tolerate this state of affairs any longer, when the legitimation of the state of emergency became dubious even for parts of the elite, the whole system exploded. Apart from the more complex cases of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the history of the dictatorship over needs displays an uninterrupted concatenation of armed revolts and mass strikes triggered by the most basic material needs (i.e., the need for bread), which demanded to be recognized. Berlin in 1953, Poznan in 1956, Novotsherkask in the early 1960s, Gdansk in 1970, Warsaw in 1975 and the Zil-valley, which was captured by striking Rumanian miners in 1977, together signify the greatest defeat of elitist hyper-rationalism. These were revolts that transformed the history of the dictatorships over needs into a powerful case study of rationality and resistance.

Although the perverted radicalism of the dictatorship over needs is the primary constitutive characteristic of the "designed" society, the most important points of resistance obtain around the problem of the market.[11] An examination of the central role of the market in the present turbulence provides a possible critical analysis of one of the most vulnerable features of the system. One need only point to the recurring uprisings provided by the regime's unsatisfactory economic rationality to realize why this is so. It has also become clear to the ruling elite that it is no longer possible to solve this problem by

11. The best analysis of this problem is to be found in a book by György Bence, Janos Kis and György Markus, *Is Critical Economy Possible?* This work contains the best available critique of Marx's economic model. Unfortunately, it was suppressed by the Hungarian regime. In a *samizdat* format, however, it was widely circulated among the young Hungarian intelligentsia.

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simply resorting to the wide-scale repression previously legitimated by the state of emergency. Only increased economic efficiency *combined with* more refined systems of intimidation can guarantee the regime's survival.

It is no secret to the ruling elite that all experiments in creating authentic market relations involve the following consequences: *the separation of the state from society as producer;* (2) the acknowledgement of the *raison d'être* of particular interest groups; (3) the inevitable acknowledgement of the free market of labor power and, in the wake of all this, (4) the relative tolerance of certain civil liberties, e.g., some pluralism and freedom of contract. It is precisely for these reasons that from the very beginning, the planning elite did not tolerate the existence of market relations, and that it reduced the market to a pseudo-market. Thus, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia, all efforts at economic reform have been rendered futile. In addition, the ruling elite could feel itself to be legitimately consistent with orthodox Marxism in this regard because, for Marx, the abolition of market relations and the concomitant withering away of the state, was the *conditio sine qua non* of authentic socialism.

What is a pseudo-market and why is it tolerated by the planning elite? In order to clarify this, it is necessary to enumerate briefly the well known social preconditions of an authentic market. First, it presupposes the separation of productive units from each other within the social division of labor and, also, within each separate branch of production. Second, it implies a concern of producers for the consumers, for, as Marx clearly pointed out, only those commodities whose value has been acknowledged by consumers have exchange value. Third, it presupposes the principle of mutual transactions that either implies the exchange of commodities of equal value or the subjection of commodity exchange to the oscillations of supply and demand. At any rate, however we formulate these preconditions, it has to be an immediately economic—not a political—dynamic that regulates such transactions. Fourth, and as a result of the above three, there is the relative independence of productive units, i.e., there should be legal restrictions to interference in transactions between the various units. Obviously, the final precondition amounts to the existence of the free circulation of financial means within society.

At first glance, it is obvious that it is only the last of these preconditions that is tolerated in the system of the dictatorship over needs. The process of production tends to be absolutely *monopolized* within the branches of production by the one productive agent of the state. Producers are not concerned with the consumers' demands (except in the army, which carries enough political clout in the system to force its demands on production). The productive units are only interested in the consent and approval of the planning center. Consequently, transactions are not determined by economic, but by political principles as the price system is politically determined and the real costs of production constitute one of the regime's greatest mysteries. Finally, the acknowledgement of the legally independent standing of producers entails

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constant state interference in transactions.

Yet, even a superficial glance at the regime's economic life reveals that it is characterized by *simulated* market transactions. Factories and enterprises are seemingly self-accounting units even if they depend both legally and practically on the system of direct interventions of the planning center. Moreover, although the separate productive branches are predominantly monopolized, they form lobbies to fight against other lobbies within the central political organs. While production costs are not calculable due to the constant political interference, they become fictitious and form a constant frame of reference in the negotiations with financial organs and political institutions. There are constant allusions to consumer's interests in the form of publicity and repeated checks on the quality of commodities, which, however, never lead to any lasting improvement. All these activities portray consumers as an independent factor influencing the market while in reality production is determined by political decisions. This confused system of relations and activities constitutes the pseudo-, or simulated, market.

Why is the pseudo-market tolerated by the regime? It has always been the dream of the planning elite to create a perfectly homogeneous society, the model for which can perhaps be found in war communism between 1918 and 1920. To abandon the clear-cut orthodoxy of war communism was a shock not only for honest doctrinaire communists (such as Bukharin and Lukács), but also for the whole elite. The planning elite readily understood that only a perfect homogenization of society—the abolition of all mediations between the state and wage laborers—would bring about the ultimate triumph of the policy of dictatorship over needs. For various technical and political reasons, they had to renounce abolishing money and the food rationing system. Yet, they never gave up the dream of a fully homogenized society and always sought to degrade all real market relations into simulated ones.[12]

But even the maintenance of the pseudo-market is in the interest of the people. Wage laborers within this system know instinctively that a complete system of rationing and the exclusion of all mediations between them and the state would mean the loss of their last free space. That is why they constantly fought, in a literal sense, for the pseudo-market.[13]

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12. Thus, as an example of this, after the Soviet currency reform in the early 1960s, when the new ruble was officially appreciated to ten times the worth of the old one, the relatively tolerated "household-market" of the kolkhoz system seized the opportunity to behave like a real market: it refused to acknowledge the currency reform by not changing its previous prices and demanding payment in new rubles (i.e., it greatly increased prices). The response was not economic, but political: instead of bargaining with the household-market, in order to acknowledge its market character and reduce the irrational price increase, peasants traveling to the cities to sell their commodities were treated as political criminals and the police broke the peasant initiative in a long-lasting guerrilla fight. The legitimate outburst of a market dynamic was consequently channelled back into the framework of a pseudo-market.

13. Thus, the New Economic Policy was precipitated by the Tambov peasant uprising against the direct provisioning system. It was a demand for the establishment of market relations by arms. The major political event in Russia in the 1920s after the fall of Trotsky and the expulsion of the "Leftist opposition" was the clash between Stalin and Bukharin. Stalin expropriated the program of the left opposition and sought the perfect homogenization of society under the guidance of the

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In addition to safeguarding a minimum of free activity and self-realization for the productive agents, the pseudo-market indicates the limits beyond which the distortions of redistribution become intolerable. As the total distributor and redistributor of all production and goods, the state does not want to have any signal system (other than hunger revolts) to monitor the real extent of social dissatisfaction.

Today, however, it is no longer the pseudo-market, but the market which is on the agenda in the revolt against inefficiency. Of course, here the leading role of goal-rationality and its bearer, the technocracy, is an obstacle for socialist strategies and it entails an element of resignation, since a consideration of value rationality would mean a direct debate concerning the legitimacy of the ruling elite. At any rate, the revolt of goal-rationality in seeking to create authentic market relations not only provides a springboard for a socialist strategy, but is necessarily part of it. In the first place, it entails a commitment to certain civil liberties—the most important being the freedom of productive agents to dispose of their own labor power as they see fit. In addition, attempts to introduce authentic market relations sharpen the contradictions between technocracy and workers (as in Hungary in 1969), and unmask the legend of a homogeneous society by exposing at least part of its actual structure and dynamic. Finally, in spite of its pragmatic nature, the option for an authentic market embodies the radical philosophical idea that a truly emancipatory movement towards socialism can only be based on the acknowledgement and free articulation and debate of the totality of existing needs. Thus, pragmatic goal-rationality is a corrective principle in the interest of rationalism after the debacle and excesses of "designing" hyper-rationality.

As for the third basic ideological principle of legitimation, the abolition of exploitation, the advocates of the dictatorship defend it neither in terms of high living standards or the system's political democracy. The former could not withstand comparison with the living standard in industrially advanced Western countries, even during a capitalist world crisis. As for the second, the defenders of the system choose to talk about its "historical necessity." What they actually emphasize is the system of social security—lack of unemployment, health services, completely free education, and, to a limited extent, organized holidays for employees, etc. This type of argument carries a double weight. On

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ruling elite. Of course, Bukharin wanted something more than the mere establishment of a pseudo-market. His program entailed the establishment of relatively free market-like exchanges bewteen city and countryside, and some tolerance toward agricultural producers. Yet, neither he nor Stalin ever dreamed of renouncing the *total* state control of both land and industry. The outcome of the clash is instructive. Politically, Bukharin was crushed and his program never reappeared *overtly*. On the other hand, Stalin had to give up the idea of establishing a network of kolkhozes of the "most advanced form," i.e., where not even pseudo-market relations existed and which were tied directly to the planning center. Sholokhov reports how the most fanatic sectors of the apparatus sought to set up precisely those cartel-types of collectives and were forced to retreat on Stalin's orders. Yet, a theoretically inconsistent and dishonest "Bukharinist" defense of the pseudo-market constantly reappears in the history of the dictatorship over needs, e.g., in the 1948 and 1953 Nagy reforms, in the Kadar regime after 1960, and in Yugoslavia where it had been extended even to the city, etc.

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the one hand, the social security in these countries is developed enough to be envied even by people in capitalist countries that are either too poor or too individualistic to introduce a satisfactory welfare system.[14] Yet, on the other hand, with respect to social security, even the slightest freedom is absent. Every service is an "amenity" or a "gift" of the state, which obviously becomes a serious problem whenever the question of necessary reforms arises in the social security system. Despite all this, the fact remains that social security is a great practical asset for the population in those countries where the dictatorship over needs presides. In fact, aside from wages, it was precisely in the field of social security that traditional working class demands were the most pronounced.

The function of this social security system, however, is hardly the result of the system's benevolence—a system that unhesitatingly used millions of slave workers to execute some "plan," squashing the most innocent workers' petition for higher wages at the cost of overwhelming bloodshed. Indeed, in order to understand the dictatorship over needs, only one simple question need be raised: why does the system function at all? Some answers are obvious: perfected technology of police repression, the suppression of smaller nations' attempts at emancipation (as in Czechoslovakia, for example), the cohesive impact of nationalist ideologies, the achievement of "super-power" status, etc. All of these answers, however, do not account satisfactorily for the system's success.

The positive cohesive element resides in the fact that while the state of the planning elite expropriates the whole system of human needs, in exchange, it guarantees the comfort of unfreedom by ensuring the satisfaction of the most basic needs through amenities for which the individual should not, and cannot, do anything. The prescribed quantity of goods and services "flows," as it were, into everyday life. Dostoevsky ingeniously remarked that one of the greatest forces of attraction of socialism is the fear of having an opinion of one's own. No doubt, one has to run risks to lead a democratic and individual life. The planning elite understood this very well: it was fully in harmony with its anthropological pessimism. Thus, it transformed this idea into a material principle of its social basis.

The individual is relieved from doing anything for the preservation of the rudimentary conditions of his social existence. He need not exert any special effort for them, since they are taken care of by the state as an "amenity." There is no unemployment, since it is compulsory to work. Even if illness entails difficulties in the family budget, the state takes care of the patient in a nearly automatic way, the more so since, as labor power, he is property of the state. The state grants its people free education, which in turn allows the state the chance to indoctrinate and control its children. Obviously, the social amenities granted by the dictatorship over needs are worthless during the cruelest periods of mass terror, when the fear of death is all pervasive, or when even the most elementary goods are in short supply. In times of crisis or peace, these

14. Of course, critics have pointed out in the last decade the blatant inequalities behind the alleged egalitarianism of the social security system.

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mechanisms guarantee the smooth functioning of the degraded existence of the subjects of unfreedom, emancipated from the risks of a truly individual life.

The other side of the coin is not only the obvious manipulability of human beings, but also an after-effect that is devastating for the functioning of the regime itself—the utter demoralization of labor power. Bereft of all possibilities of decision and spoiled by the social "amenities" that guarantee one's life without any special effort, people lose interest in the process of production. Thus, one of man's greatest capacities, that of doing meaningful work, is squandered. The result is decreasing—or stagnating—productivity, an effect disastrous both for the ruling elite and for the whole population, and a decreasing rate of moral adulthood.

Thus, the vicious circle of the irrationality of hyper-rationalism, boasting of having created a society free of exploitation while actually having created a self-reproducing system of unfree paternalism, is closed.

The last vestige of hope rests in rationality in revolt. In the present state of affairs, it does not matter whether the revolt assumes an exclusively goal-rational form or a value rationality form, as can be seen both in various instances of workers' resistance in the interest of traditional collectivist values and in movements by various social strata seeking a meaningful way of life. Even from a socialist viewpoint, the differentiation is only of secondary importance. Having inextricably bound its fate (with Marx) to rationalism, socialism must seek to transcend the phase of a totalizing hyper-rationalism that has turned into irrationality.

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THE CRISIS OF ONE-DIMENSIONALITY

by Paul Piccone

From One-Dimensionality to Artificial Negativity

When the one-dimensionality thesis was fully enunciated in the early 1960s, it was already historically obsolete, not because of the student activism and anti-war militancy that exploded in the following years, but because it described a phase of capitalist development already in the process of being superseded. Furthermore, the critical theory that had formulated such a thesis from 1940 on, turned out to be structurally unable to anticipate and explain the new social process. This failure was the result of key theoretical commitments made in the 1930s to explain those social developments which orthodox Marxism seemed unable to grasp, while retaining unchanged most fundamental Marxist assumptions. Rather than critically dissecting Marxism itself, critical theorists initially chose to merely modify it by taking out a mortgage that finally came due in the mid-1960s.

Contrary to Left conventional wisdom, according to which the quandaries of critical theory are the result of its having jettisoned too much Marxist theory, the problem is the exact opposite: the unwarranted retention of too much traditional Marxist baggage. By the late 1930s, the Stalinist outcome of the Bolshevik revolution should have led to drawing the logical implications of a *premature* totalization in a situation where the theory itself had ruled out such a totalization as impossible.[1] Thus, far from resulting in socialism, this totalizing outlook became the ideology of a party bureaucracy. Such a critique goes to the very core of Marxist theory and demands a radical restructuring of the whole conceptual edifice.

Although fully aware of the Stalinist travesty before most of their contemporaries, critical theorists failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of Stalinism and, consequently, they also failed to account for fascism and the New Deal. Their initially cautious attitude toward Stalinism and their inability to come up with a *socio-political* theory of fascism was due to their reluctance to give up the traditional Marxist model. Rather, they chose to keep the model by adding to it a psychoanalytic epicycle which sought to explain the failure of revolution and the rise of fascism in terms of *individual* dynamics, leaving the traditional Marxist socio-economic framework largely unaffected. Instead of curing the objectivistic cancer of Marxist theory, this psychoanalytic turn intensified it, thus forcing the theory into a pessimism and political impotence from which it would never recover—even after the transitory phase of capitalist development that they sought to explain gave way to a new state of affairs offering new possibilities.[2]

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1. For a fuller discussion of this problem, see my "Labriola and the Roots of Eurocommunism," in *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, XXII (1977-78), pp. 3-44.

2. A full discussion of this problem is in my "The Changing Function of Critical Theory" in *New German Critique*, 12 (Fall 1977), pp. 29-38.

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The first victim of the psychoanalytic turn was the dialectic itself, which, in order to survive, had to be ontologized as the trajectory of all of Western civilization or forced into a biological straitjacket. While in Hegel it had been possible only as the self-unfolding of the Absolute *after* its full realization, in Marx it conflicted with the rest of the theory—as becomes embarrassingly clear in the *Grundrisse*, with the presupposed linear theory of history shipwrecks on the Asiatic mode of production. Only with *History and Class Consciousness* is the dialectic successfully integrated into Marxism, to be blown ski-high by its own internal assumptions. In fact, if the whole "*objective theory of class consciousness*" was "*the theory of its objective possibility*," its validity was conditional on its actual bringing about of that classless society and collective subjectivity needed to retroactively guarantee its scientificity. The failure of that epistemological wager necessitated nothing less than the junking of the entire framework—something that Lukács himself was soon to realize. But in Adorno and Horkheimer the dialectic becomes de-historicized over the whole of Western civilization as the genesis of the domination of the concept. It ultimately retreats to defend particularity, autonomy and non-identity in the totally administered society where even internal opposition is successfully instrumentalized toward further strengthening that very society. Yet, the dialectic remains throughout anchored in an objectivistic theory of being—precisely what had to be discarded in order to salvage it.

This unwillingness to break with traditional thought is reflected in the retention of the primacy of unequal exchange, a lingering faith in the unavoidability of the economic collapse, and an overestimation of the pervasiveness and effectiveness of the bureaucratized institutions of the administered society. Psychoanalysis relates this traditional and previously explosive social account to the psychological dimension, which explains why the explosion no longer occurs. The subject tends to disappear, society becomes all-powerful, and the intellectual can only escape into abstruseness to avoid homogenization, instrumentalization and, in extreme cases, annihilation. What this approach loses is precisely that non-identical which it sought to preserve. Instead, it embalms it and reifies it in an increasingly rigid and objectivistic conceptual reproduction of a reality that has already been frozen by the all-pervasiveness of the concept.

Psychoanalytic theory comes in to vindicate a biological dimension which resists all efforts to blend human nature to a fundamentally irrational social system and thus becomes the repository of emancipatory hopes. Recent developments, however, have shown this to be wishful thinking. When the system itself exhausted the one-dimensional model of the transition phase (fascism, Stalinism and the New Deal) and attempted to reconstitute the previously destroyed individuality, the resulting desublimation ended up reproducing exactly the predominant social relations which it was meant to qualitatively alter—not in the interest of emancipation, but in order to provide the over-administered society new and badly needed internal control

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mechanisms. What Habermas describes as a rationality crisis is *the* fundamental crisis of the over-administered society and it can be successfully managed only by reversing the logic of one-dimensionality. The process of homogenization and fragmentation has been too successful, with the result that it has destroyed that otherness which made homogenization work. When, in order to guarantee the smooth functioning of monopoly capital, it became necessary to reconstitute artificially that negativity without which the system cannot operate, the instinctual fortress to which critical theory had retreated became a conceptual prison preventing an understanding of those qualitative changes apprehensible only through that very same dialectic which had earlier become ontologized and, therefore, deactivated. In the same way that the counter-culture of the late 1960s succeeded only in reproducing existing social relations under different labels, critical theory could see nothing but a mere extension of the same homogenizing processes, thus missing the most fundamental new developments in advanced capitalism during the last forty years.

From the present post-one-dimensional vantage point, the full logic of the transition period becomes much clearer than in the critical theorists' aphoristic presentation, resulting in a more accurate periodization of capitalist development and, consequently, a fuller understanding of the nature of many otherwise puzzling recent events. The age of one-dimensionality was only a transition period between entrepreneurial capitalism and the full domination of capital.

Already prefigured at the turn of the century, when entrepreneurial capitalism seemed to have entered into its final crisis, but fully institutionalized only after the 1929 crash, the age of one-dimensionality meant the domination of collective capital over every facet of everyday life—to the point of even reconstituting character structure and personality in accordance with the new requirements of capitalist rationalization. The rapid expansion of entrepreneurial capitalism within a pre-capitalist context met its historical limit with the disappearance of the obsolescent pre-capitalist framework whose systematic erosion had fueled an unprecedented restructuring of political and socio-economic relations. The crisis of entrepreneurial capitalism was successfully resolved by massive government intervention to turn extensive into intensive development, colonialism into imperialism, and internal conflicts into regulatory social mechanisms. Unlike in Europe where similar measures could be implemented only by authoritarian means—given the existence of strong internal political opposition—in the U.S., where almost every internal opposition had been destroyed during the 1920s, a much more peaceful transition was possible. Although a variety of both peaceful and violent projects of social reconstruction had been devised and tested during the Progressive era—when it was still assumed that entrepreneurial capitalism could be kept alive by piecemeal social reforms—when it became obvious that only a major reconstitution would do, the socio-political means were already available.

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Furthermore, given the lack of internal opposition, the transition in the U.S. could come with a "human face." Thus, whereas most pre-World War I preogressive legislation, scientific management, and the integration of the earlier forms of opposition were finally institutionalized as the New Deal, prohibition and other overtly repressive projects could safely be dropped in a situation where they were utterly unnecessary.

One-dimensionality came about as a result of a massive drive to annihilate all specificity and otherness typical of the entrepreneurial phase, in order to create the conditions necessary for this further rationalization of capital. Both work and leisure had to be homogenized by turning people into the abstract labor-power needed in the new Taylorized productive process, and into the alienated consumers needed to buy the well-packaged and carefully marketed junk that such a system could profitably produce.

Taylorization, capital-intensive technology, the culture industry and consumerism combined within a productive system based on the automobile and military expenditures to facilitate the penetration of capital relations into every domain of life. The homogenization and depersonalization associated with this period—i.e., the domination of the concept and of the abstract instrumental reason of capital—constitute the historical limit of this transitory rationalizing phase. The full triumph of one-dimensionality corresponded to the exhaustion of the model that had generated it.

Contrary to the Weberian vision of a constantly rationalizing and bureaucratizing process of capitalist development, bureaucratization becomes counter-productive precisely when it successfully penetrates what it seeks to rationalize. What makes its fragmenting formal mechanisms successful is the lingering resistance of that yet-unrationalized specificity which it constantly destroys. The bureaucrat's linear logic remains effective only as long as it confronts a recalcitrant non-linear reality. As Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse vividly showed, Auschwitz, Hiroshima and the Gulag are the logical outcomes of this process. Yet, they are not its fulfillment. Long before the attainment of total annihilation, this process threatens the very capitalist growth which it was meant to facilitate, thus necessitating radical reconsiderations. Marcuse himself already discussed how the system ends up creating and supporting its own opposition. But, at the beginning of the 1960s, the crisis of one-dimensionality was yet to explode fully and, at any rate, Marcuse had already reduced his own theory to unidimensionality by fully accepting a psychoanalytic foundation, thus ruling out any possible qualitative reconstitution. In order to indicate how artificial negativity increasingly displaces one-dimensionality, one need only examine the changing structure of several social spheres. In the same way that the shift from entrepreneurial capitalism to the New Deal meant that in order to guarantee existing relations of domination almost everything had to be changed, the shift from the New Deal and its aftermath to the new state of affairs also necessitated a major institutional overhaul—and a parallel conceptual retooling to fully understand it.

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Consider the Vietnam war. The U.S. "defeat" is still celebrated in conventional New Left nostalgia as the greatest achievement of the student movement and of the successful mass mobilization that it provoked. But what was the Vietnam war other than the extension of the logic of the transition *after* that logic had become historically obsolete? It resulted from the uncritical continuation of the Dulles imperialist policy at a time when that policy was patently obsolete, against the best interests of a large segment of capitalist interests, and in the process of being replaced by a new one. Whereas during the phase of entrepreneurial capitalism the appropriate form of foreign expansion is colonialism, and during the transition phase it is aggressive imperialism based on indirect political domination and economic control, in the new phase all former overt coercive features are no longer necessary. Based on the culture industry, the Marines give way to Coca-cola and Xerox machines: cultural hegemony displaces political domination in a cybernated imperialism where the victims yearn for their own forms of oppression. Within such a context, all that is necessary to guarantee imperialist relations of unequal exchange is merely commerce between advanced and backward societies. As Emmanuel has shown, the very existence of different organic compositions of capital in the two worlds guarantees the institutionalization of the imperialist rip-off. All that is necessary today to safeguard international domination is trade and cultural imperialism. The struggle is no longer fought in the battlefields, but in the disproportionate confrontation between the "American way of life" and traditional cultures.

Thus, Vietnam is the watershed between the old and the new imperialism, belonging respectively in the transitory and full monopoly phase. In many respects, the liberal argument that it was all a mistake and the conservative rebuttal that the war was lost at home, are both true. From the viewpoint of the new imperialism based on multinational corporations and cultural hegemony, it was a mistake to try to prevent the communist reunification, since relations of domination would not have changed anyway; only their management would have been different. Instead of the U.S. directly dominating Vietnamese society, this domination would have been indirectly managed by the USSR, itself indirectly tied to the U.S. in a relation of sub-imperialism. From the viewpoint of an *unopposed* one-dimensional imperialism, however, old traditional relations could have been retained by using a few atomic bombs and by seriously confronting the North. In terms of the most lasting consequences, the Vietnam war was a confrontation between a progressive and a backward sector of capitalism. As it turned out, the progressive sector won.

The Nixon removal could also be seen as part of the same scenario, where traditional corruption was opportunistically used to dispose of one major remnant of the old bankrupt policy. The authoritarian Greek or Chilean solutions—all extensions of 1950 *Realpolitik*—give way to the "human rights" offensive which is not only much more effective, but in a context of restored

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U.S. world hegemony it is also the most appropriate one. Having already won the confrontation with traditional culture, it becomes viable to indict the repression necessary to fill the gap in most of the Second, Third and Fourth Worlds between rising expectations and increasing underdevelopment as a result of what Carlo calls "the iron law of underdevelopment."

Given a situation where either the opposition successfully overthrows the system or ends up strengthening and rationalizing it, in retrospect the New Left performed precisely such a rationalizing function. Unable to translate its moralism into a qualitatively different form of social organization, it merely accelerated the shift to the new rationalized phase where the U.S. can present itself as the champion of freedom, the bureaucratic collectivist regimes of the Second World can only solve their internal contradictions through increased dependence on the U.S., and the Third World ends up with the unpleasant predicament of having to choose between two equally disastrous modes of domination, ultimately under the same capitalist management.

A roughly similar state of affairs exists with respect to the repressive apparatus which is becoming increasingly more unnecessary and therefore in need of dismantling or otherwise rationalizing—which explains the recent scaling-down and close scrutiny of previously untouchable police agencies such as the FBI and CIA. While during the transition phase any type of opposition—real or imagined—had to be eliminated in the process of homogenization, overbureaucratization requires the opposite. In order for the system to function, it needs control mechanisms such as the Naders and Commoners, to guarantee its viability. Far from being persecuted, the lingering opposition now needs to be supported to keep functional a bureaucracy in a state of fatal involution. Counter-bureaucratic bureaucracies become one of the paradoxical expressions of artificially generated negativity. The problem with this system-generated negativity is that, to the extent that it is itself bureaucratically sanctioned, it tends to become an extension of the very bureaucracy in need of control. Consequently, caught in the paperwork of funding, reporting, justifying, etc., it simply extends the bureaucratic logic it was meant to challenge and becomes counter-productive. The organic negativity necessary to successfully sustain this challenge must develop *outside* the bureaucratic administrative framework. Yet, since both the organic community as well as the individual have largely been destroyed during the transition period in the rush to homogenization, the conditions no longer exist which, in a context of de-centralization and de-bureaucratization, would readily lead to the resurgence of a manageable internal opposition and, therefore, the much needed control mechanisms. One need only examine what has recently happened to the black movement, women's organizations and criminality in general to realize the pervasiveness of this change from the transition stage to that of the full domination of monopoly capital.

While in Europe homogenization meant, among other things, a brutal policy of anti-Semitism, in the U.S. its counterpart was the civil rights

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movement. Both aimed at eliminating specificity and otherness—one through extermination camps and the other through social integration. The logic of the transition does not accept racial or ethnic differences: blacks had to become abstract and manipulable labor-power as the whites within the predominant administered rationality. But with the shift to the stage of the full domination of capital, the opposite is the case. It is no accident that black nationalism explodes on the American scene in the late 1960s and in spite of the simultaneous implementation by the agencies of the old transitional logic of a policy of extermination *vis-à-vis* the Black Panthers, the winds rapidly change direction: the search for black identity (also adopted by all other ethnic groups) sought to artificially reconstitute an otherness which had long since been effectively destroyed. Thus, the pathetic efforts of American blacks to become re-Africanized was matched only by the increasing disintegration of the traditional black community centered around the church, now seen as an agency of white domination. Again, contrary to Left conventional wisdom, the Civil Rights movement was not the result of a sudden rise in militancy on the part of Blacks—racist oppression and rebellion against it had been a constant feature of American life throughout this century. Rather, it was triggered by the Warren decision of 1954 and sustained subsequently by federal legislation. Attempts to reconstitute a non-existent Black community are similarly orchestrated from above, this time in accordance with new requirements.

Although somewhat different because of its longer history of struggle, the women's movement meets substantially the same fate. While its rise does not take place until the middle 1960s, it immediately fell into the logic of the transitional phase: homogenization, formal equality, legal recognition. Only with the development of a feminist movement was the thrust updated. Thus, while attempts to obtain even symbolic formal recognition such as the ERA steamrolled through one state legislature after another at the beginning, it is now stalled, with its chances of ever making it into the Constitution growing slimmer by the day. Identified with the forced bureaucratization of the last vestiges of individuality and specificity, the ERA is progressive neither from the viewpoint of the new requirements of the system nor from the depersonalized perspective of the private woman who sees in her femininity the last protection against total anonymity and vulnerability.

Similar patterns appear in other domains as well. Thus, the explosion of criminality since the middle 1960s is also connected with the process of re-externalization of repressive mechanisms whose earlier internalization—during the transition phase—destroyed spontaneity and creativity to the point of becoming counter-productive within the over-homogenized and over-pacified system of social relations. But the loosening up of repressive mechanisms could not restore the long-since destroyed personality molded by organic community life. Consequently, in the age of artificial negativity, anomie and criminality become the rule rather than the exception—which also explains the need to reintroduce external control mechanisms which had

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been rendered obsolete during the phase of transition when internalization has successfully taken its toll. The reintroduction of the death penalty, the growing drives against pornography, and the increase in prostitution are all signs of this phenomenon. The brutalized and depersonalized individual that breaks free of the shackles of internalized control mechanism has to be externally kept in check with objective threats and prohibitions.

The New International Context

Internationally, the situation takes on a bizarre configuration with the reversal of the U.S. international role. First Budapest in 1956 and then Prague in 1968 brutally ruled out the possibility of reforming the "socialist" system either from below or from above, with the result that the bureaucratic statist model could only intensify its internal contradictions without ever hoping to resolve them or to integrate them creatively in a dynamic framework. Consequently, the repressive apparatus can neither be dismantled nor significantly reduced, since it is an important social glue holding the system together. Thus, the conflicts generated by this state of affairs increasingly pushes the intelligentsia toward mysticism and an uncritical pro-Western stance, the working class to drink more and produce less in an increasingly depoliticized existence whose long-range result can only be the resurgence of traditional religion, the peasants toward an intensification of a cynical individualism resulting in a chronic agricultural crisis, and the bureaucracy toward an unprincipled opportunism whose main goal is merely the retention of existing privileges. Confronted with an internal crisis manageable only by remedying the floundering consumer goods sector and agriculture, and unable to implement the reforms necessary to bring about improvements in these two areas since they entail unacceptable political costs (the dismantling of both the bureaucratic as well as the repressive apparatus), the only viable alternative is to seek external solutions entailing *acceptable* political costs: the increasing dependence on the U.S. To the extent that the retention and growth of U.S. hegemony requires primarily a continuous international trade, Russian needs feed directly into the logic of the new American imperialism with the result that the Russian model becomes totally discredited and the main foreign policy question is not the acceptance or rejection of détente, but *how* to manage it and under what terms. No matter what solution is provided to this problem, the result is the gradual deterioration of Russia to the level of a sub-imperialist power—notwithstanding its military might and occasional scientific breakthroughs.

The Chinese model does not fare much better. Even ignoring the fact that it is intended for and applicable only to a backward and pre-capitalist society, Chinese communism is also beset by hard-to-manage internal contradictions which not only make it totally irrelevant in the West, but which also raise serious doubts about its future development. At any rate, China will eventually have to come to terms with its Stalinist mortgage which

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will increasingly pose the party, the bureaucracy and the army as the crucial social agencies running the system. Even at the peak of the cultural revolution, the army defined the socio-political space within which challenges could be made and, throughout, "the primacy of politics" had an economistic justification: ultimately it provided a more efficient and legitimate path to economic development. A genuine process of politicization aiming at the creation of social individuality not only cannot be instrumentalized to immediate productivist requirements, but cannot exhaust the private and the public or dissolve the particular into the universal. Without an irreducible particularity to express and articulate it, the universal loses its concreteness and rapidly deteriorates to the level of a false totality enforceable only by a bureaucracy and a repressive apparatus. Thus, the inherent tendency of the Chinese model is not only increasingly toward bureaucratic collectivism, but also toward Stalinism and its irresolvable internal conflicts.

Both Russia's growing dependence on the U.S. for agricultural goods and sophisticated technologies to manage crisis in two vital areas, as well as China's internal struggle with Stalinism play into the logic of American imperialism which, along with Western Europe and Japan, far from being in a weak position after the Vietnam disaster, emerges as the unchallenged world power. This overwhelming hegemony, however, is not based on sheer military superiority—in fact, if this were the criterion to measure hegemony, it would have to be admitted that there has been a *relative* decrease as a result of the growth of other military powers—but on its overwhelming productive superiority, the instrumentalization of internal contradictions as control mechanisms and propellants to growth, and the lack of a significant alternative to the predominant consumer ideology which automatically legitimates the system by retaining a framework of perpetual scarcity and glorifying the efficiency of the capitalist economy able to feed this consumerism. Given the tendency of the system to overproduce and underconsume, the thrust toward economic crisis can be averted only by successfully disposing of the surplus and exporting the ecological problems generated by intensified production. What is crucial at this point for the U.S. is the guarantee that international trade will continue and grow. The logic of "unequal exchange" whereby any trade between a more advanced country and a less developed one will result in the former having the upper hand not only places the U.S. in a favorable economic situation, but also allows for the exportation of the ecological problems resulting from the continued effort to maintain economic growth. Increasingly, less developed countries will be able to offer in trade to the U.S. precisely those items (usually natural resources) whose continued flow raises ecological questions. Thus, the system's Achilles heel is no longer economic nor social, nor political, but *cultural*—and at this level there are no challenges anywhere—except perhaps in Southern Europe.

As long as consumerism is not seriously challenged by simultaneously demystifying technocratic management, scientistic ideologies, hierarchical

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relations in everyday life, and generally raising questions of quality of life and of *meaning*, capitalism will be able to thrive—short of a global ecological catastrophe (but the latter remains so remote at present, and greatly postponeable by technological means, that it is not yet a realistic prospect). Communism, as the last step in the secularization of the Judaeo-Christian tradition and understood as the maturation of humankind through the elimination of exploitation and domination, has historically challenged capitalism on *economic* grounds while relegating questions of *meaning* and *value* to a cultural dimension degraded to epiphenomenal status. Yet, unless these questions are brought to the political forefront, capitalism will remain practically invincible—at least until further growth runs into its ultimate physical limits. In the present socio-historical context, however, the cultural challenge has practical meaning only in Southern Europe—and even there it is still greatly underdeveloped.

This state of affairs is not determined by the policies of the Italian, French and Spanish Communist Parties but rather by the contradictions generated by their strategies to participate in the administration of state power. It is quite clear that these parties' policies amount to little more than recycled traditional social-democracy, yet their frontist strategies lead to the internalization of political contradictions which may eventually explode these parties from below. In the quest for power, the Italian Communist Party has gradually developed into a mass organization almost resembling the American Democratic or Republican Parties, encompassing an astonishing spectrum of views. Its journals have carried out as open a theoretical debate as has ever been possible on the left and, for all practical purposes, the Italian extra-parliamentary opposition has been completely reintegrated within the party. Although this openness at the base corresponds to an intensified bureaucratization above, eventually the leadership will have to come to terms with its base, not only because it lacks any kind of secret police to bring the base back into line, but also because it is aware that the social-democratic perspective it advocates is an historical dead end, and that the Russian model is even worse.

Thus, the communists' rise to power in Southern Europe (and even their staunchest adversaries see this as only a matter of time) will initially mean nothing more than a variation of the social democracy presently operating in Scandinavia and West Germany but, given the qualitative differences of the respective political bases, one is aimed toward stagnation and the gradual elimination of its politically emancipatory elements, while the other will provide the most significant socio-political battleground during the next decade. Notwithstanding the overwhelming economic superiority of Northern social democracy, in the long run it will be no match for its Southern counterpart. For example, the repression of internal opposition in West Germany will take its toll, as it does in every repressive society, in terms of stifling creativity and enforcing a conformity which discourages much-needed

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criticism and reduces that society's potential for self-adjustment. In the long run, the "Northern" and the "Southern" models express qualitatively different alternative forms of social democracy which, given the collapse of the Bolshevik model, will determine the future of socialism.

It is impossible to understand the authoritarian German model of social democracy and the contradictions it expresses independently of the peculiar German context within which it exists. The constant presence of the DDR, the lack of a strong liberal tradition and similar national characteristics go a long way in explaining Germany's propensity for authoritarian solutions to social and political problems. But to the extent that capitalism, social democracy and socialism do not exist independently of particular national contexts, the "German character" must be part of any analysis of the prospects for European social democracy. Thus, the regressive features of German social democracy, such as its support for repressive legislation (*Berufsverbot*), a political opportunism shunning any theoretical articulation, and a phasing out of earlier progressive achievements (*Mitbestimmung*), far from being accidental aberrations inconsistent with the long-range vision, are logical expressions of an increasingly authoritarian model of social democracy.

The basis for German European hegemony, however, is not overwhelming economic superiority, but the precondition for it: the best disciplined working class in Europe and the successful management of social conflict. As long as these two elements remain, the German model will go unchallenged and unassailable. But it is precisely at this cultural level that the PCI's "Compromesso Storico" raises crucial challenges rather than at the purely economic level where the German model is strongest. The Italian communist policy of an umbrella party able to eventually accomodate the full leftist spectrum (a policy followed also by Mitterand in France) will have to accomodate the far-left at least by recognizing it in its internal debate and, somewhat less, in policy determinations. While these seemingly inconsequential concessions will have no immediate impact, they tend in the long run to undermine precisely that cultural hegemony characterized by consumerism, technocracy, acceptance of existing relations of domination as natural, etc., which is the social glue holding together working class discipline and legitimating one-dimensional management of social crises. Although unavoidable socio-economic constraints will prevent the Italian Communist Party from implementing any significant reforms in the short run, they will open debates whose outcome will prevent the smooth management of alienated consciousness. This frontal cultural challenge has not only existed for a long time in the press, but it now being extended also in state-run radio and television, whose programs and social impact is increasingly open to political debate. Challenged on its cultural weak side, German social democracy cannot maintain the economic thrust necessary for the retention of European hegemony. Having greatly underestimated the need for internal

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ideological defense by ruthlessly repressing left opposition and phasing out any theoretical articulation, the German social democratic model will find itself vulnerable to the new challenges of the southern version of social democracy.

If the PCI and the French socialists can successfully attack the consumerist model, one of the immediate repercussions will be in Eastern Europe and, *ipso facto*, in undermining Russia's sub-imperialist role—which may explain the U.S. reluctance to allow the Italian Communists to share state power. The establishment of close economic and cultural ties between Eastern Europe and Italian and French Communist controlled governments will confront Russia with a challenge even more formidable than Prague in 1968 and Budapest in 1956. This, in turn, will upset the new *Pax Americana* and reopen the debate on the meaning of socialism, no longer confined to its economic component, but expanded to cover consumerism, technocracy, scientism, relations of domination in everyday life, and personal freedom and fulfillment—precisely all those elements which had been relegated to epiphenomenal status and wholly subverted by the socialism resulting from Bolshevik-type revolutions.

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CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL NEGATIVITY

by Tim Luke

The thesis of "artificial negativity," as it has been tenatively outlined so far, asserts that the transition to full monopoly capitalism—that began seriously in the United States during the Great Depression—is now complete.[1] After being briefly tested by the Progressives as they coped with the final crises of entrepreneurial capitalism after the 1890s, the one-dimensional logic of the transition emerged full-blown only with the advent of the New Deal.[2] At this historical juncture, monopoly capital sought "to organize the *entire* society in its interest and image,"[3] through new business marketing strategies and governmental regulations. Thus, the forms of labor, education, entertainment, health care, housing, leisure, transportation, and social welfare were increasingly "rationalized." Through the culture industry, the interventionist welfare state, and consumerism, collective capital homogenized traditional American society[4] to conform to the post-WWII administrative regime of New Deal liberalism and Cold War internationalism.

In fact, late capitalism so successfully re-organized American society during the 1940s and 1950s that, by the 1960s, the further extension of corporate capital's instrumental rationality proved politically counterproductive and organizationally destructive.[5] Because its own instrumental reason totally reconciled the remaining structural contradictions and countervailing forces that initially regulated the system from within, in the mid-1960s this destruction of internal control mechanisms[6] necessitated the "artificial"

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1. See Paul Piccone, "The Changing Function of Critical Theory," *New German Critique*, 12 (Fall 1977), pp. 29-38.

2. For a historical and organizational discussion of this general cultural transformation, see James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (Bloomington, Ind., 1960); Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes* (Chicago, 1976); Peter Drucker, *The New Society: The Anatomy of Industrial Order* (New York, 1962); John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston, 1971); Gunnar Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State* (New Haven, 1960); and Robert Presthus, *The Organizational Society* (New York, 1962).

3. Herbert Marcuse, *Counter-Revolution and Revolt* (Boston, 1972), p. 11.

4. See Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Americans: The Democratic Experience* (New York, 1973); Lawrence Goodwyn, *Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America* (New York, 1976); Herbert G. Gutman, *Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America* (New York, 1966); and Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* (New York, 1971).

5. See Paul Piccone, "Beyond Critical Theory," mimeo, pp. 6-7.

6. Or, more concretely, the New Deal coalition and its interventionist state successfully integrated the working class vote as well as working class wage and labor demands into the Democratic Party and the national collective bargaining structures. Yet, it was this same bloc of urban, blue-collar, often ethnic voters whose potential unrest and political militancy in the 1920s and 1930s elicited the formation of the New Deal state and the organized labor bureaucracies in order to deliver increased social services and jobs in exchange for docile loyalty. But, once the state satisfied these publics with economic growth, jobs, and services, the coalition lost its platform while

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nurturing of its own "negativity."[7] In other words, the attempt to generate "artificial negativity" is the administrative regime's own response to its continuing but changing crises.

In encouraging the regeneration of contradictions, the revitalization of diversity, and the renewal of antagonism, monopoly capital—whose transnational knowledge-intensive base enables it to manage contrary forces for its own continued growth[8]—has partially displaced the transitional state-corporate bloc which suppressed these creative tensions. Still, the battle is far from over as the emergent regime of full monopoly capital, so powerfully implied by the world economy of the transnational corporation, remains hobbled by the political and structural left-overs of the increasingly obsolete state-corporate system. In the final analysis, then, "artificial negativity" emerges with the cultural alternatives and the political movements *arising from within* state-corporate capitalism, but *directed* against it. These internal challenges to the administrative domination of the transitional system uncover its unreconciled contradictions and recreate the internal political checks and cultural balances which could limit purposive-rational social domination and allow for the reopening of the public spheres.

The Transition to One-Dimensionality

The massive expansion of entrepreneurial capitalism into the pre-capitalist world, which began during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,[9] met its inevitable historical limits in the late 1880s and early 1890s. Until that time, entrepreneurial capital effected its unprecedented transformation of global economic relations by *extending* its rationalizing influences into the pre-capitalist societies of the Western and Southern hemispheres. Yet, as the ink dried on the Treaty of Berlin in 1885, ratifying the European powers' marketsharing in the last unclaimed regions of pre-capitalist Africa, and as Frederick Jackson Turner closed the history books on further economic expansion on the great North American frontiers after 1890, the world economy was seized by a massive depression that finally toppled entrepreneurial capitalism. Consequently, the progressive business, industrial, and intellectual elites of entrepreneurial capital slowly recognized the necessity of transforming capital from its historical mode of *extensive* expansion via entrepreneurial commerce into a more organized mode of interaction, namely, corporate capital based upon *intensive* productive transformations by means of technical rationalization guided by scientific

failing to adjust to the new challenges and needs of the 1960s.

7. In other words, the diverse counterculture movements of the 1960s such as the black power movement, the anti-war movement, the new feminist groups, the student movement, gay activists, and religious revivalism all directly contradicted the standardized cultural homogeneity of the transition period.

8. See Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations* (New York, 1974); John M. Blair, *The Control of Oil* (New York, 1976); and Richard Eells, *Global Corporations* (New York, 1972).

9. See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York, 1974).

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research.[10] Hence, these allied elites worked toward intensifying capitalist rationalization by means of increased state regulation, the technical re-organization of labor, and the scientific management of all spheres of social interaction.

In the United States, these needs were recognized during the Progressive Era by such figures as Herbert Croly in *the Promise of American Life* and Woodrow Wilson in *The New Freedom* who both maintained that Yankee science and governmental authority could be used to place "our businessmen and producers under the stimulation of a constant necessity to be efficient, economic, and enterprising."[11] Thus, in 1900, General Electric opened the first corporate industrial laboratory in the United States where, in the words of a latter-day imitator, "science gets down to business." In 1913-1914, Henry Ford perfected the continously moving assembly line in Highland Park which had been made possible, in part, by Taylor's, Fayol's, Gantt's, and Gilbreth's contributions to "scientific management."[12] By separating "planning" from "doing," or theory from practice, skill from activity, and thought from action, Taylorization and assembly line production slowly stripped American workers of their skills. The administrative regime of state bureaucrats and corporate managers, in turn, legitimized their managerial rule through their new-found grasp on "the art of bringing ends and means together—the art of purposeful action."[13] And, finally, in pre-figuring the administrative welfare state of the New Deal, President Wilson's administrations turned the federal government down the road toward becoming a regulatory, interventionist state with the passage of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act (1914), the Federal Reserve Act (1913), the Underwood Tarrif Act (1913), the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914), the Federal Farm Loans Act (1916), and the Eighteenth Amendment (1920).[14]

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10. Of course, less progressive elites, especially in latecomer imperialist states such as Germany, Japan and the United States pressed for continued colonial and imperial expansion, and when matched against semi-capitalist states on the capitalist periphery, such as Spain, China, Ethiopia or the Boer Republics, the United States, Japan and the European powers continued their expansion after 1885. In fact, World War I resulted, in large part, from Germany's expansionistic designs on Eastern Europe, the Ukraine, and the Near East. However, the other European powers, who had already embarked upon the *intensive* logic of capitalist expansion, necessarily resisted this out-moded *extensive* model of capitalistic development.

11. Woodrow Wilson, *The New Freedom* (New York, 19193), p. 22. Cf. also Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (New York, 1909).

12. For a well argued historical treatment of the scientific management of labor and production, see Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1974); Siegfried Giedion, *Mechanization Takes Command* (Fairlawn, N.J., 1948); and David Noble, *America By Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism* (New York, 1977).

13. American Institute of Management, "What is Management," *Dimensions in Modern Management*, ed. Patrick E. Connor (Boston, 1974), p. 23.

14. Each of these pieces of legislation vastly expanded the interventionist mechanisms of the federal government. The Federal Reserve Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act gave the federal executive the tools to effectively manipulate economic activity through the money supply and commercial rulings, while the tariff and farm loans legislation enabled the central government to open the hitherto restricted American market to crucial world production centers and to finance farm activity—all new functions for the proto-administrative Progressive state. Moreover, Wilson's

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All of these conscious intensifications of capitalist production evolved under the pressures of World War I and the business boom of the 1920s into the New Deal as their collective effect—despite the Progressives' vigorous radicalism—failed to forestall the Great Depression. Of course, like the European nations, the United States initially embarked upon these changes by enacting socially repressive legislation to discipline its working class. Yet, unlike Europe, the United States soon dropped such strategies as the Eighteenth Amendment and the Palmer Raids proved too overtly repressive for the rationalization of corporate capital. Instead, with the development of advertising and mass marketing strategies, corporate capital fostered "consumption communities"[15] in which workers as consumers disciplined and repressed themselves to gain access to Woolworth's, Model T's, the movies, and suburban living. Yet in doing so, much of the ethnic specificity, cultural otherness and political negativity tolerated under entrepreneurial capitalism disappeared. Mass consumption and government regulation further advanced and finally fixed the social conditions for the complete rationalization of capital.[16]

The rapid expansion of state control over social relations during the transition to full monopoly capitalism, also was embodied in the revolutionary labor and social welfare legislation of the New Deal. During the 1930s all of the political caution that characterized the Progressives' limited rearrangement of the entrepreneurial capitalist market disappeared in an aggressive assault upon traditional entrepreneurial society by the federal government intent upon integrating America's economic diversity into its bureaucratic plans for national industrial recovery. Before 1933, the American working classes remained basically craft-oriented in terms of the individual worker's skills, shopfloor society, and labor organization. Although partly broken by the scientific management movement and the assembly line system after 1910, these workers were still politically restive, administratively unorganized, and craft-centered in their individual skills and values up to the 1930s. Only one in ten American workers belonged to a union—mainly craft unions—and individual workers were subject to the repressive measures of prohibition, political harassment, and a cultural assimilation policy based upon WASP conformity.[17]

Beginning in 1933, however, these unintegrated spheres of social specificity

"New Freedom" legislation, in testing the totalizing logic of one-dimensionality, instituted strong means for controlling individuals—the direct national income tax and the 18th Amendment—by empowering large new federal bureaucracies with the task of policing the general population's private finances and lives.

15. Boorstin, *The Americans: The Democratic Experience*, pp. 89-166.

16. See Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston, 1964), pp. 1-55.

17. Jules Blackman, "Emerging Trends," *Labor, Technology and Productivity in the Seventies*, ed. Jules Blackman (New York, 1974), pp. 19-25. For further discussion of this problem on a broader international context, see Mario Tronti, "Workers and Capital," *Telos*, 14 (Winter 1972), pp. 25-62; and Sergio Bologna, "Class Composition and Theory of the Party," *Telos*, 13 (Fall 1972), pp. 3-27.

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and political negativity were obliterated in the totalizing logic of national industrial mobilization as federally mandated collective bargaining legislation and federal emergency employment programs inducted the American working classes into the administrative regime of the interventionist state. Passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), the Public Contracts Act (Walsh-Healy Act), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (Wage and Hour Act) made possible the rational administration of labor's hours, wages, hiring, firing, compensation, unionization and contract bargaining as set by the bureaucratic rules of the federal bureaucracy, the large corporations, and the national labor unions. Similarly, bureaucratic solutions for the abstract administrative problems of national unemployment, such as the Civil Works Administration, the Public Works Administration, the National Recovery Administration, the Works Progress Administration, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, provided millions of jobs regimenting the labors of hitherto unorganized and non-uniform American workers. After effacing the social otherness of American workers, the administrative regime reconstituted the individual and communal fragments in national unions, standardized collective bargaining, public works employment, and the federally managed national economy. As the working classes were made more dependent upon the state-corporate regime, corporate capital repealed the Eighteenth Amendment in 1933 and adopted the Social Security Act in 1935 halting the repressive controls of prohibition and economic insecurity.

These early measures were further rationalized and continued to unfold in mass manpower mobilizations of the Selective Service Administration, the War Manpower Commission, and the National War Labor Board during World War II. Later, with the Employment Act of 1946 and the Labor Management Relations, or Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the administrative regime extended this intricate command aparatus over the national economy and society to maintain standard levels of guaranteed employment and rational control of labor conflict. By 1948, one in three workers in the United States were affiliated with the corporate-modelled, administratively-rational unions.[18] Corporate capital, then, efficiently reorganized organic communities such as those of black sharecroppers, Polish ironworkers, female textile workers, and Montana copper miners in a vast administrative apparatus based on national labor laws, federal labor boards, and collective bargaining mechanisms that merged the inherent contradictions between employees and management, workers and owners, labor and capital into the one-dimensional programming of the administrative state.

Yet, in faithfully creating the administrative conditions for the advanced rationalization of corporate capital, the transitional logic of the New Deal—and its latter-day continuations in the Fair Deal, the New Frontier,

18. Blackman, "Emerging Trends," *op.cit.*, p. 20.

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and the Great Society—systematically stifled the social logic inherent in full monopoly capital. Bureaucratic decisionism and instrumental organization lost its purposive rationality when it fully penetrated pre-rational social interaction. Once the rational has permeated and transformed the pre-rational, any further "re-rationalization" self-destructs the original rationalized constructions. It is the lingering opposition, the unabsorbed specificity, the negativity of the Outsider that keeps the purposive-rational on its historical tracks and within its political limits. Thus, the total domination of the concept in the hegemony of instrumental organization over social specificity constitutes the deepest subversion of that same abstract instrumental reason.

Consequently, during the transition, the state-corporate health delivery systems trained more doctors and built more hospitals to significantly improve national health care and individual life expectancy. Yet, these organizations—once in place and on line—continue to expand to the point that highly capital-intensive hospitals and expensively trained doctors mainly are dealing with ingrown toenails, common colds, and routine pelvic examinations, while life expectancy and other health indicators decline or hold steady in spite of massive new health expenditures, federal health care, and redesigned delivery organizations.[19] Likewise, during the transitional phase, federally encouraged electrification programs doubled energy consumption in the United States from 1940 to 1960 to improve measurably the basic standard of living. But, in turn, these programs further stimulated another doubling in national energy consumption from 1960 to 1978 with no new immediately evident "improvement" in the "standard of living."[20] Similarly, by the logic of the transition, federally subsidized mass education made possible a tremendous expansion of the schooling system. Youths stayed in school longer to learn increasingly more sophisticated skills that better integrated their labor power in the technological production of corporate capital. However, forced mass enrollments of entire generations in these educational instruments, at the same time, has led to rampant indiscipline and a loss of skills among elementary schools students, has fostered functional

19. See Odin W. Anderson, *Health Care: Can There Be Equity? The United States, Sweden, and England* (New York, 1972); and Ivan Illich, *Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health* (New York, 1976). The impact of artificial negativity on health care systems seems quite radical inasmuch as many health professionals are beginning to favor reversing a century-old practice, namely, of taking the individual's health care skills and responsibilities away and giving them to a scientifically trained doctor. Thus, in order to make the system more effective, individual subjects are to be given back their personal skills, individual decision, and family medical knowledge which never should have been taken away to begin with. Instead of furthering integrating individuals into a standardized system, which has overloaded the once efficient system to its cost-effectiveness breaking point, health professionals are giving individuals back their autonomy and judgment in self-help health maintenance and sick-care training.

20. Similarly, United States energy consumption per capita in 1972 was over twice that of West Germany and the Netherlands, but it is doubtful that this greater technical potential means a superior standard of living in the United States despite its greater instrumental rationalization of energy consumption. See Amory B. Lovins, *Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).

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illiteracy among secondary school graduates, and has allowed for the systematic overtraining and underemployment of thousands of university graduates.[21]

Thus, the total administration of the state-corporate regime endangered the rational development it originally sought to advance necessitating, in turn, the reversal of this totalizing instrumental logic. So, as large sections of the Washington bureaucracy tried to rationalize the caloric intake of peasants in Bolivia, Zaire, and Thailand to combat the spread of Soviet communism, and as the Pentagon sought to win the hearts and minds of the Indochinese peoples by mounting airborne search and destroy sweeps, and as several other bureaucratic instruments attempted to regulate the width, thickness, and composition of federally-funded cement sidewalks in Oakland, East St. Louis, and Newark in the name of urban renewal and the war on poverty, the transitional logic of New Deal liberalism and Cold War internationalism exploded *from within.*

The Age of Artificial Negativity

To fully comprehend how and why artificial negativity is coming to displace one-dimensionality, one must reconsider the meaning of recent events taking place in several crucial social spheres. These changes, as profound and far-reaching as the reforms of the New Deal period, currently are obscured by out-moded interpretations and well-worn conceptualizations on both the left and the right. A correct understanding of artificial negativity, moreover, provides an effective interpretation of these events as a tentative reopening of the public sphere. While in the short run this may result merely in a reconsolidation of instrumental domination, in the long run it may make possible new forms of human emancipation.

In the last analysis, one-dimensionality boils down to corporate capital's efforts to impose instrumental rationalization of each moment in the everyday life of advanced industrial society. Its successes were dizzying as long as the totalizing designs of formal rationality confronted and consumed the pre-rational traditions of entrepreneurial society. But, as the diverse dimensions of regional culture, craft labor, ethnic community, popular politics, and the traditional family were administratively processed to suit a uniform conformity, state-corporate capitalism overshot its practical boundaries. Any sort of social specificity, personal autonomy, or political opposition were leached away in the homogenizing wash of mass marketed commodities, mass public education, and collective benefits of state social welfare programs. Tradition succumbed to technique. Yet, technique could evince this sort of superiority only over and against tradition. Once the purposive-rational mode of action turned back on itself, as in the

21. See Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reforms and the Contradictions of Economic Life* (New York, 1976); Ivan Illich, *De-Schooling Society* (New York, 1971); and Leo J. Ryan, "Our Public Schools Need to be Reordered," *Los Angeles Times,* March 16, 1978.

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mid-1960s, it proved neither purposive nor rational either within its own formal operations or in terms of its efficient delivery of services.

To recognize this dual loss of purpose and rationality, one can reevaluate the meaning of the American policy of containment from the Truman to the Nixon Administrations. Here, the logic of the transition prompted American decision-makers to instrumentally reorganize the political alignments of the nation-state system following WW II to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union.[22] By skillfully exploiting its military and economic superiority, the United States instrumentally forced "the American way of life"—formal democracy, two-party parliamentary regimes, mixed capitalist economies, and a lifestyle rooted in material consumption—upon many unwilling and unworkable societies in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia.[23] In Western Europe, Greece and Korea, the totalizing domination of American world power barely won its border wars against the Soviet Union, successfully containing Soviet expansion while making Europe, the Near East, and South Korea "safe" for the more advanced rationalization of American, European, and Japanese monopoly capital. Yet, in Vietnam, this logic went awry. In foolishly underwriting the out-moded leftovers of French colonialism, the United States bungled its opportunity to nurture a friendly, independent strain of national communism—an Indochinese Yugoslavia—and sank deeper into the bankrupt strategies of military assistance, political manipulation, and economic subsidy for the obviously unpopular "democratic" South Vietnamese governments.

Under entrepreneurial capitalism, gunboat diplomacy and the landing of the Marines constituted the most effective mode of foreign domination. Yet, with the consummation of the transition the cumbersome techniques of naval blockades and troop movements were replaced with more covert tools of political and economic domination, such as CIA operations officers and AID program directors bearing Food for Peace bundles. These changes, moreover, accurately reflect the course of American involvement in Vietnam after the defeat of the French in 1954. However, these state-corporate instruments for foreign control were proven obsolete even as they were deployed inasmuch as transnational corporate enterprise devised more effective modes of domination—the material goods and cultural services of the transnational corporation.

The administrative state's covert means of political control—undercover intelligence operations, international development agencies and cultural shock troops such as the Peace Corps and the USIA—necessarily assumed the existence of the Cold War superpower struggle. When they failed, as in Vietnam, the administrative state could only resort to open military invasion,

22. See Raymond Aron, *The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1973* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974); Ronald Steel, *Pax Americana* (New York, 1967); and Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, 1977).

23. See Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, N.J., 1973).

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which had already been proven by the French experience to be a policy of failure. Even more ironically, this massive expansion in American military involvement comes at exactly that moment in which the Soviet Union ceased to be a qualitatively different alternative to the American way of life for the Indochinese peoples. In fact, as Kennedy and Johnson committed more and more American troops to Vietnam, Khrushchev and the Soviet Politburo redefined socialism as providing more TVs, more washing machines, and more private autos to the new Soviet man.

Under the transnational mode of control, however, the notion of Cold War and zero-sum superpower struggle becomes anachronistic as the transnational corporation willingly serves *any* potential customer seeking its goods and services. Thus, recalcitrant peoples and maverick nation-states no longer are forced into submission at the end of a Marine's bayonet nor do they need to be covertly controlled under an agricultural scheme set up by AID planners. Instead, they submit willingly to their own self-control with each new commodity purchase to satisfy each new corporate-defined need as transnational corporations deliver the material goods and cultural services of the "modern," or American way of life. And, by the same token, political and economic control unfolds in the unequal exchange of transnational commerce between the goods and services exporting and importing regions.

Hence, the Indochinese wars as they were waged by the United States mark the turning point between the old and the new imperialisms. From the vantage of the new corporate imperialism, Vietnam was a fiasco from start to finish inasmuch as the old state-based colonialism of France, and later of American Cold War imperialism, could only wage a bloody war that was doomed to failure. By the rules of the old imperialism, before they produced counterproductive side effects such as the anti-war and student movements, control over Vietnam might have been attained with a few more hundred thousand troops, a full-scale invasion of the North, or, perhaps, a few strategically-placed nuclear strikes to "nuke the gooks." Instead, the new imperialism won out in Vietnam by assisting the phased withdrawal of American troops, the institution of "Vietnamization," and, then, the inevitable collapse of the southern regime.[24] And, now the united communist Vietnam is coming to the United States and Japan for oil technology, industrial capital, and renewed foreign trade in an effort to modernize her war torn economy, which perfectly conforms to the inner logic of the transnational corporate enterprise and its new imperialism.[25]

24. This reversal of the old imperialist domination, however, did not come soon enough to save Cambodia from near total destruction of its relatively peaceful and stable traditional political order. Indeed, the Cambodian incursion, perhaps better than any other recent imperial adventure, illustrates the bankruptcy of the old imperialism as the coercive logic of instrumental domination toppled the established government, smashed the rich particularity of Cambodian culture, and in the space of five years, reduced its peoples to the dark barbarities of the Khmer Rouge—all in the name of "pacification."

25. And, as the United States and Japan contend for the control of Indochina via the logic of monopoly capital's new imperialism, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are embroiled in a proxy war in the tradition of the East-West Cold War as Communist Vietnam and

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By the same token, Angola, and to a lesser extent, Mozambique and the Horn of Africa, represent a triumph in the new imperialism in spite of the militaristic fulminations of the old imperialist interests. Here, the transnational corporate community and its cultural domination have taken advantage of the radical Marxist-Leninist regimes to enforce social peace, to suppress tribal differences, and to mobilize the populace for modernization as they continue to operate and expand their corporate holdings. Mozambique, despite its militant Marxist ruling party, is tightly integrated into the corporate co-prosperity sphere of the Republic of South Africa, and the People's Republic of Angola as it stumbles along under the vanguard guidance of the Popular Movement's Workers Party remains "almost totally dependent for hard currency revenue on the operations of the Gulf Oil Company of Cabinda."[26]

In the Horn of Africa, a massive contingent of Cuban, Soviet, and East German troops and technical experts are assisting the Marxist People's Republic of Ethiopia[27] rationalize the economy and effect political order in a traditional pre-capitalist empire. Ethiopia's further development, however, given Cuba's and Eastern Europe's own technological dependence on Western transnational enterprise, can only proceed rationally under the new imperialism of transnational corporate capital. Yet, all of these advances in political control and economic integration were achieved *without* any significant American military intervention. Instead of allowing the President to massively intervene in Angola, the Congress energetically counterattacked his moves checkmating the tendencies for using direct military controls. And rather than responding to Cold War horror stories about the "threat" of Marxism-Leninism in Africa with military invasion or economic manipulation, the transnational system of corporate capital has instrumentalized the African Marxist regimes, deputizing them to enforce social peace, economic stability, and social mobilization within the operational sphere of transnational capital.

Likewise, corporate capital is trying to insure the successful American divestiture of the Panama Canal, realizing that Panama can be more closely controlled if it owns and operates the Canal than if the United States clings to this colonial anachronism by military occupation. But, in playing the the old scripts of open imperial control, the United States looks like a colonizing empire demanding an unjust say in the affairs of a tiny impotent nation. Yet,

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Communist Cambodia act out the old imperialist designs of the transition for the Soviets and the Chinese.

26. *New York Times,* Dec. 5, 1977.

27. The presence of the Soviet and East European advisers as well as the Cuban military elements are desperately needed in Ethiopia to rationalize the Marxist rule of the Dergue, whose current leader came to power, it is rumored, because he emerged victorious from a pistol fight in the Dergue's council rooms one afternoon when the central committee meeting became particularly heated. Having evinced the correctness of *his* party line with his marksmanship, the remaining members of the central committee renewed their proletarian solidarity with Colonel Mengistu as the smoke cleared over the bodies of the revisionist deviationists.

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in giving back the Canal over a period of two decades, the United States could appear as a mature, honorable power with a respect for national freedoms and human rights even though it has so technologically and economically penetrated the Panamanian society that it can not keep its economic and political ducks in a row without the aid of American transnational capital. In fact, while right-wingers decry the threat of a Communist takeover in Panama, transnational capital has turned Panama into a major off-shore banking and shipping center for the major transnational corporations. In giving the Canal back to the Panamanians, both Panama and Latin America in general, would more easily accept their continued domination by corporate capital in exchange for the less important ownership and control of the Canal. Corporate capital, then, has a large stake in returning the Canal Zone to Panama because if a national liberation struggle should begin, no one will be buying or using its many goods and services. However, if the United States lowers its flag and removes its troops from the Canal Zone to avoid such a war, corporate capital can continue to sell Fords, Coca-Cola, Exxon Hi-Test, and the Brady Bunch to Latin American consumers who might even have more income to spend on this "modern" way of life.

The utter collapse of the New Left in the 1970s follows, in part, from its failure to understand these transformations in the international and national arenas. Still, in the 1960s, the New Left along with the various counterculture movements of feminism, black consciousness, and student activism were part of the constitution process of artificial negativity. Here, then, the New Left served a function comparable to that of the Old Left prior to the New Deal. At that time, the various radical populist, socialist, and progressive movements in the cities and countryside provided a telling critique that challenged the social structures to provide more political freedoms and economic benefits for the population at large. Indeed, populism inspired many of the first principles of Progressivism, and prairie socialism originally proposed many of the New Deal's welfare and labor programs.

Yet, once into the transition, these popular movements became highly suspect in the totalizing logic of one-dimensionality and vigilantly were repressed. Hence, a series of government sponsored red scares, witch hunts, counter-intelligence activities, and McCarthyism developing during the New Deal and Fair Deal years. The administrative regime, instead of recycling the opposition's political programs as sound political horse sense, diligently proscribed membership in such groups and forbade the propagation of their ideas to effect total control of the popular political process. But, inasmuch as it succeeded during "the end of ideology" in the 1950s, the system seriously threatened its own continued development as it effaced the otherness which had hitherto kept it on its developmental tracks.

Consequently, the stimulation of the New Left—the Free Speech movement, the black power groups, militant feminism, the drug culture, the anti-war organization, and the peace movement—prevented the complete derailment of advanced capitalist growth. These internally-generated sources

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of negativity once again challenged the state-corporate social formation to reopen the public spheres and to reconsider the basic logic of many social and political policies. Unlike the Old Left during the transition, the New Left did not fall victim to the repressive counter-measures of the administrative regime. At many turns in its history, the movement was spied upon, infiltrated, and subverted by the FBI and CIA, as these bureaus stubbornly followed the repressive rules of the transition. But, its members were not completely proscribed nor vigorously repressed in a general anti-leftist hysteria. After all, in the 1950s, the Rosenburgs went to the chair blackmarked as foreign agents; in the 1970s Jane Fonda and company went to Hanoi as cultural heroes.

Thus, in a political situation in which it either had to overthrow entirely the administrative regime or strengthen it with its innovative notions, the New Left succumbed to the latter as the instrumental purposes of progressive corporate capital worked through the anti-war movement. This unlikely alliance ended the unpopular Vietnamese War and weakened the popular commitment to fight any enemy at any time in any place to protect "the cause of freedom." But, unlike the old populist and socialist movements which constituted organic negativity, the New Left came from within the system's universities, bureaucracies, and corporations[28]—the growing elite of middle class university students and the professional intelligentsia who have a large stake in the existing reward structure of the system—to check the excesses and failures of the administrative regime. Still, after having made these important breakthroughs the New Left failed to consolidate its gains and lapsed back into the divisive contradictions of the Old Left as its splinter groups marched in orthodox lockstep into ecological protest, violent terrorism, electoral politics, or public interest lobbying.

The initial advances made during the 1960s by the New Left and other countercultural forces, however, gained greater force and full institutionalization in a second wave of counter-bureaucratic movements. The administrative regime has tolerated, if not stimulated, these antagonistic forces to more closely regulate the old bureaucratic apparatus of the transitional period.[29] Clearly, the most important of these counter-bureaucratic movements has been the transnationalization of corporate capital during the late 1960s, which reopened the contradictions between state and

28. The basis for these movements, perhaps, is best captured by the example of Daniel Ellsberg. A Harvard graduate, ex-Marine infantry officer, one-time RAND corporation strategic analyst, Ellsberg turned from within the system against the system using the Pentagon's own strategic studies—and its own Xerox machines—against the bureaucratic administration of an impossible war made possible by the transitional organization of the state-corporate regime.

29. Although he did not say it in this context, President Nixon anticipated the intent and form of these counter-bureaucratic movements throughout his first administration with his Federal Executive Service and the New Federalism doctrines, which were meant to reconstruct the New Deal state in its entirety. Indeed, he proclaimed, "this will be known as an Administration which advocated... more significant reforms than any Administration since Franklin Roosevelt in 1932." Cf. *New York Times*, Nov. 10, 1972.

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corporation within advanced capitalist society. This "globalization process" has made the American economy and state "dependent upon economic activity outside the United States to an unprecedented degree."[30]

Between 1960 and 1970, fixed overseas investment of American transnationals rose from 21 percent to 41 percent of their fixed domestic investment. In 1966, foreign corporate income was only 24 percent of domestic income, but by 1970 it was 44 percent of domestic income; in 1966, foreign sales of American transnationals were 30 percent of domestic sales, but in 1970, these overseas sales were nearly 40 percent of domestic transactions. In fact, by 1970, over 20 percent of all American transnational corporate profits came from overseas, while over 25 percent of their corporate workforces were employed in foreign countries.[31] Until 1966, American exports had a higher labor component than American imports, but by 1970, American exports had lost their labor intensiveness as the United States became "a service economy and a producer of plans, programs, and ideas for others to execute."[32] For the most part, this managerial transformation occurred during the mid-1960s as the transnational corporate managers reacted to the abject failure of the New Deal state in dealing with its domestic challenges and international obligations. Recognizing the inability of their traditional home countries—given the massive decolonization and ill-fated colonial wars of the 1950s and 1960s—to protect their world markets, to insure their international security or to expand their economic operations, transnational corporations began to disguise their national origins. By adopting anational names such as Asarco, Amax, Exxon, Arco, Textron, Uniroyal, or United Technologies, transnational capital recruited management and labor worldwide, and sketched out their own *corporate* foreign, economic, employment, and investment policies. In the age of full monopoly capital, then, transnational corporate interests increasingly are *not* those of their former home or their present host countries.

To fully appreciate these shifts the major oil corporations, the large nuclear technology firms, the computer technology combines, the arms builders with the Arab states, the aggressive regional powers like Iran, Brazil, Pakistan, and India, the Eastern European states, and conflict zones in the Mideast, the Indian subcontinent, and Southern Africa. American interests usually *are not served* by corporate deals in these areas. National foreign policy, then, no longer instrumentalizes corporate interests to advance its national objectives. Rather, corporate policy needs, such as selling warplanes to agressive regional powers or nuclear reactors to hitherto non-nuclear nations, become the substance of national foreign policy as the state advances the interests of corporate capital. Still, these contradictions reintroduce an element of organizational otherness, political negativity, and unrationalized specificity into the conduct of political bargaining and social policy which

30. Barnet and Muller, *The Global Reach*, p. 258.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

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have been lacking for nearly four decades.[33] At the same time, the knowledge-intensive, technology-exporting industries that form the commanding heights of full monopoly capital exploit these contradictions in their efforts to instrumentally organize the entire world—including the former great powers and the super-powers of the nation-state era—in accord with their corporate managerial designs.[34]

These developments also are witnessed in the attempts of corporate capital to reverse the limited social advances of the welfare state. Private corporate and foundation studies in favor of dismantling the Social Security system and having its welfare functions "better served" by private pension schemes or corporate offensives to forestall comprehensive national health care in favor of private health delivery systems indicate the corporate leadership's disenchantment with the inefficient state bureaucracies. Similarly, the mounting militancy of corporate management in demanding "giveback" provisos in labor contracts—corporations are taking back many of the state and corporate welfare benefits that they had conceded to organized labor during the transition—also illustrates the opening of a counter-offensive against the state-supported labor unions.

In addition to this counter-bureaucratic movement by corporate capital against the advanced industrial nation-state, the administrative regime of the increasingly out-moded transitional state purposely has opened a limited free space. Within its own structures, weak, negative forces are nurtured as an adaptive control mechanism for the larger bureaucratized social formation. The emergence and survival of professional public interest lobbyists, such as Ralph Nader's task forces, Barry Commoner's environmental studies, John Gardner's Common Cause organization, or Howard J. Phillips' Conservative Caucus,[35] continue the critique of state-corporate capitalism by bureaucratically mobilizing interests against the bureaucratic decision-making of large corporations and the federal bureaucracy. Instead of being systematically repressed, these weak oppositional forces are systematically encouraged to prod the bureaucratic apparatus to perform more efficiently or more humanely.[36] Such counter-bureaucratic influences, however, are not

33. Obviously, this current division holds the possibility of transnational corporations, at some point in the future, totally obliterating the social and political otherness of the nation-state system itself. And, although that point in the development of monopoly capital is some time off, it has nevertheless begun. See Barnet and Muller, pp. 213-362, on the "Latin Americanization" of the advanced capitalist *nation-states* by transnational corporate capital.

34. Barnet and Muller, pp. 363-388.

35. See John Guinther, *Moralists and Managers: Public Interest Movements in America* (New York, 1976) and William J. Lanouette, "New Right Seeks Conservative Consensus," *National Journal: The Weekly on Politics and Government*, 10:3 (Jan. 21, 1978), pp. 88-92.

36. Indeed, these oppositional forces have even begun to form entire alternative policy practices in addition to providing systematic policy critiques as such institutions as the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, the Institute for Policy Studies or World Watch rationalize the interests and values of artificial negativity in their research and publications. See William J. Lanouette, "The 'Shadow Cabinets'—Changing Themselves as They Try to Change Policy," *National Journal: The Weekly on Politics and Government*, 10:8 (Feb. 25, 1978), pp. 296-303.

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allowed to become powerful enough to completely disrupt or dismantle the apparatus as it currently functions. Nader's failure to found a meaningful consumer protection agency, Commoner's inability to effect passage of a real energy conservation bill, or Gardner's frustrations in constructing a systematic electoral reform program all suggest how weak these negative thrusts really are. Undoubtedly, these reforms will be achieved but only once they have been watered down to an appropriately symbolic level.

Along with these professional counter-bureaucratic lobbyists, similar agencies also have been institutionalized within the government itself. Beginning with Nixon's slow sabotage of the various Great Society programs, a new form of federalism has been developing which seeks to halt the continued rationalization of state and local government by central decision-makers. Instead of a single welfare state system operating from Washington, the instruments of revenue sharing, block grants, and community action programs are giving state and local decision-makers back some of the discretionary authority expropriated by the federal bureaucracy. Therefore, the welfare state notion is injected into city, county and state government as they too set up social welfare divisions, community development agencies, and economic intervention bureaus that take the administrative load off the federal government's shoulders, while extending its organizational clout. But, in doing so, these multiple centers of power and decision-making, at the same time check and counter the organizational dictates of the administrative regime.

Similarly, Congress, the Justice Department and the national media recently have counterattacked against the Presidency to contain its imperial authority. Most importantly, the Senate Watergate investigations and the House impeachment committees finally resisted the overwhelming power of the President ending an executive regime that sought to undermine the very democratic structures which made its rule possible. The War Powers Act of 1973, the Budget Act of 1974, and the extensive expansion of the Congressional staff after 1974 all are significant new constraints on the President's ability to make war, to arbitrarily dispose of legally appropriated funds, and to arbitrarily manipulate information by virtue of its data gathering and analysis monopoly. These important legal developments, in turn, are not simply fortuitous reactions to the Watergate affair. Rather, they amount to a systematic attempt to revitalize the constitutional contradictions and political conflicts between the executive and legislative branches to keep the federal government manageable, responsive, and under control. As a result, these artificially engendered negative forces have kept two Presidents —Ford and Carter—well within the weakened scope of the post-imperial Presidency.[37]

37. Carter's recent plan to reorganize the federal bureaucracy with his Federal Personnel Management Project is a continuation of this same decentralizing tendency. By using a personal incentive system to increase the efficiency of the administrative apparatus and to improve the delivery of state services, Carter is seeking to abolish the hierarchical, command relations of the

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Of course, it is no accident that the CIA, as well as the other federal intelligence services, underwent the most thorough-going transformation of its thirty-year history during the 1970s. Beginning with Ford's Executive Order 11905 of February 19, 1976, which hobbled the operations directorate by outlawing political assassinations and domestic spying, and continuing up to Carter's recent executive orders on the CIA, which serve as the agency's new charter, the agency has been subjected to a number of important counter-bureaucratic reforms. Armed with a new charter that limits covert action in favor of greater technologically-based analytical sophistication, the CIA also is saddled with new Congressional oversight committees and very tight budget restrictions. Although the basic capabilities of the CIA remain essentially the same, the federal executive has accepted a series of real checks on its once untrammeled freedom of action. Indeed, this redirection was reconfirmed by Admiral Turner's abrupt dismissal of 820 agents from the 4,500-man operations division, mainly veteran clandestine operatives from OSS and CIA Cold War intrigues.

In addition to these more formal expressions of artificial negativity, the administrative regime has fostered a variety of other internal reforms to correct the totalizing excesses of the transition. Bureaucratic insurgency tactics, ranging from whistle-blowing to public employee unionization to information leaks as well as new anti-bureaucratic legislation, such as sunshine laws, sunset provisions, and zero-based budgeting policies, are making bureaucratic decision-making more accountable as the aura of total power and absolute knowledge are stripped away from bureaucratic practices. Similarly, the system accomodates artificial negativity by organizing increased citizen participation as part of its standard operating procedures.

The administrative state now favors local action over federal action, neighborhood action over state action, and individual decisions over government decisions as President Carter's new urban policy, "The New Partnership," partly indicates. Thus, the revitalization of personal decision-making, as a powerful source of negativity in the organizational society, becomes an integral component of the post-transitional bureaucracy in the form of citizen committees, community liason offices, and public hearings to improve the bureaucratic delivery system.

By the same token, mass culture has witnessed the partial reversal of mass media, which assume the passivity of the subject, in favor of media which entail the subject's active participation. Consequently, instead of a culture industry rooted in the totalizing logic of central broadcasting, reified aesthetic experiences, and the passive acceptance of media-borne values and needs, during the age of artificial negativity there is a revival of individualized craft production, de-centralized media broadcasting, a competetive proliferation

New Deal bureaucracy. Carter seems more intent upon reconstituting the apparatus than any of his recent precursors—Johnson, Nixon, Ford—who also had many of the same ideas, but, it will be difficult to de-program the administrative programmers.

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of software and hardware producers, and interactive electronic media whose software—video cartridges and audio tapes—allow for personal creativity and participation. With the re-opening of a relatively free space, the culture industry's mass production and consumption of cultural experiences is questioned by interactive electronic technologies—CB radio, videotape systems, small film and recording companies—and alternative media systems—personal presses, chapbook production, small circulation journals, and multiple media publics. Such advances could explode the totalizing culture industry from within.

What is more, the alternative cultural movements of the late 1960s and 1970s, running from the black consciousness movement, feminism, student activism, the new ethnicity, and the new regionalism subverted the homogenizing demands of the transition. In constituting abstract, reified, fungible labor units, the instruments of the transition did not allow for unique personal or social specificity. Hence, blacks, Hispanos, women, Poles, and southerners all were reduced to their abstract labor power in labor law, union rollbooks, and federal job campaigns much like the already absorbed WASP male. But, whereas this homogenization process took the destructive guise of anti-semitism in Europe, the standardizing logic of America's transition assumed the form of the civil rights movement, beginning with the women's suffrage movement in the 1920s and extending up through the black civil rights movement of the 1960s. The sudden burst in black, Hispano, youth, and feminist consciousness defied the totalizing logic of domination as they all sought to revive artificially the personal specificity and group-based otherness that the standardizing dictates of civil rights and labor legislation had suppressed for four decades. In fact, the search for unintegrated otherness became so desparate that even the highly integrated white ethnic communities dug up their cultural roots. In ethnic festivals, traditional religions, and genealogy crazes, white ethnics celebrated an identity and community that died with their grandparents or great-grandparents as the totalizing demands of WASP conformity smashed apart the working class, Eastern and Southern European ghetto in the large American industrial cities.[38]

And, at the same time, regional cultural identities from the mainstream of American society and politics—which had been effectively contained during the populist revolts of the 1890s—underwent a considerable resurgence as the artificial specificity of the Sunbelt, or the New South and the New West, wrestled with the Frostbelt of the Old North and the Old East for cultural and political preeminence.[39] Yet, the common thread uniting all of these cultural crusades remains their *artificial negativity* that denies the purposive-rational

38. See Mark R. Levy and Michael S. Kramer, *The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections* (New York, 1973).

39. See Kirkpatrick Sale, *Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and Its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment* (New York, 1975), and Carl Oglesby, *The Yankee and Cowboy Wars; Conspiracies from Dallas to Watergate* (Mission, Kansas, 1976).

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uniformity of the transition in favor of their self-defined specificity and collective otherness, which emanates from within monopoly capital but which is directed against the state-corporate regime.

Beyond Artificial Negativity

Once the *pre-rational* aspects of American society submitted to the *rational* imperatives of purposive-rational management, the instruments of social administration lost their original purpose. The technical organization of the pre-rational as instrumentally-rational activity, then, succumbed to its own mode of destructive totalizing "rationalization." Here, the state-corporate administration necessarily began to lose instrumental control over the economic and social processes of its continued expansion as it "re-rationalized" aspects of its interventionist apparatus. Yet, only the continued maintenance of this technical control over economic production, social consumption, and political administration guarantees the "rationality" of full monopoly capital in efficient ends-means terms. Once this technical control loosens, a crisis in the state-corporate system's "rationality" necessarily ensues. [40]

Furthermore, this slippage in the instrumental command over capital expansion and utilization further aggravated the on-going economic crisis. As the state-corporate social formation emerged from the economic disorders and social conflicts of liberal-entrepreneurial capitalism, the essential mechanism of legitimation turned on its administrative effectiveness in providing the general social "goods" of political stability, economic growth, expanded mass consumption as well as social welfare services. But, as the regime's over-rationalization disrupts the management of the economy, polity, and society, the administrative ability to efficiently deliver the system's own self-defined social "goods" is weakened substantially. [41]

The rationality and legitimacy crises of the administrative state provide an unprecedented opportunity to combat the continuation of political domination by technocratic administration. The most distinctive characteristic of artificial negativity is that it is counter productive and it can never become a substitute for the organic negativity that is no longer spontaneously generated. This organic negativity, however, either develops freely, or not at all. As it becomes increasingly clear that only organic negativity will successfully regulate the system, at least in the short run, the system begins to develop emancipatory possibilities, in spite of itself. In order to reconstitute organic negativity, however, American politics must project new political needs for a *social individuality*—and this will open new possibilities for emancipation.

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40. See Jüergen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston, 1975), pp. 50-68, 75-92.

41. See Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology* (New York, 1976), pp. 195-273; James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York, 1973); and Claus Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structure—An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies," *International Journal of Sociology* (Spring 1972).

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UNDERSTANDING BUREAUCRATIC CENTRALISM

by Andrew Arato

The failure of classical Marxist social theory is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in the face of the bureaucratic centralist societies that use Marxism as their "science" of legitimation. The project of a critical social theory demands the immanent critique of all Marxist and neo-Marxist attempts to theorize this *new* social formation, but this is as yet an unfulfilled task. For now, only some hypotheses are possible regarding the failure of the whole set of approaches, and these are best organized around five fundamental components of the classical theory.

1. *The concept of critique.* A genuine immanent critique of Soviet Marxism, attempted most notably by Marcuse[1] had to fail according to the basic premises of critical theory itself. This occurred by the 1930s, as soon as the ruling ideology degenerated to a one-dimensional, eclectic mixture of reduced and caricatured elements of the classical theory with no regard for either empirical or normative truth. A critique of Soviet ideology nevertheless is possible, but now only with respect to true and false dimensions of the secondary but increasingly important domains of legitimation: technical, planning and technocratic rationality[2] and nationalist ideologies. The self-critique, or immanent critique, of Marxism is worthwhile, furthermore, only in those countries where the "renaissance of Marxism" shows some signs of survival (at present only Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia).

2. *The theory of history.* Classical historical materialism admits only two types of industrial society: capitalism and socialism-communism, and perhaps a transitional phase between the two.[3] Hence its adherents can interpret bureaucratic centralism as either socialist (the view of most communist parties), as restored capitalism (the view of Maoists and some Trotskyists), or as a transitional form between the two under an appropriately mythological name—Thermidorian restoration, Bonapartism, degenerate workers' state, etc. (the view of orthodox Trotskyists). In this context we are

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1. Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism* (New York, 1958).
2. On this point, see Istvan Szelenyi and György Konrad, *Toward the Class Power of the Intellectuals* (New York, 1978) and Ferenc Feher, "The Dictatorship over Needs" in this issue of *Telos*.
3. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, chapter on Trotsky in *Adventures of the Dialectic* (Evanston, Ill., 1973), and especially M. Rakovsky, "Marxism and Soviet Societies," *Capital and Class*, 1 (Spring 1977).

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fortunate to have the guidance of another Marx,[4] the theorist of discontinuous social formations, each with a unique, historical principle of organization. Bureaucratic centralism, fully out of step with the main line of Western development, must surely be conceptualized according to this non-evolutionist understanding of history and even modernity.

3. *The theory of the state.* In no area has 19th century Marxist theory, with its evolutionist schemata and de-emphasis of culture and politics, been a heavier liability than for thought aiming at emancipation. The theory of superstructures hides from our critical view the state—the guiding center and identity of most modern systems, especially of bureaucratic centralist societies.[5] In this respect, Marx's later, more flexible theory of discontinous social formations itself had to pay some of the costs: the concept of the state appears even here as a fundamental moment only of societies having no history—primarily Asiatic despotism but also ancient Graeco-Roman society. Although in our own civilization—the only allegedly historical one—the empirical transition to the present social formation was mediated, according to the first volume of *Capital*, by the extra-economic violence of the absolute state, on a categorial level, however, the state modestly withdraws from the logic of capitalist economic forms. In spite of (or because of, if we go along with Bakunin) Marx's own periodic statist inclinations, the same modesty is repeated in many of Marx's remarks about the only society that can and will replace capitalism—though here the state hides not behind the law of value but variously, behind the scientific plan that abolishes the anarchy of production, behind the centralized *and* presumably self-managing associated producers who abolish exploitation, or behind the public society that expropriates and replaces the private owners. It is in such contexts that Marx's own theory dangerously approaches the proto-science of legitimation of two yet undreamt of forms of statist authoritarian societies. But it was left to some of his most orthodox followers to draw the most absurd conclusions. Combining the myth of the transitional society with the reductive treatment of superstructures, Trotsky (who must be seen both as an important forerunner and an implacable foe of Stalin) had no difficulty in identifying state ownership with public-collective ownership and, as such, as a permanent feature of socialism.

4. *The theory of capitalism.* Though very little emerges concerning "post-capitalist" society in the Marxian critiques of political economy, two or three undeniably salient features are relevant to our concern. First the contrast between the socialization of production and the anarchy of market distribution implied (especially to Kautsky and Lenin) the extension of developed industrial microstructures to society as a whole: the idea of the national economy as one big factory. This model tends toward the social

4. Karl Marx, *The Grundrisse* (New York, 1971). See chapter on "Pre-capitalist Modes of Production."

5. See Mihaly Vajda, "Sozialismus und Staat," unpublished lecture.

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generalization of factory domination rather than its abolition. Second, the anarchy of production is to be solved by centralized planning on the basis of the direct control by the associated producers. Even Marx saw no contradiction between these two principles. His followers almost always restricted their emphasis to the first. Third, the abolition of inequality[6] implies central redistribution according to some rational criteria[7] (work, need, or worse, of all "public" interest). In this context it has been argued very persuasively[8] that the very terms of Marxian value theory imply for socialist society a central administration of labor time and use values. In these three respects the Marxian critique of capitalism represents an anticipation of key features of bureaucratic centralism.[9] Once again, Trotsky's fetishization of planning fully coincides with the ideological and control imperatives of the society in question. The same fetish is present in much of contemporary socialist theory, from the critical theory of the 1930s to the Marcuse of 1957 and to Sweezy and the so-called neo-Marxist economists.

5. Class theory and theory of revolution. Nothing could be more misleading for bureaucratic centralism than the statement: "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."[10] Even more dangerous is the identification of ruling and rising classes with old and new forces of production. All of the *Neo*-Trotskyists and *Neo*-Maoists (from Rizzi and Carlo to Sweezy and Bettelheim) who think of the Soviet Union in terms of a new class of owners repeat the mistake of historical materialist evolutionism in the domain of class theory. While some of them formally recognize the social formation as new, they all locate its dynamic in the various historical-economic schemata that classical Marxism produced for classical capitalism.[11] Above all, these theorists do not consistently acknowledge the fusion of superstructure and base, and the primacy of the state, that of the political, over the economy. But it is precisely the primacy of the political that disorganizes all global, horizontal stratification relations. The primacy of the state-party will further modify and restrict the growth of the forces of production whenever its organizational requirements are tendentially endangered. While there is no critical sociology without a dynamic theory of stratification and interest conflict, in state-organized societies this theory cannot be a class theory.[12]

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6. Agnes Heller and Ferenc Feher, "Forms of Equality," *Telos*, 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 6-26.
7. Szelenzi and Konrad, *op. cit.*
8. Gyorgy Markus, Janos Kis, Gyorgy Bence, *Is Critical Economy Possible?* unpublished manuscript.
9. As seen by Horkheim as early as 1940 in "The Authoritarian State," *Telos*, 15 (Spring, 1973), pp. 3-20.
10. For a general critique of the Marxian class history, see Jean Cohen's review of Agnes Heller, *The Theory of Needs in Marx, Telos*, 33 (Fall 1977), pp. 170-185.
11. This refers to the contradiction of forces and relations of production (Mallet, Carlo, Parkin, *et al.*), immanent economic crisis tendencies (Cliff, Di Leo) to be converted into revolution or reform (Deutscher) instituted by a proletarian (Carlo and all neo-Trotskyists) or technocratic subject (Mallet, Szelenyi and Konrad, Parkin).
12. See Cohen, *op. cit.*

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As long as we are interested in a critical theory of the present, the difficulties of classical theory demand not that we abandon the self-critique of Marxian theory, but that we reconstruct it. Certain features of Marxian theory remain regulative, at the very least, for our project: the concept of the critique of ideology, the theory of discontinuous social formations, the need for a critical stratification theory and the necessity of conceptualizing models of social reproduction for modern industrial societies. The focus here will be primarily on this last point, hoping to rescue the critical impulse of the critique of political economy for the study of bureaucratic centralism.

Fortunately, problems of late capitalism have already been the object of important investigations into state organized societies—especially Habermas' critique of some key forms of the Marxian economic crisis theory and the relative success of his Starnberg group in building a complex model of state-organized late capitalist reproduction. Very schematically, Habermas' solution is (1) to accept for liberal capitalism (not with complete justification) some weakly specified *classical* version of the Marxian crisis theory (conceptualized around the steering and normative role of the self-regulating market); (2) to demonstrate its fundamental instability around the dialectical relationship of economic crisis and political class struggle; and (3) to show how only a new state-organized capitalism has a chance to manage crisis and to remove the problem of legitimation from the immediate terrain of system integration. Nevertheless, Habermas affirms no fundamental system stability for late capitalism, and seeks instead (with his co-workers, above all Claus Offe) to repeat for our time Marx's achievement in the critique of political economy:[13] by building a theoretical, abstract model of multi-leveled political-cultural crisis in the social reproduction of late capitalism. Even though I will attempt below to draw out the implications of this procedure for the study of those "totally administered" societies of our time (neglected by Habermas) I will first begin with a series of reservations, and some theses.

Abstract models of system reproduction can deal only with the system-functional aspects of politics. The fundamental models from *Das Kapital* to *Legitimation Crisis* have not even managed to raise the issue of the history of states and of cultural-national traditions. This lacuna is especially serious for Habermas, who thematizes the problem of traditions and who tries to say something conclusive about the *logic* of cultural forms.[14] Surely Habermas' theory of motivation crisis (central in this context) applied only to the student movement. Of course, one can and should conceptualize abstract models of system reproduction, at least for rational, socialized societies. But two questions necessarily come up: Are these models able to anticipate and analyze the unearthing of buried traditions by states seeking new legitimations? And will any of the models point to those normatively and

13. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston, 1975).

14. Instead of logic, I should rather say a *field* of contestation between the administrative and legitimating needs of the state, and the cultural-critical expressions and needs of the agents and users of culture.

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culturally meaningful tendencies toward *rupture* that can be recognized in given historical settings where, very likely, a concrete second unique nation state plays a major role in social interaction and where, almost certainly, only historically specific cultural traditions can supply the nodal points of serious resistance.

I would like to state a few of my basic methodological premises:

1. Models of systems of reproduction can be, but need not be, only ideal types (heuristic constructs). As Marx and the early Lukacs maintained in their ideology critique of political economy and sociology, abstract models of systems *can* correspond to the frozen self-image and historically specific tendency of socialized societies to abstract, quantify, reduce, simplify, rationalize: in short, to *reify* and systematize through the differentiation of and totalization of the various rational spheres of society. But models are always biased in favor of the unification if not the stability of social formations. They take on the viewpoint of capital or of the state, at least initially.

2. Nevertheless, abstract models of social reproduction are only rarely able to grasp whole sets of specific, historical, cultural realities and even then only partially. The only two complex societies that can be adequately represented by abstract models are the classical Stalinist system developed in Russia in the 1930s and imposed on Eastern Europe between 1948 and 1956—my topic here—and the classical capitalist system (analyzed by Marx, Weber, Polanyi), especially in the period prior to World War I. The necessary uniformity in the first case was based on the enforced imitation of Soviet state institutions, and in the second case on the partial withdrawal of state institutions from the major terrain of economic reproduction, the self-regulating market.

3. There is no Universal History or Universal Evolution. There are only histories. Moreover, they are histories of particular, small or large, continuous or partially discontinuous cultural clusters. Even the *tendency* toward the self-unification of the species may itself be an exceptional 19th-century phenomenon. As a host of political thinkers from Machiavelli to Hegel (but not Marx) recognized, in the epoch of modern civil society the nation-state (with its executive power, officials, armies, taxes and symbols) is the major carrier of historical identity.

4. Models of social reproduction are both diachronic and synchronic. But, contrary to the expectation of the Habermas *Evolutionstheorie,*[15] they do not contain the sufficient conditions of their future historicity.

5. While systems of reproduction in general have crisis *tendencies* based on immanent contradictions,[16] the objective and subjective emergence of system-transcending ruptures depends on a specific interrelation of system and history, of the state as agent of reproduction and of culture as a medium of self-expression. National tradition is the terrain of this confrontation of statist pressure and cultural submission or resistance. Since their formation,

15. Jürgen Haberman, *Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus* (Frankfurt am Main, 1976), see "Introduction" and Chapters 6 and 7.

16. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis, op. cit.*, pp. 26ff.

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modern nation-states have been the hidden or open battlegrounds between the desire of administrative centers of power to legitimate their rationalization, control and unification of social-cultural spheres, and the quest of underlying populations, nationalities, cultures, subcultures, strata, and religions for autonomy and self-affirmation. The memories, traditions, symbols of these controntations do not seem to die—though they are often buried.

This new emphasis on national histories or histories of states hides the danger of a relativistic historicism. For the latter there can be no theory of fascism, but only the history of German National Socialism, Italian Fascism, etc., no theory of Stalinism, but only the description of an extraordinary, unique set of events. I prefer therefore to work initially with the best available model of system reproduction (the Starnberg political and cultural crisis theory) and to open it up from the inside toward national-cultural histories. Mine is different from Habermas' own alternative in this context, which is anticipated in *Legitimation Crisis*, and which juxtaposes a logically closed philosophy of history (*Evolutionstheorie*) to all historical relativism. This approach once again abstracts from national histories, but now on the diachronic plane of the logic of history, and occludes the plurality of possible forms of society (it has, for example, only one concept of traditional society, leaving little room to distinguish among the polis, Asiatic Despotism, and Feudalism). Habermas further imposes the category of class on all post-primitive societies, thereby veiling rich constellations of estates, orders, castes, strata, elites, etc. Finally, he implicitly orders an unjustifiably small number of possible social formations on a single developmental plane.

My topic is the social model of modern bureaucratic centralism (Stalinism and neo-Stalinism). Here, Habermas' designation of "post-capitalist societies" turns out to be weak and indirectly ideological—against his intentions. In reality, as the earlier work of Wittfogel and recent works by Dutschke, Tucker, and Szelenyi and Konrad[17] show, the history of the Soviet Union makes sense only if we understand its prehistory not as merely traditional or, more particularly as feudal, but as a unique Asiatic and later semi-Asiatic, semi-rational autocratic state. The Soviet Union is not "post-capitalist," but indeed most of its history until the 1960s represents a specific historical model of the modernizing (industrializing, urbanizing) of a specific form of traditional or semi-traditional society. Since we intend to hold the Soviet system up to a model developed for capitalist society, we must be extremely careful in delimiting the stages of the two developments that are indeed comparable. It has been suggested (e.g., by Serge Mallet)[18] that the Stalinist

17. Rudi Dutschke, *Versuch Lenin auf die Füsse zu stellen* (Berlin, 1974); Robert Tucker, "Stalinism as Revolution from Above" in Tucker ed., *Stalinism* (New York, 1977) and the third, historical chapters of the Szelenyi and Konrad book that is the most suggestive on the actual uses of Russian history for our present purpose, in spite of the fact that they (mistakenly and unnecessarily) seek a single East European model of development.

18. Serge Mallet, "Bureaucracy and Technocracy in the Socialist Countries" in *Essays on the New Working Class* (St. Louis, 1975).

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period should be understood as primitive socialist accumulation and post-Stalinism as a stage analogous to classical capitalism. However, the monarchical absolutist pre-history of both capitalism and bureaucratic centralism are themselves comparable in the sense that they laid the groundwork for the developed systems. And the Stalinist period itself is above all comparable to liberal capitalist industrialization in its rapid and global transformation of all society. Given this, it is most convenient to regard the Soviet 1920s as the emergence and triumph of the organizational principle of bureaucratic centralism, the monopolization of power in the hands of the party-state (the accumulation of power, and not of capital) and to look at Stalinism and post-Stalinism as two significantly different but deeply related stages of the developed system. But it is also necessary to consider the Stalinist period as the terroristically and egotistically deformed process of bureaucratic centralism that is imposed on a system that does not in itself require such terror and individual power for its integration. The reason is ultimately found in the key institutional difference between liberal capitalism and Stalinism: whereas the former is tendentially integrated by the self-regulating market, the principle of integration throughout Russian history (with the possible exception of NEP) is the autocratic and bureaucratic state. For our purposes, therefore, we will have to compare the constituents of bureaucratic centralism with both those constituents of liberal and late (state-organized) capitalism as outlined in the Starnberg-Habermas model.

To summarize so far: the model of bureaucratic centralism developed in a few years of cataclysmic social change—or rather it developed out of an already existing institutional pattern (formed in the fractional struggles between 1918-1929 that invested all political power in the monopolistic party.[19] The model can be considered "constituted" from the moment the bulk of the population became reduced to the object of plans. This process occurred as soon as the peasantry was forcibly collectivized with astonishing and brutal rapidity. As a result what appears as two stages for our capitalist "analogy"—the stage of original accumulation and of liberal capitalism—is here fused into one. Stalinism is *both* the formative process *and* the first stage of bureaucratic centralism.

Only on a level of useless abstraction can one identify the historical background of modernization in Russia and the West as traditional. Though the concept of the Asiatic or semi-Asiatic mode of production in the early Russian context may lead to serious confusions of its own, at least it indicates Russia's radically different historical lineages and the difference between a fundamentally unbroken statist tradition and the relative degrees of decentralization and regionalism characteristic of the West. Ever since the Tartar conquest, the history of the Russian state was well marked out[20] by the characteristic institutions of a form of bondage as close to slavery as it was to

19. Claude Lefort, "What is Bureaucracy," *Telos*, 22 (Winter 1974-75), pp. 31-65.
20. Dutschke, *op. cit.*

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serfdom, prebendal property, service nobility and extreme monarchical autocracy.[21] I accept the thesis that all attempts at modernizing Russia--from Ivan IV to Catherine and Peter and even as late as Witte—were for the sake of consolidating and militarily strengthening a historically continuous autocracy. And these institutional, social and cultural traditions of the autocracy survived the revolution itself. What we must therefore remember is that nothing could be more different than these two traditions: the Western one rooted in serfdom, contractual freedom and estates, feudal decentralization, private property and chartered boroughs, and the Russian one rooted in serfdom renewed as second serfdom, service nobility, autocratic military centralization, prebendal property and enslaved towns (after the early defeat of Novgorod, Pskov, etc.). The reforms of the 19th century most emphatically did not bring the divergent paths closer together. Thus, liberal capitalism and Bolshevik statism resolved the problem of modernization in two entirely different ways, with significantly different traditional elements surviving in both cases.

I would like to sketch the major constituents of modern bureaucratic centralism. Since my procedure here can only be formal and comparitive but not historical, I will omit the problems of the transition between Tsarist and Stalinist autocracies. I will focus on (1) the organizing principle of modern bureaucratic centralism; (2) the problem of control (system integration); (3) the problem of legitimation (social integration); (4) the primary crisis tendency; (5) the specificity of rational crises. The Habermas models of classical and late capitalism will be referred to throughout for the sake of the implicit and explicit comparison.

The organizing principle of modern bureaucratic centralism lies in the antagonistic relationship of the pyramidically organized and unified party-state bureaucracies to the wage laborers and consumers. The principle emerges in the 1920s as a result of the fusion of all bureaucratic organizations into a single pyramid that was accomplished by the vanguard party—that new, mobile, not quite Weberian bureaucracy.[22] The fusion is accomplished by the party monopolizing its hold on political power through force and organizational activity, and by its self-homogenization, which through the purges, by 1929 had eliminated heterogeneous interests within the party itself.[23] Nevertheless, only in the period from 1929 to1932, in the forced collectivization and industrialization campaigns, is the organizational principle terroristically imposed on society as a whole by turning the whole population into unfree state wage laborers.[24] This process is, of course, the famous civil war against the peasant.[25] Characteristically, unlike the

21. See Szelenyi and Konrad, and Tucker on this point.
22. Lefort, *op. cit.*
23. R.V. Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) is still the best treatment of this dynamic.
24. See Szelenyi and Konrad, *op. cit.*, and Feher in this issue of *Telos*.
25. Moshe Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power* (Evanston, Ill., 1968).

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organizational principle of liberal capitalism, where wage labor is a capital relation veiled by the market and the party-state, the state wage labor relation is not anonymous politically since *dictatorship* is frankly admitted, either as that of the party or transparently veiled as that of the proletariat. The antagonistic relation, however, becomes socially anonymous because both the key operation of the state—i.e., the central plan—and the fundamental control operations of the party are presented as the representation and fulfillment of collective interests on the bases of scientific knowledge of history in general and economy in particular. The fetish of the plan and the party's claims to represent real interesta (rather than immediate ones) are further supported in this context by the state bureaucratically structuring *all* employment.

The central plan performs not only ideological functions cited above but also the key steering function of the system, as corrected by the supervisory, control and retribution functions of the party. Even if the long-range plans themselves have historically been propagandistic and politically primary, the society indeed planned on the bases of more or less *ad hoc* yearly plans. These plans have incorporated, both for ideological and economic reasons, fundamental biases for military consumption, for heavy industry, for the primary sector, and for industry in general against personal consumption, light industry, the secondary sector and agriculture. All this is extremely well known. What is important for my purpose here is that the state or political order itself, heavily connected to tasks of economic steering as well as redistribution, must be directly legitimated under bureaucratic centralism. Even if the politically and functionally dominant strata are socially disguised by planning and party organization, the primacy of the political in every sphere of life is known even to school children and is indeed a doctrine of the ruling ideology. In Habermas' terminology, therefore, we might say that there is a permanent need here to legitimate the political order, which, however, similar to the self-regulating market of liberal capitalism, combines functions of social integration and system integration. This brings us to two key questions: (1) Are the claims of rational knowledge sufficient to legitimate such a political order? (2) What happens to the claims of rational knowledge in context of crises of planning rationality?

The transference of the organizational principle of bureaucratic centralism onto society as a whole was legitimated only to a small but key part of the population through the rationality claims of classical Marxism-Leninism. In Gramscian language, domination replaced hegemony for the bulk of the population, for the peasant victims of the logic of the new social formation. To the peasantry, the regime did not seem rational then or probably anytime later. Nevertheless, agricultural production did continue and peasant soldiers proved far more reliable in World War II than in World War I. The role of terror and the resulting social atomization throughout the Stalin period must have played the key role. Not only the peasants, but all strata showing even signs of internal structure and solidarity, were objects of the terror, from the

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technicians produced by industrialization itself,[26] to the military leadership and the party organization itself. But even here, Bonaparte's maxim about bayonets must be stressed: the regime had to and did in fact sit on at least some cushions of legitimate acceptance. As Tucker has shown,[27] the revival of traditional nationalistic and familial motifs and the trappings of a new autocracy were important in consolidating the traditionally fatalistic attitudes of the bulk of the peasantry now in condition of "third serfdom," the best description of the *sovkhozniki* and *kolkhozniki* who lost their right to move about freely. The revival of service nomenclature may have played the same role for lower level officialdom. Furthermore, the nationalistic ideologies of the heroic construction of socialism in a threatened fortress and of the heroic war against the invaders on Russian soil played an even greater role in moments of vast mass exertion. Popular Marxism-Leninism and socialist realism quickly became the best vehicles for the transition of precisely these ideological elements. The cult of personality finally was the basis of unity for all nationalistic legitimations, no less than the cultic rituals that surrounded the absolute monarchs in the formative centers of European nation-states.

It was the allegedly rational components of Marxism-Leninism, however, that somehow could not perform their function as parts of a crude science of legitimation. Social equality, workers control—communism itself, to be sure—could be placed in the far future by the all-powerful scientists of history. If the state had to be temporarily (under socialism) strengthened for the sake of these goals, so be it. But at least the much claimed economic-military rationality of the regime should have been a bit more evident in more than just one or two sectors of production. During the 1930s the terror had to shift its objectives not only because of the potential formation of new strata but also because the rationality crises were becoming more visible to the upper echelons of party and military leadership. The decimation of Lenin's party is one of the best documented historical facts of the century. Tendentially Stalinism and police terror might have threatened the identity of the system as we defined it above, more likely that party dictatorship as a structure is not bound to any given personnel. No one person and secret police could have ruled such a complex, industrial society without the continued penetration and control of the party organization over all aspects of life. More important, even at the height of Stalinist terror, steering activities had to remain in the hands of state and party officials if the collapse of the system was to be avoided. At most I would admit that at the ultimate boundaries of Stalinist autocracy there was a clash of two organizational principles, one based on the party, and the other on the cult of personality

26. Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast* (London, 1963), pp. 306-07. Here the issues of technical elites and bureaucrats are not clearly distinguished. The issue is more clearly presented by Szeleny and Konrad although their teleological argument on the logic of technocratic (intellectual!) class rule is unacceptable and even analytically unworkable.

27. See Tucker, *op. cit.*

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—neither one possible without the other.

The system of bureaucratic centralism is based on the consolidation of the first principle. After the strengthening of the Soviet Union as the result of the war and the formation of the peoples' democracies—and especially after the death of Stalin—the party bureaucracy was ready to resume fully its function of institutional-bureaucratic unifier, a role that was also a *sine qua non* of the Stalinist epoch in the first place. The key difference was that the party bureaucracy had learned that one of the objective possibilities of the system—now to be avoided at all costs—was the dialectic of fusion-terror-personal power so revealingly described by Sartre in his *Critique*. But the party, unlike Sartre, was not going to submit to this dialectic in its presumed ontological necessity.

The normalization of modern bureaucratic centralism provides us with more or less a self-reproducing model of a system whose key contradiction lies on the level of planning rationality. Without open terror and its trappings, the features of both the system and its contradiction finally become fully visible. We should note from the outset Habermas' observation that in a system in which social and system integration are the tasks of the same institutional order, steering problems are at the same time problems of legitimation. The "forms of appearance" of rationality crises under bureaucratic centralism have been well described:[28] decreasing rates of growth with greater complexity, general periodic shortages, chronic disproportionality of sectors, lag of skills behind occupational structure, fetishism of number, low labor productivity, low quality products, and buyer's strike among others, should be shared here. Many of these phenomena are brought on by the resistance of managers, workers and consumers to impossible plans. But it is a mistake to derive them from an immanent and linear dynamic of forces and relations of production, as do both historical materialist interpreters and convergence theorists. Rather, following Marx himself, I would say "the greatest limit on capital [plan] is capital [plan] itself." The rational claims of the plan are contradicted by the fact that global plans cannot be rational in detail; the political needs of the plan are specifically incompatible with goal-rationality in many instances. Global plans run into the immanent limits of plan administration and execution. The claims of rational planning are further contradicted in a society that drastically limits rational, public discourse. Following the analyses of Offe, Hirsch and Habermas, I would stress the penetration of opposing interests into plans (of partial bureaucracies, regions, industrial branches, at times government and even party tendencies) and the very real possibility that, in fact, the plans work at all only because of the introduction of foreign elements into the system (markets, money, private plots, decentralization schemes, organized ellegality and corruption.). I would only deny Habermas' claim that successful global plans are possible in principle.

28. Among others: Antonio Carlo, F. Janossy, Moshe Lewin, A. Nove.

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Much more important is Habermas' indication of the specificity of rationality crisis as the key steering crisis of state-organized industrial societies.[29] (1) Rationality crises disorganize social life on a continuum (and not with cyclical ruptures) with an uncertain threshold of tolerance. (2) Bargaining and reciprocal adaptation can contain some of the disruptive consequences because the key parties meeting face to face can anticipate some of these and avoid the worst results, or at least displace them toward the weakest possible strata, regions, or institutions. (3) The agents of planning can be shielded from political, public criticism through a closed system of technical expertise supported by full-fledged technocratic ideology.

This last and most important "solution" of rationality crisis out of question as long as the political bureaucracy is unwilling to rationalize itself fully. It may be impossible, furthermore, even if there is a fusion of technocratic and political forces in the bureaucracy as long as the steering system and ideological-legitimating systems remain tightly coupled. The "planning elite" can ultimately be protected only in two directions: by a generalized move toward a pseudo-market[30] that would *seem* to remove a significant portion of economic rewards and punishments from the sphere of responsibility of the plan, or by a drastic shift of the cultural milieu of legitimation from the party-state to the nation-state, whose traditions have been well protected by Stalinist and quasi-Stalinist models.

The outline proposed here of the major components of modern bureaucratic centralism may very well be more static than the Starnberg model of early or late capitalism. And this is how it should be, because a model of reproduction (in itself only a group of systematically limited alterations) should yield a genuine dynamic conflict-crisis theory only at its junctures with historical development. The emergence of the Stalinist model in the first place was objectively possible because of the contingent constellation of several factors: (1) the Leninist organization, unified through factional struggles and purges; (2) The statist side of Marxist theory; (3) the statist bureaucratic autocratic Russian tradition of revolution from above; (4) the personality of Stalin; and (5) the atomistic economic resistance of the peasantry in the 1920s. These five factors (and probably others) constitute the movement of the practico-inert (Sartre)[31] that is the Stalinist organizing process of modern bureaucratic centralism. To put it more simply, Marxist-Leninist Statism could not engulf the whole of society except on a specifically Russian basis, utilizing Russian insitutions and national ideologies. But in the process, both Marxism-Leninism and Russia were altered almost beyond recognition. A model was constituted that was different both from the Marxist conception of a transitional society and from

29. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 63-68.

30. See Feher's excellent discussion of the difference between market and pseudo-market in this issue.

31. See Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (London, 1976). The argument culminates in Part II, Chapter 6, "The Institution."

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the social type of the Russian autocratic heritage. It is this model that I have proposed to outline. It was this model that was forcibly imposed on East Europe after World War II.

It is astonishing how exactly Communist parties sought and managed in East Europe to imitate the model in question, given the great diversity in these countries of national, religious and revolutionary traditions, social and political institutions, and levels of economic development. Party monopoly, overcentralized planning, forced industrialization and collectivization, primacy of heavy industry, nationalization of the labor supply, elimination of all autonomous institutions, curtailment of civil liberties, purges and terror: these were the staples of the newly established systems. the one moment of Stalinism that could not be institutionalized was the full-fledged nationalist legitimation of statism: the formal elimination of particular national sovereignties was impossible (although the Yugoslav and Bulgarian CPs could once upon a time even imagine their countries as Soviet Socialist Republics); the complete imitation of Stalinist nationalism in turn had to lead to the first break in the system (Yugoslavia) and ultimately to an autonomous development away from Stalinist itself.[32] Elsewhere, too, and more subtly, the national differences mentioned interfered with complete homogenization: there were no blood purges in East Germany and Poland, collectivization was very slow in Poland, Hungary and Romania, and after Stalin's death political revolts were quick to occur in East Germany, Poland and Hungary. The revolts especially represented practical critiques of the ideology of both Marxist and national claims of the systems that were now confronted with miserable realities. In particular, 1956 had to mean the lasting modification of economic voluntarism and the genuine (if only eventual) restoration of national sovereignties. The way was open to the national development of models of bureaucratic centralism.

To be sure, fundamental limits and contradictions of the model remain the same. The only question is whether its analysis is sufficient for an adequate theory of social change. An economistic interpretation of the model that focuses on the contradiction of forces and relations of production easily comes up with a univocal class (or stratus) confrontation of old bureaucracy and new technocracy (the last being the one stratum created by Stalinism that even Stalin could not ultimately destroy), representing the old relations and the new forces respectively. The rest of the scenario need not be sketched. An interpretation that understands and analyzes the primacy of the political is necessarily more open and less optimistic. Such interpretation understands the consequences of the elimination of all possible organizations of a class *for itself*[33] and of the social anonymity of antagonistic relations in East Europe and the Soviet Union. It also discovers that without the constant unifying activity of the Communist Party itself, technocracy and bureaucracy

32. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, 1967).
33. See Rakovsky, *op.cit.*, pp. 100ff.

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disintegrate into particularistic and competing technocracies and bureaucracies. What Jean cohen has demonstrated in regard to capitalism applies here, too: technocracy and bureaucracy are neither a single class nor two classes. These institutional structures, forms of hierarchy are basically opposed, yet their relation to all others is one of domination. They are torn by fundamentally different rationalities, but against the population as a whole they represent the legitimating principle of rational knowledge.[34] And in fact, as the experiences of East Germany[35] and the Soviet Union after the reform period[36] show, the ruling political bureaucracy, even in the context of deep rationality crisis, is not without resources: segments of the technocratic stratum can be easily integrated and coopted; key sections of the population have much to fear in the area of economic reform and rationalization,[37] and technocracy with a charismatic revolutionary heritage and without the ideology of worker's interest may have even greater legitimation problems than the party bureaucracy.[38]

Many of these arguments are not new. What needs to be demonstrated is the greater plausibility of a theory that does not rush into a clear cut model of stratification and conflict, a theory stressing endemic rationality crises and the unavoidability of increasing necessity of finding traditional and national solutions of the resulting legitimation problems. Of course, there are reform attempts all over East Europe and the Soviet Union, stretching from the cybernetic rationalization of planning to market socialism. But these attempts will not solve the underlying contradiction of planning and rationality because a successful, global central plan may very well be impossible.[39] A market that eliminates the inefficient and that increases consumption might thereby multiply the competing claims directed at the state. In any case, a market cannot operate efficiently in context of the ultimate authority and long-range planning decisions of a party bureaucracy that is not goal-rational. The only solution that preserves social integration is the uncoupling of rationality and legitimation—the latter becoming increasingly national, traditional, and at times irrational. Solzhenytsin's "Open Letter" is in this sense a representative document, and not just for the Soviet Union.

It is in this context that I would like to indicate briefly the uses and limits of a political crisis model of bureaucratic centralism. The insolubility of rationality crises follows from the model, as I have argued, as does the necessary economic-cultural deprivations at *all* times of at least some regions, economic branches, occupation groups, nationalities, cultures, subcultures and religious groups. The dynamics of the theory, when worked out (and if

34. See Szelenyi and Konrad, *op. cit.*
35. Peter Ludz, *The Changing Party Elite in E. Germany* (Cambridge, 1972).
36. Moshe Lewin, *Political Undercurrents of Economic Debates* (Princeton, 1976).
37. John P. Hardt and Theodore Frankel, "The Industrial managers" in *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, ed. by H.Gordon Skilling and F. Griffiths (Princeton, 1971).
38. Mallet, *op. cit.*
39. Antonio Carlo, "The Socio-Economic Nature of the USSR," in *Telos*, n. 21 (Fall 1974), pp. 2-86.

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not occluded by a dogmatic stratification theory) may even indicate those groups that are sources of resistance, along with quasi-institutions (schools, unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, etc. will likely be subject to special strain. This much the model can do as a part of critical social science, as a constellation of systematically linked alternatives. It can do no more: it can predict neither the full meaning, the intensity, the strategies nor the ambiguities of such future struggles. It cannot plot out the future history of states. Part of the gap is left to the practical-critical activity of an ideology critique (to be developed in East Europe, of course, and not here) that presupposes critical social science but which establishes a hermeneutic-communicative rather than a scientific-analytical relation to its addressees.

The possibility of a *new* compromise between the normalized oligarchic Marxist-Leninist party, the technocratic interest in reform, and the national traditions of statism is indeed open to *three* kinds of ideology critique. The confrontations of the utopian promises of Marxism with Leninism, of the technical interest of rationality with the unavoidable crisis of bureaucratic planning, and of the statist tradition of nationalism with the rebellious and emancipatory memories of national cultures should—given the built-in crises—find some political and social groups who are able to compromise their differences. Given the legitimating needs of the systems, the issue of national heritage may, however, be the most explosive and the most ambiguous. Here we must keep in mind the necessarily double character of the concept of "nation." Fortunately even Russia is not only the country of Ivan Kalita, of the Church of Nikon, of the state of Ivan Grozny, Peter and Catherine, of the White Hundreds and of Lenin's party, but also of the Novgorod city state, of the stubborn Old Believers, of peasant and intellectual rebels, of Jews and of the councils and Kronstadt.

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DESIRE AND THE COMMODITY FORM

by Robert D'Amico

Introduction

There is no doubt that the arena of political action can no longer be held within the limits of the direct activity of labor. It is also obvious that no matter how many nuances there are in Marx's conception of a mode of production, his analysis is, in the final moment, centered around the assumption that an effective political struggle emerges only at the point of production. It would be the height of scholasticism to take this point of Marx's account as another lacuna to be neatly filled in since it is an historical rather than purely theoretical issue. The point is that what now appears as an inadequacy is only present as the after effect of a significant shift in social integration and structure that has seen the collapse of radical working class politics and purely political-economic critiques of late capitalism. There are two sides to this shift. First, power resides more in the control over and formation of a subject's needs, desires and very identity (as defined legally, medically, educationally, etc.) than solely over the conditions of labor. Second, specifically in those societies in which the mode of production is highly developed, the stability and legitimacy of the society resides not in justifying or concealing the continuing degradation of labor, but in those societies' ability to create and satisfy ever increasing and diverse needs.

The question of the relation between desire and labor is inextricably bound to deep ideological and practical splits in the history of Marxism, which is all outside the scope of this paper. For the purposes of the following discussion, however, an underlying continuity in approach to this question is more interesting. In the tradition of orthodox Marxism extending from the Second International to Leninism, there has always been a biological approach to need combined with a purely economic and technical definition of labor. Control was assumed to be solely a matter of "control" over the means of production, in the economic sense, and the assumption was continued that societies meet a certain physiological substratum of needs. Needless to say, the inadequacies inherent in such an approach were confronted at both the theoretical and practical level in a series of important critical reactions within Marxism. However, alternative accounts of the place of desire and need in the mode of production as well as their political roles (as in Reich or Veblen, for example) have not always transcended certain assumptions of the orthodox account. For example, the belief that capitalism represses sexuality so as to intensify labor (found in the otherwise divergent analyses of Reich and Weber) still retains the economistic account of labor. Also need, want and desire are assumed to be inherently present, as a substratum for different forms of repression and domination with no critical reflection on their own formation. But if desire and need are themselves actively formed by a social

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structure rather than merely negatively repressed, and if control can be exercised as much through what it allows as what it prevents, then the relation between desire and labor can never simply be hydraulic. What that relation may be, as well as why there arise dilemmas in its role of social reproduction, is the object of the following study.

The study is roughly divided into two parts. The first uses examples from Lévi-Strauss and Marx in the effort to explain how social structure can be said to reproduce its own subjectivity. Lévi-Strauss has a non-reductive view of the symbolic, but lacks the analysis of falsification that is the essence of Marx's critical theory of form or fetishism. The second part of the paper uses aspects of the work of Goux, Baudrillard and Deleuze and Guattari to explore different thematizations of the relation between desire and labor, the problems encountered in such theoretical analyses and the light they throw on the political issues so very briefly outlined above.

Symbolic Effectiveness

Lévi-Strauss introduced the concept of *l'efficacité symbolique* in an article on shamanism. The article describes the narrative song (as well as ritual actions) employed by a shaman in dealing with a difficult childbirth. Lévi-Strauss's point is that shamanistic practices involve "cures" through "sham battles" or recitations of incantations and prescribed actions. The status of this "therapy" is therefore difficult to grasp since the actions are too crude to result in a cure and the abstract ritual does not seem to have any bearing on illness. The question Lèvi-Strauss sets up with this example is whether we can grasp "how specific psychological representations are invoked to combat equally specific physiological disturbances." According to Lévi-Strauss's analysis, the shamanistic recitation or song reconnects the patient's physiological reactions to mythic categories (in this case the events of childbirth to a mythic struggle over the woman's soul). Hence, it is directed primarily at a *prise de conscience* on the part of the patient which will indirectly produce the hoped for physiological response. "Everything occurs as though the shaman were trying to induce the woman—whose contact with reality is no doubt impaired and whose sensitivity is exacerbated—to relive the initial situation through pain, in a very precise and intense way, and to become psychologically aware of its smallest details."[1] As Lévi-Strauss indicates, in this way the myth "names" the process so as to present it in a *form* accessible to the woman's consciousness. The myth, which is primarily a social dimension and practice, allows manipulation *but only* through the symbolic realm, through meaning equivalents which nonetheless have an efficacy and force in reality[2]—an efficacy and force very different from medical treatment

1. "In effect the situation intorduces a series of events in which the body and internal organs of the subject constitute a kind of theater." C. Lévi-Strauss, *Anthropologie Structurale* (Paris, 1958), p. 123.

2. "The cure will consist of rendering thinkable a situation given first in emotional terms: and to make the mind accept pains the body refuses to tolerate. It is of no importance that the mythology of the shaman does not correspond to objective reality: the woman in birth believes it and she is a member of a society that believes it." *Ibid.*, pp. 213-14.

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and not reducible to physical manipulation. "The technique of the narrative thus aims at recreating a real experience in which the myth shifts the protagonists...to make the center of inexpressible and painful sensations 'clear' to her and accessible to her consciousness...enables them to relate in detail a complicated itinerary that is a true mythical anatomy corresponding less to the real structure of the genital organs than to a kind of emotional geography."[3]

But if pains are thus given a meaning and coherence, why does that entail a physiological reaction? In other words, merely explaining to someone that their disease is the result of viruses does not in itself produce health. Why should the coherence of mythic categories produce a physiological change, simply because they are strongly believed by both the shaman and the patient? The point at issue is really two separate forms of explanation—One concerned with explaining why a birth is difficult (and which is external to the birth act itself) and a second that is solely concerned with how the woman understands and deals with these specific experiences and which is therefore inseparable from the actual birth event. The "cure" Lévi-Strauss is investigating is a symbolic manipulation.[4] That is, it is a physiological change that results from approaching the patient through physiological events presented in their meaningful and significant equivalents, in their already (socially) mediated symbolic form. "The relation between microbes and sickness is external to the patient's mind, it is a cause and effect relation; whereas the relation between monsters and sickness is interior to the conscious or unconscious mind itself; it is a relation of symbol to thing symbolized, or...of signifier to signified. The shaman furnishes a *language* to the sick person, in which otherwise inexpressible states can be immediately expressed. And it is this passage to verbal expression (which permits, simultaneously, living through in an intelligible and ordered form an actual experience which would otherwise be chaotic and ineffable) which induces the release of the physiological process, that is, the reorganization, in a favorable direction, of the sequence of events to which the patient is subjected."[5]

The experience is provoked through language, it is concerned with the patient's access to meaning (physiological responses are sought through a level of symbolic manipulation) and the process involves some form of transference. As usual, Lévi-Strauss draws a connection with psychoanalysis. "When a transference is established, the patient puts words into the mouth of the psychoanalyst by attributing to him alleged feelings and intentions; in the incantations, on the contrary, the shaman speaks for his patient. He questions her and puts into her mouth answers that correspond to the interpretations of

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 214-15.

4. "The notion of manipulation which is central to the intelligibility of the shamanistic cure must be broadened in its traditional definition. It is neither wholly a manipulation of ideas or a manipulation of organs because the common condition remains that it is done through symbols, i.e., through the significant equivalents of meaning (*signifié*) belonging to another order of reality." *Ibid.*, p. 221.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 218.

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her condition that she must come to see through (*se penetrer*)."[6]

Of course, the point of this article is a reiteration of the major Lévi-Straussian themes: the unconscious is a symbolic function (beyond and outside of all social systems), it is structured like a discourse and its form dominates all content. The point of using this as an introduction concerns neither these views of Lévi-Strauss nor the value of the shaman-psychoanalyst analogy. Rather, the example seems particularly effective in demonstrating what it means to say that the symbolic realm is *productive*, that is, a real efficacy of social reproduction apart from and independent of force or coercion. To say that symbolism or symbolic effectiveness binds together the life-processes of the subject and society does not reduce to the claim that fixed, abstract physiological events are given different "names" by different cultures. Rather, it is to say that the realm of the symbolic, of meaning and equivalence is productive (effective) in that it materially *forms* needs and desires as much as the physiological substratum.

What is produced at the level of social mediation is the meaning and mode of expression of sexuality, maturation, procreation and consumption and thereby the very reality of human activity. What is being emphasized here concerning Lévi-Strauss's concept of "symbolic effectiveness" is that it binds together mediately disparate levels of social reality. Suspending for the moment the obvious point that Lévi-Strauss's intent is to deny any social specificity to this concept or its role in reproduction, the following definition grasps this point. "Symbolic effectiveness would consist precisely in this 'inductive property' by which formally homologous structures, built out of different levels of life—organic processes, unconscious mind, rational thought—are related to one another."[7]

The insight here is not only that the materiality and productivity of symbolization and meaning equivalence are emphasized, but that the symbolic dimension is identified as the *place* in which physiology is mediated (socially). As a place of manipulation, the subject's desires and needs (the areas of sexuality, maturation, consumption, etc.), in spite of their biological continuity, enter into the reproduction of diverse social formations in diverse modes of expression. Lévi-Strauss shows that the dimensions of sexuality, need and biological function are, for any society, not a matter of physiology but first a matter of symbolic manipulation.

Commodity Form

The analysis of the commodity, which is the foundation of Marx's critique of political economy, is also the presentation of a homologous *form* through which a social formation relates disparate practices on the basis of a specific mode of production. But the commodity is not only the "inductive property" that Lévi-Strauss describes linking through its "efficacy" social life and economic utility, but a "fantastic form" concealing what is not equivalent—

6. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

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that for which there is no exchange. The dynamic of concealment in this "social hieroglyphics," which secured social reproduction at the level of consciousness, is precisely the point of *critique* in Marx. It is precisely this critical, social aspect of form that is missing in the example from Lévi-Strauss. The following section will show how equivalence and form operate in Marx's analysis.

Marx approaches exchange value as the process by which diverse products are given a uniform social status as commodities distinct from their varied "*forms* of existence" as use values. Hence exchange value is a form of equivalence—a comparative analysis of "objects" through a common denominator. Value allows objects to function and circulate in a specific *social form*. "Value, therefore, does not have its description branded on its forehead; it rather transforms every product of labour into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, men try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their own social product: for the characteristic which objects of utility have of being values is as much men's social product as their language."[8]

The secret of the social product is the value form—the abstract equivalence of exchange. But that form is the product of a specific practice. This practice is labor-power as homogeneous, abstract and equivalent. Thus, in labor as in all commodities, the qualitative distinctness of utility is eliminated through "equal exchange magnitudes." This form of equivalence is realized in the act of exchange and in that way expresses an identity (form as abstraction) between labor and the commodity form. "Quite irrespsective, therefore, of their natural form of existence, and without regard to the specific character of the needs they satisfy as use-values, commodities in definite quantities are congruent, they take one another's place in the exchange process, are regarded as equivalents, and despite their motley appearance have a common denominator... As exchange-values in which the qualitative difference between their use-value is eliminated, they represent equal amounts of the same kind of labour...they represent the same homogeneous labour, i.e., labour in which the individual characteristics of the worker are obliterated. Labour which creates exchange-value is thus *abstract general* labour."[9]

Of course, this concept of abstraction is used by Marx in the Hegelian sense and is therefore not merely an operation in thought (as Althusser has claimed). It is, as Marx says, "an abstraction which is made every day in the social process of production." This process of abstraction has two moments. The product is abstraction from the "natural form" of utility while labor, the activity, is abstracted from all organic and social limitations that stand against the universalizing tendency of the value form. The important point, the distinctive feature of Marx's theory of subjectivity and production, is the distortive and mystifying function of the equivalence form. "Human

8. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I (London, 1976), p. 167.

9. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, (New York, 1970), pp. 28-29.

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labour-power in its fluid state, or human labour, creates value, but is not itself value. It becomes value in its coagulated state, in objective form. The value of linen as a congealed mass of human labour can be expressed only as an 'objectivity' (*Gegenständlichkeit*), a thing which is materially different from the linen itself and yet common to the linen and other commodities... Here is therefore a thing in which value is manifested, or which represents value in its tangible, natural form."[10]

Here we see the equivalence form as the motor force for allowing activities and objects to have the same form and thus the same social meaning. But simultaneously it misrepresents this reproduction so that labor does *appear* as a value, so that human activity does exist only in the form of some object. Therefore, while human subjectivity is mediated through a symbolic function (and consequently the error of all economistic readings of Marx's categories) that creation of meaning has an ambivalent function of concealment that introduces control and manipulation of those activities. Whereas this appears neutral, benevolent and even asocial in Lévi-Strauss, in Marx it is directly tied to a critical assault on the form and limits of human activities and of human subjectivity in relation to social control.

The value expression does not appear as a social relation since the commodity appears to express value in itself, endowed with the property of exchangeability from Nature. Conversely, the limiting and formation of human activities appears not as an act of social control and domination but as a direct result of its immutable, inherent nature. As mediation, the equivalence form, like symbolic manipulation, turns a physiological act into a symbolic, meaningful practice. In this case it turns concrete labor into the manifestation of abstract human labor and therefore, the labor of private individuals becomes "labor directly social in its form," with the added step that this whole mediation does not appear to consciousness which in an inversion returns it to the physiological. In this interpretation, the value form and the equivalence form function to bring together the mediately separate social spheres and to reproduce social subjectivity. The commodity is simultaneously an exchange value and a *hieroglyphics* of social relations—it is literally a text.

Marx shows how the *form* in which labor becomes abstract is also the necessity by which exchange moves toward equivalence. Thus we see that one aspect of the "efficacy" of the equivalence form is its destruction of all natural or customary restraints on production. This is why there is a liberating moment in the abstraction process (Marx describes human equality becoming a "fixed popular opinion"). The privatization of the laborer (which accompanies the homogeneity of labor power) is the force that expels the vestiges of extra-economic domination over production, characteristic of pre-capitalist societies, and that allows the equivalence form to enter directly into social relations, the characteristic of capitalist reproduction. "In the same

10. *Capital*, p. 142.

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proportion as exchange bursts its local bonds and the value of commodities accordingly expands more and more into the material embodiment of human labour as such, in that proportion does the money-form become transferred to commodities which are by nature fitted to perform the social function of universal equivalent... We have seen that the money-form is merely the reflection thrown by a single commodity of the relations between all commodities... The process of exchange gives to the commodity, which it has converted into money, not its value but its specific value form."[11]

When a specific commodity is crystallized as money, its "bodily form" takes on a power and value that is both mysterious and yet naturalized. In its occult power to manipulate, to determine significance and mediate life—the "*galvano-chemical* power of society," as Marx called it—money is the culmination of the "efficacy" of the commodity form—an efficacy whose logic is simultaneously to conceal and thereby to reproduce its reality. It is this double movement of "effectiveness" that is Marx's critical theory of meaning forms. As he says, "The intermediate steps of the process *vanish in the result* and *leave no trace behind.* Commodities find their own value already completely represented.... Hence the magic of money." The "magic" here is not the shamanistic manipulation of consciousness through symbolism but an amnesia, the "lack of trace" through which a form takes on its "fantastic imaginary" power.[12]

In a famous quote, Marx specified the difference that arises in the historical satisfaction of needs. The quote intends to show how production creates the very nature and character of the needs to be satisfied. Marx had in mind his own analysis of how a new subjectivity is mediated through commodity production (the category used in the *Grundrisse* is personal independence) thereby revealing historically, for the first time, the self-production of the subject through laboring activity. "Hunger is hunger, but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a *different hunger* from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth... Production not only supplies the material for the need, but it also supplies the need for the material."

Marx's conclusion from this could serve as the focus for the rest of this paper. "Production produces not only the object but also the manner of consumption, not only objectively but also subjectively."[13]

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11. *Ibid.*, pp. 183-84.

12. "The forms which stamps products as commodities and which are therefore the preliminary requirements for the circulation of commodities, already possess the fixed quality of natural forms of social life before man seeks to give an account, not of their historical character, for in his eyes they are immutable, but of their content and meaning." *Ibid.*, p. 168. The following comments by Adorno and Horkheimer have a similar intent. "Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes the dissimilar comparable by reducing it to abstract qualities." And "Abstraction, the tool of enlightenment, treats its objects as did fate, the notion of which it rejects: it liquidates them." Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York, 1972), pp. 7, 13.

13. Marx, *Grundrisse,* trans. Martin Nicolaus (London, 1973), p. 92.

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Mode of Symbolization

There is one aspect of Marx's analysis that has been of particular interest to those influenced by theories of symbolic exchange. In his discussion of money, Marx presents a concept of "stages" to the development of exchange. The version of this presented in the *Grundrisse* diverges in interesting ways from the presentation in *Capital* (which would be very important to explore in another context), but for the purpose of the following discussion the version in *Capital* will be briefly reviewed. Marx notes that exchange in the immediate form of barter is a matter of chance and that the rough distinction between objects for consumption and use and objects for exchange is the *stamp of custom*. This control or limitation through custom (a non-economic moment) gives exchange a non-economic form and function. That is the essence of primitive society for Marx and the separation of exchange from custom and non-economic status is the movement of the next stages, a coincidence of logical and historical moments that suggest Weber's concept of rationalization.

When the number and variety of objects to be exchanged increases there is a need, in Marx's analysis, to equate them to a special object. Though the special object remains non-economic, this expansion and partial systematization of exchange serves to bring about the "general social equivalent." Here in the third stage exchange is literally "made abstract"—or rationalized. All objects become equivalences not to some specific object but to the *form* of an object of exchange. J.-J. Goux, in *Economie et Symbolique,* begins with Marx's treatment of the genesis of the money form and constructs his book around the claim that that treatment is isomorphic to transformations in the practice of significations (history of writing) and the genesis of sexuality. Sexuality, writing (language) and money (exchange) are the three moments of subjectivity. According to Goux, Marx has given us in his analysis of money the logic to deal with these practices—a logic that must now be extended to the levels of meaning and psychosexual development of social subjectivity as against an economistic and positivistic reading of Marx.

Goux's central argument is that commodity fetishism sustains capitalist appropriation only by being linked to the function of the commodity form in writing (logocentrism) and in sexuality (phallocentrism). To account for this, Goux has two arguments. First, he claims that there is a general dialectical logic of the symbolization process. The model for this, of course, is found in Marx's treatment of the value form. Since what is presented is the general logic or outline, it can be effectively extended into the genesis of writing, law, religion and philosophy.[14] In other words, what will finally tie these different

14. "Our thesis is that in conceptualy reproducing the development of contradictions contained in simple exchange... Marx discovered a *dialectical logic* that holds for other types of exchange than market exchange... it is possible to realize, in broad lines, a similar dialectical logic for all sorts of exchanges... On the condition that the category of exchange (and therefore also that of exchange *value*) is given an enlarged, multilateral and complex content... in all social practices. Whether these practices are material or signifying there are economic, political,

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practices to a single social structure is not causal chains or mechanisms but an identical logic of equivalences—the same *form* reproduced through gold, through the law and through the phallus.

The second approach Goux takes is that each mode of production should also be seen as a specific mode of exchange or substitution. In other words, each social system is characterized by a dominant mode of production along with various kinds of substitutions and exchanges between various social practices. This extends from the customary, highly segmented and segregated social formation in which activities are radically incommensurable to the world of generalized social equivalent in which every activity (including, as Marx lists, honor, morality and justice) are capable of entering into commercial exchange. With this, needs and desires (discussed more specifically in genesis of sexuality) come to be objectified in specific forms and therefore, according to Goux, it is the mode of exchange that ties human subjectivity to production and not a reflection of the isolated economic base. "Each phase of the genesis of the money form, which is also the development of the forms of value, constitutes...the form of exchange of a mode of production. This form of economic exchange determines, in the last instance, the mode of substitution in this society, at all levels and in all practices of the social organism...thereby the mechanistic and positivistic dichotomy between superstructure and base can be made more fluid by grasping the conditions and forms of multiple metabolisms which enter into and constitute the life of the social organism: the grasp of its 'symbolization' process as a whole. In place of dividing the social organism in movement between a superstructure and a base...one considers its dominant 'mode of exchange' which intervenes at each level and in practice... One thereby enlarges, on the basis that Marx established with the genetic typology of modes of economic exchange, a concept that M. Mauss and Lévi-Strauss had only been able to demonstrate statistically and partially for primitive societies."[15]

Goux's argument that the economic *form* determines, in the last instance, the mode of substitution or exchange dominant for the social whole is an effort to salvage an orthodox position (made more "fluid" as he says). It is through the dominance of one form of substitution that social practices enter into the reproduction of the mode of production and thus he can claim that they are relatively autonomous. "Correspondence is only intelligible if it is emphasized that these two types of exchange, the economic and the signifier, present the same *mode of symbolization*. The concept of 'symbolization' and 'forms of the symbolization process' furnish a concept of the mode of exchange or substitution... In such a way that the notion of 'mode of symbolization' leads to an enrichment of historical materialism because a

moral religious, philosophical, aesthetic, sexual and intersubjective aspects of exchange." J. J. Goux, *Economie et Symbolique: Marx, Freud* (Paris, 1973), p. 19.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 38. A similar point has recently been made within linguistics. "Semen, excreta and words are communicative products... At the far root, their symbolic significance, the rites, taboos and fantasies which they evoke, and certain of the social controls on their use, are inextricably interwoven." George Steiner, *After Babel* (New York, 1975), p. 39.

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close link can be affirmed between diverse social practices without utilizing a mechanistic type of causality."[16]

For Goux, there are three main modes of symbolization: the economy; signifying practices (writing, law, inscription, art, etc.); and sexuality.[17] For the purpose of this discussion, it is the role of sexuality in the general process of exchange and substitution that is significant and it is here that Goux draws an isomorphic relation between the psychic apparatus—the organization of human desire—and the history of modes of production. "If one can claim, as it is the object of this text to do, that the 'psychic apparatus'... has the same structure as the history of writing, re-evaluated on the base of the history of modes of production and exchange, it is to stress these two aspects. On the one hand, in the subject... (there is) the succession of different phases of the libido..., but on the other, the social actualization of these phases depends on the *dominant signifying forms* with which the subject accommodates in reality, *forms* resulting from an historic process presupposed in the social structure."[18]

Goux wants to take Freud's analysis of the genesis of sexuality as coinciding with Marx's analysis of the genesis of the money form. Marx saw the development through barter, limited exchange and generalized exchange. Goux extends this a bit, adding the money form and abbreviating it as Form I, II, III, and IV. Form I is the moment of immediate identification and corresponds to the "oral stage." This simple "exchange" is broken down with the emergence of different objects having possible equivalences. Form II then corresponds to the anal stage of unprivileged equivalences: breast equals pacifier equals thumb equals piece of cloth. As yet we have no privileged object in the series and of course for Freud the key step to organization in sexuality is the phallus (taken in the symbolic sense—i.e., the phallic form). With the phallus corresponding to Form III, we have an object that can stand for a general equivalence—it is the commodity against which all the other commodities are measured. The equivalence form of the phallus functions to allow the whole object of desire to emerge from its "partial" character in previous forms. Goux then reserves Form IV, the money form, for the genital stage in which the phallic form reaches stability and organization. Here Goux is drawing the analogy with Marx's statement that money represents the material embodiment of the equivalence form. "That Marx discovers historically and logically *four phases* in the genesis of the money form and that Freud is led to distinguish *four stages* in the development of sexual

16. *Economie et Symbolique, op.cit.*, pp. 222-223.

17. "A mode of writing is representative of a mode of signifier exchange. This mode of signification is also manifested in other cultural aspects, such as aesthetic production. There exists a correspondence between the mode of production in general, economic exchange and the mode of signification in particular... it is as if it were possible to discover the same *mode of symbolization* in all characteristic practices of a mode of social production and exchange. Law, dominant intersubjective relations, religion, sexuality, parental relations... entail the same dialectic of symbolization." *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

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organization is no accident... It is a similar genetic process, it is the same principle of discontinuous and progressive structuration that commands the ascension to normative sovereignty of gold, the father and the phallus. The phallus is the general equivalent of *objects,* the father is the general equivalent of *subjects,* in the same way that gold is the general equivalent of *products.* The elements constituting these wholes are different, but the *syntax* by which one of these elements...accedes to power and rules the evaluation of the whole in which it is excluded is identical."[19]

When Goux draws the connection between the genital stage and the money form he reveals the nexus of a theoretical-political distortion common to certain Marxist-Freudian interpretations in France. Theoretically he constructs a semiotic objectivism which converts the dynamic of labor and production into linguistic and cybernetic categories emphasizing equilibration and evolutionism. Politically, Goux asserts an ahistoric privilege to phallocentrism and genital sexuality—a defusing of the critical content of libido theory and repression—clearly paralleling his theoretical objectivism. These errors can be seen concretely in Goux's treatment of Freud and Marx.

First, for Marx, Goux interprets the genesis of the money form as an objective evolutionary development, clearly contained in his use of cybernetic images of equilibration and internal regulation. In this way the genesis *represents* different historical forms completely distorting the abstract-concrete method in Marx by treating the abstract as autonomous and the movement to the concrete as a pure and simple historical progression. However, in Marx the money form is a critique, a "false appearance" concealing exploitation under the "show" of necessity. The money form is *converted into a necessity*—that is precisely the function of the commodity form, as has already been shown. Thus "form" is not a "final stage" in the achievement of organization or stability, not some autonomous movement of reality to be set in correspondence with other movements, but an illusion to be demystified. Thus, history must not merely be *remembered* in its progressive development, so as to be internalized, but robbed of its power of necessity through the emancipation of human activity. The unlinear and evolutionist character of these social forms is a symptom of their *pre-history.*

But this semiotic objectivism is more apparent in Goux's reading of Freud. Here Goux follows a left interpretation of Lacan. The first step is to read the libidinal dynamic in Freud under the model of the signifier—that is, a structural linguistic model of organization for the unconscious. Then the stages for formation of sexuality are tied to this analysis by taking the phallus as a signifier or sign that allows the partial objects of the previous stages (breasts, thumb, clothing, etc.) to become symbolized and therefore capable of exchange. This entrance into the *symbolic order* is for Lacan the resolution of the Oedipus complex—it is the passage to culture and law—and failure to make that transition will manifest itself for the analyst linguistically. Once having secured the linguistic reading of Freud which is both phallocentric and

19. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

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objectivistic, it is a simple step to generalizing this semiotic or "syntactic" model to Marx. "It is clear that this process described in the field of political economy finds an exact homology in the field of language and writing. The opposition between signifier and signified is nothing other than... this "split" between use value and exchange value... In a precise and limited fashion, through the constant of a parallel hegemony between linguistic *meaning* and the exchange *value* of commodities we must trace out the contours and decisive implications that this homology suggests."[20]

In fact, Goux's whole system of isomorphisms rests on doing to Marx what Lacan did to Freud. For Goux, what predominates over production and labor is syntax and semiology. It is this hidden lawfulness of the "signifier" that sustains Goux's objectivist view of historical progression. He abandons Marx's critical use of the designation "form" and turns it into a periodization of *forms* where the function of "significance" and meaning (a general model of representation) comes to replace completely and obscure the real productive activity that is the base of the equivalence form. So Marx's theory of the money form is not seen in its fetishizing dynamic, but as a stabilization and organization of exchange, corresponding to and therefore legitimizing the same function of phallocentrism for sexuality. In this sense Goux distinguishes between the "real economic instrument of economic exchange in the life of society" from a secondary significance, "*a semantization of the use of money.*" "Thus, in a general fashion, it is not *money* as empirical reality nor as unconscious and neurotic signifier that will correspond isomorphically to the phallus. It is the monetary function in the *organization of economic exchange* and the function of the phallus in the instinctual system of exchange (*échange pulsionnels*). Here is the distinction... between, on the one side, the social process of *symbolization* which is... the exchange process (substitution) of vital activities and, on the other hand, the complicating process of *significations*... showing its dimension and its necessity."[21]

It is clear that the economic is only the *economic function* (the priority of the symbolic) and the symbolization process of exchange and substitution has an objectivistic necessity as the basis for "vital activities." In this way, the primary process in Marx and Freud, of the productivity of labor or the libido, is seen only as it functions "linguistically"—only as meaning, signifier, *representation.* Goux has overcome the Marxist mechanism that he sees threatening orthodoxy through a theory of correspondences, parallels and isomorphisms. But these epicycles only serve as myriad paths by which Goux endlessly relates meaning as representations, to what he calls "vital activities." It is this representational model that Goux never questions.

Marx's critical use of the equivalence-form is transformed by Goux into an objectivistic and evolutionary historical model. In this objectivism the process is treated as a simple linear expansion growing toward stability. The symbolic order is thus conceived as the final stage of development that gives history this

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-27.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

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false "show" of necessity and unilinearity. The final step is that Goux relates history to knowledge as an act of contemplation and historical necessity. "The movement of history is the evolution of the total social organism toward its arrangement, at all levels, by the principle of its general equivalence. History reaches its summit (we do not say end) as reorganized and confirmed by the hegemony of major symbols established by the reign of the general equivalent... The summit of history has a place. It is accomplished with the mode of production founded on monetary exchange. And it is the after-effect of this summit (history as science) that we undergo today." [22]

This evolutionary treatment of stages and forms is reproduced in Goux's phallic theory of sexual development. By viewing sexuality in the fixed forms of equilibrium and organization, it is integrated into the objectivist, evolutionary model. Without a critical analysis of Marx's use of the "equivalence form," desire does not appear, in Goux, as a basis for political praxis. Rather, sexuality under the dominance of the equivalence form is treated as a permanent stage of development.

Symbolic Exchange

Goux had made a partial deconstruction of the superstructure-base ideology by arguing that all the levels of the social structure reproduce the value form. Thus, in Goux, a form of economism is overcome by reducing labor (and then libido) to the common denominator of *semanticization*. As can be seen, this reductive solution and use of the symbolic leads to an objectivistic historicism that is the mirror image of the economism that Goux is trying to escape. Politically we find the category of desire fitted into biology, maturation and stable equilibrium. Thus, in an effort to retain a systematic and orthodox Marxist theory, Goux pushes its latent objectivism to an extreme—however, this time not as fatalistic laws of the economy but rather as Lévi-Strauss's naturalistic account of symbolism and mind.

Jean Baudrillard's work forms a unique case in this context because he has focused on a critique of the very semiology Goux accepts without reflection. Baudrillard in *Pour une critique de l'économie politique du signe* extends the fetishism critique to the function of the sign and is thus able to go far beyond what Goux can derive from Marx's theory of the value form. But in addition, Baudrillard wants to do more than show an analogy between the commodity form and the sign. He takes this analysis as breaking down Marx's theory by revealing its naturalistic weak link—namely, the category of use value.

Baudrillard uses the concept of the symbolic and symbolic exchange in a way that is radically different from the "effectiveness" and "structural causality" present in Goux and Lévi-Strauss. For Baudrillard, the symbolic is a critical dimension of demystification, an ever present threat and opposition to the homogeneity of exchange and the commodity form. The entire social structure mobilizes itself against the non-equivalence, ambivalence and incommensurability of true symbolic exchange, according to Baudrillard. This concept of symbolic exchange, in contrast to the socially legitimated

22. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

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appearance of equal exchange, is thus a reformulation of Marx's theory of fetishism. This reformulation and the criticism of Marx that it entails, are the central focus of Baudrillard's book.

As the title of his book suggests, Baudrillard is drawing a comparison between Marx's critique of political economy through the distinction use value-exchange value and a critique of semiology that starts from the distinction of the sign into its signifier (the material vehicle of the sign) and its signified (the meaning or concept referred to by the sign). We are to understand the connection as follows: exchange value and signifier designate *relational* forms, whereas use value and the signified stand for the *content* or object of the relations. Here Baudrillard begins with the crucial aspect of mystification or falsity *produced* by the commodity form and extends it to the broader areas of exchange, i.e., discourse and sexuality. This is the very aspect Goux positivizes in an objective history of forms (resulting in his isomorphic parallels between the commodity form, the sign form and the phallic form). Baudrillard, in opposition, develops the critical side of this dynamic: "Marx had shown that the objectivity of material production resides not in its materiality but in its *form*. That is the point of departure for all critical theory. The same analytic reduction must be made of ideology: its objectivity does not reside in its 'ideality,' i.e., in a realist metaphysics of *thought content*, but in its form... Ideology is in fact the whole process of reduction and abstraction of symbolic material in a form—but the reductive abstraction presents itself immediately as value (autonomy), as content (transcendence), as representation of consciousness (signified). It is the same process that inscribes (donne à lire) in the commodity an autonomous value, a transcendent reality, by miscomprehending (*méconnaissance*) its form and the abstract labor that it brings about."[23]

Baudrillard argues, as will be shown, that this connection between the commodity form and the sign leads to uncovering a latent idealist anthropology of "needs" in Marx—an anthropology contained in Marx's "naturalization" of use value in the labor theory of value of *Capital*. In Baudrillard's language, Marx's treatment of use value is as if "the fetishized commodity appears as a real immediate value, correlated with the subject by needs and use value, and circulating according to the rules of exchange value." To correct this, the theory of fetishism must be extended from the commodity form to the realm of the *object form* (for example, *utility* as a coding of the object prior to exchange). Objects are not autonomous contents waiting to be signified and given a meaning; rather, they are already, as objects, coded and formed. As in Baudrillard's example, "utility" already forms the object prior to its exchange so that it cannot be the case that use value refers to a permanent need served by objects. Use value is the *form* in which objects and needs coincide.[24]

23. J. Baudrillard, *Pour une critique de l'economie politique du signe* (Paris, 1972), pp. 174-75.

24. "We call the *form object* the abstract equivalence of utilities, we also say that the

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By showing that the value form is preceded by an object form, Baudrillard can establish a relation between signification and the economic without recourse to the model of infrastructure and superstructure. In other words, the production of both objects (as objects of use) and meanings (as in the realm of culture) are related because of their *form*. But in recognizing this we must treat semiology (the study of the production of signs and meanings) as Marx treated political economy. Semiology is the political economy of cultural production and the sign is the corollary to the commodity. The sign form and the commodity form operate through equivalence, reduction and abstraction. "Ideology is the very form itself which traverses all the fields of social production. It is the taking up of all production (material or symbolic;) in a similar process of abstraction, of reduction, general equivalence and exploitation. 1. This is so because *the logic of the commodity and of political economy is at the very heart of the sign*...which can function as exchange value (the discourse of communication) and as use value (the rational decoding and socially distinctive use of the sign). 2. This is so because the *structure of the sign is at its very heart the commodity form*...because it constitutes itself by its form, as a total medium, as a system of communication regulating the whole social exchange. As a form sign the commodity is a *code* ordering the exchange of value." [25]

Thus Baudrillard's aim is to show how the commodity form can extend itself through the entire social field and, of course, not bring in a direct theory of causation (economism) or a representational theory of "mirroring" between superstructure and base. Such a separation between the cultural and the economic is itself a function of the ideological form. In addition, Baudrillard argues that a specific kind of exploitation occurs through the sign as it functionally organizes the cultural sphere. In fact, he argues that exploitation is now predominantly in the sphere of significant, that is, it is no longer production or the commodity form as value but the object form as utility that produces the most intense mystification and social control (hence the shift from political economy to semiology as the subject matter for radical critique). Furthermore, in coding objects for consumption, need and fulfillment a new "surplus value" is extracted in the form and level of consumption. This new fetishization at the level of signification can only be opposed, according to Baudrillard, with a form of exchange (exchange which is ambivalent, non-equivalent, non-reductive and symbolic) that strikes at the code's authority. Thus, there is a conjuncture between Baudrillard's rejection of "production" as the starting point for Marxist theory and his position that political struggle must center on positivized, economistic forms of consumption (not around labor). Before discussing this, however, a clarification of Baudrillard's critique of Marx is necessary.

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form object is only the developed form of the form commodity. In other words, the same logic (and the same fetishism) operates on both sides of the commodity, use value and exchange value, as specified by Marx." *Ibid.*, p. 160.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 176-77.

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The issue revolves around Marx's use of the category "use value" in the treatment of the labor theory of value. Baudrillard claims that Marx imports into the concept of "use value" an ideology of primary given "needs" that rest on an assumed autonomous relation of humans to their products. This primitive, constant conception of need (and satisfaction) forms the basis of an anthropological objectivism latent in Marx's theory. Baudrillard supports this by quoting those passages early in Volume I of *Capital* where Marx speaks of use values as the constants of all societies, as leaving or "exiting" the exchange process by being consumed, or as representing the physiological constant of useful labor. The conclusion is that for Marx, use value refers to an object satisfying a need or use directly whether or not exchange exists and as a seemingly natural physiological constant.[26]

From this it would appear that unlike Marx's treatment of exchange value, use value does not entail the objectification or fetishization of social relations. Implicitly this leads Marx, Baudrillard argues, to assume a *constant of utility*, falsifying and reifying a *form* as though it were a "natural" property of the object. This assumed objectivity and universality of objects as "useful" circumscribes the whole dynamic in a fictitious substratum of human needs. "It appears that the 'fetishism of commodities'...does not operate on the commodity simultaneously as exchange value *and* use value, but only on exchange value. Use value in this restrictive analysis of fetishism does not appear as a social relation, nor therefore as a place of fetishization: utility *as such* escapes the historical determination of class: it designates a final objective relation of simple destination which does not mask itself and whose transparence as *form* defines history (even if its content continually changes with social and cultural determinations). It is here that Marxist idealism operates, it is here that it is necessary to be more logical than Marx himself, in his own sense, more radical. Use value, utility itself, as all abstract equivalence of commodities, is a fetishized *social relation*—an abstraction, that of the *system of needs*, which takes as its evidence a false concrete destination, a finality proper to goods and products—just as the abstraction of social labor which founds the logic of equivalence (exchange value) hides itself under the illusion of value infused in the commodity."[27]

Therefore, Marx's famous quote concerning the "different hunger" satisfied by a knife and fork versus tearing the meat off the bone is not an answer to Baudrillard's criticism. This simply assumes change in "content" through cultural relativity while preserving an unmediated relationship to the satisfaction of the need *as such*, i.e., as object form. According to Baudrillard then, even in that quote, Marx still assumes that *the object's* usefulness or ability to satisfy a human need is somehow naturally there and given rather

26. Baudrillard's point could be formulated as the claim that Marx retains an economictic definition of "needs" and "use value." Baudrillard defines consumption "not as traditional political economy defines it (namely, the reinversion of economic exchange into use value, as a moment of the production cycle) but as the conversion of economic exchange value into exchange sign value." *Ibid.*, p. 129.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

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than formed through social relations. Baudrillard offers for further proof the fact that Marx never entertains the possibility of a *system of needs* (or needs as form) as he does with the commodity. Marx asserts in *Capital* that use values, unlike exchange values, are "incomparable" and their irreducible particularity makes it impossible to treat them in a homogeneous fashion. Baudrillard's point is that this is simply inconsistent. For there to be exchange value it is already necessary that *utility* become the principle of reality for the object as product. Exchange presupposes that the objects are already *rationalized as useful.* The reduction to utility is the basis for both exchange and systematization—the preconditions, in Baudrillard, for fetishism (which he defines as the reduction of the symbolic-ambivalent to the systematic-equivalent). For Baudrillard exchange and the equivalence-form are made possible by an object's being made comparable through the common denominator of functional-rational. (Only the objects of symbolic exchange retain their true singularity and incommensurability.) Therefore, to be more radical than Marx is to see the priority of the object form over the commodity form. "Every object is translatable in the abstract general code of utility, which is its reason, its objective law, its meaning... It is functionality which enters the object as code, and this code, which bases itself on the adequacy of an object to its end (use), surmounts all real and virtual objects... The commodity form is only the developed form of this economic calculus to which it continually returns. But the use value (utility) is also a *social relation*, contrary to the anthropological illusion that wants to create a simple relation between the 'need' of man and the usefulness of the object. Just as in exchange value the man-producer does not appear as the creator but only as socially abstract labor power, so in the system of use values the man-consumer never appears as desire and fulfillment (*jouissance*) but as socially abstract need power."[28]

With the rationalization of utility as the condition for the equivalence form (and exploitation centered on the functional object form instead of the economic value form), Baudrillard has given both a theoretical account of the shift of social control outside of the direct laboring process and a political significance to the intense cultural subjugation and manipulation of needs and desires (a significance obscured by the naturalization of use value). The latent fetishizing of use value in Marx reappears in the failure of Marxism as a whole to grasp the role of consumption and exchange that characterizes late capitalism. Baudrillard extends this to theorists who have raised these questions, who are critical of orthodox Marxism but still cling to the distinction between true and false needs (e.g., Marcuse).

There are two aspects of Baudrillard's reading of Marx. First, Baudrillard reiterates that the priority Marx gives to labor and praxis is obsolete both theoretically and politically. Baudrillard is aware that labor for Marx is a dimension of human activity escaping the value form but believes that for historical and theoretical reasons the only alternative and escape from the

28. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

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code is what Baudrillard calls "symbolic exchange." Secondly, Baudrillard explicitly pursues a non-dialectical reading of Marx and therefore ignores the abstract-concrete mode of presentation.[29] In describing the method of *Capital*, Marx emphasized its dialectical mode of presentation. The main concepts are given to the reader not in a literal historical progression nor in the haphazard manner in which they occurred during Marx's research, but are laid out from the point of immediacy and abstraction to the mediated concrete. Thus methodologically Marx's statements about use value have to be understood in their "logical" position of abstract immediacy. It would simply be wrong to assume that therefore these are the aspects that are "autonomous" in Marx. Also, Marx maintains a consistent terminology of distinguishing between the two *forms* of the object as immediate and mediated. It is very odd that these quotes, which are so central, never appear in Baudrillard's discussion, but this may follow from his anti-dialectical position. At any rate, further developments of Baudrillard's criticism, which is becoming very popular, must at least deal with those quotes in Marx that seem to stand in the face of Baudrillard's thesis.

But the main point does not reduce to an argument about how to read a text, no matter how interesting that may be. One could still argue in support of Baudrillard's position that Marx does talk about a "metabolism between Man and Nature" as a constant or "imposed necessity" of labor.[30] Doesn't this passage point to an at least implicit substratum view in Marx where History remains constrained by certain fixed and natural needs? But what is at issue in these quotes is precisely whether Marx can claim that labor or production escapes the value form. To put it in Baudrillard's language, can Marx claim that praxis is a non-reductive, ambivalent form of exchange? In the quote above, the "imposed necessity" concerns the necessity of mediation between production and the objects and needs that are objectively and subjectively formed. Therefore, it stands opposed to the view of natural immediacy. The following quote from the *Grundrisse* makes exactly the same point about what is *constant* in the labor process—it is certainly not the need or the object, but the mediation of labor. "The object is not the only thing which production creates for consumption. Production also gives consumption its specificity... *the object is not the object in general,* but a specific object which must be consumed in a specific manner, *to be mediated in its turn by production itself.*"[31]

29. "After the *Requiem* for the Dialectic, it is necessary to sound the *Requiem* for Infra and Superstructure." *Ibid.*, p. 207. Also his argument about the difference between his concept of "ambivalence" and the dialectical theory of negation. p. 263f.

30. "Labor...is an eternal natural necessity which *mediates* the metabolism between man and nature, and therefore human life itself." *Capital, op. cit.*, p. 133.

31. *Grundrisse, op. cit.*, p. 92. Of course Baudrillard is correct in arguing that an objectivist reading obliterates the whole theory of fetishism. But it is easy to show, and Baudrillard ignores those passages, that Marx continually refers to the natural or physical aspects of the commodity as *forms*. However a non-dialectical reading would miss the connection between *natural* and *immediate* and therefore tend to objectify immediacy, much as Baudrillard describes in his critique of use value. "Therefore they only appear as commodities, or have the form of

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Marx intends this as a non-positivized form of exchange not reducible to the value form. Thus the dialectical mode of presentation is inseparable from seeing that it is mediation, not objects or needs (which are in themselves abstract), which is not equivalent and not reducible. It is not specific social objects or needs that are necessary, but production as the material form of mediation. Marx's whole argument revolves around showing that the mediating power of labor is in reality not identical to the specific historical *form of labor*. The fetishism of the commodity form acts, of course, to create that identity and reify the labor process within the value form. But is that not exactly what Baudrillard intends with his concept of symbolic exchange that plays the same oppositional and critical role even to the point of a similar analysis of mystification and form? Then the real point of difference is a choice between praxis and symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is quite correct in opposing an objectivistic or naturalistic reading of Marx (a position in which he is hardly alone) but he has given no basis either for the claim that Marx does not see that use values are a form (in fact, quotes can be found to the contrary) or, beyond this textual point, that a theory of praxis or labor necessarily entails an anthropologism of needs.

The argument concluding this section can be summarized. It will be shown that Baudrillard's category of "symbolic exchange" functions identically to the category of labor in *Capital*. That is, both represent that which breaks the dominance of the equivalence-form *immanently* to the process. However, "symbolic exchange" is an inferior concept because it views the social process solely from the side of consumption and exchange and acts against the equivalence form only through "lack" (desire that cannot be fulfilled). This political passivity follows from the disappearance of the moment of praxis. Thus, despite many valid criticisms of mechanical Marxism, Baudrillard is left in a completely ideological and contemplative position. He is open to the very phenomenon of "integration" that he warns against. A "unique" form of exchange or consumption is a weak moment of opposition within a social structure that is oriented to the illusory independence of consumption.

Baudrillard's examples of symbolic exchange are the "gift" or the act of gratuitous consumption whose classic example is the potlach ceremony—the whole concept is heavily dependent on anthropological theories of Marcel Mauss and Lévi-Strauss. Symbolic exchange asserts itself continually against positivity, equivalence and reduction either in the value form (the exclusivity of use value and exchange value) or in the realm of meaning (the systematization of the sign). Baudrillard's point is that since the sign and commodity are one, unified as form, it is only in symbolic exchange that both the economic and symbolic aspects are opposed. Exploitation occurs not only at the level of the commodity's production but at the level in which it codes

commodities, in so far as they possess a *double form*, i.e., natural form and value form." *Capital, op. cit.*, p. 138. "This contradiction can be overcome only by objectifying it: i.e., by positing the commodity as a *double form*, first in its *natural immediate form*, then in its mediated form, as money." *Grundrisse, op. cit.*, p. 168.

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and preforms our needs. In this way the radical character of desire is sublimated into value (the functional and the equivalent). The culmination of the equivalence form at the level of consumption (at the level of the object form) is that all demands are fulfilled, all lack is resolved. Desire is therefore robbed of its radical impact by continually being sublimated into socially available objects. Its ideological appearance of fulfillment is simply the fact that desire is made to coincide with a preformed object. This is how needs and their satisfaction have an ideological effect, how the very act of consumption integrates and disarms the possibility of a demand that cannot be socially met. The object form is then the unity of the commodity and the sign, it operates not only at the level of value but more importantly, for Baudrillard, it operates to abolish the symbolic, the different and the ambivalent. It seeks to abolish desire as subjectivity spilling outside the pregiven meanings.

But Baudrillard sees an inner dynamic driving equivalent exchange into crisis, a limit to the law of equivalence, control over desire and surplus value of the code which Baudrillard calls the exhaustion (*défaillance*) of the subject. Here the parallel with Marx is intentional. "The realization process of value resolves all demand into a poor unilateral and positive modality, dispossessing the subject of his symbolic demand, defined as a demand not fulfilling desire (i.e., as lack) and a demand not mediated by the systematic logic of value (i.e., as symbolic exchange). Since pleasure (*la jouissance*) is *radical* but value is sublimation, this radical demand is sublimated in value. In the economic order it is the commodity which incarnates this sublimation: the radical demand of the subject is sublimated there in the ceaselessly renewed positivity of its demand for objects. But behind this realized sublimation of value...there is *something irreducible* which can take the form of violent destruction, but more often takes the concealed form of deficit, exhaustion and the refusal or resistance to both the investment and fulfillment of desire—which...in concert with the present economic system, takes the form of what could be called the *tendency of the rate of fulfillment (jouissance) to fall.*" [32]

However, the politics of the *défaillance* of the subject are as dubious as the mechanistic theories of breakdown that Baudrillard correctly castigates. There is a familiarity to the argument. Desire is radical and revolutionary. But not because it seeks true needs and the fulfillment of some human nature, rather because it *threatens* the equivalence of utility and exchange. The question is, of course, how this "threat," this demand which fails to be sublimated in value, emerges? Here Baudrillard's answer of "exhaustion" is the political side of the passivity entailed in giving priority to consumption—an aspect it shares with traditional breakdown theories. Without a concept of praxis, Baudrillard cannot articulate the struggle as immanent, subjective and critical. The radical aspect of desire then is already held apart from labor (praxis in the narrowest sense). Baudrillard has shown how consumption and

32. *Pour une critique...op. cit.*, pp. 261-62.

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exchange are massively integrated into the social code. Against this tendency the hope that the subject will exhaust itself is as weak as the economistic hope that surplus value will exhaust itself. Nor does it give any content to the alternative of symbolic exchange.

Baudrillard is a penetrating critic of a Marxism that equates revolution with restoring commodities to their true use values and therefore assumes that the relation between needs and production will someday be transparent.[33] For Baudrillard this is a failure to understand that exploitation is no longer centered in economic production and more seriously serves to *continue exploitation* at the level of symbolic manipulation. "The social order is located in this investment of power by desire, through its fulfillment. It preserves the rules of the game by giving desire a 'need' to be fulfilled and exploiting this sublimation in its reproduction. This is where the *phantasm* and the institution are joined, the political order of power and the fetishized order of perversion (i.e., desire as fulfillment rather than symbolic exchange)... To radically subvert the logic of exchange value it is not sufficient to restore the autonomy of use value, it is necessary to restore the possibility of giving, that is to say to change the *form of social relations*.... In preserving, despite their radical analysis, a certain level of value (use value) and in coding at this level, the 'liberators' have preserved at the same time a certain level of power and manipulation."[34]

It is difficult to tell to whom the above passage is referring. Even the Marcuse that Baudrillard attacks in several other passages would accept the statement about a change in the form of social relations—the whole question revolves around the basis of that change. Much of Baudrillard's theoretical explanation of how exploitation transforms desire through fetishization is totally consonant with certain internal critiques of Marxist theory. However, the theory of desire Baudrillard ultimately concludes with is a collapse into an ineffectual demand for purposeless exchange. By seeking to liberate at first "the relation of exchange itself" Baudrillard is trapped in the passively conceived alternative of a different object form. One of his statements describing symbolic exchange is: "This object there, this *res nulla*, does not have a use value, it serves no purpose." Finally, since he reifies labor praxis in its economistic form, Baudrillard can only see desire manifest itself as indistinct longing and thereby excludes desire from the act of production. The struggle for symbolic exchange shares one aspect with the ideology it criticizes, namely, that human desire and human labor are irreconcilable.

33. An example of what Baudrillard has in mind is the following passage from Marcuse's discussion of use value in Marx. "The introduction of the category of use value was the introduction of a forgotten factor, forgotten, that is, by classical political economy which was preoccupied only with the phenomena of exchange value. In the Marxian theory, this factor becomes an instrument which *cuts through the mystifying reification* of the commodity world. For, restoration of the category of use value to the center of economic analysis, means a sharp questioning of the economic process as to whether and how it fills the *real needs of individuals*." Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution* (Boston, 1960), pp. 303-304.

34. *Pour une critique...op. cit.*, pp. 264-65.

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Desiring Production

Baudrillard's main point is that the category of exploitation should be shifted from commodity production to the level of the sign (coding system) where objects for consumption form an equivalence of meaning between needs and desires. This is contrasted with the possibility of symbolic exchange which, as a non-economistic form of consumption, fights the fetishization of the object as a use value and as a satisfaction of pre-given needs. Baudrillard concludes that the hegemony of exchange value-use value is not broken through a new form of labor, which still accepts the ideology of production, but a new form of incommensurable exchange.

Deleuze and Guattari,[35] while agreeing with Baudrillard's attack on the "representational" model of desire, insist however on taking production as the central concept and therefore viewing desire as a form of production. For Deleuze and Guattari, desiring production and social production are a continuous process—what they call a "flux"—and thus they do not begin with the field of semiology (the realm of cultural reproduction) as Goux and Baudrillard. Deleuze and Guattari can agree with Marx's starting point of material production if it is understood in the broadest metabolic terms. As we will see, their analysis attempts to unify a microanalysis at the level of the body with a macroanalysis at the level of social structures and institutions using the notion of desiring "machine" or desiring production.

The position of *L'Anti-Oedipe* is that "It is at the level of flux and. . . *not* at the level of ideology, that the integration of desire is brought about."[36] Desire does not belong to the sphere of ideology, i.e., representation, phantasm, etc. Desire is a flux, a flow, not a symbolic simulacre and therefore it does not stand in a signified relation to production but squarely within it. Thus, in agreement with Baudrillard, Deleuze and Guattari do not see desire as the representation of drives or natures but in opposition to Baudrillard, desire is neither something rediscovered in moments of non-reciprocal exchange. For Deleuze and Guattari the dominant ideology is exchangist, that is, it reduces social reproduction to the sphere of circulation. This has a double impact. First, it only allows us to see the integration of desire into the social whole at the level of the circulation of goods (for the satisfaction of needs) not at the level of the production of the desire itself. Second, it conceals the link between labor and desire. Therefore desire, in its radical form, can only appear in the negative—as lack of fulfillment.

But the main reason Deleuze and Guattari would be dissatisfied with even Baudrillard's symbolic, non-equivalent form of circulation is that they are trying to develop a more complex view of how desiring production forms a part of different societies. One of the main themes of *L'Anti-Oedipe* is that social structures have different means by which desire as a productive force is controlled. Each mode of production has forms that channel desire back into the social institutions so as not to allow the emergence of what Baudrillard

35. G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *Capitalisme et Schizophrenie: L'Anti-Oedipe* (Paris, 1972).
36. *Ibid.*, p. 284.

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designated negatively as "ambivalence" or non-fulfillment. The main contrast for Deleuze and Guattari is between pre-capitalist societies that utilize coding (not being used in the same sense that Baudrillard uses it) of desire so that it can only be invested in certain objects and relations and capitalism which is unique because it allows for expanding production while using the equivalence-form to constrain desire to the exchange system. This discussion by Deleuze and Guattari will be considered in detail after some general comments on their work.

The theme of *L'Anti-Oedipe* is that capitalism is literally perverse, both in its dominant moment of fetishizing object relations and in its subversion of all "difference," of all specificity to the single-minded exchange process. To be exchanged and to be equivalent is a logic that leaves no relation or social level untouched. Capitalism stands in a radical relation to all previous societies since it liberates production from all the boundaries that societies erect against productive and economic autonomy. Capitalism lives on the energy released when the coherence of pre-capitalist societies is torn asunder. However, this tearing asunder is not through coercion but in the very liberation and consequent levelling of subjectivity. In one of Marx's presentations of abstract labor he shows the connection between productivity as liberated and the dominance of the equivalence form. "Indifference towards a specific kind of labor presupposes a very developed totality of a real kinds of labor, of which no single one is any longer dominant. As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest possible concrete development, where one thing appears common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form alone. On the one side, this abstraction of labor as such is merely the mental produce of a concrete totality of labors. Indifference towards specific labors corresponds to a form of society... Not only the category of labor but labor in reality has here become the means of creating wealth in general, and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form." [37]

For Deleuze and Guattari, this process culminates in capitalism's production of schizophrenia. Schizophrenia stands as the absolute limit of this pervasive indifference. It is the "breakdown" inherent in and haunting this universalization of equivalence and exchange which is the capitalist mode of production. The schizophrenic as the final product is also that which stands outside of all exchange since it is a product of absolute decoding, the complete desocialization of the body—a descent into indifference and homogeneity. It can no longer enter into the exchange process. Schizophrenia is the true industrial waste and this liberation through indifference presents a weak link, for Deleuze and Guattari, in the capitalist repression of desire. "The relation of sehizophrenia to capitalism goes beyond the problems of mode of life, environment, ideology, etc., and must be posed at the deepest level of a single and same economy, of a single and same process of

37. *Grundrisse, op. cit.*, p. 104.

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production. Our society produces schizos like automobiles and shampoo with the only difference that schizos are not saleable... One could say that schizophrenia is the *exterior* limit of capitalism itself or boundary of its most profound tendency. But capitalism can only function on the condition that it inhibit this tendency or repress and displace this limit by substituting its own relatively *immanent* limits that it endlessly reproduces on an enlarged scale. The Marxist law of a counter-tendency must be reinterpreted in such a manner... The problem for capitalism is to link...energy in a world axiomatic which always opposes new interior limits to the revolutionary power of the decoded flux." [38]

Capitalism liberates the subject's productivity but that which it decodes (to free production and subjectivity from organic, biological and social boundaries), it must immediately rechannel into the equivalence form (which is a kind of interiorized limit). Schizophrenia is a product of universal decoding that cannot be integrated back into the capitalist axiomatic. "The flux is decoded and axiomatized simultaneously in capitalism. Therefore schizophrenia (which escapes the axiomatic) is not the identity of capitalism but on the contrary its difference, its disappearance and its death." [39]

For *L'Anti-Oedipe*, the fuel of capital is the release of subjectivity in the form of production but each "decoding" of the subject renews a potential threat of non-integration, that desire will not be channeled through the equivalence form of exchange. The project of *L'Anti-Oedipe* is to understand what engineers this re-integration and how capitalism mobilizes to control desire (in ways radically distinct from pre-capitalist societies). Deleuze and Guattari conclude that the Oedipus complex (and with it the whole psychoanalytic institution with its legal, medical and industrial forms) is the front line fortification holding released subjectivity within the confines of its fulfilling, positive and legitimating institutional form. Human desires find their expression only within familial exchange and therefore its social and productive reality is effectively hidden.

The relation of *L'Anti-Oedipe* to psychoanalysis is actually two-sided. First, with Freud psychoanalysis represents the discovery of libido, the abstract power of desire and is thus central to Deleuze and Gauttari's project of a unified micro-macro analysis of desiring production (as libido and as labor). But, at the same time, psychoanalysis is structured to rechannel libido into the privatized family. Therefore, Freud and psychoanalysis stand in relation to the theory of desire as classical political economy does with regard to a theory of labor. The discovery of productivity in general (i.e., labor) is accompanied by eternalizing productivity within what is only a particular historical form. Similarly with desire, the abstraction of desire from its particular manifestation to form the concept of libido is accompanied with an eternalization of familial exchange. The following quote, which is so central to understanding the book, shows how Deleuze and Guattari see desire and

38. *L'Anti-Oedipe*. pp. 291-92.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

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labor as the constitution of subjectivity. "As Marx says, it is in capitalism that the essence becomes subjective, *productive activity in general*, and that abstract labor becomes something real by which all previous social formations can be re-interpreted from the viewpoint of decoding or a generalized process of deterritorialization... It is the same thing with abstract desire as libido, as subjective essence. It is not simply a question of a mere parallel between social capitalist production and desiring production, or even between the capital-money flux and the excrement-flux of desire. The relation is much closer: The desiring machine is nothing more than the social machine, so that the conjuncture of decoded fluxes in the capitalist machine tends to liberate free figures of a universal subjective libido. Briefly, the discovery of a productive activity *in general and without distinction*, such as it appears in capitalism, is inseparable from the discoveries of political economy *and* psychoanalysis... That is not to say that the capitalist man desires labor or that labor follows desire in capitalism. The identity of labor and desire is rather, not a myth, but the active utopia *par excellence* which designates the capitalist limit that desiring production overcomes. But why, precisely, is desiring production finally always antagonistic to capitalism?... Capitalism, in the same moment that it discovers the subjective essence of desire and labor—the common essence of productive activity in general—immediately alienates it again in a repressive machine which separates and maintains the essence as divided; abstract labor on one side, abstract desire on the other: political economy *and* psychoanalysis, political economy *and* libidinal economy...the appearance of psychoanalysis within capitalism."[40]

Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate their thesis in two broad critiques—both converging on Oedipus. First, the complex is attacked within psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic theory (as well as therapeutic practice). Here Deleuze and Guattari, to put it schematically, try to recover a radical Freud of the libido theory from the conservative Freud of the metapsychology and Greek mythology. Schizophrenia is the anomaly that always disrupted the psychoanalytic model and the schizophrenic's refusal to remain enclosed within the familial analysis of Oedipus is not an example of resistance but a basis for a social and materialist theory of desire. The schizophrenic teaches us that desire is invested throughout the social field—not primarily within the family—and that desire is something produced rather than a set of representations "standing for" myths, theater or ideas. This side of *L'Anti-Oedipe* cannot be discussed within this paper. Second, the attack on Oedipus is begun again, in the middle sections of the book, through a "history" of desiring production as social production. A demonstration which is not concerned with whether or not Oedipus exists in all societies but why the complex appears universal with capitalism. The answer is that Oedipus is the *form* of desire just as the commodity labor power is the *form* of labor in a society of generalized exchange and equivalence. Deleuze and Guattari's periodization of societies is meant to show how desire is abstracted (both for

40. *Ibid.*, p. 359-60.

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theory and in practice) and how the form of the abstraction serves to enclose and repress desire within the imaginary exchange of familialism—the suprasocial triangle: mother, father and me.

Savagery and Barbarism

The following treatment of pre-capitalist societies is very briefly summarized from a more detailed and lengthy section of *L'Anti-Oedipe*. The intention here is only to suggest the contrast with capitalism rather than follow Deleuze and Guattari in their use of anthropological evidence and historical studies of ancient society. This would be much too complicated for this paper. The same problem arises with both the style and terminology of *L'Anti-Oedipe*. Since this paper is not meant as a study of the book itself, I have purposely avoided going into the reasons for their particular vocabulary (especially the term "machines," the obvious borrowings from cybernetics and Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts) as well as the quasi-literary style—which makes it very difficult to do a linear, discursive criticism. Since the book supplies alternative terms in most instances, I have avoided the terminology that relates to their problematic cybernetic conception and have used the passages that move toward a dialectical and totalizing treatment. This, of course, does not mean that there are not conceptual problems at the base of these literary effects. Specifically, as will be shown, Deleuze and Guattari lack a dialectical approach to the relation between desire and labor or more generally between the micro and macro levels of analysis. This leads to a kind of metaphysical infatuation with the category of production that levels the differences and contradictions between social processes into the monism of "microscopic" flux. However, when turning to social and historical analysis (and therefore away from the quasi-biologcial treatment of desire) *L'Anti-Oedipe* adopts a view of production as praxis that is very penetrating, as in the following statement: "But the (capitalist) universe has for its function dividing the subjective essence (identity of nature) into two functions, that of alienated abstract labor in private property which reproduces enlarged interior limits for capitalism and that of alienated abstract desire in the privatized family which produces ever narrower interior limits. It is this double alienation of labor and desire that endlessly deepens and enlarges differences inside this essential identity."[41] The point, therefore, of a history of the "desiring machine" or desire as a moment of the mode of production is to show how societies are organized to contain desire and how differences in that control relate to different forms of subjectivity itself.

When Deleuze and Guattari use the term "coding" in relation to desire, they are referring only to pre-capitalist societies. They divide pre-capitalist social formations broadly into primitive, kinship-based societies (savagery) and regimes of central state power, in which lineage is replaced by a despotic ruler (barbarism). In the primitive society, desire and production are unified

41. *Ibid.*, p. 403.

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as the *earth*. Each flux, whether that is a metabolism of procreation, agriculture, exchange or language, must be coded so that it is inscribed on and does not escape the regulation of the societies' collective source and body —in this case the earth itself.

The primitive form of the code is writing directly on the body—"tattooing, excising, carving up, sacrificing, mutilating, initiating." In this way each organism is a collective body, an earth on which the social demands are literally written. The code is physically present on both the forces and agents of the production process. But this code is weakened as it is limited to physical marking and yet must contain such complex and qualitatively distinct processes (flux) as herds and grain or sperm and menses. The inherent limit is that as there is a growing complexity to the population and production (two distinct fluxes) the control and constraint on activities only operate as they are present on flesh. "It is an act of foundation, by which man ceases to be a biological organism and becomes a full body, an earth on which are inscribed...the demands of the socius. It is a question of giving man a memory: man, who is constituted by an active faculty of forgetting, must *make* for himself another memory, a collective memory, through the repression of biological memory. A memory of speech and no longer of things, a memory of signs and no longer of effects. This terrible alphabet, a system of cruelty whose organization traces the sign on the body itself."[42]

Coding by direct inscription must allow nothing—especially wealth or prestige—to escape collective investment.[43] This is why "production" in primitive society cannot be treated solely as an economic activity. No activity, however, can become autonomous from the regulation of the social body since that would be a direct threat to the code. For Deleuze and Guattari, each production process has the potential for "abstraction" and privatization and either moment would deny to the regime the collective appropriation of an organ or an activity. In fact, in the primitive society, desire appears as that which lies beyond the code (the violation of the interdiction) and therefore is represented by a body which is no longer communal, no longer a collective investment—a body which is not human. "Deterritorialization is the nightmare that the primitive machine wards off with all its forces...nightmare or anguished premonition of what will be the decoding of the flux and the collective disinvestment of organs, the being-abstract of the flux of desire

42. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

43. In speaking of the primitive social formation, Deleuze and Guattari say that, "The unities are never persons in the 'privatized' sense of the word but in *series* which determine the connection, disjunction and conjuncture of organs. This is why fantasies are group fantasies. It is a collective investment of organs which roots desire in the *social* and reunites social and desiring production in the 'earth' as totality. Our modern societies, on the contrary, have proceeded in a vast privatization of organs, which corresponds to the decoding of the flux, to its being made abstract." *Ibid.*, p. 167. Along the same lines is this quote from Marx concerning the emergence of exchange. "The less social power of the medium of exchange (and at this state it is still closely bound to the nature of the direct product of labor and the direct needs of partners in exchange) the greater must be the power of the community which binds the individual. *Grundrisse. op. cit.*, p. 157.

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and the being-private of organs... The primitive machine does not ignore exchange, commerce and industry, it wards them off, localizes them, encastes them maintaining the merchant...in a subordinated position so that the flux of exchange and production does not come to break the code in the name of abstract and fictive quantities."[44]

This paper cannot go over the arguments Deleuze and Guattari use to construct a transition from primitive society to the formation of despotic regimes which replace lineage based on communal systems with a relatively privatized relation between the ruler and the subjected. The despotic state (here Deleuze and Guattari combine analyses taken from Marx's treatment of Asiatic despotism, Engels's treatment of barbarism, and Wittfogel's work) replaces nature or earth with the body of the despot. This is, of course, an abstracted or conceptualized *source* for society and as a code it substitutes for the primitive marking on flesh abstract signs (systems of writing, legality, morality, etc.) which create the potential for property and personal wealth. It is the centralization over production, as represented in abstraction by the body of the despot, that makes the despotics code distinct from the primitive. "The essence of the State is the creation of a new inscription by which the new body, immobile, monumental and immutable, appropriates all the forces and agents of production; but this inscription allows the older territorial inscriptions to remain... The imperial inscription recovers all the territorial alliances and affiliations and makes them converge on the direct affiliation of the despot with God, the new alliance of the despot with the people. All the coded fluxes of the primitive machine are maintained up to the point where the despotic machine overcodes them. *Overcoding,* which constitutes the essence of the centralized state, is at the same time a measure of its continuity and rupture with ancient formations. There is still the horror of desire which will not be coded but also the establishment of a new inscription which overcodes and makes desire the possession of the despot."[45]

This introduces a new *economy* of repression. In the primitive social formation there is no direct sign of repression, desire is coded indirectly by coding all activities and not allowing privatization of investment. Now the despot *represents* repression. Instead of attempting to regulate all activities, the people are allowed a private and personal existence as subjects (here Hegel's analysis of the Roman world is obviously the model) with the consequent universalization and abstraction of the State or despot. Human desire itself now becomes a direct object of the code because the code can now operate through the abstraction of legal and moral prohibitions. This is the economy of repression that Deleuze and Guattari call overcoding.[46]

44. *L'Anti-Oedipe. op. cit.,* pp. 179-80.

45. *Ibid.,* pp. 235-36.

46. "In contradistinction to the old gentile organization, the state, first, divides its subjects *according to territory*... The second is the establishment of a *public* power which no longer directly coincides with the population organizing itself as an armed force... This public power...consists not merely of armed people but also of material adjuncts, prisons and institutions of coercion of all kinds." Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the*

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Capitalism

There is an enigmatic line of Marx which Deleuze and Guattari take as an essential insight. "World history did not always exist; history as world history is a result."[47] For them this means that capitalism *produces* universality, and thus world history, through its unique function of decoding. It substitutes for the intrinsic coding of pre-capitalist social formations an "axiomatic" of abstract quantities. In the production of abstract labor, as the decoding of previously naturalized forms of labor, the *universality* of societies is concretely understood—namely, productive activity. Capital is a permanent revolt against coding and therefore grasps *in negation* all previous social formations. "In a certain way capitalism has haunted all forms of society, but haunts them as their terrifying nightmare, the panic and fear they have of a flux which will overflow their codes. On the other hand, if it is capitalism which determines the conditions and possibility of a universal history, it is only to the extent that it has to do with its own essential limits, its own destruction... Briefly, universal history is not only retrospective, it is contingent, singular, ironic and critical."[48]

As we have seen, the primitive social formation constantly comes up against dispersion as the limit of its codes. For example, the primitive coding of desire is through a direct marking of the body specifying and qualifying the investment of bodily organs as collective rather than privatized. As a barrier to the deterritorialization and privatization of desire, it prevents any equivalent exchange. The sense of capitalism as the negation of previous social formations, therefore, is in its liberation of productivity from such codes (from all intrinsic specificity) in the name of the generalized abstraction of productivity. "It is not primitive societies which are outside of history, it is capitalism which is at the end of history. Capitalism results from a long history of contingencies and accidents that bring about this end, but one can say that the previous formations did not preview it. Capitalism has only come externally through the force of arising and being provided for from within."[49]

As was clear from Marx's argument the function of the commodity-form is that it generalizes exchange and equivalence. It institutes a massive deterritorialization for the purposes of intensifying productivity in general. Capital replaces both the earth and the despot as the sources of order since it is *activity*, rather than positive code or limit, that it seeks. As a process, capital centers on the flux of producers and the flux of money, both of which embody productivity *per se* and therefore allow for its quantification.

State.(New York, 1972), p. 159. This text by Engels is central to Deleuze and Guattari's sections on primitivism and barbarism and is also a signification anti-economist writing within the history of Marxism. Specifically with regard to the topic of this paper Engels' initial statement of the *two-fold nature of production*, as labor and sex, should be stressed. This can be considered with Engels' letter attacking Kautsky's economistic treatment of barbarism which is quoted and discussed by Lévi-Strauss in *Anthropologie Structurale, op.cit.*, pp. 374ff.

47. *A Contribution to the Critique...op. cit.*, p. 215.
48. *L'Anti-Oedipe, op.cit.*, p. 164.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

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Abstraction, deterritorialization, privatization and quantification are all moments in a unified process described in *L'Anti-Oedipe*. "At the heart of capital Marx demonstrated the coincidence of two principal elements: on the one side, the deterritorialized worker, free and naked, who must sell his labor power and on the other hand, decoded money becoming capital...each of these elements puts into play several processes of decoding and deterritorialization: for the free worker, the deterritorialization of the soil by privatization; decoding of the instrument of production by appropriation; privatization of the means of consumption by dissolution of familial relations; finally decoding of the worker to the profit of labor itself or the machine—and, for capital; deterritorialization of wealth by monetary abstraction; decoding the flux of producers through market capital; decoding the State through financial capital; decoding of the means of production through the formation of industrial capital."[50]

For this whole process to operate capitalism could not constitute a new code for desire or labor. Coding is not inherently economic, rather it determines the *quality* of the flux as it passes over the source of social value—goods for consumption, goods for prestige, etc. Each are rigorously defined, limited and separated and no equivalence is allowed to obliterate their positive and unique relation to the community's collective investment. For the primitive society in the absence of the code the various circuits of exchange and circulation would become wholly dispersed, forming no coherent social investment. In fact, the very possibility of such equivalence or lack of limit and boundary is precisely what the primitive social formation protects itself against and in which desire first appears as the subversive longing for the break-up of social prohibitions and restraints. "All the characteristics of the code, namely that it is indirect, qualitative and limited, show sufficiently that a code is not and cannot be economic; on the contrary, it expresses the apparent objective movement in which the economic forces and productive connections are attributed to an extra-economic moment which they emanate from and which serves as a support and agent of inscription...in the case of feudalism, for example, the juridical and political relations are *determined to be dominant* because surplus labor...constitutes a qualitatively and temporally distinct flux from that of labor and can only enter into a whole that is itself qualitative and implies non-economic factors."[51]

Within the limits of the code, the only exploitation and appropriation possible is through its intensification (overcoding) but not immanent to the act of production. Exploitation is still, Marx says, separated in both time and space from the activity of labor itself. Thus, to say that capitalism is a liberation of productivity (the flux as labor and desire) is merely to say that both take on the character of abstract equivalents. Exchange therefore has no limits, there is no distinct and qualitative positivity resisting generalized exchange. In the form of abstract labor power, labor appears as productivity

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 266-67.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 294-95.

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which can be set in relations of equivalence to objects and needs. Thus, while at one moment human productivity is released from all intrinsic and extrinsic barriers (the intrinsic codes of pre-capitalist society) it is still controlled by anonymously reproducing itself only in the commodity form. Thus the wage laborer is not held to the production of a surplus by the imposition of a code identifying his labor as distinct and subjecting it to an extra-economics constraint. On the contrary in capital the process is immanent and subjective, since the productivity of labor is made to appear equivalent to the commodities exchanged for labor time. Here abstraction and quantification create not a boundary but a coincidence between the laborer and his desire. "Capitalism has its limits in the specific conditions of production and capitalist circulation, i.e., in capital itself. But capital only functions by reproducing and enlarging these limits to an always larger scale and in this sense has no limits. It is properly the power of capitalism that its axiomatic (equivalent exchange) is never saturated...the absence of exterior limits are 'filled' by expanding interior limits...the axiomatic has no need to write in flesh itself, to mark bodies and organs or to fabricate a memory for men. Contrary to codes, the axiomatic finds in each of its aspects its own organs of execution, perception and memorization... The person has really become 'privatized' to the point that the person is derived from abstract quantities or only becomes concrete as these quantities themselves become concrete. Thus, in capital it is the quantities themselves that are marked, not the persons."[52]

In breaking down the barriers between human labor, sexuality and symbolic meaning, capitalism *concretizes* subjectivity. Productivity in general —whether it results in objects, meanings or desires—is the actual point of reproduction of the commodity form. All the external limits to society are internalized, that is, the boundaries to activity no longer confront the subject as objective or externally imposed constraints but are displaced onto subjectivity itself. The form of control is not the boundary of the inner and outer (the opposition of culture and nature characteristic of the code) but a dynamic, in Deleuze and Guattari's language, of deterritorialization and re-territorialization. This double movement is what mistakenly appears to some as an imminent "breakdown" in capitalism. "On the one hand, capitalism can only proceed in endlessly developing the subjective essence of abstract wealth, producing for the sake of producing. But on the other hand, and simultaneously, capitalism can only do this within its own ends, as a determined mode of production... Under the first aspect, capitalism never ceases to overcome its own limits in ever increasing deterritorializations (liberation of productivity and subjectivity)...but under the second aspect, strictly complimentary, capitalism never stops erecting barriers and limits which are interior, immanent... This is why the limits of capitalism (the falling rate of profit) are never finally realized, but rather continually overcome and reproduced. The direct manifestation of this is the simultaneity

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 297-298.

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of the two moments, deterritorialization and reterritorialization."[53]

So if there cannot be a final collapse, how is schizophrenia the crucial weak link in this whole reproduction? It is the weak link only in the limited sense that schizophrenia is the unintended consequence of liberating desire subjectively. It is a limit (dysfunctional for a society of producers) created when capitalism breaks down the boundaries and codes that constrain human productivity and subjectivity. Thus, on the one hand, schizophrenia is a mirror of capitalist subjectivity since it is the fantasy of vast indifference in which objects and identities enter into endless and indistinct equivalences. This side of schizophrenia as the fragmentation and destruction of the human, as a delirium and disintegration of consciousness has appeared within Marxism under the concept of alienation (also precisely as it spoke to the inadequacy of mechanistic, economic breakdown theories). In fact, in this famous description of what he calls its *self-stupefaction*, Marx gives an amazing psycho-sexual account: "*Excess* and *intemperence* come to be its true norm. Subjectively, this is partly manifested in that the tension of products and needs falls into *contriving* and ever *calculating* subservience to inhuman, unnatural and *imaginary* appetites. Private property does not know how to change crude needs into *human* needs. Its idealism is fantasy, caprice and whim; and no eunuch flatters his despot more basely or uses more despicable means to stimulate his dulled capacity for pleasure."[54]

This Baudrillardian picture of *défaillance* and what Marx calls "artificially" produced dependence is, of course, accompanied with Marx's notion of essential human capacity and the continuing and necessary degradation and regression of the laborer. "His senses no longer exist" and he becomes, in Marx's phrase, a "cave-dweller" again. But in *L'Anti-Oedipe*, there is another side to schizophrenia, a potential for resistance (not merely in degradation and exhaustion) in the fact that schizophrenia resists, both theoretically and practically, the translation of its desires into the Oedipus complex—the rule of the family. The complex is the reterritorialization or re-integration of liberated desire characteristic of control over subjectivity within capitalism. According to Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism discovers desire as productivity, the material form of subjectivity, in the same manner in which Marx describes capitalism as the discovery that man is the outcome of his own labor. But this productivity must not appear as a social-historical act, only as a personalized, private nature, hence the need in capital for this liberated productivity to be rechanneled into the equivalence form. The form of this in the Oedipus complex is that desire be contained within the images of familial exchange so as to conceal it as productivity, as critical and social. It is domesticated in the full sense of the term. An example of this is in Deleuze and Guattari's critique of Freud's famous discussion of the schizophrenic Schreber: "Not a word is said of the enormous social, political and historical

53. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

54. Marx, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (New York, 1964), pp. 147-148.

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content of Schreber's delirium, as if the libido has nothing to do with such things. The only sexual arguments are those which join together sexuality and the familial complex and mythological arguments which consist in making the productive power of the unconscious merely 'the edifying forces of myth and religion'...(substituting) simple expressive, representative forms for the productive formation of the unconscious. The fundamental question which is ignored and repressed is: Why return to myth? Why take myth as a model?"[55]

It is psychoanalysis as the enforcement of the Oedipus complex and the reduction of desire to the representative that the schizophrenic resists; it is the product of capital that will not enter back into exchange, it is the desire that cannot be channeled back into those social institutions. "The theoretical opposition is not between two classes...because the very concept of class as the 'negation' of codes constitutes only one class (the bourgeoisie)...the theoretical opposition is elsewhere... It is between class and the 'outside' of class. Between the servants of the machine and those who 'crack up' or 'crack up' the machinery. Between the regime of the social machines and desiring machines. Between the relatively internal limits and the absolutely external limit...between capitalists and schizos."[56]

Deleuze and Guattari put themselves on the side of "a theory and practice that seeks the highest level of schizophrenia." Not to resist the process that they call deterritorialization but to push it further at all levels. Thus, like Baudrillard, they are critical of all attempts to retain a viewpoint of some stable, true needs or permanent use values. However, this confidence in what they call "the revolutionary power of the decoded flux" speaks to a kind of naiveté and immediacy in their "theory and practice" that touches on some of the main problems of an otherwise powerful study of psychoanalysis. In *L'Anti-Oedipe*, this belief in the *spontaneity* of desire as radical and disruptive goes hand in hand with the tendency toward a monistic treatment of production (the identity of desire and labor at the microanalytic level)—as in their epigram "the unconscious is a factory." The problem here is a failure to treat the contradictions between desire and labor and therefore an unreflective confidence that the "spontaneity" of desire released from the Oedipus complex resists any further integration. The whole analysis revolves around the theme that a unique control over the subject's needs and desires is formed through commodity exchange—as Marx says, "my desire is the inaccessible possession of another." But precisely in this way, any tension between desire and labor, as well as any of its critical, utopian image, is domesticated and made consonant with the life of wage labor. Control does not operate through maintaining "thinking, loving, theorizing, singing, eating" (as Marx lists them in those passages from the *Manuscripts*) as separate and distinct activities. Rather desire (like labor power) is domesticated by being introduced into a massive equalization process where it only manifests itself in the identity of the commodity form—this is the

55. *L'Anti-Oedipe, op.cit.*, p. 67.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 303.

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fetishism of the object form prefiguring needs that Baudrillard analyzes. However, Deleuze and Guattari find themselves both in their undialectical identity between desire and production and in their political thrust solely against familialism and psychoanalysis as complications with the very aspects they are attacking. Not that they assume some stable reference point of "true needs," but that they create an ontology collapsing desire into production—an ontology of what is merely the *appearance* of an identity in capitalist production. In *L'Anti-Oedipe* this is justified as part of the attack on the non-productive, representational model of desire found in psychoanalysis and used to contain desire within personal, familial relations. However, when we pursue this at the macroanalytic level, as a social history of desire, we see that familialism and psychoanalysis as integrations and territorializations are part of a dynamic in which capitalism is continually liberating subjectivity from prior constraints only to reintegrate it again into exchange relations. But at the macro-level of analysis, the ontology of *L'Anti-Oedipe* could itself become an obstacle to understanding this dynamic since it uncritically assumes that the Oedipus complex represents a *decisive* confrontation and further that desire will "immediately" be revolutionary when released from such control. These assumptions are all aspects of treating desire at the microanalytic level as a "desiring machine"—as identical to production as such.

Final Comment

The essence of capitalism is that it intensifies desire by liberating productivity in its two-fold sense (to use Engels's phrase), that is, as labor and as sex. But this released subjectivity never escapes the limits of abstraction and privatizaton and therefore can continually be reintegrated into exchange relations and the commodity form. Sexuality, money, labor and language descend into a pervasive indifference and an abstract universality. Abstraction and privatization are the two principal moments of "decoding"—as was clear in Marx's description of the emergence of labor *per se*, or indifference to concrete labor. What Deleuze and Guattari have shown is that when labor is transformed in such a way, production as a whole is transformed. That means that the body and its desires, as a moment of production, enter directly into the process of equivalent exchange. The purely negative control exercised by societies which contain and localize desire, but therefore grant it its autonomy, is replaced by a massive occupation of the body at all levels.[57] This is the meaning of Marx's statement

57. "In our societies, punitive systems are replaced by a certain 'political economy' of the body: even if they do not utilize bloody and violent punishments, even if they use 'gentle' methods which confine and correct, it is still the body which is at issue—the body and its forces, its utility, mutability and submission...(Historians) have shown at what points historical processes are implicated in what could be called the purely biological base of existence...But the body is directly plunged into a political field; relations of power operate on it at an immediate level; they invest it, mark it, punish it, compel it to labor, obligate it through ceremonies and demand signs from it. This political investment of the body is linked, in complex and reciprocal relations, to its economic utilization. For the most part it is as a force of production that the body is invested in relations of power and domination; but its constitution as labor power is only possible if it can

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that what is produced is not only the commodity but the need to be satisfied, not only the object but the subject who desires it.

It is clear throughout Marx's writings that the exit from this circle is in the priority of labor. That the laboring act must be self-emancipated before humanity can be liberated from that "pimp," as Marx refers to monetary exchange in the *Manuscripts*, that mediates between man and his needs. But we have seen that an objectivistic interpretation of Marx's account of labor and needs leads directly to the view that a transformation of labor is simply a technical, legal or administrative project and can be held apart from the whole reproduction dynamic—as a base or substratum. Therefore, as Baudrillard concludes, an exploitation will continue irrespective of the form of labor since it is rooted in the form of consumption and the ideology of needs underlying it.

The position of *L'Anti-Oedipe* is more immanent to Marx's thought. To liberate labor is to liberate desire since they are both an aspect of production *per se*—this is how Deleuze and Guattari appropriate the ontology of labor and human capacity that Marx develops in the *Manuscripts*. Further, that the weak point of labor is not its necessary degradation—the viewpoint that Marx takes, namely, that increased demands on the productivity of labor increase the misery and regression of the laborer—but precisely the productivity of its desires. It is not that the worker degenerates, it is that it is harder and harder to rechannel liberated productivity back into the commodity form, and yet productivity must be continually expanded for capitalism to survive. The crisis of capital is not objective, it is in its form of subjectivity.

The approaches considered above have been read against the background of Marxist theory, much of which has had to be left unsaid. But the intention here was not to produce some "solution" as a decision of whether or not it is in Marx, but to explicate certain strategies or directions, at the level of theory, for analyses of social control as consent and legitimacy. How, as we began with Lévi-Strauss, the seemingly biological acts become meaningful forms producing and reproducing human subjectivity. What must prefigure any future study is the realization that the political significance contained in this expanded control over productivity, as it becomes an object of opposition and struggle, is all the more powerful because it never appears: because all that ever manifests itself in the reproduction of the subject is the immutable, physiological fact of a body and its needs.

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be found in a system of subjugation (where need is also a political instrument carefully arranged, calculated and utilized); the body only becomes a useful force if it is at the same time a productive and subjugated body...this mastery constitutes what one could call the political technology of the body. What is at issue is a certain 'microphysics' of power put into play by institutions and their apparatuses." Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la Prison*. (Paris, 1975), pp. 30-1.

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INTRODUCTION TO ADORNO ESSAYS

by Wes Blomster

Theodor Adorno had not yet reached the age of thirty when the first essay which follows here in translation appeared in two installments in the initial issues of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*. Not only was the essay Adorno's first major effort in the sociology of music; it was a major landmark in a yet-undeveloped discipline which the author was to dominate during the almost four decades of life which lay ahead of him, and within which he remains the central figure today, a decade after his death. Max Weber's *The Rational and Social Foundations of Music*, commonly regarded as the first major contribution to musico-sociological investigation, although written in 1911, had been in print for only ten years when Adorno's essay was published. The relation of the two treatises is, however, more than temporal. In 1958 Adorno looked back upon Weber's book and designated it "the most comprehensive and exacting outline of a sociology of music to date." [1] In his own later book, *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, Adorno recalled his early essay from the same perspective, referring to it as "the outline of a detailed sociology of music" and further as "the first major design of a sociology of music."[2] He might have added that it can also be viewed as the essential blueprint from which his own sociology of music developed during the remainder of his life.

In the light of this positive and seemingly objective self-evaluation, it is difficult to understand Adorno's later rejection of this essay and his decision not to include it in any later publication of his works. The purpose of this brief introduction is to offer several comments upon the work—including Adorno's own explanation of his later negative attitude towards it. The positive nature of this commentary indicates the need for an English translation of this text, despite the lapse of time since its original publication and the wealth of material which has been written in sociology of music since that time.

The fundamental significance and value of the essay was underscored by Tibor Kneif when he compiled his anthology of readings in sociology of music in 1975. In his commentary upon the selection of texts, Kneif stated that his inclusion of Adorno's "Ideas on the Sociology of Music" was a second choice: "To be sure, the more comprehensive essay ...of 1932 is equally characteristic for Adorno's manner of thought, and, because of the remoteness of its place of original publication, would have been perferred here.... Permission, however, was not given."[3] Because of that quality which enables Kneif to call the essay "characteristic," the essay offers

1. "Ideen zur Musiksoziologie," *Klangfiguren* (Berlin and Frankfurt, 1959), p. 16.
2. Trans. E.B. Ashton (New York, 1976), p. 65.
3. *Texte zur Musiksoziologie* (Cologne, 1975), p. 6.

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something of a primer to Adorno's musico-sociological work. Those, for example, who struggle with the more refined and complex contents and often-obtuse style of the later *Philosophy of New Music* would find the course of their reading significantly less difficult following the study of this essay. This is not to suggest that Adorno's early thought upon music and society was either simplistic or one-dimensional; the line of this thought is, however, more clearly-defined and the presentation thereof makes it more accessible—in particular to the musical layman. The positive concern expressed here for the work of Hanns Eisler and Kurt Weill—absent from the work of later years—demonstrates a fuller appreciation of the total effort within serious musical composition at that time. The later reduction of perspective to the work of Schoenberg and Stravinsky in the *Philosophy* is obviously of great value and validity; the uninitiated reader, however, would be better prepared to appreciate this dialectic structure through the 1932 treatise.

The highly-critical position on jazz and light music defined here anticipates the essays on popular music which Adorno would write during his American years. It is also to be emphasized that this essay precedes Walter Benjamin's "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" by four years. Adorno's concern here for the negative impact of radio upon musical life prepares the way for the work which he was to do later in radio research at Princeton and Columbia.

The lectures which Adorno delivered in the early 1960s and then published as an *Introduction to the Sociology of Music* close in a sense the parentheses around his career in sociology of music which were opened by the early essay. The late book brought a necessary confrontation with the earlier treatise; the author's commentary is, however, unfortunatly brief. Adorno emphasizes the origin of the essay on the very eve of the advent of National Socialism in Germany, the essential character of which he had discerned in his analysis of the music of Stravinsky. One cannot but ask, however, whether the ease with which Adorno drew the association between the work of the Russian composer and fascism did not become a matter of embarrassment to him in later years. Faced by this pronouncement, he might have felt himself in somewhat the same position as Charlie Chaplin who stated that, had he known in 1940 the extremes of atrocity which would later manifest themselves in National Socialism, it would not have been possible for him to make the film *The Great Dictator* as a comedy. The parallel defined between Stravinsky and fascism remains in the *Philosophy*, where, however, it is expressed with reserve.

In the *Sociology*, Adorno offers a summary statement upon his later attitude towards the 1932 essay, stating that it "was his flat identification of the concept of musical production with the precedence of the economic sphere of production, without considering how far that which we call production already presupposes social production and depends on it as much as it is sundered from it. This alone has kept the writer from reissuing that

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essay. . . ."[4] Although "this alone" might seem a somewhat too facile and general formulation, the point made by the author presents a maxim stressed by the more perceptive minds at work in sociology of music today: the processes in operation in the economic and artistic realms demonstrate certain similarities; they are, however, not identical. Musico-sociological investigation has suffered from simplistic analogies drawn between the two realms.

Of perhaps greater interest than Adorno's own feelings upon his essay is the current popularity of the work among sociologists of music. The charge of resignation has often been levelled against members of the Frankfurt School in recent years. Such critics welcome the early essay as the product of a younger Adorno, still "un-resigned" and more markedly and committedly Marxist in his orientation. Kneif even detects a relationship between this essay and Ernst Bloch's *Geist der Utopie* (1918) in the kinship of both works to the speculative musical interpretations of German Romanticism.[5] It is, however, the Hungarian musicologist Dénes Zoltai who has commented most extensively upon the *Zeitschrift* essay. This is of interest in itself, for Zoltai offers an evaluation of Adorno from the perspective of the Eastern block of nations; he does so, however, without the dogmatic rigidity which would be encountered, for example, in the work of an East German writer.

Zoltai states that the Marxist perspective of the essay goes well beyond the realm of "mere flirtation"; indeed, he finds that the treatise is founded upon Marx' *Das Kapital*, proceeding from the analysis of capitalist economics given there.[6] Adorno is further indebted to Marx for his thoughts on the fetish character of music and upon the neutralization of culture. Zoltai locates in this essay "the important central thought for the development of a scientific aesthetic of music" in Adorno's assertion that musical material is not simply provided by nature, but rather that it is always socially and historically pre-formed and pre-determined as well.[7] The Hungarian regrets, however, that Adorno failed to develop and prove this thesis sufficiently in 1932.

It is of particular interest that Zoltai as an Eastern Marxist should label this essay "a declaration of war against formalism and the technicism of a decadent bourgeois aesthetics of music."[8] Although Adorno makes no use of the word in the treatise, an attack upon formalism could be read out of his criticism of Neo-Classicism and, in particular, of Hindemith. Whether this qualifies as "a declaration of war upon formalism" as that concept is commonly and pejoratively employed in the East today, is open to doubt.

In his analysis of Adorno's development after 1932, Zoltai finds the essentially bourgeois writer incapable of "raising the nebulous curtain of

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 233.
5. *Musiksoziologie* (Cologne, 1975), p. 93.
6. "Die Musikkultur der Gegenwart im Spiegel der Asthetik von Th. Wiesengrund-Adorno," *Magyar Tudomanyos Akademiia, Studia Philosophica* (Budapest, Vol. 11, 1966), p. 132.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
8. *Ibid.*

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fetishism," in which, in turn, the Hungarian finds the basis for the resignation which he sees dominant in the *Philosophy* and other post-war works, all of which give evidence of a "regressive metamorphosis in terms of world view."[9]

Zoltai's appreciation of the early essay culminates in his quotation of a passage from it which he finds an essential definition of Adorno's early position upon music and society: "Here and now, music can do nothing else but represent, in its own structure, the social antinomies which also bear the guilt of its isolation. It will be the better, the more deeply it can make its forms lend shape to the power of those contradictions, and to the need to overcome them socially—the more purely the antinomies of its own formal language will express the calamities of the social condition and call for change in the cipher script of suffering."[10] This statement is interpreted by Zoltai—and undoubtedly he can be found guilty of over-interpretation—as Adorno's endorsement of "avant garde destructivism" in modern music, uttered furthermore by the author with "a charge of significantly revolutionary and anti-capitalistic feeling."[11] From this destructivism, Zoltai distills a positive revolutionary content, beholding therein the proclamation of an "ideal collectivity and the herald of a clarified humanity."[12]

There is a certain irony in Zoltai's fondness for this passage and his use of it in his criticism of Adorno's later work. He either ignores or overlooks the fact that Adorno himself quoted these very same sentences in 1962 in his *Sociology*. In the chapter on "Classes and Strata," he emphasized once again that "the social complexion of music was to be found in its own interior, . . . not simply in its effective links with society."[13] He underscored that the demand for social change retained the same high priority in his last decade which he had assigned to it in earlier years and then continued: "What is unattainable for music of the utmost integrity might solely be hoped for from a better organized society, not from customer service. The end of music as an ideology will have to await the end of antagonistic society." He then turned to the same section of the 1932 essay quoted by Zoltai, offering the following preface to his self-quotation: "Although in 1962 I would no longer phrase the constellation of music and classes in the same terms as thirty years ago, I would still stand by a few lines I wrote then, in that essay for *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*." He quoted the passage cited by Zoltai, but continued with more of the original text: "It does not behoove music to stare at society in helpless horror; its social function will be more exactly fulfilled if the social problems contained in it, in the inmost cells of its technique, are

9. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 140. The quotation is found on p. 70 of Adorno's *Sociology*, where the author quotes himself.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.* Zoltai's fondness toward this passage is indicated by his quotation of it in another article, written together with J. Ujfalussy: "Aesthetisch-philosophische Probleme der Musik des 20. Jahrhunderts," *Studia Musicologica Academiae Schentiarum Hungaricae*, Vol. 8 (1966), p. 90.
13. *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

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presented in its own material and according to its own formal laws. The task of music as an art comes thus to be a kind of analogue to that of social theory."[14]

It is with some regret that one views Adorno's decision not to "stand by" the entire essay of 1932, for it obviously deserves and demands attention today, despite the limitation of validity defined by its author. The definition and development of a perspective upon music remains today the greatest lack within Marxist aesthetics. The essay which follows belongs among the basic texts upon which such aesthetics might be developed.

The publication of Adorno's very late reply to the charge of "Resignation" as a companion piece to his first treatise on the sociology of music might strike some readers as an exercise in sentimentality. The cautious sobriety of this statement from the final year of his life stands in a contrast to the often exuberant vitality of the early work from which both essays profit. Adorno speaks here with that nobility of the spirit which linked his generation to the grand humanism of the age of enlightenment back to which the roots of his thought and his intellectual position can be traced. It is a document with which all readers of Adorno—and particularly the younger members of this group—should today be familiar.

14. *Ibid.*

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ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MUSIC[1]

by Theodor W. Adorno

No matter where music is heard today, it sketches in the clearest possible lines the contradictions and flaws which cut through present-day society; at the same time, music is separated from this same society by the deepest of all flaws produced by this society itself. And yet, society is unable to absorb more of this music than its ruins and external remains. The role of music in the social process is exclusively that of a commodity; its value is that determined by the market. Music no longer serves direct needs nor benefits from direct application, but rather adjusts to the pressures of the exchange of abstract units. Its value wherever such value still exists at all—is determined by use: it subordinates itself to the process of exchange. The islands of pre-capitalistic "music making"—such as the 19th century could still tolerate— have been

1. Translated by Wes Blomster from the text which appeared in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforshung* 1 (1932), pp. 103-124 and pp. 356-78. No extensive annotation is offered on this essay because of the difficulty involved in defining a boundary between that which demands explanation and that which can stand without it. Adorno touches upon only a few technical aspects of music and these can be understood by the non-musician from the context within which they appear. Adorno does speak rather extensively of two concepts, popular in German music in the years between the wars, which would have little meaning even to German readers today. For that reason they are defined here. *Gebrauchsmusik*, translated in the following text as "use music," is sometimes encountered in English as "utility music." It is not to be confused with applied or commercial music—in German *angewandte Musik*. *The Harvard Dictionary of Music* (1969) states that this term was possibly coined by Hindemith, who was the leading practitioner thereof; it is "music intended for practical use...by amateurs, in the home or at informal gatherings, as opposed to music written 'for its own sake,' (*l'art pour l'art*) and intended chiefly for concert performance by professionals. Characteristic traits...are: forms of moderate length; simplicity and clarity of style; small ensembles; avoidance of technical difficulties; parts of equal interest and so designed that they can be played on whatever instruments are available; soberness and moderation of expression; emphasis on 'good workmanship.' " The rise of *Gebrauchsmusik* is typical of the neoclassical reaction against the exaggerated individualism and *fin de siècle* refinement of late Romanticism and Impressionism. The practice was generally supported by Socialists and was marked by an interest in early music, especially that of Bach. The New Matter-of-Factness, *Neue Sachlichkeit*, is readily understood by students of German literature; in music it is today not a commonly-encountered term. *Grove's Dictionary* (1954) places the movement within music between the two wars, defining it as a "tendency...to write music entirely detached from sentiment and free from any pictorial suggestion, expressive, in fact, of nothing but itself. The *Harvard Dictionary* emphasizes "antiromantic tendencies towards an objective and even nonexpressive music." Words which occupy an important position in Adorno's vocabulary are *Musikant* and *Musikantentum*. In the total absence of corresponding English terms, they are translated here as "music maker" and "music making," using quotation marks, as Adorno himself has done with the German terms in most cases. The concepts, while not necessarily pejoritive, usually convey a certain negative bite in Adorno's usage. They can refer to an extremely healthy, gifted musicianship, which is usually characterized by the lack of an intellectual dimension. The German words often evoke images of Bohemian and even gypsy musicians.

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washed away: the techniques of radio and sound film, in the hands of powerful monopolies and in unlimited control over the total capitalistic propaganda machine, have taken possession of even the innermost cell of musical practices, i.e. of domestic music making. Even in the 19th century the possibility of the domestic cultivation of music—like the entirety of bourgeois private life—represented only the reverse side of a social corpus, whose surface was totally determined by production through private capital. The dialectic of capitalistic development has further eliminated even this last immediacy offered by music—in itself already an illusion, for in it the balance between individual production and understanding by society was threatened. Since Wagner's *Tristan*, this balance has been totally destroyed. Through the total absorption of both musical production and consumption by the capitalistic process, the alienation of music from man has become complete. This process involved, of course, the objectification and rationalization of music, its separation from the simple immediacy of use which had once defined it as art and grant it permanence in contrast to its definition in terms of mere ephemeral sound. At the same time, it was this process which invested music with the power of far-reaching sublimation of drives and the cogent and binding expression of humanity. Now, however, rationalized music has fallen victim to the same dangers as rationalized society, within which class interests bring rationalization to a halt as soon as it threatens to turn against class conditions themselves. This situation has now left man in a state of rationalization which—as soon as the possibility of his further dialectic development is blocked—crushes him between unresolved contradictions. The same force of reification which constituted music as art has today taken music from man and left him with only an illusion—*Schein*—thereof. (This force of reification could not simply be reconverted to immediacy without returning art to the state in which it found itself before the division of labor.) Music, however, insofar as it did not submit to the command of the production of commodities, was in this process robbed of its social responsibility and exiled into an hermetic space within which its contents are removed. This is the situation from which every observation upon the social position of music which hopes to avoid the deceptions which today dominate discussions of the subject must proceed. These deceptions exist for the sake of concealing the actual situation and, further, as an apology for music which has allowed itself to be intimidated economically. They are also the result of the fact that music itself, under the superior power of the music industry developed by monopoly capitalism, became conscious of its own reification and of its alienation from man. Meanwhile, music, lacking proper knowledge of the social process—a condition likewise socially produced and sustained—blamed itself and not society for this situation, thus remaining in the illusion that the isolation of music was itself an isolated matter, i.e. that things could be corrected from the side of music alone with no change in society. It is now necessary to face the hard fact that the social alienation of music—that assembly of phenomena for which an overhasty and

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unenlightened musical reformism employs derogatory terms such as individualism, charlatanism, and technical esotericism—is itself a matter of social fact and socially produced. For this reason, the situation cannot be corrected within music, but only within society: namely, through the change of society. The question regarding the possible dialectic contribution which music can make towards such change remains open: however, its contribution will be slight, if it—from within its own resources—endeavors only to establish an immediacy which is not only socially restraining today, but by no means reconstructable or even desirable, thus contributing to the disguise of the situation. The question is further to what degree music—insofar as it might intervene in the social process—will be in a position to intervene as music. Regardless of the answers which might be given, here and now music is able to do nothing but portray within its own structure the social antinomies which are also responsible for its own isolation. Music will be better, the more deeply it is able to express—in the antinomies of its own formal language—the exigency of the social condition and to call for change through the coded language of suffering. It is not for music to stare in helpless horror at society. It fulfills its social function more precisely when it presents social problems through its own material and according to its own formal laws—problems which music contains within itself in the innermost cells of its technique. The task of music as art thus enters into a parallel relationship to the task of social theory. If the immanent development of music were established as an absolute—as the mere reflection of the social process—the only result would be a sanction of the fetish character of music which is the major difficulty and most basic problem to be portrayed by music today. On the other hand, it is clear that music is not to be measured in terms of the existing society of which it is the product and which, at the same time, keeps music in a state of isolation. It is the prerequisite of every historical-materialistic method which hopes to be more than a mere exercise in intellectual history that under no conditions is music to be understood as a "spiritual" phenomenon, abstract and far-removed from actual social conditions, which can anticipate through its imagery any desire for social change independently from the empirical realization thereof. It thus becomes obvious that the relation of present-day music and society is highly problematic in all its aspects. This relation shares its aporias with social theory; at the same time, however, it shares the attitudes which this theory expresses—or ought to express—towards these aporias. In a certain sense, the character of cognition is to be demanded of any music which today wishes to preserve its right to existence. Through its material, music must give clear form to the problems assigned it by this material which is itself never purely natural material, but rather a social and historical product; solutions offered by music in this process stand equal to theories. Social postulates are offered, the relationship of which to praxis might be, to be sure, extremely mediated and difficult or which, at any rate, cannot be realized without great difficulty. It is these postulates, however, which decide whether and how the

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entrance into social reality might be made. The following short circuit unfortunately develops: such music is incomprehensible, i.e., esoteric and private and must, therefore, be rejected. Such music is constructed upon the foundation of a romantic concept of primitive musical immediacy which gives rise to the opinion that the empirical consciousness of present-day society—a consciousness promoted in unenlightened narrow-mindedness and, indeed, promoted even to the point of neurotic stupidity in the face of class domination for the purpose of the preservation of this consciousness—might be taken as the positive measure of a music no longer alienated, but rather the property of free men. Politics must not be permitted to draw abstractions from this state of consciousness which is necessarily of central concern to the social dialectic, nor is cognition to allow the definition of its boundaries by a consciousness produced by class domination and which further as the class consciousness of the proletariat extends the wounds of mutilation by means of the class mechanism. Music is under the same obligation as theory to reach out beyond the current consciousness of the masses. Theory, however, stands in a dialectic relation to praxis, upon which it makes demands and from which it also accepts demands; in the same manner, music which has achieved self-consciousness of its social function will enter into a dialectic relation to praxis. This is to be achieved not through the self-subordination of music to "use" which it could do here and now only through definition of itself as a commodity and which would grant it only an illusion of immediacy, but rather by developing within music itself—in agreement with the state of social theory—all those elements whose objective is the overcoming of class domination. This music must do even where this development takes place in social isolation, confined to the cells of music during the period of class domination. It might be possible for the most advanced compositional production of the present—solely under the pressure of the immanent development of its problems—to invalidate basic bourgeois categories such as the creative personality and expression of the soul of this personality, the world of private feelings and its transfigured inwardness, setting in their place highly rational and transparent principles of construction. Even this music, however, would remain dependent upon bourgeois production processes and could not, consequently, be viewed as "classless" or the actual music of the future, but rather as music which fulfills its dialectic cognitive function most exactly. Within present society, such music encounters a vehement resistance which surpasses the resistance against all use-music and communal music, no matter how literary or political its accents might be. Nonetheless, this resistance seems to indicate that the dialectic function of this music is already perceptible in praxis, even if only as a negative force, i.e. as "destruction."

From a social perspective, present-day musical activity, production and consumption can be divided drastically into that which unconditionally recognizes its commodity character and—refusing any dialectic intervention—orients itself according to the demands of the market and that which in principle does not accept the demands of the market. A somewhat different

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view is also possible: music of the first category—passive and undialectic—takes its place on the side of society; the second, on the side of music. The traditional distinction between "light" and "serious" music, sanctioned by bourgeois musical culture, ostensibly corresponds to this division—but only ostensibly. For a great share of supposedly "serious" music adjusts itself to the demands of the market in the same manner as the composers of light music, even if this is done under the cover of an economically untransparent "fashion" or through the calculation of the demands of the market into production. The disguise of the market function of such music through the concept of personality or simplicity or "life" serves only to transfigure it and to increase its market value indirectly. On the other hand, it is precisely "light" music—tolerated by present-day society, despised and exploited in the same way as prostitution with which it is not compared in vain—with its "skirt seductively raised," which develops certain elements portraying the satisfaction of the drive of present society, whose official claims, however, stand in conflict to such satisfaction. In a certain sense, such music thus transcends the society which it supposedly serves. In the distinction between light and serious music, the alienation of man and music is reflected only through distortion—in the same manner, namely, as this alienation is seen by the bourgeoisie. An effort is made to exempt "serious" music from an alienation shared to an equal degree by Stravinsky's *Symphony of Psalms* and the latest hit song of Robert Stolz. Blame for this alienation is assigned—under the label of "kitsch"—only to that music which, as an exact reaction to the constellation of drives within this society, is the only music suitable to it; it is, however, this very suitability which disavows this society. For this reason, the distinction between light and serious music is to be replaced by a different distinction which views both halves of the musical globe equally from the perspective of alienation: namely, as halves of a totality which to be sure could never be reconstructed through the addition of the two halves.

Musical production which in the narrower sense does not subordinate itself unconditionally to the law of the market—that is, "serious" music with the exception of the obviously quantitatively dominant music, which likewise serves the market in disguise—is that music that expresses alienation. A rather crude scheme can be established: the first type of music is that which, without consciousness of its social location or out of indifference toward it, presents and crystallizes its problems and the solutions thereto in a merely immanent manner. To a degree, it resembles the monad of Leibniz; it "represents," to be sure, not a pre-established harmony, but certainly an historically produced dissonance, i.e., social antinomies. This first type—as "modern" music is the only music which offers a serious shock to the listener—is represented essentially by Arnold Schoenberg and his school. The second type includes music which recognizes the fact of alienation as its own isolation and as "individualism" and further raises this fact to the level of consciousness; it does so, however, only within itself, only in aesthetic and form-immanent

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terms. It thus attempts to annul this insight without respect for actual society For the most part, it would achieve this through recourse to stylistic forms of the past, which it views as immune to alienation, without seeing that such forms cannot be reconstituted within a completely changed society and through completely changed musical material. This music can be called objectivism, insofar as it—without becoming involved in any social dialectic—would like to evoke the image of a non-existent "objective" society or—in terms of its intentions—of a "fellowship." In the highly capitalistic-industrial nations, neo-classicism is a major component of objectivism; in the underdeveloped, agrarian countries, it is folklore. The most effective author of objectivism who in a highly revealing manner manifests each of these major directions—one after the other, but never simultaneously— is Igor Stravinsky. The third type is a hybrid form. Hand in hand with objectivism, this composer proceeds from the cognition of alienation. At the same time, he is socially more alert than the objectivist and recognizes the solutions offered by his colleague as illusions. He denies himself the positive solution and contents himself with permitting social flaws to manifest themselves by means of a flawed invoice which defines itself as illusory with no attempt at camouflage through attempts at an aesthetic totality. In his effort, he employs the formal language belonging in part to the bourgeois musical culture of the 19th century, in part to present-day consumer music. These means are used to reveal the flaws which he detects. Through his destruction of aesthetic formal immanence, this type of composer transcends into the literary realm. Extensive objective correspondences between this third type and French Surrealism justify speaking in this case of surrealistic music. Such music was developed out of Stravinsky's middle period—above all, out of *L'histoire du soldat*. It has been developed most consequently in the works which Kurt Weill produced together with Bert Brecht, particularly *The Three Penny Opera* and *Mahagonny*. The fourth type involves music which attempts to break through alienation from within itself, even at the expense of its immanent form. This is normally identified as "use music." However, it is precisely this typical use music—especially as it is produced on order for radio and theater—which gives evidence of such obvious dependence upon the market that it cannot enter into the present discussion. That which demands attention is rather the effort to produce "communal music"—*"Gemeinschaftsmusik"*; this direction developed out of neo-classicism and is represented by Hindemith and the proletarian choral works of Hanns Eisler.

Arnold Schoenberg decried the resistance that each new work encounters as intellectualistic, destructive, abstract and esoteric, not unlike the resistance shown toward psychoanalysis. Actually, he does manifest extensive correspondences to Freud—not, to be sure, in terms of the concrete thematic content of his music, divorced from all psychological references, but rather in terms of social structure. Like Freud and Karl Kraus, whose efforts towards the purification of language find a counterpart in Schoenberg's music, this

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composer—also from Vienna—is to be counted among the dialectic phenomena of bourgeois individualism—taking the word in its most general sense—which work in their supposedly "specialized" areas of problems without respect for a presupposed social totality. In these areas, however, they achieve solutions which suddenly change and turn unnoticed against the prerequisites of individualism. Such solutions are in principle denied to a socially oriented bourgeois reformism which must pay for its insights, aimed as they are at totality but never reaching the basis thereof, with "mediating" and—consequently—camouflaging machinations. Freud, in order to arrive at objective symbols and finally at an objective dialectic of human consciousness in history, had to carry out the analysis of individual consciousness and subconsciousness. Kraus, in order to perfect the concept of socialism in the sphere of the "superstructure" for a second time, as it were, did nothing but confront bourgeois life with its own norm of correct individual behavior, thus revealing, in turn, to individuals their own norm. According to the same scheme, Schoenberg has annulled the expressive music of the private bourgeois individual, pursuing—as it were—its own consequences, and put in its place a different music, into whose music no social function falls—indeed, which even severs the last communication with the listener. However, this music leaves all other music of the age far behind in terms of immanently musical quality and dialectic clarification of its material. He thus offers such a perfected and rational total organization that it cannot possibly be compatible with the present social constitution, which then unconsciously through all its critical representatives takes up an offensive position and calls upon nature for assistance against the attack of consciousness encountered in Schoenberg. In him—for perhaps the first time in the history of music—consciousness has taken hold of the natural material of music and seized control of it. In Schoenberg, however, the breakthrough of consciousness is not idealistic: it is not to be understood as the production of music out of pure spirit. It is much rather a type of dialectic in the strictest sense. For the movement perfected by Schoenberg proceeds from questioning how this movement is situated within the material itself. The productive force which incites this movement involves the reality of a psychic drive—the drive, namely, towards undisguised and uninhibited expression of the psyche and of the unconscious per se. This is found most precisely in the works of Schoenberg's middle period, including *Erwartung, Die glückliche Hand* and the Little Piano Pieces, which place his work in direct relationship to psychoanalysis. However, this drive is confronted by an objective problem: how can material which has achieved the highest technical development—i.e. the material which Schoenberg inherited from Wagner on the one hand and, on the other, from Brahms as well—subordinate itself to radical expression of the psychic? It can do this only by submitting itself to thorough change. This means that it must surrender all alleged connections and obligations which stand in the way of freedom of movement of individual expression; these connections are the reflection of an "agreement" of bourgeois society with the

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psyche of the individual which is now renounced by the sufferings of the individual. These are the traditional musical symmetrical relations in that they are based upon the technique of repetition—no matter what form it might take—and—again in agreement with Karl Kraus and also in harmony with the architectural intentions of Adolf Loose—that this technique further takes the form of criticism of every type of ornamentation. In view of the limitation of all musical elements this criticism does not restrict itself merely to musical architecture, the symmetry and ornamentation of which it negates; it extends equally to the harmonic correlation of tectonic symmetrical relations and tonality, simultaneously touched by dissonance as the vehicle of the radical principle of expression. With the decline of the tonal scheme, counterpoint—previously subject to chordal limitation—is emancipated and produces that form of polyphony known as "linearity." Finally, the total homogenous sound, supported by the substance of traditional orchestral string tutti, is attacked. Schoenberg's really central achievement—which, by the way, has never been properly appreciated from the traditional perspective of observation—is that he, from his earliest works on—for example, in the songs of his Opus 6—never behaved "expressionistically," superimposing subjective intentions upon heterogenous material in an authoritarian and inconsiderate manner. Every gesture with which he intervenes in the material configuration is at the same time an answer to questions directed to him by the material in the form of its own immanent problems. Every subjective-expressive achievement of Schoenberg is simultaneously the resolution of objective-material contradictions which continued to exist in the Wagnerian technique of chromatic sequence and in the diatonic technique of variation employed by Brahms as well. Schoenberg is by no means an esoteric to be reserved for a specialized and socially irrelevant history of music, but rather a figure to be projected upon the social dialectic from the perspective of his dialectic of musical material. This is justified by the fact that he—in the form of material problems which he inherited, accepted, and continued—found present in the problems of society that produced this material and in which the contradictions of this society are defined as technical problems. That Schoenberg's solutions to technical problems are socially relevant in spite of their isolation is proven by his replacement within all his works—in spite and because of his own expressive origins—of any private fortuitousness which might have been viewed quite correctly as a type of anarchic musical production with an objective principle of order which is never imposed upon the material from the exterior, but rather extracted from the material itself and brought into relationship with it by means of an historical process of rational transparence. This is the meaning of the revolution which technologically took the form of "twelve-tone composition." In the very moment in which the total musical material is subjected to the power of expression, expression itself is extinguished—as though it were animated only by the resistance of the material, itself "alienated" and alien to the subject. Subjective criticism of instances of ornamentation and repetition

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leads to an objective, non-expressive structure which—in place of symmetry and repetition—determines the exclusion of repetition within the cell, i.e., the use of all twelve tones of the chroma before the repetition of a tone from within the chroma. This same structure further prevents the "free," arbitrary, constructively-unrelated insertion of any one tone into the composition. In corresponding manner, the expressively-obligatory leading tone harmonic is replaced by a complementary one. Radical freedom from all objective norms imposed upon music from the exterior is coordinated with the most extreme rigidity of immanent structure, so that music by its own forces eliminates at least within itself alienation as a matter of subjective formation and objective material. Music thus moves towards that for which Alois Haba coined the fine expression "musical style of freedom." To be sure, music overcomes inward alienation only through the perfected expression thereof on its exterior. And if one were to assume that the immanent overcoming of the aporias of music were consistently possible, this would be nothing more than a romantic transfiguration of craftsmanship—including that of Schoenberg—and of the finest of contemporary music, tantamount to the failure to recognize these very aporias. For with the choice of text for his most recent opera *Von heute auf morgen*—a glorification of bourgeois marriage in contrast to libertinage, unreflectingly contrasting "love" and "fashion"—Schoenberg nevetheless subordinates his own music to a bourgeois private sphere attacked by his music in terms of its objective character. Certain classicistic inclinations within the overall formal architecture which can be detected in Schoenberg's most recent works might well point in the same direction. Above all, however, the question is whether the ideal of the hermetic work of art, resting within itself, which Schoenberg inherited from classicism and to which he remains true can be reconciled with the means which he has defined and, further, whether such a concept of a work of art, as totality and cosmos, can still be upheld at all. It might well be that at their deepest level Schoenberg's works stand in opposition to this ideal; the impulse resulting from the total absence of illusion in them offers proof thereof. This impulse was expressed in his struggle against ornamentation and still more strongly in the sobriety of his present musical diction—and in the diction of the texts as well. It might well be that the secret which dwells within his work is hostility towards art; according to its implicit claims, the intention of this work is to force the autonomous work of art—as Beethoven knew it, sufficient unto itself and all-powerful in its symbolism—back into existence again by means both thoroughly and historically rationalized. However, the possibility of such reconstruction is—as in the case of Kraus' attempted reconstruction of a pure language—a doubtful undertaking. Here—and to be sure only here and not in the unpopularity of his work—Schoenberg's social insight reaches the boundary of this work; not only are the limits of his talent defined, but rather the limits of the function of talent per se. This boundary is not to be crossed through music alone. Schoenberg's student Alban Berg established residence at this boundary. In terms of compositional technique, his work represents to

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a certain degree the reverse line of association between Schoenberg's advanced work and that of the previous generation: Wagner, Mahler and, in many respects, Debussy as well. However, this line is drawn from the perspective of Schoenberg's niveau, which embraces his technical achievements: extreme variation and through-construction and also the twelve-tone method are applied to older chromatic material, including the leading tone—as happens in Schoenberg's works—without "repealing" it. The expressive function is thus preserved. Berg's dialectic is carried out within the realm of musical expression, which cannot be repudiated unconditionally as "individualistic," as the advocates of an empty and collectivistic New-Matter-of-Factness incessantly proclaim. The question of expression can be answered rather only in concrete terms, only according to the substratus of expression, of that which is expressed, and in terms of the validity of the expression itself. If this question is seriously asked within the realm of bourgeois-individualistic music of expression, it becomes apparent that this music of expression is questionable not only as music, but as expression as well. Similar to practices in many of the "psychological" novels of the 19th century, it is not at all the psychic reality of the subject in question which is expressed, but rather a fictive, stylized and, in many respects, counterfeited reality which is encountered in both cases. In music the interlacing of the psychological concept of expression with that of the style of Romanticism is an indication of this state of affairs. If music is successful in breaking through the fictive psychological substratus—through the Wagnerian heroic-erotic image of man, to begin with—then the function of music regarding the bourgeois individual changes. It is then no longer the intention of music to transfigure the individual, establishing him as a norm, but rather to disclose his misery and his suffering, which are concealed by psychological as well as musical convention. By expressing the misery—or the vileness—of the individual without abandoning him to his isolation, but rather by objectifying this misery, music turns in the final analysis against the order of things within which it has its origins as such—just as does the expressed individual have his roots as an individual—but which in music attains to consciousness of itself and of its despair. As soon as such music—for its part sufficiently related in its content to psychoanalysis and not in vain at home in the regions of dream and insanity—eradicates the conventional psychology of expression. It decomposes the contours of the surface thereof and constructs out of the particles of musical expression a new language by means of musical immanence; this converges with Schoenberg's constructive language in spite of the totally different course by which this goal is approached. This dialectic evolves within Berg's works and it is this alone which permits an understanding of his composition of Büchner's tragedy *Wozzeck* in its full significance. A parallel to fine arts is perhaps permissible: Berg's relation to the expressive music of the late 19th and beginning 20th century parallels that of Kokoschka's portraits to those of the Impressionists. The authentic portrayal of the individual psyche, both of the bourgeois psyche and of the proletarian psyche

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which is produced by the bourgeoisie, is suddenly transformed in *Wozzeck* into an intention of social criticism, without of course destroying the frame of aesthetic immanence. It is the deep paradox of Berg's work, in which social antinomy is work-immanently defined, that this critical development is possible in reference to material from the past which is now made transparent by his criticism. This can be observed in one of the most significant scenes in *Wozzeck*, the great scene, in the tavern and here Berg's method intersects with that of the Surrealists. At the same time, it is this reference—at least in terms of the drama—which has protected Berg's work from total isolation and elicited a certain resonance from the bourgeois audience. Even if this resonance is rooted in the misunderstanding of *Wozzeck* as the last "music drama" of Wagnerian coinage, it permits a certain amount of that quality in *Wozzeck* which manifests a dark and dangerous current originating in the caves of the unconscious to trickle into prevailing consciousness through the channels of misunderstanding. Finally, within this context, brief reference must be made to the third representative of the Schoenberg School: Anton Webern. Unquestionable as the extraordinary musical quality of Webern's work is, the social interpretation of this work presents great difficulty and it cannot be more than touched upon here. In Webern, loneliness and alienation from society—conditioned in Schoenberg by the formal structure of his work—become thematic and are transformed into content. The declaration of the inexpressible and of total alienation is asserted by every sound of Webern's music. If one were to apply the basic concept of immanent dialectics, which constitutes the foundation of the Schoenberg School, to Webern, one would have to employ a sub-title from Kierkegaard—who is sufficently close to Webern—and speak of "dialectic lyricism." For here the most extremely individual differentiation, a dissolution of the material used which musically goes far beyond Schoenberg and expressively beyond Berg, is employed for no other purpose than this: for the liberation of a type of natural language of music, of pure sound, which Webern denied without fail in the regression to a natural material, i.e., to tonality and to the "natural" overtone relations. To produce the image of nature within historical dialectics: that is the intention of Webern's music and the riddle which it offers. As a riddle, it offers an answer totally contrary to all nature-romanticism. This riddle will be solved only much later.

The virtuosity of Stravinsky and his followers forms an exact antithesis to the mastery of Schoenberg and his school; here the game is opposed to the absence of illusion; the seductively arbitrary change of masks, whose wearers are consequently identical but empty, is set against responsible dialectics, the substratum of which transforms itself in sudden changes. The music of objectivism is socially all the more transparent than that of the Schoenberg School, the less compactly and densely it turns upon itself in its technology. For that reason the social interpretation of objectivism must proceed from the objectivists' technical method. In every objectivist music the attempt is made to correct the alienation of music from within, that is to say, without any clear

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view of social reality; however, this is not attempted through further pursuit of its immanent dialectic, which is reproached as alien to nature, individualistic and overly differentiated. Absurdly enough, Stravinsky once compared Schoenberg with Oscar Wilde. The musically immanent correction of alienation is rather sought through regression to older, totally pre-bourgeois musical forms, within which an effort is made to affirm an original natural state of music—indeed, it might be said, a musical anthropology appropriate to the being of man and his bodily constitution is the objectivist goal. This explains the inclination of all objectivism to dance forms and to rhythms originating in the dance; they are thought to be elevated above historical change and accessible to every age. Objectivism distinguishes itself from the concept of stylistic history so important to Romanticism—defined in an extreme formula as the "sound of legend" in Schumann; this process involves not only the contrasting of a past musical condition with the negative present-day situation as something positive which it longingly hopes to reinstitute, but even to a greater degree the construction in the past of the image of something absolutely valid which might be realized here and now just as at any other time. This is why objectivism in its theoretical pronouncements has attacked Romanticism so vehemently. From a practical-musical perspective, however, all this means is that the regression of objectivism to its historical models—regardless of whether genuine or false rustic folkmusic, medieval polyphony or the "pre-classic" concertante style is involved—does not aim merely at the reinstitution of these models; only in exceptional cases has objectivism—in the form of stylistic copy—undertaken such reinstitution. In the breadth of its production, however, objectivism does endeavor under the banner of "new-Matter-of-Factness"—dutifully emphasizing its contemporaneity and the fact that it has arrived—to apply old and presumably eternal models to its actual material: to the same harmonically-free material, pre-disposed to polyphony and emancipated from the pressures of expression, which proceeds from the dialectic of the Schoenberg School and is taken over undialectically by objectivism. The ideal of musical objectivism is the formation of a highly differentiated material, manifesting all the signs of the division of labor, but doing so in a static naturalistic manner pre-dating the division of labor.

In this process inescapable contemporary social analogies become apparent. The estate-corporative organization of a highly industrial economic context is manifested, which in objectivist music appears as a conforming image. It appears that the sovereign composer stands in free control of the supposed musical organism, in much the same way that in fascism a "leadership elite"—*Führerelite*—appears to be in control, while in truth power over the social "organism" lies in the hands of monopoly capitalism. When a dissonance is to be introduced or when a suspended note is to be resolved is decided neither by a pre-established scheme, annulled after all by the actual material, nor by structural immanence, the rational order of which is negated precisely in the name of nature, but only by the inclination,

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i.e., the "taste" of the composer. Tempting as the analogy is and no matter how much of the true state of affairs it might reveal, it is not to be made responsible for cognition without the expression of resistance. In the Russian emigrant Stravinsky or even in a neo-classicist such as Casella, who is so very ambitious in cultural politics, the relation to fascism is beyond question. The social interpretation of music, however, is not concerned with the individual consciousness of authors, but rather with the function of their work. And this is where the difficulties begin. First of all, if the association of objectivism with fascism is to be understood as something actual, categories of mediation must be found and the mediation itself must be explained. The mechanism of mediation is, however, still unknown. It could be revealed most readily by an analysis of the state of affairs in fashion, which—as demonstrated, for example, in Stravinsky's case by his generally familiar dependencies—does not permit the essential formal elements of neo-classicism to define themselves through the asking of immanent-technical questions. These elements were rather first deposited from outside the work and were then later transposed into the technical immanence of the work of art. Fashion itself, however, points back judiciously to social and economic facts. This indicates that a solution of the problem of mediation in music has by no means been found; it is rather only that the location of the problem has been designated with greater precision. And furthermore, in the interpretation of objectivism in regard to fascism, problems of content must be confronted. These difficulties are caused by the same state of alienation, the immanent-aesthetic eradication or concealment of which objectivism sets as its task. Even if it were assumed that in terms of intention and objective structure this were indeed the music of the most progressive class within monopoly capitalism, this class would still remain unable either to understand or to consume this music. In the effort of objectivism to overcome alienation only in terms of artistic imagery, alienation is permitted to continue unchanged in reality. The technical specialization of music has progressed so far that an audience is no longer in a position to comprehend this music, even when it is an objective expression of the ideology of the audience itself. In addition, ideological forces of other types, such as the concept of "education"—"Bildung"—as an accumulation of spiritual goods out of the past, have a far greater musical effect upon the audience than the immediate configuration of its social ideals in music; this audience is already too far removed from music to place contral importance upon such configurations. It might well be that Stravinsky's music reflects upper bourgeois ideology far more precisely than, for example, the music of Richard Strauss, the upper bourgeois composer of the last generation; even so, the upper bourgeoisie will nonetheless suspect Stravinsky as a "destroyer" and prefer to hear Strauss in his stead—but prefer even more to hear Beethoven's Seventh Symphony. In this way, alienation complicates the social equation. It is manifested, however, in immanent-aesthetic terms as well—and this might well be the true source of the distrust of the upper bourgeoisie against "its" music. The incorrectness of the structure within

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itself, within which the contradiction between the affirmed formal intentions and the actual state of the material remains unresolved, corresponds to the arbitrariness—the negative arbitrariness—with which the composer disposes over his material. This he does with no preformation of the material in any objectively obligatory manner and without any unequivocal judgement upon musical justice and injustice pronounced by the inner construction of the musical constellation itself.

The greatest justice is done to the material by compositional practices such as those encountered in the significant Hungarian composer and folksong scholar Béla Bartok; he refutes the fiction of formal objectivity and goes back instead to a pre-objective, truly archaic material, which, however, is very closely related to current material precisely in its particular dissolution. Radical folklorism in the rational through-construction of his particular material is, consequently, amazingly similar to the practices of the Schoenberg School. In the realm of objectivism, however, Bartok is a totally singular phenomenon; his earlier collaborator Kodaly, on the other hand, falsified authentic folklore as a romantic dream image of unified-folkish life which denounces itself through the contrast of primitivizing melody and sensuously soft, late Impressionistic harmony. Stravinsky's games of masks are protected from demasking of this type by his highly precise and cautious artistic understanding. It is his great and dangerous accomplishment—dangerous to himself as well—that his music uses the knowledge of its coercive antinomy in presenting itself as a game. It does this, however, never simply as a game and never as applied art; it rather maintains a position of continual hovering between game and seriousness and between styles as well, which makes it almost impossible to call it by name and within which irony hinders any comprehension of the objectivist ideology. This, however, is the background of a despair which is permitted every expression, since no single expression suits it correctly; at the same time it brings the game of masks into relief against its dismal background. Within this oscillation a game might become seriousness at any moment and change suddenly into satanic laughter, mocking society with the possibility of a non-alienated music; it is this which makes the reception of Stravinsky as a fashionable composer whose pretention simultaneously elevates his music impossible. It is precisely the artistic security with which he recognizes the impossibility of a positive-aesthetic solution of the antinomies conditioned by society, recognizing, at the same time, the social antinomy itself which makes his suspicious in the eyes of the upper bourgeoisie. In his best and most exposed works—such as *L'histoire du soldat*—he provokes contradiction. In contrast to all other objectivist authors, Stravinsky's superiority within his métier endangers the consistent ideological positivity of his style, as this is demanded of him by society; consequently, in his case as well, artistic logical consistence becomes socially dialèctical. It is only with the *Symphony of Psalms* that he seems to have warded off the suspicion of prevailing powers against big-city "studio" art, decadence and disintegration.

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The essential social function of Hindemith is the decontamination of Stravinsky's objectivism by means of the naivété with which he assimilates it. His objectivism offers a picture of consistent seriousness; artificial security becomes artisan respectability, whereby the idea of the artisan as a "music maker" again corresponds to the ideas of a state of production not based upon the production and reproduction in music. Hindemith's satanic irony regarding "healthy humor," the health of which indicates the unreflected state of nature in objectivism, disturbed by the grin of Stravinsky's masks and his humor regarding aggressive irony—no matter whether it is avant garde irony or snobbish irony—both reveal his principal reconciliation with social conditions. Stravinsky's despair—this totally historical despair driven to the boundary of schizophrenia in *L'histoire*—is the expression of a subjectivity achieved only through fragments and ghosts of past objective musical language. In Hindemith, this despair is moderated to a naturalistic, unresolved—but still undialectic—melancholy, which looks upon death as an eternal state of affairs similar to numerous intentions of contemporary philosophy, evading concrete social contradictions under the banner of "existentialism" and thus subordinating itself willingly to the anthropological super-historical ideals of objectivism. Stravinsky absorbed social contradictions into artistic antinomy and gave them form; Hindemith conceals them and for that reason his blind configurations turn out to be filled with contradictions. The more perceptive technical eye, which is able to penetrate the surface of consistently interlocking movement and infallible security of instrumentation within the acoustic inventory, locates the flaw of Hindemith's technique everywhere; it discovers the differences between arbitrary material employed as motifs and would-be rigidity of form, between the principal unrepeatability of the components and the forms of repetition which grant surface continuity, between terraced architecture on a large scale and the lack of discrimination—along with the necessity of ordering—in the ordering of the individual terraces. All of this happens simply because "objective" architecture does not embrace the individual productive impulses as a prescribed organizational principle, but rather is imposed upon them by compositional arbitrariness, resulting in a false facade under the sign of the New-Matter-of-Factness. The thematic content of objectivism here remains arbitrary, just as it is in Stravinsky and, to be sure, in the legions of his followers; it is arbitrary in the sense that it is interchangeable and replaceable according to changing ideological needs. It is not unequivocally predetermined by a social constitution and nowhere is it that order for which music might bear witness; it is rather a class order, to be concealed by music under the sign of its humanity. Now mere formal objectivity, totally lacking in content, is offered in its emptiness as thematic content—objectivity for the sake of objectivity, as is often the case in Stravinsky. This obscure vacuity is thus praised as an irrational natural force. Now—as in Hindemith—it is introduced as proof of a community, as such is often formed as a petit bourgeois protest against capitalistic forms of mechanization or in the

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manner in which the Youth Movement would like to influence production, while simply avoiding the capitalistic production process. Now music is supposed to be an aural game, providing man with relaxation or creating community; now it should offer him cultic or existential seriousness, as in the instance when the critics demanded of Hindemith—who was then still much more aggressive—"great depth," to which he responded with the composition of Rilke's *Marienleben*. The thematic contents of musical objectivism are as divergent as the interests of the prevailing forces of society and a difference such as that between upper and petit bourgeoisie—to use the concepts as vaguely as the state of social cognition still proscribes for the present—is reflected clearly enough in the objectivist product. The question of "mediation" would also have to be asked here. All objectivist music has one thing in common: the intention of diverting attention from social conditions. It attempts to make the individual believe that he is not lonely, but rather close to all others in a relationship portrayed for him by music without defining its own social function; it attempts to show the totality as a meaningful organization which fulfills individual destiny positively merely through its transformation into the aural medium. However, the foundation and the meaning of this state of relationship are interchangeable. Insofar as the intention of diversion is actually present and not merely the reflection of wishes within an isolated aesthetic realm, it can be looked upon as unsuccessful. The petite bourgeoisie, intensively courted by objectivism with choral societies and instrumental ensembles, "guilds of music makers" and work collectives, has accomplished nothing for the market. The distress of the capitalist crisis has referred the groups addressed by objectivism and its popularizers to other, more tractable ideologies and to those complicatedly manipulated ideologies of objectivism which are of undefined content. They will hardly feel an inclination to distinguish between the "esoteric" Schoenberg and the "music maker" Hindemith; under the label of cultural bolshevism they will reject both of them and, for their part, cling to resurrected military marches.

This anticipates the essential problematic social dilemma of those types of composers who no longer come to terms with the fact of alienation in the aesthetic image, but rather wish to overcome it in reality by including the state of actual social consciousness in the compositional process itself; they would do this through transformation of the musical *terminus a quo* into a social *terminus ad quem*. On its lower levels objectivism shows a marked tendency towards such a method. The demand for aesthetically-immanent music conducive to community is transformed with continuity into a call for aesthetically elevated "use" music. When Kurt Weill as the major representative of musical surrealism shows himself vastly superior to such methods and to the inferior ideal of such elevation, it is because he—better informed about the social condition—not only accepts the positive change of society through music as a possibility, but rather because he views the disclosure of these conditions through music as possible. He does not present

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man with a primitivized art intended for use; he shows them rather their own "use" music in the distorting mirror of his artistic method, thus revealing it as a commodity. It is not without meaning that the style of Weill's *Three Penny Opera* and *Mahagonny* stand in grater proximity to *L'histoire* than does Hindemith; it is a style based upon montage, which abrogates the "organic" surface structure of neo-classicism and moves together rubble and fragment or constructs actual compositions out of falsehood and illusion—as which the harmony of the 19th century has today been revealed—through the addition of intentionally false notes. The shock with which Weill's compositional practices overexposes common compositional means, unmasking them as ghosts, expresses alarm about the society within which they have their origin and, at the same time, it is the living negation of the possibility of a positive communal music, which collapses in the laughter of devilish vulgar music as which true use music is exposed. With the means of past illusion, present compositional practices confess their own illusory nature and in their crude radiance the coded script of social conditions becomes legible; this prohibits not only every appeasement through an aesthetic image—for the contradiction of this condition appears again in the image itself—but rather approaches man so directly that he will no longer even consider the possibility of the autonomous work of art. The qualitative wealth of results developed out of this constellation by Weill and Brecht is admirable; they sketch innovations of the opera theater in the sudden illumination of moments which simultaneously turn dialectically against the possibility of the opera theater per se. It is beyond question that Weill's music is today the only music of genuine social-polemic impact, which it will remain as long as it resides at the height of its negativity; furthermore, this music has recognized itself as such and has taken its position accordingly. Its problem is the impossibility of remaining at this height; as a musician, Weill must try to escape the responsibilities of a work method which—from the perspective of music—necessarily seems "literary"—similar, in its way, to the pictures of the surrealists. The misunderstanding of the audience which peacefully consumes the songs of the *Three Penny Opera* as hit tunes—hostile as these songs are both to themselves and to this audience—might be legitimized as a vehicle of dialectic communication. The further course of events reveals another danger in ambiguity: illusion blends into false positivity, destruction into communal art within the realm of the status quo. But, as an experimentor, Weill is fundamentally so far removed from any faith in the unconsciously organic that it is hardly to be expected that he will fall victim to the dangers of the undangerous.

Communal and use music in the broadest sphere have become subject to this danger. Their activity asserts itself at the wrong place—in music rather than in society, and therefore they fail in both instances. For in capitalist society the human state of togetherness from which they proceed is a fiction and, where it might be something real, it is impotent when confronted by the capitalist process of production. The fiction of "community" in music

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conceals this process without changing it. At the same time, in inner-musical terms, communal music is reactionary: in the same direction as objectivism, only far more coarsely, it rejects the further dialectic movement of musical material as "individualistic" or "intellectual" and seeks instead a static concept of nature in the restitution of immediacy—namely, the "music maker." Rather than engaging in a—certainly justified—criticism of individualism and in the correction of its immanent contradictions, while recognizing it as a necessary step in the liberation of music for mankind, recourse is taken here on all sides to a primitive, pre-individualistic stage, without any further posing of the neo-classic question regarding the reforming of material. The basic error lies in the conception of the function of music in relation to the public. The consciousness of the public is absolutized; in petit bourgeois communal music this consciousness is viewed as "nature," while class-conscious proletarian music—represented by Hanns Eisler—sees it as proletarian class-conscousness which is to be understood positively here and now. In the process it is overlooked that precisely the demands according to which production should orient itself in these cases—i.e., singability, simplicity, collective effectiveness per se—are necessarily dependent upon a state of conscousness suppressed and enchained through class domination, which results in fetters placed upon musically productive forces. No one has formulated this more exactly and extremely than Marx himself. The immanent-aesthetic results of bourgeois history, including that of the last 50 years, cannot simply be brushed aside by the proletarian theory and praxis of art, unless the desire is to eternalize a condition in art produced by class domination. The elimination of this condition within society is, after all, the fixed goal of the proletarian class struggle. In this process, the submissiveness of communal music in its relation to the present state of consciousness is revealed as deceit by this consciousness itself, for a hit song from a film about a nice little officer of the guard is given preference over popularly conceived communal music which glorifies the proletariat. The agitatory value and therewith the political correctness of proletarian communal music—for example, the choruses of Hanns Eisler—is beyond question; only utopian-idealistic thinking could demand in its place a music internally suited to the function of the proletariat, but incomprehensible to the proletariat. However, as soon as music retreats from the front of direct action, where it grows reflective and establishes itself as an artistic form, it is obvious that the structures produced cannot hold their own against progressive bourgeois production, but rather take the form of a questionable mixture of refuse from antiquated inner-bourgeois stylistic forms—including even those of petit bourgeois choral literature and from the remains of progressive "new" music. Through this mixture, the acuteness of the attack and the coherence of every technical formulation is lost. In place of such intermediate solutions, it is conceivable that melodies of vulgar bourgeois music currently in circulation could be provided with new texts which would in this way bring about a dialectic "re-functioning." It is,

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nevertheless, worthy of notice that in the figure of the proletarian composer most consequent for the present, Hanns Eisler, the Schoenberg School, from which he came forth, comes into contact with efforts seemingly contrary to the School itself. If this contact is to be fruitful, it must find dialectic employment: this music must intervene actively in consciousness through its own forms and not take instructions from the passive, one-sided position of the consciousness of the user—including the proletariat.

II. Reproduction—Consumption.

The alienation of music from society is reflected in the antinomies of musical production; it is tangible as an actual social fact in the relation of production to consumption. Musical reproduction mediates between these two realms. It serves production, which can become immediately present only through reproduction. Otherwise it would exist only as a dead text or score. Reproduction is further the form of all musical consumption, for society can participate only in reproduced works and never only in the texts. The demand of reproduction—understood as the demand for authenticity—and that of consumption—the demand for comprehensibility—address reproduction to the same degree and intertwine in it. The postulate of "intelligible" reproduction of the work can apply equally well to the portrayal of the text in terms of its true meaning and to the comprehensibility thereof for the listener. When production and consumption meet in this way within the innermost cells of reproduction, reproduction then becomes the most narrowly defined scene for the conflicts into which they enter with each other. If reproduction involves only alienated music, it cannot hope to reach society; as reproduction for society, it misses the essence of the works involved. For concrete reproduction is concerned—as everyday criticism would always like people to forget—neither with an eternal work per se nor with a listener dependent upon constant natural conditions, but rather with historical conditions. Not only is the consciousness of the audience dependent upon the change in social conditions and not only is the consciousness of those involved in reproduction dependent upon the state of the total musical constitution of society at a given time, the works themselves and their history change within such constitution. Their text is merely a coded script which does not guarantee unequivocal meaning and within which changing thematic contents appear along with the development of the musical dialectic, which in turn encompasses social impulses. The change within works themselves is portrayed in reproduction; this happens under the sign of radical alienation as the reduction of reproductive freedom. Pre-capitalist reproduction was dominated by tradition: the tradition of musical guilds—at times even the tradition of individual families. The impulse of tradition guaranteed a continuing stable relation between music and its public within the stability of reproduction. The work did not stand in a state of isolation from society; rather through reproduction it exerted an influence upon production. Down to the end of the 18th century—i.e., until the elimination of the practice of

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general bass through Viennese classicism—production, reproduction and improvisation intermingled without definite boundaries. Even such a strictly-composed form as the Bach fugue which—as the heir of medieval polyphony—did not subordinate itself to the general bass practice permits the interpreter full freedom in tempy and dynamics, factors only occasionally defined in the text. The regulation thereof is assigned to a tradition which remains irrational for several centuries following the introduction of tempered tuning. All this changes with the victory of the bourgeois class. The work itself establishes its independence and, in a rational system of signs, defines itself as commodity in relation to society. The tradition of interpreters and their guilds breaks off with the establishment of free competition; "schools of interpretation" are turned into collectives for learning and ideology with no responsibility towards the transmission of traditional teaching. The remnants of traditional musical practices—as, for example, they were encountered by Mahler in Vienna—are, in his words, transparent "slovenliness"—*Schlamperei.* The intervention of the interpreter in the work, still tolerated in the era before the definitive reification of the work, becomes an arbitrary and evil concern from which the rationally-designed work must keep its distance. The history of musical reproduction in the last century has destroyed reproductive freedom. The interpreter has only the choice between two demands of rational character: either he must limit himself strictly to the realization—at most to the decoding—of the exact language of musical signs, or he must adjust to the demands which society as market makes upon him and within which the configuration of the work perishes. In the 19th century the "interpretive personality" mediated between these two demands as the last musical refuge of irrational reproduction within the capitalist process. This personality stands in a clear relation to the forms of competition and contains an equal amount of irrationality. It serves the work by producing its contents again out of the work itself within the framework of the prescriptive text and its signs; this is possible through the homogeneity of the structure of author and interpreter who are both in the same way bourgeois "individuals" and both perfect the "expression" of bourgeois individuality in the same way. Models of such interpretation are Liszt and Rubinstein, both expressive composers and—as interpreters—"re-creators." The society to which they offer music is just as individualistically constituted as they are; it recognizes itself in them and through them it takes possession of the work offered. In the triumphs which it prepares for the virtuoso—far greater than those with which the composer is celebrated—it celebrates itself. In contrast to the 19th century, the decisive change experienced by contemporary musical reproduction is the destruction of the balance of individualistic society and individualistic production; the freedom of reproduction has therewith grown highly problematic. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism. To be sure, the "interpretive personality" continues within musical life and might well be socially more effective than ever before. Its function, however,

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has changed totally and the sovereignty with which it asserts authority over both works and audience conceals in dictatorial fashion the abyss between free interpreter and work. However, musical production—insofar as it asserts any independence from the market—demands total subordination of the interpreter to the text. This subordination is not restricted to present production, but rather becomes the necessary postulate of past production as well—insofar as the reproduction of older works has not become totally impossible in the light of progressive production, causing these works to lie in transparent muteness before the eyes of the strict interpreter. As a composer, Schoenberg eliminated the tonal cadence and all formal means originating in it; at the same time, however, the emancipation of representation which unquestionably belonged to these means and which consequently were not expressly defined were lost; that such means were taken for granted guaranteed the interpreter his freedom. Now the text is annotated down to the last note and to the most subtle nuance of tempo; the interpreter becomes the executor of the unequivocal will of the author. In Schoenberg this strictness has its dialectic origin in the strictness of the compositional method, according to which music is thoroughly "composed out" with no aid from a pre-existing and socially guaranteed material. In Stravinsky, on the other hand, whose text of notes is no less exactly defined, the freedom of the interpreter is eliminated through the style and "taste" of objectivism. This is achieved undialectically, but with similar results. This objectivism, which of course is not purely borne out in construction, demands nonetheless total subordination of the interpreter to its objective attitude. This subordination, even if it is not totally defined in the composition and in the composer's annotation, is intended at least to result in an unemotional manner of performance, similar to that offered by mechanical instruments. The improvements and innovations in the realm of mechanical musical instruments, which make possible a more precise reproduction than that given by mediocre and uncontrolled "free" interpreters, might well have influenced the ideal of reproduction; at any rate, it has affirmed the claims of social interpretation of the conditions of musical production insofar as their immanent complex of problems has brought about the same limitation of reproductive freedom and the same tendencies towards technification and rationalization experienced outside of music in social and economic developments. The perfection of the machine and the replacement of human forces of labor through mechanical forces has become a matter of reality in music as well. These tendencies are not restricted to the reproduction of contemporary music. The historical mutation of works within the framework of ambiguous texts is not an arbitrary process, but rather obeys strictly the insights gained within the realm of musical production. Subjected to more careful observation, older and, above all, "classical" German music—if it is to be realized as its construction presents itself to the eye of today—demands the same strict reproduction as does new music, resisting every improvisational freedom of the interpreter. The demand for a neutrally

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adequate reproduction of the work has emancipated itself from the will of the author—which is also a difficult perspective to define—and it is precisely in such emancipation that the historical character of reproduction is responsibly revealed. If an early Beethoven piano sonata were to be played today as "freely," with such arbitrarily improvisational changes—for example, changes of the basic tempi of individual movements—as it was—according to contemporary reports—by Beethoven himself at the piano, the apparently authentic manner of interpretation would strike the listener as contradictory to the meaning of the work in the face of the constructive unity of such movements. This unity has become clear only today and largely through the efforts of later production in music.

In the immanent confrontation with the work, the most progressive interpretation, oriented to the actual state of production, attains to the idea of self-suspension of the work; an open conflict with society necessarily develops, which further develops into a conflict with the audience, which feels itself represented by the interpreter in the work and, through the sacrifice of the work, this audience now feels itself expelled from the work. This process is to be observed most markedly in the best representatives of interpretation, who concentrate upon a pure reproduction of the work. The ambivalence of society regarding realization is revealed still more sharply in regard to reproduction than to production. With the perfection of technical means for the purpose of reducing the labor force and with the progressive development of the independence of music in terms of a unity of commodities subject to exchange as abstract units which then finally divorces itself totally from society, bourgeois society has not only furthered the process of musical rationalization—it is rather that only through this society did such rationalization become possible in the first place. The consequences of rationalization, however, attack the stability of bourgeois order in its basic categories; this order retreats before these consequences into a conceptual world which long ago took leave not only of immanent-musical reality, but of immanent-bourgeois reality as well. Despite this distance, this order has proven itself highly useful in the ideological concealment of the monopoly capitalist development of society. The rationalization of musical production and reproduction—the result of social rationalization—is cloaked in horror as "de-spiritualization," as if it were feared that the irrationality of the social condition which asserts itself despite all "rationalization" had become all too obvious in the light of radical artistic rationality. In so doing, "spirit" is silently equated with the bourgeois-independent private person, whose rights one would like to define ideologically with greater clarity the more they are questioned in economic and social terms. The most pedestrian antitheses are acceptable to the consumer consciousness which wishes to protect itself from the force of true reproduction in terms of its cognitive character, seeking to secure a type of music-making, the major function of which is to conceal reality through dream, intoxication and inward contemplation. At the same time, such reproduction offers the bourgeoisie in aesthetic images precisely

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that satisfaction of drives which it prohibits them in reality. The price paid for this by the work of art, however, is its integral configuration. The organic is played off against the mechanical, inwardness against vacuity, and personality against anonymity. Objectivism, in its more conciliatory German form, attempted to counter such objections as were expressed against rational reproduction from the side of production by assimilating the lost reproductive freedom—or at least the appearance thereof in the form of "music-making"—"Musikantentum"—into the text, further developing the text out of instrumental performance methods, as though it were only the free possibility of reproduction which made production itself possible in the first place. The illusory character of this attempted mediation is disclosed by the fact that the function which would necessarily fall to reproduction is assigned to production. This makes the "text" and the concrete composition the final instance for the playing of music and the musicianship of the performer becomes a mere ornamental addition to the composition. As far as the audience is concerned, music for mere music-making has always been ineffective. The will of the public was once realized in the same "interpretive personality" who served the breakthrough of individual expression in music in the 19th century and whose function has now undergone drastic change. This personality must now fulfill a double function. First of all, it has to establish the lost communication between work and public through the sovereignty of its "concept" by exorcizing the configuration of the work in a type of enlargement or bigger-than-life image. This image might, of course, be unsuited to the work; nonetheless, it guarantees the effect upon the public. It must further evoke the work as the expression of individual human dynamics and private animation which it, of course, no longer is. Above all other qualities, it is the ability to present works in a configuration long absent from them—indeed, which they perhaps never possessed at all—which distinguishes the "prominent conductor." The dream image of vital fullness and uninhibited verve, of animated organic quality and direct, non-reified inwardness are provided by him corporally for those to whom capitalist economy denies in reality the fulfillment of all such wishes. It further strengthens them in their faith in their own substance, brought to the fore by those very immortal—i.e., immutable—works evoked by this conductor. By virtue of their education, these listeners are firmly in control of these works which, at the same time, they honor as fetishes. Such a conductor stands in an alien or negating relation to contemporary production—in strict contrast to his predecessors in the 19th century; from time to time he offers a modern work as a horrifying example or permits new music at most the position of a transition to the restoration of the old art of the soul. Otherwise he clings to the heroic-bourgeois past—to Beethoven, or to an author such as Bruckner, who unites the pomp of social event with the same claim to animation and inwardness expressed by the prominent interpreter. The same type of conductor who undertakes an insatiably contemplative celebration of Bruckner's Eighth Symphony lives a life closely akin to that of the head of a

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capitalist combine, uniting in his hand as many organizations, institutes and orchestras as possible; this is the exact social corollary to the individual structure of a figure whose task it is to reduce within capitalism the business trust and inwardness to the same common denominator. Several phenomena drawn from the history of types represented by today's prominent interpreters indicate the manner in which the conductor plays the role of a total individual who—like the lord of the monopoly—allegedly overcomes mechanization as the lord of a monopoly who conceals the rational-mechanical apparatus from the view of individuals in order to control it in his own interest. He dominates irresponsibly and without contradiction over the orchestral mechanism, suppressing the free competition of instrumental and vocal virtuosos. He is an individual, but also a "personality" who at one and the same time assumes command over music and public and in the name of the public—but without its conscious will; with gestures of command he quotes the past. Finally, his success is upheld through the gesture of command with which he counters his audience. His ideological domination is supported by a fame in which society reproduces his restorative-reproductive achievement again and again. Class consciousness is so precisely attuned to a fitting ideal of the interpreter that it removes interpreters who do not correspond to it—no matter how indisputable their professional qualifications and even their suggestive force might be. This was done in Vienna before the war in the same way as in present-day Milan and Berlin.

Present-day society demands of music that it serve this society as ideology in the fulfillment of its wishes, as these wishes are manifested dialectically in the problematic realm of reproduction in the figure of the "interpretive personality." It is this demand that dominates the official musical consumption of bourgeois society in toto; this demand is further sanctioned by the institutions of education. In its "musical life"—as it lays claim at present to its traditional locations in opera houses and concert halls—bourgeois society has concluded a type of armistice with alienated music, associating with it in carefully regulated forms of behavior. To be sure, this armistice could be terminated at any time. "Musical life" reacts promptly and exactly to every change of social conditions in the bourgeoisie. For example, the expropriation of the upper middle class through inflation and other crises has expelled this stratum of society from opera and concerts, exiling its members before the radio, the distraction of which adequately expresses the atomization of the bourgeoisie and the exclusion of the bourgeois private person from public affairs. Sitting in front of the loud speaker, the bourgeoisie is subordinated to the monopoly economically and musically, even in terms of a "mixed economic operation." Because musical life registers inner-bourgeois structural changes so directly, analysis must necessarily consider the immanent differences and contradictions of the bourgeoisie. In a sphere in which the autonomous claim of isolated works of art is already broken and replaced by the needs of the market, statistics could assemble essential material for social interpretation. Such material is,

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however, not available. Nonetheless, observation can offer a number of findings. First of all, as far as opera is concerned, it has lost its actuality as a vehicle of consumption. Its primary function in the 19th century—i.e., that of representation—has at any rate been taken away from it for the present: the impoverished members of the middle class do not have the economic power to support such representation, nor do they any longer form a cultural unity, capable of such sublimated representation as was once to be found in the opera theater. The most they can do is to commemorate their happier years at performances of *Die Meistersinger*. The upper bourgeoisie, however, which is able and willing to engage in representation, avoids all too open presentation of itself as the dominant and economically competent stratum of society; for the moment, it restricts its representation to more exclusive circles—above all, to those in the loges, accessible to every opera glass. Furthermore, they are totally disinterested in the opera repertory and prefer to establish their musical domain in the large concert organizations which they dominate economically as well as through the politics of programming without exposing themselves to an undue degree. It is nonetheless conceivable that with progressive political development of the forms of domination in monopoly capitalism, opera could regain something of its previous social lustre. On the one hand, opera is attended in part by subscription holders from the older generation of the "educated" middle class, who experience there their own past, enjoying the triumphal bourgeois intoxication which is the particular specialty of Wagner. At the same time—by clinging to a form of art little influenced by social conditions in the breadth of its production—they are able to protest against artistic innovation and related social intentions per se. Another part of the audience which fills opera houses consists of members of other bourgeois circles, such as small merchants, and even of representatives of the artisan professions who still command a certain economic standard, but are excluded from the fruits thereof by "education" in terms of their origin and training. This is the type of opera-goer who is naturally delighted to hear the march from *Aïda* and the aria of Madame Butterfly again—familiar to him from movies and coffee houses and on a level with his musical education. At the same time, he feels that he owes it to his actual economic position and to the possibility of social ascent to receive these bits of commodity in the place consecrated by the old bourgeois ideal of education and which grants the opera-goer—at least in his own eyes—through his presence in the opera house, something of the dignity of that education. It can be assumed that there is a considerable percentage of this type of listener present in the opera audience; this audience is, of course, subject to great modifications. Characteristic today is the total absence of the younger generation of the upper bourgeoisie and of all intellectuals and white-collar workers. The structure envisioned is primarily that encountered in the audience of a provincial opera house. In the metropolitan centers—Berlin, and Vienna as well—the bourgeoisie is still further distracted from the opera through the highly developed mechanism of diversion, so that the

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middle class comes less in question for the opera in those cities than in the provinces. On the other hand, opera is granted a representative dignity in the name of truly existent or fictive "foreigners" and this draws the upper bourgeoisie to it, making opera performances as social events possible.

The function of concerts within the bourgeois household is still more significant. In the concert the rather crude subject matter of the opera is absent. It manifests a baroque heritage which has remained largely unaffected by the shift of weight in inner-musical developments from the vocal to the instrumental in recent centuries. The role of opera within bourgeois humanism and idealism is only indirect and beyond question only in the greatest works of the genre: in Mozart, in Beethoven's *Fidelio* and in *Der Freischütz*. It is precisely the subject matter which draws the lower middle class to the opera; in it they seek something similar to a regression into pre-bourgeois culture. However, the same subject matter frightens away the upper stratum of society which finds it "primitive" and "raw." Possibly they sense the danger in the energy of the pre-bourgeois or—in any case—non-bourgeois world of the opera theater—a danger which always seeks to activate itself politically; perhaps they are interested in concealing the character of reality as a world of mere objects, as it is manifested by the opera with uncontrolled joy of discovery. They would like to conceal this precisely because it remains the character of bourgeois reality still today. The upper class retreats from this reality into "inwardness"; the more pleasant its experience, the more it distances itself from social conditions and insight into the contradictions involved therein. This insight can even be presented through music and cloaked in the illusion of immediate collectivity. The upper bourgeoisie loves concerts; in the concert hall it cultivates the humanistic-idealistic educational ideology without compromising itself. This ideology attracts the educated class in large numbers—including its impoverished and petty bourgeois representatives—into such concerts. The ambiguity of "education and property" which achieves ideological reconciliation in the concert hall is expressed conspicuously in the doubling of orchestras in numerous cities: while the "philharmonic" plays for the upper bourgeoisie in expensive concerts, the exclusivity of which is guaranteed by the family subscription system, performing with highly famous guest stars and a very limited number of sanctioned, likewise ceremonial works, the "symphony orchestras" serve the middle educational stratum with cautious doses of novelties within the traditionalist program through the inclusion of resident "local" talent and for low-priced admission. This continues as long as the economy makes such participation possible. Soloist concerts—the number of which shrinks because of increased risk to the concert agent—no longer encounter the former interest; through the reduction in number, they recede more and more from the public consciousness and restrict themselves obviously to the circle of monopolized stars. Concerts such as the offerings of the International Society for New Music, which ostentatiously represent contemporary independent production, demonstrate their isolation through

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drastic economic measures; they are attended almost exclusively by musicians —regardless of the direction of modernity that they propagate—and tickets are furnished to the audience gratis. Therefore, these concerts remain within the sphere of musical production and are furthermore economically totally unproductive: they are undertakings dependent upon subvention and deficit financing. The few amateurs who support them—members of the bourgeoisie, for the most part—share in the process of economic production only indirectly or not at all; they have been eliminated from it by the economic crisis. There simply is no such thing as the "consumption" of new music. Insofar as it ever experiences reproduction, this is made possible through organizations of artists among themselves who are hardly capable of bearing the economic burden or through international meetings of political flavor that prove fictive in terms both of the position taken by the individual nations toward current musical production and of their interest in "spiritual exchange." Consequently, a life span of any considerable length cannot be forecast for such organizations. Such concerts and conventions—by clinging liberalistically to the fuction of consumption and "exchange" for economic reasons—have sacrificed any mutually binding effect or responsibility through the compromises involved in the politics of their program. This is true even from the perspective of musical immanence.

The consumers' consciousness of official musical life cannot be reduced to any simple formula; any comment upon the ideological character of bourgeois musical consumption demands explanation. It is incorrect to believe that no actual need lies at the basis of the consumption of music—as though all musical life were nothing but some type of resounding cultural backdrop, erected by bourgeois society for the concealment of its own true purposes, while its authentic, economic-political life takes place offstage. Regardless of the degree to which musical life assimilates such functions and no matter how great its share in the representation of the specifically "social" —i.e., in matters divorced from actual musical needs—these factors alone do not offer the complete picture. It is rather that the ideological power of musical consumption is all the greater, the less it is transparent as mere illusion and as a thin surface gloss and the more precisely it communicates in terms of true needs—doing so, however, in such a way that a "false consciousness" is the result and that the actual social situation is hidden from the consumer. The need for music is present in bourgeois society and this need increases with the problematic social conditions that cause the individual to seek satisfaction beyond immediate social reality, which denies him this satisfaction. This satisfaction is "ideologically" provided by musical life through its acceptance of the bourgeois tendency—again a dialectical product—to flee from social reality and to reinterpret this reality for them by providing them with contents which social reality never possessed or—at best —lost long ago. The clinging to these contents involves the objective intention of thwarting change within society, which would necessarily unmask the true identity of these contents. The ideological essence of musical life is its ability

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to satisfy the needs of the bourgeoisie adequately, but to do so by means of a form of satisfaction which accepts and stabilizes the existing consciousness, rather than revealing through its own form social contradictions, translating them into form and cognition regarding the structure of society. When Nietzsche condemned the "intoxication" which music produces as an unproductive intoxication, incapable of activation, impure and dangerous, he correctly recognized the relation between the satisfaction of needs and ideological obscurement—the basic law of bourgeois musical practices—and further identified the unconscious as the setting of that relation. He achieved this despite the doubtfulness of his categories and the unconditional orientation of his musical concepts in terms of the work of Wagner. The association of the bourgeoisie with music takes place under the protection of the unconscious; this is true both of the "legal" association within "musical life" and—to a greater degree—the "illegal" within "light music." The unconsciousness of the relation simultaneously guarantees the fetish character of music-objects; reverence, projected rather distortedly from the theological realm into the aesthetic, forbids any conscious "analyzing" concern with music, the comprehension of which is reserved for "feeling." The uncontrollability of the private-bourgeois manner of reaction to music corresponds to the fetish-like isolation of the musical structure itself. Every technological reflection which might illuminate something of the social function of music along with an explanation of its formal aspects is refused in the name of feeling; at the same time, knowledge of general and meaningless concepts of style is promoted in the name of education. Reverence and feeling cling to the celebrities of the past, before whom all criticism grows silent and in whom the bourgeoisie loves to affirm its own origins and the source of all heroism. Today, since apology is the primary obligation of official musical culture in rationalized society, equal use is made of bourgeois-revolutionary objectivity—"Classicism"—and resigned bourgeois subjectivity—"Romanticism"; the glorification of the victory of bourgeois ratio as well as the suffering of the individual under the sole domination of this ratio is the object of bourgeois musical life, expressed in its canonical works. The ambivalence of a feeling which finds equal satisfaction in Classicism and Romanticism is the ambivalence of the bourgeoisie toward its own ratio. Beyond the tension between rationally constituted objectivity and irrationally emphasized, private inwardness, the bourgeoisie registers the phases of its ascent to the heights of capitalism in "musical life." In *Die Meistersinger*, one of the most informative and—not without reason—socially popular of all works, the theme is the ascent of the bourgeois entrepreneur and his "national-liberal" reconciliation with feudalism in a type of dream displacement. The dream wish of the entrepreneur who has arrived economically makes it possible that not he is received by the feudal lord, but rather the feudal lord by the rich bourgeois; the dreamer is not the bourgeois, but the Junker, whose dream song simultaneously re-establishes lost, pre-capitalistic immediacy in contrast to the rational system of rules developed by the bourgeois "master." The

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suffering of the bourgeois individual under his own—and at the same time, isolated—reality—the *Tristan* side of *Die Meistersinger*—is united in hatred against the petty bourgeois Beckmesser with the consciousness of the entrepreneur whose interest is worldwide economic expansion. The entrepreneur has experienced existing conditions of production as fetters upon the forces of production and perhaps already longs for monopoly in place of free competition—in the romantic image of the feudal lord. On the Festival Meadow in Act III of the opera, competition is actually no longer present; only a parody thereof is offered in the confrontation between the Junker Walther and Beckmesser. In the aesthetic triumph of Hans Sachs and the Junker, balance is achieved between the ideals of the privateer and the exporter in their struggle with each other. In Richard Strauss, the last significant bourgeois composer whose music is consumed by the bourgeoisie, international economics—as Ernst Bloch was the first to recognize—have attained the upper hand. Inwardness and pessimism have been liquidated. "Ardour"—as the spirit of the entrepreneur—emancipates itself. Chromaticism and dissonance—previously means of liberation for bourgeois music from a proscribed, irrational system and vehicle for a dialectic which attacks and transforms the material of music—lose their revolutionary-dialectical force and become—like exoticism and perversity in the subject matter—the mere emblem of worldwide economic maneuverability. Technically, they are arbitrarily related as though they were ink blots which at any moment can be liquidated by the healthy optimism of the six-four chord. The material which finally emerges in Strauss' music is to a degree the primal material of all bourgeois music, diatonic-tonal, to which the bourgeoisie, in spite of all changes in structure, clings in truth as faithfully as it does to the principles of profit and interest. In Strauss this makes its appearance with some cynicism by subordinating to itself such foreign markets as literature, the Orient, antiquity and the 18th century. There is a sharp divergence between Strauss' often and verbosely praised "technical sophistication"—i.e., a sophistication imposed from without and not immanent to the material, intended for the arbitrary and actually irrational "domination" of the apparatus—and an historically innocent, harmless and jovial musical substance. This divergence is not only quite suitable to the empirical state of consciousness of the upper bourgeois industrial entrepreneur around 1900, it further denotes with clarity the self-estrangement of the bourgeoisie from its own ratio, which it must intensify and curb simultaneously. Nonetheless, within the post-Wagnerian musical situation, through the social development and the immanent dialectic of Wagner's work, the alienation of musical material from society has advanced to such a degree that a productive force such as that of Strauss could not simply and unconditionally ignore the material demands and adapt itself to society. To be sure, in his best works—*Salome* and *Electra*—the divergence is already indicated; in the music of John the Baptist and in the entire final section of *Electra* banality is dominant. But at the beginning of *Salome*, in Electra's monologue and in her scene with Klytemnestra, his

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compositional material declares—as it were—its independence and advances, against its will, to the very boundary of the tonal realm. This boundary is also the boundary of consumption: in the face of both works, the audience was shocked by both music and content and consequently denied them—if not the stages of all opera houses—at least a secure place in the repertory. This audience drew the line of its tolerance with Strauss and this line, in turn, affected his later work. But, in another sense, Strauss drew the line himself. Of all the composers of the bourgeoisie, he was perhaps the most class conscious; *Der Rosenkavalier* was his greatest success and in it the dialectic of material is invalidated from without. The diatonic is cleansed of all dangerous fermatas and Octavian, the young man of good family—a trouser role, to top it off—is married to the daughter of newly ennobled wealth, while the Marschallin—simultaneously the heir of Hans Sachs and Isolde—has all the difficulty and finds consolation only in the abstract consciousness of transitoriness. With this intellectual sacrifice to consumer consciousness, Strauss' productive power is extinguished: everything that follows *Rosenkavalier* is either applied or commercial art. The break between production and consumption to which Strauss fell victim as a producer first took on extreme form only in Germany. In France, where the process of industrialization was less far advanced—thus expressing within itself the antinomies of bourgeois order less radically—both remain in harmony for a longer time. The bourgeoisie which was interested in music had extensive free time at its disposal and, trained by the painting of Impressionism, it was able to follow the movement further. Music, not yet isolated and not dialectical within itself by virtue of its polemic position toward society, could sublimate the means of this society within itself without making a substantial attack upon society. Debussy, an autonomous artist like the Impressionist painters, whose technology he transposes into music, can take with him into his highly fastidious artistic method elements of bourgeois culinary music and even of salon music in terms of sound and melody. Of course, just as in Strauss, the diatonic emerges in Debussy, too—barren and archaic. This happens in his theory as well—in the dogma of natural overtones and the resulting Rousseauean diction, the consequence of the total sublimation of the primal musical material of the bourgeoisie. Ravel, with his knowing eye, can find no other means of adjustment to this situation than through psychological-literary appeasement: he resorts to gentle irony. Even in France, however, this marks the end of reconciliation. The composers of the post-Ravel generation manifest the most suspicious lack from which French artists could possibly suffer: the lack of métier. Tradition, which lasted for such a long time, has been broken; a replacement through isolated musical training in Schoenberg's sense has not yet come into being. Between serious production and bourgeois consumption a vacuum is openly revealed everywhere. Production within which immanence achieved crystallization remains inaccessible; that production, however, which adjusted to consumption is rejected in its subaltern faint-heartedness by the upper bourgeoisie itself as

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"epigonal." The bourgeoisie thus sees itself thrown back ever more definitely upon the limited circle of "classic" production which is no longer capable of extension. The recourse to pre-liberalist classicism, the refusal even of the "moderately modern" corresponds precisely to the economic-political recourse to pre-liberalist forms, as this recourse is dialectically conditioned by liberalism itself, wherever it has no desire to move progressively beyond itself.

Below the realm of "musical life," below education and representation, stretches the vast realm of "light" music. Along with commercial art and song, literature for male chorus and sophisticated jazz it extends musical life without interruption, assimilating as much from above as is accessible to it. It reaches downward into the bottomless underworld far beyond the bourgeois "hit song" and from which at only occasional junctures eruptions such as the horrifying song "Drink, Drink, Dear Brother, Drink," ascend into consciousness. Light music satisfies immediate needs, not only those of the bourgeoisie, but of all of society. At the same time, however, as pure commodity, it is most alien of all music to society; it no longer expresses anything of social misery and contradiction, but forms rather in itself one single contradiction to this society. This it does by falsifying the cognition of reality through the satisfaction of desires which it grants to man. He is forced away from reality and divorced from both music and social history. Society tolerates light music as "kitsch," which, of course, lays no claim to aesthetic rights; as a means of diversion, however, it is not subject to any criticism. Thus in its way, society adjusts to the paradox of light music which of all music at one and the same time is the closest to and the most distant from man. The same products which as daydreams fulfill the conscious and unconscious desires of men are forced upon the same people by capitalism with all its technique with no influence from those affected whatsoever; they are not asked—indeed, they have not the slightest chance of defending themselves. Light music is protected in many ways from the grasp of cognition. First of all, it is looked upon as harmless—as a minor happiness of which man must not be robbed. Further, it is viewed as lacking in seriousness and unworthy of educated consideration. Finally, however, the mechanism of wish fulfillment is rooted so deeply in the unconscious and is assigned so cautiously to the darkness of the unconscious that this mechanism—precisely in the most important cases—is hardly accessible without the aid of theory. Reference to such an "absurd" hit song as "Who Rolled the Cheese to the Depot?" makes this sufficiently clear. Such study demands highly exact interpretation—the bourgeoisie would speak of "artistic" interpretation; indeed, even very precise psychological training is called for. Observations upon technique, such as are applied to art music, reveal very little, for they are able only to characterize vulgar music in terms of its inability to develop an autonomous technique, through which it might easily have met the demands of consumption as a commodity. The place of technical analysis should be taken by an indication of the few, regressively preserved and obviously archaic-symbolic types and figures with which vulgar music operates.

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Furthermore, a scheme of depravation should be worked out, in which only light music registers history, integrating it into the archaic mechanism of drives. Finally, changes within light music demand description and documentation of their economic constitution; in spite of the "ahistoricism" of their types, they are extensive and important. Organized scholarship has paid no attention to any of this; the material involved has not even been philologically prepared. Such study has not gotten beyond the obvious relation between contemporary and older vulgar music—i.e., traditional dance forms, the communal song, opera buffa, and the *Singspiel*—and the confirmation of "primal motives" along with the folkloristic satisfaction that they offer. Here, however, where the invariables are completely obvious, the concern should be less with their definition than with their functional interpretation; it should be shown that the same components and the identical drive structures to which light music adjusts take on totally different meanings depending upon the given state of social progress. The same vulgar song type, for example, with the profanity of which the the youthful bourgeoisie of the 17th and 18th centuries unmasked feudal hierarchy and made fun of it today serves the transfiguration and apology of the rational bourgeois profane world, whose typewriters—despite all rationalization—are transformed into music and sung—i.e., they are capable of transforming them into "immediacy." Furthermore, the formal changes encountered in all types of light music should be studied in connection with change in function. If the apocryphal character of light music complicates its social study, it could be simplified through the disappearance within it of any autonomous dialectic of production. The exposure of vulgar music need not be mediated through the technological indication of its immanent contradictions, because, in obedience to social dictates, it offers far less opposition to social categories than do independent production and educated musical life. However, the obscure realm of light music remains unexamined; there is, therefore, nothing to be gained from prejudging its topography, for the limited number of basic types, along with the drastic ideological function of many phenomena within this music, are misleading, resulting in premature anticipation of the entire sphere without definition of its "idea" with the necessary pragmatic discipline. Social interpretation is thus deprived not only of its reliability, but probably of its productivity as well. Even the conceitedly summary treatment of light music remains obedient; by borrowing from it that ambiguous irony with which light music—like many contemporary films—inclines to smile at itself in order to pass by without being challenged, such observation accepts as an object of the game that which should be seen by the inexorable eye, untouched by laughter, as the fateful power of deception concentrated in light music. Until such observation becomes possible, fragmentary indications must suffice.

As old as the tension between art music and vulgar music is, it became radical only in high capitalism. In earlier epochs, art music was able to regenerate its material from time to time and enlarge its sphere by recourse to

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vulgar music. This is seen in medieval polyphony, which drew upon folk songs for its cantus firmi, and also in Mozart, when he combined peep-show cosmology with opera seria and *Singspiel* in *The Magic Flute*. Even the masters of the 19th century operetta, Offenbach and Johann Strauss, remained sufficiently in command of the divergence between these two spheres of musical production. Today the possibility of balance has vanished and attempts at amalgamation—such as those undertaken by diligent art composers at the time of the rage for jazz, remain unproductive. There is no longer any "folk" whose songs and games could be taken up and sublimated by art; the opening up of markets and the bourgeois process of rationalization have subordinated all society to bourgeois categories. This subordination extends to ideology as well. The categories of contemporary vulgar music are in their entirety those of bourgeois rational society, which—only in order that they remain subject to consumption—are kept within the limits of consciousness imposed by bourgeois society not only upon the suppressed classes, but upon itself as well. The material of vulgar music is the obsolete or depraved material of art music. The music of Johann Strauss is set off from the art music of the time through its "genre," but this separation is not total; his waltzes leave room for harmonic differentiation and, furthermore, they are formed thematically out of small, contrasting units never subject merely to empty repetition. It is the surprising connection of these fragments which gives the Strauss waltz its charm, its "pungency," relating it at the same time to the tradition of Viennese classicism, from which it is derived via Strauss senior, Lanner and Schubert. It is the decisive factor in the history of recent vulgar music that the definitive break, the sacrifice of its relation to independent production, the growing vacuity and banalization of light music corresponds exactly to the industrialization of production. The authors of light music were forced into mass production by inconceivably intense competition. Those among them who succeeded—back before the war already—banned together in compositional trusts; they settled down in the Austrian Salzkammergut and, in carefully planned cooperation with librettists and theater directors, kept outsiders and novices at a distance. Through restriction of production to their own limited number, they established norms for the manufacture of the operetta, defining, above all, the quantity and type of the individual "numbers." At the same time, they calculated the sale of their creations in advance, avoiding for that reason all difficulties that might hinder remembrance and singing of their melodies—a practice of which the Viennese or Parisian bourgeoisie of 1880 was still capable. The sign of the industrialization of musical production was the total elimination of all contrast within melodies and the sole domination of the sequence, which of course had been employed previously as a means by which music impressed itself on the listener. Exemplary for the establishment of the new style is the Waltz from *The Merry Widow*; the jubilation with which the bourgeoisie received Lehar's operetta is comparable to the success of the first department stores. Oscar Strauss, for example, who was still rooted in the

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Viennese tradition, had learned his handicraft and had exerted great effort toward a richer and more complex operetta music. However, he had to earn his living either through commercial music—from which the social effectiveness of Johann Strauss was lacking—or adjust to industrialization. Leo Fall is the last composer who withdrew from this affair with some dignity. All these composers, however, were still on intimate terms with bourgeois art music—expressed within the operetta form itself as a unity or a "totality," even if in a parodistic manner—which demanded of them musical architecture, strong personal contours in the characters of their works and, finally, originality and inspiration as well. The industrial development of light music annuled the last aesthetic responsibility and transformed light music into a market article. The material subject matter of the revue liquidated the subjective, formal element of the operetta and, in its appeal to the listener, the operetta was undercut by it. This it did not only by offering the audience "girls," but further by liberating it from the last demands of intellectual activity, of thinking participation in the events presented to it and in their unity. The stage thus surrenders to irresponsible play with wishes and desires, through which the revue-operetta—strangely enough—approached certain intentions of independent production. This aspect of the revue made the Viennese operetta and its Hungarian byproduct institutions of serious competition. The sound film then eliminated all original musical inspiration. While a hit such as "Valencia"—in order to dominate the market—was still called upon to make a distinction between the banality of its second steps through asymmetrical, "cute" meter and other banalities, the totally rationalized factories of sound film hits with their capitalistic division of labor are excused from such efforts. No matter how their products look and sound, they are "successes"; listeners are forced to sing them to themselves, not only because the most finely tooled machinery hammers them into them, but above all, because the monopoly of the sound film prevents all other musical commodities—from which they might choose something else—from reaching them. Here monopoly capitalism has asserted itself purely and extremely; in clumsy efforts such as *Bombs on the Monte Carlo*, it has further defined the political dimension of the omnipotence. Even if vulgar music in terms of its form and structure is thus removed from the educational categories of bourgeois society—categories about whose continuation this music is deeply concerned—it clings nonetheless to the materials of education as fetishes. The industrialization of light music and the abrasion of the bourgeois educational heritage which it accomplishes go hand in hand. It is no coincidence that at the same time in which the last chances of authentic production of light music have been eliminated, the operetta undertakes the glorification of the "creative" artist by stealing his melodies: *Das Dreimäderlhaus*, with its abuse of Schubert's music, is a necessary component of the economic substructure of hit song fabrication—both as an advertisement and ideology—and every further development of the industrial apparatus has strengthened the fetish character of the educational heritage within which light music still lives more

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extremely. Friederike and *Das Land des Lächelns* with all its exoticism are sister-works; the ready-made jazz industry lives from the arrangements of "classical" music, for this heritage provides jazz with raw materials. This heritage, in turn, is strengthened—as a fetish—through the happiness of renewed encounter. The ideological function of jazz when it first asserted itself as the upper bourgeois form of contemporary vulgar music was to conceal the commodity character and alienated manner of production of this music; it was to be offered under the trademark of "quality goods." Jazz was to evoke the appearance of improvisational freedom and immediacy in the sphere of light music; this is why it could be so adapted so conveniently by efforts of similar intention in art music. The maneuver of jazz has been psychologically successful for years thanks to the structure of a society whose mechanism of rationalization inevitably produces the necessity of disguising itself in the interest of turnover on the marketplace. In jazz there can be no talk of "immediate" production; the division of labor into "inventor," proof reader, harmonizer and specialist for instrumentation is, if possible, still further advanced in this case than in the manufacture of operetta. The apparent improvisations of "hot" music are totally the expression of set norms which can be traced back to a very few basic types. In the same manner, in jazz, freedom and rhythmic wealth are illusory from the perspective of musical immanence: metrically the eight-bar structure dominates, making use of syncopes and the interpolation of an "illusory" beat only as ornaments. In its harmonic-formal relations, however, this structure asserts itself without challenge, and rhythmic emancipation is restricted to the sustained fourths of the bass drum. Beneath the opulent surface of jazz lies the most primitive harmonic—tonal scheme—barren, unchanged, clearly detachable—with its breakdown into half- and full-cadences and equally primitive meter and form. It is socially and musically equally revealing that jazz bands and jazz composition were able to obey the fashion of military marches with ease when political reversal took place within the crisis which proclaimed the upper bourgeoisie drive of the entrepreneur in place of world-market expansion and the exotic-folkloristic corollary thereof in the vulgar music of national autarchy, which it further demanded of commercial art. The bass drum, whose previous purpose was the representation of the dance-like primal feelings of colonial peoples, now regulates the march step of local formations. The elements of musical impressions used by jazz—the whole-tone scale, the ninth chord, chordal parallel movements—change nothing in this situation. It is not merely that they do not appear until after the dialectic of art music has left them far behind, following the exhaustion of their value as stimuli—in the same manner, vulgar music of the second half of the 19th century took over chromaticism from preceding Romanticism. More essential, however, is that these means totally lost every formative power in jazz. All the old salon pieces, waltzes, character pieces and reveries inserted into jazz employed chromaticism only in the form of intermediate notes alien to harmony without chromaticization of the harmonic foundation itself. In like manner,

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in jazz, impressionistic flourishes appear only as interpolations without disturbing the harmonic-metric scheme. Light music clings rigidly to the diatonic as its "base in nature," and it is the more certain of this base the sooner it can permit itself—as jazz does—an excess under this sign.

If the scheme of depravation of light music is anticipated by its immanence in the static basic material of bourgeois art music—i.e., in tonality—and if in these terms the relation of light music to art music offers no terribly great difficulties—even in terms of social interpretation—the difficulties involved in a theory of all types are all the greater. Even the very basic state of affairs in light music, the division into couplet and refrain, is not easily accessible. If the historical origins thereof in the exchange between solo and choral song is considered, and if it is compared with the trick of many contemporary hits which narrate the story of their refrain in the couplet, as it were, the following interpretation seems probable: in its stereotyped figures, light music attempts to master the fact of its alienation by absorbing the reporting, observing and detached individual—as soon as he begins the refrain—into a fictive collective. This individual, in turn, finds his significance enforced through his participation in the objectivity of the refrain; indeed, he experiences the content of the refrain text as his own content in the couplet. He then recognizes this content in the refrain with astonishment and elevation as a collective content. The psychological mechanism of hit song production, consequently, is narcissistic; the demand for arbitrary singability or hit tunes corresponds to this: in his ability to resing the melody with which he is manipulated, every listener identifies with the original vehicles of the melody, with leading personalities or with a collective of warriors which intones the song. He thus forgets his own isolation and accepts the illusion either that he is embraced by the collective or that he himself is a leading personality. Be that as it may, this mechanism does not prevail without exception: even if the major portion of hit song production clings to the division between couplet and refrain, several of the most successful hits of the post-war period—such as "The Dancing Tambourine" and "The Wedding of the Painted Doll"—sidestepped this division. The first of these songs is a dance movement with trio; the second, a type of "character piece" in the sense of the 19th century. In such pieces, the success of which is not to be ascribed to their texts, the psychological mechanism cannot be defined so easily. In "Tambourine," it might be a certain melodic contour, particularly in the trio; in the "Doll" song, the impulse of infantilism has an influence, but such definitions are far less meaningful than psychoanalytical characteristics provoked by every hit song. This it does in order that a second and more dangerous significance can be concealed behind the psychoanalytic individual meaning: i.e., the social significance of the song. If, however, in these two instrumental songs, the role of the music is so considerable in the effect produced, one is hardly justified in ignoring this effect in those songs with text. No method for the analysis of the psychological effect of music has been developed and even Ernst Kurth's psychology of music offers no sufficient instructions on this problem which is

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perhaps in reality the most important one in the social interpretation of music. There is the further question, whether psychology in this case is sufficient; whether the decisive categories are not rather to be provided by social theory. The "psychology" of hit songs in the traditional sense leads to constants in the realm of drives. Thus, in the explanation of the "absurd" type of hit, it is illuminating to make reference to anal regression along with its sadistic components which are seldom lacking in the song texts at hand. Absurdity is portrayed as blanks created by censorship which can, however, easily be filled in. With the definition of the anal-sadistic structure of those hits, nothing is said about their present social function; their effect is rather traced back to a natural disposition of drives and the conflict thereof with society in general, an aspect which at any given time is equally specific, while the origin and function of the hit song within capitalism is not questioned at all. However, as long as the social dialectic and the analysis of the structure of drives stand discretely or merely complementarily beside each other, the concrete effect of light music has not been seen through; it remains rather assigned to various individual disciplines, which—in the sense of bourgeois systematic scholarship—proceed in isolation, underscoring in their separation one of the most questionable disjunctions of bourgeois thought itself: the disjunction between nature and history. The social interpretation of light and—in the final analysis—of all music is faced by the one central question: what method is it to employ to avoid still further presumption in methodology of the ambiguity of the static state of nature—in the components of drives—and of dynamic historical quality—in its social function. If music—as it has done up to the present—is to escape the schematism of individual psychology, if the most elementary of its effects presupposes a concrete social condition of which it offers a tendentious indication, and if nature itself does not appear in music other than in historic images, then the material character of music might offer an indication that dialectical materialism might not answer the "question" about the relation of nature and history, but that it might rather contribute to the elimination of this question both in theory and praxis.

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RESIGNATION*

by Theodor W. Adorno

We older representatives of that for which the name Frankfurt School has established itself have recently had the reproach of resignation levelled against us. We had, it is stated, developed elements of a critical theory of society, but we were not prepared to draw the practical consequences from this theory. We neither designed programs for action nor did we support the actions of those who felt themselves inspired by critical theory. I shall sidestep the question whether this demand can be made at all upon theoretical thinkers who always remain to a certain degree sensitive and by no means unshakable instruments. The task assigned such individuals within a society characterized by the division of labor might indeed be questionable; they themselves might well be deformed by it. But they have also been formed by it. And there is no way in which they can repeal that which they have become merely through an act of their own will. I should not want to deny the impulse of subjective weakness inherent in the confinement to theory. The objection raised against us can be stated approximately in these words: a person who in the present hour doubts the possibility of radical change in society and who for that reason neither takes part in or recommends spectacular, violent action, is guilty of resignation. He does not consider the vision of change which he once held capable of realization; indeed, he actually had no true desire to see it realized in the first place. In leaving conditions as they are, he offers his tacit approval of them.

Distance from praxis is disreputable in the eyes of everyone. Anyone who does not take immediate action and who is not willing to get his hands dirty is the subject of suspicion; it is felt that his antipathy toward such action was not legitimate, and further that his view has even been distorted by the privileges he enjoys. Distrust of those who distrust praxis extends from those on the opposite side, who repeat the old slogan, "We've had enough of talking" all the way to the objective spirit of advertising, which propagates the picture—it's called Leitbild or "image as motiv"—of the actively involved human being, no matter whether his activity lies in the realm of economics or athletics. One should take part. Whoever restricts himself to thinking but does not get involved is weak, cowardly and virtually a traitor. This hostile cliché on the intellectual is to be encountered with deep roots within that branch of the opposition that is in turn reviled as intellectual without any awareness thereof on their part. Thinking activists answer: among the things to be changed is that very separation of theory and praxis. Praxis is essential if we are ever to be liberated from the domination of practical people and practical ideals. The trouble with this view is that it results in the prohibition

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of thinking. Very little is needed to turn the resistance against repression repressively against those who—little as they might wish to glorify their state of being—do not desert the standpoint that they have come to occupy. The often-evoked unity of theory and praxis has a tendency to give way to the predominance of praxis. Numerous views define theory itself as a form of repression—as though praxis did not stand in a far more direct relationship to repression. For Marx, the dogma of this unity was animated by the immanent possibility of action which even then was not to be realized. Today it is rather the opposite situation that prevails. One clings to action because of the impossibility of action. But Marx himself reveals a concealed wound in this regard. He no doubt delivered the 11th thesis on Feuerbach in such an authoritarian fashion because he was not at all sure of it himself. In his youth he had demanded the "ruthless criticism of everything that exists." Now he mocked criticism. But his famous joke about the Young Hegelians, his coinage "critical criticism," was a dud and went up in smoke as nothing but a tautology. The forced precedence of praxis brought the criticism which Marx himself practiced to an irrational halt. In Russia and in the orthodoxy of other countries, the malicious mockery of critical criticism became the instrument that permitted the status quo to establish itself in such horrifying fashion. The only meaning that praxis retained was this: increased production of the means of production. The only criticism still tolerated was that people still were not working hard enough. This demonstrates how easily the subordination of theory to praxis results in the support of renewed repression.

Repressive intolerance toward a thought not immediately accompanied by instructions for action is founded in fear. Unmanipulated thought and the position that allows nothing to be deducted from this thought must be feared because that which cannot be admitted is perfectly clear: this thought is right. An aged bourgeois mechanism with which the men of the Enlightenment of the 18th century were very familiar displays itself anew but unchanged: suffering caused by a negative condition—in this case by obstructed reality—turns into anger toward the person who expresses it. Thought, enlightenment conscious of itself, threatens to disenchant pseudo-reality within which—according to Habermas' formulation—activism moves. This activism is tolerated only because it is viewed as pseudo-activity. Pseudo-activity is allied with pseudo-reality in the design of a subjective position; an activity that overplays itself and fires itself up for the sake of its own publicity without admitting to what degree it serves as a substitute for satisfaction, thus elevating itself to an end in itself. All those behind bars are despondent in their desire to be released. In such situations one no longer thinks or thinks only in fictive postulates. Within absolutized praxis, only reaction is possible and for this reason the reaction is false. Only thinking could offer an escape, and then only that thinking, the results of which are not prescribed—as is so frequently the case in those discussions in which it is predetermined who is right and which therefore do not advance the cause, but rather degenerate without fail into tactics. When the doors are barricaded, it is doubly

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important that thought not be interrupted. It is rather the task of thought to analyze the reasons behind this situation and to draw the consequences from these reasons. It is the responsibility of thought not to accept the situation as finite. If there is any chance of changing the situation, it is only through undiminished insight. The leap into praxis will not cure thought from resignation as long as it is paid for with the secret knowledge that this course is simply not the right one.

Generally speaking, pseudo-activity is the attempt to preserve enclaves of immediacy in the midst of a thoroughly mediated and obdurate society. This process is rationalized through the acceptance of any small change as one step on the long way toward total change. The unfortunate model of pseudo-activity is the "do-it-yourself" syndrome—activities that do that which has long been done better through the means of industrial production and which arouse in unfree individuals, hampered in their spontaneity, the confident feeling that they are of central concern. The nonsense of the "do-it-yourself" approach to the production of material goods and in the making of many repairs is equally obvious. However, it is not total. In view of the reduction of so-called services—sometimes superfluous in terms of technical standards—measures taken by a private person fulfill a semi-rational purpose. In politics, however, the "do-it-yourself" attitude is not of quite the same character. The society that confronts human beings in such an impenetrable manner is these humans themselves. Confidence in the limited action of small groups is reminiscent of the spontaneity which atrophies beneath the encrusted totality and without which this totality cannot be transformed into something different. The administered world has a tendency to strangle all spontaneity or at least to channel it into pseudo-activity. This, however, is not achieved so totally without difficulty as the agents of the administered world would like to imagine. Nonetheless, spontaneity is not to be absolutized—just as little as it is to be separated from the objective situation and idolized in the same manner as is the administered world itself. Otherwise the axe will break down the next door in the house—a process which never spares the carpenter—and the riot squad will appear on the spot. Political acts of violence can also sink to the level of pseudo-activity, resulting in mere theater. It is hardly a wonder that the ideal of direction action and propaganda glorifying the deed have been resurrected, upon the heels of the willing integration of formerly progressive organizations that, in all lands of the earth, manifest the character of that against which they were once directed. This process, however, has not weakened the criticism of anarchism, the return of which is the return of a ghost. The impatience toward theory manifested in this return does nothing to advance thought beyond itself. Theory falls behind the thought which it forgets.

For the individual, life is made easier through capitulation to the collective with which he identifies. He is spared the cognition of his impotence; within the circle of their own company, the few become many. It is this act—not unconfused thinking—which is resignation. No transparent relation prevails

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between the interests of the ego and the collective to which it assigns itself. The ego must abrogate itself, if it is to share in the predestination of the collective. Explicitly a remnant of the Kantian categorical imperative manifests itself: your signature is required. The feeling of new security is purchased with the sacrifice of autonomous thinking. The consolation that thought within the context of collective action is an improvement proves deceptive: thinking, employed only as the instrument of action, is blunted in the same manner as all instrumental reason. At the present moment, no higher form of society is concretely visible: for that reason, anything that seems in easy reach is regressive. According to Freud, however, whoever regresses has not achieved the goal of his drives. Objectively viewed, reformation is renunciation, even if it considers itself the opposite and innocently propagates the pleasure principle.

In contrast, the uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither superscribes his conscience nor permits himself to be terrorized into action, is in truth the one who does not give up. Furthermore, thinking is not the spiritual reproduction of that which exists. As long as thinking is not interrupted, it has a firm grasp upon possibility. Its insatiable quality, the resistance against petty satiety, rejects the foolish wisdom of resignation. The utopian impulse in thinking is all the stronger, the less it objectifies itself as utopia—a further form of regression—whereby it sabotages its own realization. Open thinking points beyond itself. For its part, such thinking takes a position as a figuration of praxis which is more closely related to a praxis truly involved in change than is a position of mere obedience for the sake of praxis. Beyond all specialized and particular content, thinking is actually and above all the force of resistance, alienated from resistance only with great effort. This emphatic concept of thinking is by no means secure; no security is granted it by existing conditions nor by the ends yet to be attained nor by any type of organized force. Whatever was once thought, however, can be suppressed; it can be forgotten and can even vanish. But it cannot be denied that something of it survives. For thinking has the momentum of the general. What has been cogently thought must be thought in some other place and by other people. This confidence accompanies even the loneliest and most impotent thought. Whoever thinks is without anger in all criticism:[1] thinking sublimates anger. Because the thinking person does not have to inflict anger upon himself, he furthermore has no desire to inflict it upon others. The happiness visible to the eye of a thinker is the happiness of mankind. The universal tendency toward suppression goes against thought as such. Such thought is happiness, even where unhappiness prevails; thought achieves happiness in the expression of unhappiness. Whoever refuses to permit this thought to be taken from him has not resigned.

1. This sentence was recently used in *Der Spiegel* (43: 1977, p. 214) as the headline for a brief article on the relationship of the Frankfurt School to terror as recently manifested in the German Federal Republic.

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NOTES AND COMMENTARY:

THE TOTALLY ADMINISTERED SOCIETY

by the St. Louis *Telos* Group

Given the rate of disintegration of the Left politically as well as theoretically, those who still keep alive an interest in emancipatory activities have a need to convene periodically to share ideas and positions and to consider new political and theoretical projects. For this reason, a conference on "The Totally Administered Society" was seen as a good opportunity to bring together many of the people around *Telos*. The Adornian title, of course, was not taken literally: such a society is certainly impossible. Yet, it provided the umbrella under which a cluster of problems dealing with new forms of domination, changing institutions and the declining quality of human relations could be discussed. Sponsored by the Students for a Critical Social Science—an undergraduate student organization—the conference was held at Washington University in St. Louis, February 9-11, 1978. The participants included not only most members of *Telos'* editorial staff, but other scholars as well whose work had recently converged with the broad perspectives delineated in the journal.

Although *Telos* has acquired over the last ten years a reputation for publishing articles of an esoteric and foreign nature, the editorial core has always consisted of persons whose political and theoretical consciousness was shaped, for the most part, by the events of the 1960s. Most editors had come to realize that without a re-examination and critical reappropriation of the European intellectual tradition, it would be impossible to develop an emancipatory perspective adequate for the United States. The Frankfurt School, in spite of its Teutonic origins, had long been considered the starting point toward developing such a theory, not only because of its high level of rigor, but also because it had emigrated to the United States in a crucial phase of its formation and, despite claims to the contrary, it had developed an analysis of contemporary society whose primary reference point was the United States. In other words, critical theory was seen as the first successful, systematic attempt to extend the Marxist categories across the Atlantic, thus developing a neo-Marxist analysis of the United States. The problem, however, was that the conclusions of that analysis—i.e., that whatever the results of the analysis, they would necessarily be doomed to integration within the existing society, thus serving to reinforce precisely what was to be opposed—ruled out the very possibility of its ever gaining a broad popular audience. To prevent instrumentalization, the theory had to retrench behind impenetrable language and into formulations whose very decoding already ruled out conformist consumption. The theory's very effectiveness was safeguarded by preventing it from becoming part of the false totality, and critical theory thus remained the prerogative of a handful of the uncorrupted initiated. Among other things, the conference was to investigate the tenability of this thesis—the possibility of total administration and integration of both internal as well as external opposition—within the present context, and to investigate any related analyses that might be developing in various specific fields.

The sequence of panels was tentatively planned so as first to pose the problem, second to provide a series of more specific analyses, and third, to bring it all together in a closing section. The first panel was to have dealt with problems of bureaucratic and technocratic administration by examining existing theoretical perspectives on the subject. The second one, on individual autonomy and the family, was to have dealt

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with what had happened in those areas over the last three decades. The third panel focused on the culture industry and the changing character of the public sphere. The fourth panel was to have investigated internal contradictions within the logic of planning and technological rationalization in order to uncover new forms of domination and control. The fifth one was to have focused on new political struggles responding to the changing political context. And finally, the closing session was to have attempted a synthesis of all these analyses, thus offering some kind of coherent picture of not only the present political and theoretical predicament, but also of more specific tasks. But things did not turn out quite that way.

The first panel, broadly titled "Theories of Bureaucracy," was expected to plot out a general critique, the particular features of which would be investigated in later panels. Since Franco Ferrarotti was unable to come at the last minute, the first panel was reduced to Alvin Gouldner, Jean Cohen and Dick Howard. Thus, Gouldner opened the conference by providing a rough analysis of the emergence of a critique of bureaucracy—a critique of which the conference was regarded as but one manifestation. Following the pattern already established in previous works, Gouldner set about to criticize an *ideological* critique. As the first presentation of the conference, this produced a certain confusion inasmuch as he was, in effect, addressing a critique that had not yet even been stated. In the process, he undermined later efforts to tie the analyses of specific areas into a systematic critique of administration and its negative consequences.

Gouldner characterized the first critical opposition to bureaucracy as originating among segments of the aristocracy who found the bureaucracy to be a tool of domination by the autocrat against their interests. Later, that critique spread with the rise of the bourgeoisie and entrepreneurial groups. He emphasized that, in both cases, the critique was articulated by highly educated and wealthy segments of the population that found their interests impaired by bureaucratic controls. This critique thus tended to obscure what Gouldner analyzed as the actual progressive tendencies of the bureaucracy as a social agent.

According to Gouldner's account, what was central to these progressive characteristics of the bureaucracy was the transition from a system of personal (autocratic) domination to domination embodied in the authority of the office and confined within rigid limits. The validation of this new form of authority, of course, was purposeful rationality rather than tradition (as in pre-capitalist societies). Gouldner emphasized these progressive tendencies as a justification for a positive view of bureaucracy, and contrasted it to the most horrible events of "modernity." On this basis, he suggested that the bureaucracy does not normally become a regime of terror. On the contrary, it can be seen as a relatively "pacific and amicable" system concerned with fulfilling specific tasks. This delineation, in which bureaucracies were contraposed to other modes of domination such as Fascism and Nazism, resulted in an ahistorical account that obscured the present repressive and dehumanizing role of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, Gouldner outlined the necessary preconditions for the existing critique of bureaucracies: the marginalization of the question of unemployment, the declining relevance of questions of scarcity and the disappearance of existing or potential international conflicts. Accordingly, he suggested that a serious critique of bureaucracy is only feasible in periods of plenty as well as in periods of international and domestic well-being. Only under these circumstances could the expansion of bureaucracy be seen as a serious and imminent threat.

Having dismissed most critical perspectives on bureaucracy, Gouldner conceded

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that bureaucracy *could* become a problem. This would happen when its purpose-rationality becomes misdirected; when the services it was instituted to provide are not actually provided; or when it becomes a closed system callous to the human needs that confront it. At this point, dissent is legitimate and the structure of bureaucracies must be humanized, controlled, and civilized—or else ways to confront it must be developed. In closing, Gouldner outlined a major source of tensions around which such a critique may develop. He pointed out that there are two potentially contradictory aspects within the bureaucracy as a result of two corresponding sets of personnel. The first is the stress on expertise and the legitimation of authority in terms of efficiency and competence. (This creates a technical intelligentsia.) The second is the stress on the meticulous adherence to rules and decisions within the organizational hierarchy. (Emerging from this is the body of old-line officials loyal to the organization and to their office.) Within this scheme Gouldner foresees potential conflict and a major source of criticism within the system.

Gouldner's comments provided an offbeat first note of the conference by questioning its central theme and, by implication, questioning the relevance of any such critique for anyone other than pampered individuals in an affluent society. Second, he emphasized the progressive tendencies of bureaucracies, abstracting them from their particular economic and political contexts. Thus, by emphasizing their role as mediators, he obscured the specific systems of social domination of which they are a crucial part. This resulted in a positive evaluation by avoiding any serious consideration of their overall social function. This isolation of the bureaucracy from the social world led to charges of theoretical abstraction by the audience—not only against Gouldner, but later against other speakers and, by some, against the whole conference. One last consequence came out in Jean Cohen's presentation. She had come to the conference with an elaborate critique of Gouldner's already prefigured but as yet unpublished "new class" thesis. Yet, given the nature of Gouldner's comments, she found herself criticizing an unstated position, which, although traced briefly in Gouldner's closing statement, was essentially unknown to the audience.

Cohen began her presentation on the new class thesis, but was soon interrupted because her delivery was inaudible to most of those present. She left the rostrum and resumed her talk closer to the audience, but the poor acoustics of the room combined with her own poor projection and her insistence on *reading* her paper, to prevent a large proportion of those present from hearing her argument. (Later this was described by some who read the paper as a blessing in disguise.) Her critique of the new class thesis centered around the distinction between bureaucrats and technocrats; and the concomitant distinction between formal and instrumental rationality.

Cohen argued that, as agents, technocrats do not have a particular political grounding. They are not bound by a common vision allowing for joint action on strategic issues. She saw a one-dimensional concept of rationality as the source of the new class thesis—a concept that grounded the contention that the interests of the technical intelligentsia converged, thus providing a unifying theme necessary for the emergence of this group as a class. But she challenged the validity and the relevancy of that reasoning, saying that it obscured the actual state of affairs. It failed to realize, she said, "that power can be exercised without being possessed" and that "it could be the effect of a series of strategic positions rather than the unique privilege of a dominant class."

Cohen emphasized the inappropriateness of considering this group as a class, for it was not, nor did it have the potential to be, a class either "in itself" or "for itself." She

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further accused those advancing such a thesis of reinforcing the principle of domination legitimated by knowledge and of seeking to obscure all counter-rationalities in lieu of the claims of scientific rationality.

The last speaker of the evening was Dick Howard, who had been forcibly talked out of speaking on Fichte and 18th-century Prussian society. As a compromise, he promised to tie together several themes that he had been studying and which he promised were relevant to the conference. Unfortunately, his extemporaneous attempt came across as such and gave his presentation a loose, ragged tone. Yet, although he did not have anything relevant to say, he said it brilliantly and clearly, thus successfully occluding a fundamental vacuity.

Howard tried to develop a historical notion of bureaucracy as inextricably tied to the development of capitalism. In its first stage, bureaucracy was an attempt to create enlightened citizens—it was the agent of the state in the creation of a civil society. The advent of this civil society gave rise to capitalism, and brought about a second stage in the development of bureaucracy, one based on the profit imperative. Here Howard outlined two diverging tendencies in the relation of capitalism to bureaucracy. First, there was the dynamism of capitalism whose profit imperative demanded the unfolding through time of the investment-production-profit sequence. Second, there was the demand by the bureaucracy that all activity be channeled through established patterns. This discouraged innovation and creative activity. Thus, Howard suggested, there was a strain between the dynamism of capital and the bureaucracy's attempts to conjure this threat away. He did not go on to elaborate this point, but noted that Russia was a case in which the bureaucracy had replaced civil society.

The ill-orchestrated unfolding of the first three presentations closed off many potentials for discussion. The papers did not concentrate on crucial issues and failed to provide a clear definition of the broader issues the conference sought to address. Gouldner's stress on the positive aspects of the bureaucracy, Cohen's critique of an unstated thesis, and Howard's attempts at improvisation created a confusion about the conference's general aims. Their close relation with the conference sponsors had failed to make these aims clear, and this was aggravated by their indifference to the project and to the opportunity they had to communicate important concerns to the large audience that had turned out.

The second panel opened the next morning, and the cacophony of the previous evening was muted by the expectation of a substantive dialogue. The panel focused on the family, and the participants were all noted for their work on either the family, its administration or the plight of the individual in society.

Mark Poster began the panel with an avowed contribution to a "Critical Theory of the Family." But this consisted of relativizing the Freudian model of the family in terms of Marxian class categories. Poster considered the psychological level as the most salient and was convinced of the unique power and sensitivity of Freud's theories in laying bare the intra-psychic and interpersonal foundations—sex and age conflicts within the family—that undergird the hierarchical forms of domination in society. At the same time, Poster stressed the need to de-ontologize and de-universalize the bourgeois nuclear family, which must instead be identified as class-specific as well as associated historically with the rise of entrepreneurial capitalism. Thus he sought to discuss how modes of family organization that antedated and were superseded by the bourgeois, child-centered family themselves represented distinct alternative models of socialization. By analyzing the impact of these non-bourgeois child-rearing patterns on the child's ego development and identity formation, Poster attempted to gain

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historical and critical distance from the bourgeois model of individuality. He suggested that there has been an unwarranted tendency to regard the products of the bourgeois child-centered family as the consummate form of the autonomous human being.

Despite his announced intention to discuss four models of the family—the aristocratic (pre-capitalist), the bourgeois, the peasant, and the proletarian—Poster concentrated his presentation on a comparison of the first two types. His delineation of the aristocratic family stressed two key points of substantive contrast with the bourgeois mode of socialization: the extended network of politically-based sociability within which the aristocratic household was embedded; and the absence of instinctual repression in child-rearing.

In developing his models of the aristocratic and bourgeois family, Poster dwelt at length on the sensational rather than the salient. He moved from patterns of defecation and copulation among the aristocracy to Draconian methods of preventing masturbation and the rigid, "premature" enforced toilet training of the bourgeoisie. Although his analysis turned out to be entertaining, it was not very systematic and provided only a crude typology for distinguishing family forms. When queried on the proletarian family, he stated that it essentially did not have a unique form but rather was the distorted reflection of the more repressive aspects of the bourgeois family.

Russell Jacoby's remarks, following Poster's presentation, provided another example of general unpreparedness. He outlined a criticism of three chapters of Poster's forthcoming book (with which Poster had provided him) instead of Poster's conference paper, whose substance Jacoby only discovered during the panel itself. Thus, Jacoby undertook to rebut "vulgar sociologists and other critics of the Frankfurt School and Freud"—i.e., the positions outlined in Poster's book, which, unfortunately, had not been discussed in the presentation. Once again, there was an attack on a position that had not been explicitly put forth. Jacoby stressed that Freud's categories are trans-class, and that psychoanalytic tools apply not only to the bourgeois family, but to the proletarian family as well. He argued that Freud is by no means just the theoretician of the bourgeois family. For Jacoby, such a misapprehension belongs to vulgar Marxism, which speaks of bourgeois versus proletarian individuals, when in fact there probably is no qualitative difference between them. He then dug up some previously articulated themes to balance out a struggling presentation. These dealt with the eclipse of subjectivity and the parallel eclipse of class consciousness.

The third and final speaker, and the high point of the morning, was Joel Kovel. He discussed the psycho-social functions of bureaucracy in a de-subjectivized world, under the heading "Rationalization and Family Relations." Kovel argued that the rationalization peculiar to bureaucracy serves to forestall the anxieties resulting from individuals' unfulfilled emotional needs—needs that are stimulated to very high levels but which cannot be satisfied within the contemporary family. The traditional patterns of family relations and roles persist, but the structure has been lost; the bourgeois family has been hollowed out. These roles—especially that of the father or head of the household—no longer correspond to economic reality now that the vast majority of workers at all levels have become dependent on bureaucracy in its various forms. Where the older, and especially the pre-capitalist, functions of the family were basically economic, with advancing industrialism its primary functions have become psycho-social. Within the family children are acculturated to need and expect intimacy, but prevailing conditions (bureaucratization) make it extremely difficult to find and sustain intimacy. The resultant anxiety draws individuals to the apparent order, predictability and security offered by the bureaucracy.

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Pervasive administration, Kovel went on, embodies the necessity of binding subjectivity to the kind of objectification that the capitalist system requires to maintain itself. Thus, under conditions of bureaucratic domination, anxieties are forestalled rather than desires being met. Furthermore, the individual's continued submission to bureaucratic domination comes to be conditioned in part by raised expectations (that his desires will be met). This mechanism effectively functions to prevent the emergence of class consciousness. Yet, Kovel also pointed out that, while the binding of time and the discontinuity of bound and unbound time constitute key mechanisms of bureaucratic domination, an increase in unbound time, even if "administered," enhances the possibilities for resistance.

During the discussion that followed, Poster countered Jacoby's criticism by setting out what he perceived to be salient psychological differences between bourgeois and working-class families. The latter, Poster argued, exhibit less of the seductive play of affection and authority characteristic of the former. Also, inasmuch as the proletarian individual tends to view the outside world as overtly hostile, his aggression is more likely than that of the bourgeois individual to take an overt form, i.e., super-ego development based on guilt (internalized aggression) is relatively weak. Poster maintained that, in keeping with these differences, mental disturbances among members of the working class tend to take the form of psychosis and schizophrenia, while the typically bourgeois mental disorder is neurosis.

From the audience, Preston Schiller criticized Poster's failure to present empirical evidence. The representativeness of Poster's aristocratic model was problematic, Schiller said, given important historical differences among European aristocracies in the pre-capitalist era. Furthermore, Poster had failed to take into account the upper bourgeoisie's eventual adoption of aristocratic (non-child-centered) patterns of child-rearing. Poster replied that he had intended to focus on models and that combinations of them were certainly possible. Underlying this focus on family models, Poster said, were two main considerations: the need to explore deep-seated areas of conflict beyond class—i.e., age and sex conflicts as the prototype of emotion-charged hierarchical relations; and the fact that we currently perceive "the family" as problematic. The morning panel closed with the beginning of a true discussion and the opening of a critique of administration that had been aborted the evening before.

But the third panel broke the morning's spell. As at other times during the conference, there was a failure by the participants to look around and realize that there were other panel members as well as an audience. Discussion was totally sacrificed to presentation, and after three and a half hours of unrelenting delivery, there was little energy left for discussion.

The first paper, delivered by Stuart Ewen, was on "Americanization and Consumption" and dealt with the role of the culture industry in "Americanizing" immigrants in the early 20th century. The key point was that total administration has been and still is the ideal of the culture industry. The basic thrust of the Americanization program, Ewen maintained, was to turn subjects into consumers in order to standardize, rationalize and, with regard to immigrants in particular, denationalize experience. Thus, those immigrants who came to save money and then return home with full pockets eventually found themselves too caught up within consumerism to think of leaving. A second point was that the United States "has traditionally articulated a national identity in terms of the domination of nature." Again, the major agency of this process has been the culture industry.

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One weakness of the presentation was that Ewen made little attempt to investigate *reception*, i.e., how real people in real situations respond to manipulation. Did Italian immigrants really come to the United States on the basis of ads whose utopian content they believed? Instead of investigating the concrete reasons for immigration, Ewen romanticized the immigrants' traditional past as contrasted with their consumerist, one-dimensional future. Although he spoke from the viewpoint of subjectivity, Ewen emphasized primarily system demands and system manipulation. Until the closing few Benjaminian moments, where he called for a reappropriation of culture and politics, he gave the impression that consumers and ad-readers (which seemed to exhaust subjectivity) respond precisely in the way the system expects them to respond. Ewen's presentation, however, had many redeeming qualities. His comments were concise and always interesting. This was unfortunately not the case in the next speaker's approach.

The length of John Fekete's paper, "Administered Society and its Culture Industry: Politics and Rationality in Science Fiction," probably prevented the audience from grasping both the theoretical importance of his analysis as well as its relevance to the conference's theme. Fekete developed Piccone's notion of artificial negativity by examining one of the most advanced forms of contemporary critical discourse: science fiction. Although he spent far too much time reviewing Le Guinn's *The Dispossessed* and Delany's *Triton*, he summed up two basic, alternative tendencies in current utopian thought: LeGuinn's hope for a reconciliation of the general and the particular, subject and object, in the unified individual (a rationalist fiction, according to Fekete); and Delany's recognition that the only hope to emerge from contemporary anomie is creativity at the micrological level.

For Fekete, it is the presentation of "other-world" anarchist social models that makes these books, written in the mid-1970s, worthy of attention. Thus, he began by re-examining the connection between anarchist thought and total administration. In the first place, the bureaucratization and colonization of consciousness, as Ewen's talk had made clear, imperils subjectivity and, as is well known, the "problem of personality" is anarchism's "traditional terrain." Second, in light of the fact that the "collective subject" has no contemporary grounding (and would in fact be fair game for system demands of artificial negativity), the individual becomes the "very tentative and problematic unit of both political action and consciousness." Yet, LeGuinn and Delany provide very different answers to the questions, "what kind of individual" and "what kind of action."

LeGuinn's book deals with the progressive realization by the protagonist, an intellectual, that the bleak, ascetic, socialist environment of Anarres (home of the anarchist Odonians) had itself become oppressive because the inhabitants had internalized "bureaucratic walls" that separated them from each other and, in enforcing equivalence, had homogenized social reality. The protagonist's dream is to reconcile being and becoming, synchrony and diachrony; the goal: immediacy, transparency and total harmony—a goal that Fekete locates at the point where "utopia becomes totalitarian and totalitarianism wears a utopian face." Fekete argued that LeGuinn's solution—the rationalist fiction of total harmony—leads to yet greater opportunities for total administration.

Delany's novel, drawing on the structuralist repertoire, which includes "discontinuities," "fragments," "systems analysis," and "decentering of self," challenges faith in a coherent, integrated and independent individual. Two critiques of the individual's relation to the system are offered in *Triton*: one denounces a

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supposedly libertarian society in which "the conventional oblivion to other people's pain is a political crime," and the second calls for an increase in effect on the part of individuals (as a strategy to combat increasing rationalization). The protagonists realize that effective and creative action is only possible on the micrological level and that extrapolations to the macrological level (and vice versa) are impossible. Fekete concluded with a plea to investigate "the limits of system and limits of reason in our time."

Jack Zipes spoke next on "The Changing Notions of the Public Sphere," sharply criticizing a procedure common to many of the conference panelists: "There has been too much of a tendency to look at the administered society from the point of view of the administrators." In his attempt to find a way to reappropriate the European category of the public sphere for the American experience, Zipes first traced the concept in its European context, through Habermas, Negt, and Kluge. He then criticized the inadequacies of immediately importing the concept into the American context. Examples cited of these distorted importations were Sennett and Bell. The critique of Sennett centered on his conclusion that the public realm has been eroded by too much autonomy and subjectivity, and that we must recapture some 18th-century ideal to escape "the tyranny of intimacy." This misunderstanding of the "public sphere" needs no further comment. Bell's distortion ends in a call for a return to classical liberalism, which, as Zipes noted, he neatly abstracts from its capitalist context.

Zipes also criticized the inability of such left journals as *Telos* and *New German Critique* to mediate successfully European theoretical constructs with American experience. Defending the relevance of the category of the "public sphere," Zipes proposed Aronowitz's *False Promises* as a necessary starting point of the study, not of the administrators, but of the resistance of the administered. Here, Zipes' orthodox Marxist slip shows through. Overlooking the historical inaccuracy of Aronowitz's accounts, which implicitly recycle Old Left mythology by proposing to explain why the American working class did not become the revolutionary agency that traditional Marxism expected it to become, Zipes suggested that the search be continued for that ever-elusive and dormant revolutionary spirit, which is to bring about collective redemption. Thus, instead of attempting to understand new social realities, Zipes concluded that it is the present task to study the formation of all counter-public spheres—presumably in order to keep the old faith alive.

Finally, building on the foundation set by Zipes, Oskar Negt spoke on the "Role of the Proletarian Public Sphere in West-European Class Struggles." He quickly disclaimed any attempt to transpose European categories to the United States experience since, according to Negt, these categories are closely tied to specific historical events in contemporary France, Italy and Germany. For Negt, the proletarian "public sphere" represents all oppositional groups—e.g., women's groups, environmentalists, community organizations, ethnic groups, etc. It includes the production of experiences that seek to understand the conditions of existence and it is therefore continually constituted by "collective and public moments." The goal of such a public sphere is to disrupt the "cultural monopoly of interpretation" held by the ruling class. Whereas cultural critique is today a prerequisite to revolution, what is even more necessary is a mass material base, which, e.g., in the case of Paris 1968, was lacking. When the Parisian working class attempted to immediately appropriate the students' public sphere, it had to fail: the students' public sphere did not fit working

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class experience. Unions and left-wing parties then returned to their traditional organizational forms, "which are always affected by elements of the bourgeois public sphere."

Basic to Negt's thesis was Bloch's "utopian" emphasis on the liberating potential of fantasy and imagination. Capitalism continuously produces needs and fantasies that it cannot satisfy. The revolutionary potential lies precisely in these unfulfilled hopes. The capitalist culture industry, of course, tries to harness fantasy to commodities, while the proletarian public sphere organizes it into autonomous counter-units. Negt's analysis failed to pay sufficient attention to the effects of the administrators' plans. What happens to the human psyche, fantasy, imagination under systems of cultural hegemony? But there was another, more important, though less apparent problem in Negt's analysis. For the most part, "proletarian" seemed to mean nothing other than "anti-bourgeois." Suddenly, in the closing pages, "labor power" emerged to define the common substance of dissenting individuals. Where it came from or why it was needed was totally unclear from his presentation. From the best of Bloch to the worst of orthodox Marxism is a long distance to travel in a few short comments, and Negt was later to be taken to task by Arato and Piccone for having done so. Unfortunately, as already indicated, the four presentations took far too long, and discussion of all the crucial issues that they raised had to be postponed.

A more interesting theoretical discussion took place after dinner that evening, when Negt, Breines and several other conference participants lingered briefly after dinner in a Lebanese restaurant to take in the floor show. As is customary in such performances, the belly dancer toward the end of the show sidled up along the customers for them to insert whatever donation they care to in whatever location suits their fancy. Totally by accident, Negt was the first spectator to be offered the opportunity to make a donation. With a mixture of delight and mild embarrassment, Negt remarked to Breines: "Das ist Arbeit!" Caught by surprise, Breines instinctively retorted: "Yes, but is it productive or unproductive labor?" After puzzling over the question in silence for the remainder of the performance, Negt finally came up with an answer en route to the next panel: "As Marx points out in the third volume of *Capital* in the discussion of the clown, since the belly dancer produces surplus-value for the restaurant owner, it is productive labor. Had she performed privately, it would have been unproductive labor." On that elaboration of Marxist choreography, the participants reconvened for the next panel on Friday evening.

At this point, the heavy demands of the rapid schedule were beginning to show. Due to the afternoon marathon, the session began late and the juggling of participants began in earnest. David Noble, scheduled to speak, had been snowed in at Boston. Andrew Arato, who was scheduled to speak earlier, was bumped to this panel, but last-minute insertions in his own piece caused him to be the final speaker. The haphazard manner in which this panel took form was soon to become apparent.

Despite the flaws of previous panels, their debate seemed high-powered in comparison to this one on "Problems of Planning and Technology." Here, the discussion deteriorated as Barry Commoner and the Science for the People contingent in St. Louis reassured the audience that the rates of profit were falling and that the problem of alienation was partly correctible by teaching the masses how to do their own plumbing.

Commoner set the tone for the session by noting that he was merely a plain old biologist with a sense for the "facts" and a basic knowledge of Karl Marx. Using

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statistics developed by the Chase Manhattan Bank, Commoner proceeded to recycle the familiar fears of Wall Street over the recent slowdown in U.S. domestic capital expenditures—often decried in full-page ads in major national newspapers—as devastating radical analysis. And, indicating how industry has become energy-intensive during the last 35 years, he suggested that capital has sought to stave off the inevitable crisis by displacing human labor with machine labor. Refusing to tolerate the way "critical theory" has pulled its Hegelian wool over the eyes of American radicals, Commoner cleared the air with the "facts:" there *is* a falling rate of profit, as the Chase Manhattan statistics show, and Marx was right over a century ago when he, too, predicted the falling rate of profits. Unfortunately, after dazzling his listeners with a slide show full of multi-colored charts and graphs, Commoner's articulate delivery and orthodox Marxian analysis did not turn out to be too convincing.

What Commoner apparently failed to realize was that, if indeed profits are falling, then it would be in the interests of the business community to attempt to suppress such information to avoid a panic among investors, thus precipitating an even faster decline of profits. On the other hand, if profits are not actually falling, then it would be in the interests of business to at least claim that they were in order to sandbag the government into providing more favorable tax breaks, to plan austerity measures, and generally to lead to an ever-higher profit rate. Be that as it may, despite any statistics from Chase Manhattan, no one still has been able to figure out just what has happened to the rate of profit over the last 50 years. Thus, even Marxists addicted to the facts should be wary of such claims—especially considering the nature of their source.

Having opened on this note, the session recouped a bit as Jadwiga Saniszkis, a Warsaw University political sociologist visiting at Stanford University, spoke on the mechanisms of crisis management in Eastern Europe. Much of her presentation was difficult to follow, owing to her heavy accent, but she gave a detailed analysis of how socialist command systems, such as those in Poland and Czechoslovakia, have divorced political from economic crises as a means of correcting and steering the development of their societies. In fact, she argued, managed crisis in the political sphere has become a ritualized, periodic means for the masses to express their discontent and for the party leadership to reconsolidate their policy-making paradigms. Thus, the successive waves of worker unrest in Eastern Europe do not indicate the coming of the final economic crisis in spite of the basic instability of the socialist command economy. Rather, these political rituals are a stabilizing mechanism that further rationalizes the total administration of socialist society.

Following Staniszkis' presentation, Dan Bolef, of the St. Louis Science for the People group, recounted a series of horror stories about the lack of personal conscience and individual responsibility in American weaponry research laboratories. As a former participant in the defense research process, he related his sense of personal outrage and sorrow that the Pentagon actually stooped so low in the course of the Vietnamese war as to use napalm to destroy whole villages of defenseless peasants. But, he concluded, all is not lost if "the people" only assert their control over the course and conduct of scientific research. After Bolef's presentation, the next speaker, Ellen Irons, also a member of the Science for the People group, lost the interest of many of her listeners with her discussion on the relation between technology and alienation. After recounting her personal experiences along these lines, she reached the conclusion that alienation in modern life boils down to the individual subject's inability to use or understand modern technology. Alienation, then, is behind the

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systematic cretinization of the masses, who now are totally incapable of fixing their carburetors, replacing the burned-out tubes in their television sets, unstopping their toilets, or conducting basic health care such as breast examinations. Hence, it becomes a revolutionary act, according to the Science for the People program, to overcome this alienation by learning basic auto repair, delving into TV fix-ups, mastering the use of a plumber's friend, or coping with self-help literature on breast examinations. Because "the people" do not control the development or utilization of technology, alienation results. Thus, Science for the People seeks to demystify technology, thus restoring individual autonomy and reducing bureaucratic and technocratic dependence.

Finally, Dick Moss, a professional HEW bureaucrat, attempted to discuss the growth and role of federal research during the post-World War II era as an aspect of the bureaucratic planning process. However, in face of time constraints and the audience's exhaustion, he concluded his brief remarks by noting that the financing of federal research had gone up tremendously since the 1950s—although his figures were not adjusted to non-inflated dollars—and that too many people were being paid too much for doing too little in the federal bureaucratic research game.

The nadir of the whole conference, however, was reached when Commoner, in the ensuing discussion, again attempted to deal a fatal blow to "critical theory" by blaming Marcuse and his followers for the failure of the Left in the late 1960s. At this point Arato, who up to then had suffered through it all in silence, blew out every fuse in his conceptual circuitry. Where did Commoner get off deducing the demise of capitalism from a few highly dubious abstract figures? Furthermore, Marcuse's political failure was largely a result of his having pursued truth rather than power—which was more than one could say for Commoner. In order to prevent further deterioration, at this point, Tim Luke, the panel's moderator, mercifully adjourned the conference to the next day.

The concerns of the fifth panel the next morning focused on de-bureaucratization. Needless to say, as in the previous panels, the attempt to caption diverse interests of speakers into a framework of de-bureaucratization was something less than successful. The first panelist, Bob D'Amico, discussed the impact of Marx and Freud on Foucault's theory of cultural interpretation. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault proposes that the function of the human sciences has more to do with the reproduction of power relations than with the direct control over the labor process. According to D'Amico, Foucault's critique of the Marxist tradition's account of power or of the function of the sciences reappears in his study of the history of sexuality. He further summarized Foucault's recent *Volonté de Savoir*, dealing with Reich and the Freudian-Marxist "repression hypothesis," and concluded by reiterating Foucault's examination of the relation between power and knowledge. The latter becomes the starting point for his political analysis of Western culture in its control over labor and desire. In closing, D'Amico emphasized the extent to which Foucault's analysis flows into the ongoing discussion of "artificial negativity."

Murray Bookchin next addressed the conference with the composure of a speaker whose elegant explanation of the inner logic of bureaucracy was surpassed only by his skill in filling the gap between speaker and audience. Bookchin focused on the problems of modernity and its implication for socialism. The organic structure of society has been hollowed out by the bureaucratic requirements of capitalism to offset the chaos of the market. The bureaucratic web abstracted the individual into a "granular" network of social relations that destroyed the cultural mediation between

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man and nature. Echoing anarchist sentiments, Bookchin called for an *ethical* socialism that could reintroduce *culture* as an emancipatory structure. The Left's traditional focus on abstract conflict, i.e., between classes, is no real solution. Although this rekindled smoldering New Left sentiments, and he emphasized that general interests must emerge from the particular, Bookchin's concerns were not grounded in Marxism or critical theory. The thrust of his presentation was that this required substitution of the web of bureaucracy must be displaced by a network of relations concretized through the past and grounded in the "hidden wisdom" of the polis.

Paul Breines, the next panelist, provided a few insights on why "A Defeated Left Never Lived So Well," and, to augment the sparse substance, provided some "Modest Reflections on Murray Bookchin." With the exception of the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, Breines pointed out, revolutionary efforts have been historically repressed through bloody reaction. The absence of terror following the demise of the New Left has led to three consequences for activists: "family-building," "body-building," and, as in the case of the revival of Stalinism, "party-building." Stalwarts in the audience, to be sure, immediately called Breines' attention to the bloody repression of the Black Panthers and the American Indian Movement, among other groups.

David Noble, who had been displaced from the fourth panel due to the snow in Boston, sought to demonstrate the impossibility of a totally administered society. His comments focused on the "cybernetic rationality" that pervades the administration of highly technologized production. Automation, Noble declared, will not solve the problem of rationalizing productive forces. Whereas machine designs reflect the imperatives of management, they also display the contradictions of the concrete work situation. To paraphrase one of Noble's examples from a manager: "You put a man on a machine and he gets temperamental, and then the machine gets temperamental." No matter how ingenious management becomes in circumventing workers' autonomy, the process can never be completely successful. The work situation is too contradictory and indeterminate to allow such an outcome. Yet, management's techniques to limit workers' prerogatives compel workers to develop new forms of self-assertion. If Noble's central point was to demonstrate that total administration was impossible, his empirical analysis provided concrete examples of meta-strategies on the part of management to both foresee workers' reactions and new forms of self-assertion, as well as to constantly develop ever-new methods of complete administration.

Strung out between Bookchin's charisma, Noble's machine-shop plotting, Breines' cheerful divested revolutionaries and D'Amico's "powerful" knowledge, the long discussion that followed did not stimulate much beyond everyone's appetite. On that unintellectual note, the panel was eventually de-bureaucratized.

The last panel of the conference Saturday afternoon brought to a climax all of the conflict that had been brewing up to that point. The panel was set to deal with emancipatory possibilities, but it soon developed into a theoretical free-for-all. By this time it was all too clear that the trajectory of the conference was not the one that had been traced by the organizers. Consequently, when Piccone got up to deliver his paper on "The Changing Functions of the Left," he chose to unleash a preliminary general critique of what had taken place so far. According to his analysis, most of the papers had failed to transcend the framework of either the old or the new Left. Both alternatives had historically run out of gas with specific rationalizations of the

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capitalist system. They had become obsolete precisely when this content of their critiques had become integrated into an even more streamlined and efficient administrative apparatus.

Piccone castigated Commoner for his orthodoxy, for accepting public statements by corporations as valid evidence for equating economic and political crisis tendencies; and for insulting the intelligence of the audience with his recycling of the falling rate of profit. Piccone also turned on Negt as a representative of the new Left and for his uncritical positing of a "proletarian" public sphere. This notion presupposes that such an alternative exists in some way or other, but Piccone categorically denied that any of the developments of Eurocommunism had generated such qualitative alternatives. He further charged that the notion of the proletarian public sphere collapses Habermas' general notion into particularity, thus resulting in an unworkable bastardization of Gramsci's comparable notion of cultural hegemony. By its very nature, the "public sphere" is a category of the totality which resists reduction along class lines. Gramsci's "cultural hegemony" was never something limited to one sector of society—the proletariat—but rather sought to provide a different cultural perspective to displace earlier ones. His cultural hegemony is still something to be conquered within the public sphere, and to brand it "proletarian" is nonesense.

After proclaiming the bankruptcy of old and new Left, Piccone dismissed China and Russia as travesties of statism and bureaucratic collectivism, which have led to the rise of Eurocommunism as an alternative. But Piccone cautioned against seeing Eurocommunism as a panacea. "The left would not know what to do with power if by some stroke of luck they were to gain it soon." He reiterated the critique of workers' councils as the reaction of skilled workers to the Taylorization of the work process, and of the left in general as a rationalizing agency. To the extent that it fails to take power, it allows capitalism to integrate radical critiques and use them for greater efficiency and control.

After "clearing the ground" with this critique, Piccone began to outline his account of artificial negativity so as to provide an understanding of recent developments within advanced capitalism. The system's most immediate need is to develop internal control mechanisms that have been destroyed in the effort to integrate all opposition. Without this internal opposition, however, the system becomes intrinsically irrational and generates scores of new internal problems that cannot be tackled in the old bureaucratic ways. What is needed are social counter-weights to the bureaucracy. In order to provide these, it is necessary to reconstitute internal critique and opposition—so much so that where these critiques and oppositions do not develop spontaneously, they tend to be bureaucratically planned. But to the extent that this "planning" rationalizes the critiques and the new forms of opposition within the one-dimensional logic of the bureaucracy, they are condemned to fail as regulatory mechanisms—hence, "artificial negativity." Only by creating free social space within which *spontaneous* critiques and oppositions (i.e., organic negativity) can develop will the system be able to help generate the kind of internal regulatory mechanisms that it so badly needs in a context of over-bureaucratization. Among other things, this state of affairs leads to a lessening of repression and to a partial dismantling of the administrative apparatus whenever possible. Thus, recent efforts toward a partial "dismantling" of the FBI and CIA exemplify the need of the system to stop the total control, suppression and repression of all alternatives and to allow the creation of free space within which critique and opposition can develop and thus regulate the system. Yet, this historical reversal finds the existing left in a unique role. Now the left is able

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to put forth a critique of the existing order, but either it no longer has anything to say, or there is no one who will listen. During the last thirty years, the individual and the possibility of an emancipated subjectivity have rapidly declined, and whatever radical elements there were within both the old and the new Left critiques, they have long since been integrated in a context where the lack of individuality prevented any emancipatory political outcome.

Moving to less polemical topics, Arato next spoke on "Systems of Reproduction and Histories of the State." Departing from Habermas' recent works and their methodology, Arato pointed out that these social analyses attempt to provide an encyclopedic framework. He agreed with Habermas in noting the fusion of the base and superstructure in advanced capitalism, and in giving primacy to politics. This disorganizes all "global, horizontal stratification relations" and frustrates all analyses based on this tenet (i.e., Sweezy, Carlo, Bettelheim). He also pointed out that Habermas' theory of evolution fails to realize that models of social reproduction "do not contain the conditions of their future historicity." As an alternative, Arato suggested that social developments must be analyzed in their emergence from particular cultural and national conditions. A communicative hermeneutic analysis must replace a systems analysis in order to regain an understanding of the particular social-political developments that have been obscured by the veil of analytic categories. As an example of this categorical occlusion, Arato cited Habermas' description of the Soviet Union as a post-capitalist phenomenon. In order to give a clearer idea of what he meant by an alternative, he focused on the constellation of factors that led to the development of bureaucratic centralism in Russia. This reconstruction of the historical dynamic blended particular historical events into an analysis explaining the rise of workers' councils and Kronstadt along with a general system of state repression and terror.

Jim Watson spoke next on the "Administered Society and the Denial of Otherness" and gave the briefest presentation of the conference. He located one source of the unfolding process of domination in Marx's Hegelian heritage. This domination is the result of the tension between man and nature in which the former asserts total control over the latter—both its human and non-human aspects. In both cases subjectivity stands in opposition to progressive rationalization. Any divergence impedes the flow of production as required by the social blueprint. Labor power, the abstraction, comes to displace real labor, the activity, and the work process becomes alien to the living individuals. In both the bureaucratic collectivist as well as the capitalist framework, any opposition to production and to rationalization comes to be internalized by the individual as terror—the terror of a subjectivity that cannot afford expression.

After these exceedingly abstract comments, Carl Boggs presented an analysis of the capitalist state as a legitimating functionary titled, aptly, "The Problem of the State and Legitimacy." Boggs first outlined four propositions and then sought to demonstrate how Habermas' analysis was wrong in projecting a legitimation crisis. These propositions were, (1) The state becomes the primary source of legitimacy in late capitalist societies, (2) Its centralization and instrumentalization of politics had tended to close off the public sphere and deprive it of content, (3) System contradictions are transferred from the economy to the state and the public sphere, and (4) In the capitalist system the state is no longer a mere tool of the ruling class, but has an identity and dynamic of its own. In criticizing Habermas' concept of the legitimation crisis Boggs first argued that cultural hegemony rooted in the development of bureaucratic and technocratic rationality is not subject to internal

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tensions for both of these processes are consonant with the quest for capital accumulation. Secondly, the assumption that struggles within the state apparatus will lead to the articulation of alternatives in the public sphere has proven to be false. Third, alternative political parties have always been absorbed by the logic of rationalization and domination in capitalist societies. And fourth the expansion of the public administrative sector (social welfare programs, etc.) is rapidly pushing the political character of the state to a marginal position, as the bureaucratic-administrative status of political institutions becomes preeminent.

By undercutting the crisis thesis, Boggs effectively pared down emancipatory alternatives. The decline of the public sphere and the strength of institutions perpetuating cultural hegemony lay at the basis of his analysis. Here he strangely turned to the model of workers' councils and re-cycled the emancipatory potential of direct democratic self-management. His allusion to this anachronism was a clear *non sequitur* and was apparently motivated by his desire to offer some type of emancipation at all costs to conclude an analysis that otherwise ruled out all hope.

As the planned presentations ended, a flamed dialogue exploded with the audience. The ensuing exchange, however, was primarily between conference participants who had already spoken and had had their accounts destroyed by Piccone's earlier blast. The first flurry was brought about when Gouldner unleashed a general attack on *Telos* editors and a particularly detailed attack of Piccone's theory of artificial negativity. He rejected the thrust of the attack on Commoner—whose work had been crucial in calling the system to task for the ecological consequences of its irrationalities—and questioned the worth of the very notion of artificial negativity. First, he argued, it seemed to presuppose the one-dimensionality thesis; and, secondly, it was a critique without politics because it reduced all political projects to mere regulatory means condemned to become victims of the system's assimilative power.

First Arato and then Piccone defended the political implications of their analysis further pointing out that the left, particularly, has no politics at all. Barry Commoner then attacked Piccone concerning the accuracy of the latter's facts—such as the statement on the dismantling of the FBI and CIA. He declared that Piccone was a threat to the Left, not the old or new, who had both lived through their productive years, but to the potential left in the minds of young students who, in their gullibility, might be taken in by Piccone's account. A voluble debate then developed between a visitor from Kansas City and Piccone over the issue of the primacy of economic conditions in determining political crises. The visitor rallied to Commoner's earlier statements addressing the distinction between necessary vs. sufficient conditions for political crises, while Piccone again pointed out that in the absence of any organized opposition, economic crisis is reduced to regulatory mechanisms rather than political crises, and to analyze the present situation in terms of discredited traditional categories was to occlude rather than clarify the nature of present socio-political reality.

Jack Zipes and Oskar Negt then sought to defend the notion of the proletarian public sphere. Central to their defense was providing a definition of what social groups now composed the proletariat. Negt asserted that all people who in any manner could be construed to sell their labor power were members of the proletariat. Arato countered indicating that this definition would encompass over 99% of the population as proletarian, leaving a residual less than 1% as representative of the dominant capitalist group. Negt did not equivocate his position and Zipes supported it by defending the utility of the concept in analyzing conditions in Europe.

A variety of other issues were raised by the audience, many marginal to the

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discussion, e.g., the accusation that Piccone and Arato had no notion of the emancipation upon which to base their critique. Both responded through the back door saying emancipation could not be defined beforehand, but that they would recognize it when it arrived. On this note the whole conference adjourned to a closing party (non-M.-L.) where the same issues were discussed within a more informal setting.

The general lesson to be learned from all the debates and elaborations was that a more totally administered conference might have produced better results. Given the instinctive anarchism of most of the participants, as well as the great distances—both geographic *and* intellectual—separating them, it is unlikely that a more coherent effort could have been produced. On the whole, the conference provided an opportunity for those involved to obtain a general picture of the present state of affairs in radical theory. Even more importantly, it showed the immense amount of work remaining to be done in order to provide an articulate political perspective based on sound theoretical foundations.

INTRODUCTION TO THE "BELGRADE MANIFESTO"

by Sharon Zukin

The "Belgrade Eight," a group of social scientists and philosophers from Belgrade University, has issued a statement on civil rights in socialist society to coincide with the current Belgrade meetings on compliance with the international Helsinki agreement. Their case, like their argument, is both ironic and complex.[1] After being removed from their teaching positions years ago, at least seven members of the group[2]—as well as several other sociologists in Zagreb and Ljubljana—are now enjoying the apparent benefits of the universal academic dream. They are free to travel and to lecture outside the country; they enjoy tenured status at full salary; and they have no teaching duties. However, they are not permitted to lecture or to hold meetings in Yugoslavia; they are only slowly reappearing in print in Yugoslav journals and books; they believe that their mail is inspected; and they are prohibited from teaching. This "balance" of prohibitions and perquisites is not the product of either full constitutional legality or totalitarian terror—each of which would have produced an unambiguous punishment or vindication. Rather, it seems to have evolved during negotiations on several levels over the last few years between the eight Belgrade professors and various institutional representatives of the Yugoslav juridical, ideological, and political system: the university branch of the League of Communists (LC), the university self-management council, the LC city and republican leaderships, and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia. Just as the punishment indicates the uncertainty of this process, so, too, does the procedure itself illustrate the difficulties of maintaining both that "socialist legality" so common to disparate but

1. For more detailed analyses, see Yugoslav Embassy, "On the Ideological and Moral Fitness of Professors and Teaching Staff at Belgrade University" in *Telos*, 18 (Winter 1973-74), pp. 156-58; and Sharon Zukin, "The Case of the Belgrade Eight" in *Telos*, 19 (Spring 1974), pp. 138-41.

2. One of the original eight is not among the signers of this statement; coincidentally or not, his articles have re-appeared in one of the major sociological journals in Yugoslavia.

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politically repressive regimes and that socialist liberalism, for which Yugoslavia has often been singled out.

In such a system, what exactly is the nature of the crime? The statement of the Belgrade group suggests that it is "criminal" to construe in a literal fashion constitutionally guaranteed liberties as facts. But since 1948 when, under Tito's leadership, the country challenged the authority (though not the authenticity) of the Soviet revolutionary experience, Yugoslavia has not encouraged abstract reflections on Kafkaesque or Foucaultian paradoxes. Instead, some Yugoslav intellectuals have pushed the official ideology of self-management to the logical expectations that it engenders, e.g., a legislature that represents constituents' demands, distinct slates of candidates in truly contested elections, free popular choice between realistic policy alternatives. Particularly since the political liberalization of the early 1960s—which is often confused with the economic liberalization of the 1965 reforms—the Belgrade group has not been "dissenting" so much as stressing or affirming their rights, which, in theory, have already been won. In the Yugoslav context, as in other societies, such affirmation evokes competing definitions of legality, legitimacy, and practice. By grounding their argument in the tension of *praxis*, the Belgrade group continually exposes the utopian root of a practice that seeks stability. By emphasizing the ideals on which the legitimacy of socialist society is based, the Belgrade group implicitly threatens state power.

It is surely not accidental that Eastern Europe has become the locus of current attempts to define a theoretical base for democratic socialism. Throughout the modern period in this area of the world, the relation between intellectuals and enlightened despots, between intellectuals and the state, has crossed mutual dependence with mutual fear. If intellectuals in Eastern Europe refuse to submerge themselves in the image of a totally romanticized victim-group—which seems to be the recurrent illusion of Western intellectuals, who lionize the working class, or migrant workers, or prison residents, or the mentally ill—then they appear in their own guise, as a minority group that aspires to save the people. As such, they present their rulers with an either/or situation. It is significant that at this point in the development of the East European states, the humanist intellectuals are working within a Marxist and a modern framework. Sophisticated technology, socialist redistribution, goals of high productivity and a high standard of consumption are accepted as givens; "developed" communism is accepted as a goal. Now, as in the past, intellectuals in Yugoslavia, in Czechoslovakia, and in Hungary are trying to develop a blueprint for a transitional period. What is needed, in particular, is a system of politics and of ethics that is both workable and real. Of course, this raises many problems that the East Europeans do not resolve. Can such a politics be practical but not Machiavellian? If one of the basic causes of social inequity and moral illegitimacy in socialist society is the primacy of the political sphere and political actors, then can there be any political resolution to the revolution? Nonetheless, the Yugoslavs are optimistic that a socialist revolution can be built on political rights. It is toward this goal that the Belgrade group has directed the following statement.

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THE MEANING OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS

by the Belgrade *Praxis* Group*

Since the democratic revolutions of the 18th century, the modern world has tolerated a gap between the proclaimed ideals of human rights and a limited social reality in which those rights have been systematically ignored and suppressed. But there are two sources of novelty in the current definition of human rights: first, after a series of social unrests in the first half of this century, the range of human rights has been extended to embrace socio-economic rights in addition to political ones; second, there has been a universal acceptance of certain basic human rights. In spite of all their differences in social structure, political culture, and basic values, the governments of East and West agreed, first, on the *United Nations Declaration on Human Rights*, and, then, on the Helsinki Convention of 1975. Unfortunately, the relative ease with which those accords were reached does not indicate the birth of a new universal spirit of justice so much as it illustrates the pragmatism and hypocrisy of most professional politics. The ideological habit of mystifying reality and hiding an oppressive political praxis behind a veil of appealing legal declarations is still deeply rooted in the behavior of every bureaucracy. Judging from the reluctance of many governments to adhere to or even to ratify certain parts of signed accords and from the anger with which they react even to the most justified criticism concerning their implementation; one can only conclude that they considered the Helsinki accords as yet another useful—but essentially harmless, non-binding—document. These accords were harmless because it seemed unlikely that they would have any important internal implications; and the document itself was non-binding because, in a world which is still organized according to the principle of state sovereignty, there is almost no possibility of controlling the implementation of international legal obligations.

The expected, routine skirmishes among official politicians concerning the implementation of the Helsinki accords grew into a conflict of considerable historical importance only when the whole issue of human rights was raised to the level of a universal ethic, in contradistinction to the political sovereignty of particular states, and when it was raised by the victims of injustice and oppression themselves.

The basic civil rights and liberties are the great achievements of the past democratic revolutions. They are necessary—though not sufficient—conditions of a free human life in any society. A critique of these rights which rejects or disparages them as merely "formal," "abstract," or "bourgeois" is not only devoid of historical sense, but, in the context of societies which have not only not overcome this "bourgeois" level but have not even approached it, also expresses an aggessive obscurantism.

Surely, these rights remain limited. In the conditions of material and spiritual misery in which great parts of the world's population are still condemned to live, these rights represent only a partial expression of abstract possibilities which, for economic reasons, cannot be brought to life. But it is equally true that changing the economic system without also making a political democratization does not lead to new and more

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* The authors of this text are seven professors of the University of Belgrade suspended from teaching in 1975 for expressing their critical views in the journal *Praxis*: Mihailo Markovic, Ljubomir Tadic, Dragoljub Micunovic, Svetozar Stojanovic, Zagorka Golubovic, Miladin Zivotic and Nebojsa Popov.

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just forms of society. Mere economic changes keep alive authoritarian institutions analogous to those in feudal society, in the same way as political democratization without economic democracy made possible the survival of slavery from Washington's time to Lincoln's. In our century, socialist revolutions rejected imperial and royal autocracies because they were *imperial* and *royal*—not because autocracy is incompatible with the principle of popular sovereignty. [Even after the Revolution,] power remained completely concentrated in a single center. The individual was called "citizen" and "comrade," but the level of civil rights and civil consciousness which had already been reached in the eighteenth century remained an almost unattainable goal. In place of the [Western] civil *servant*, who was responsible to the citizen, the state functionary continually demanded that the citizen prove his or her political loyalty. The functionaries' power fully controls the people instead of being controlled by them. When the citizens behave exactly according to the Constitution, they are far from a secure position. Those citizens who interpret literally the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of public demonstration, and freedom of political organization frequently wind up in jail.

Although bourgeois representative democracy can no longer be considered the best form of political organization of society, it is the necessary starting-point of all democracy. Democracy's basic assumption is that *demos*, the people, are mature, are able to make basic decisions, are able, among other things, to elect their own representatives. With the nineteenth-century political parties, powerful mediators between citizens and their representatives appeared on the historical stage. As a consequence of this mediation, the influence of the voters on their elected representatives was diminished, the power of political parties and their fractions in the parliament was increased and became alienated. This alienation reached its maximum when a single, monolithic, authoritarian party monopolized all political power. Under such conditions, elections no longer express the people's will but the people's loyalty; voting is no longer a right but an obligation. Ruling cadres who can be replaced only by the force of biological laws or as a consequence of disloyalty to the sovereign leader recall feudal rather than a new socialist society.

A consistent critique of oligarchic lawlessness is possible only from the viewpoint of democratic socialism. Such a critique does not justify the conservative ideologues' distinctions between the "Free World" and an "unfree world."

In the first place, some of the traditionally recognized civil rights have not yet been fully implemented even in the nations of the great democratic revolutions; in the countries of their political allies, these rights have sometimes been drastically suppressed. Furthermore, some of the essential socio-economic rights proclaimed by the socialist movement are, in principle, out of reach of any capitalist society. The rights of citizens to freely express their opinion, to criticize existing policy, and to organize politically have always been limited by an unequal and unjust distribution of wealth, economic power and leisure time. Nowadays it is common practice in the "free" world that citizens lose or cannot get jobs because of their political convictions. The right of citizens to mobilize for changing the social order has been denied. An alarming growth of intelligence services and techniques of data collection effectively denies the individual's right to privacy. Abuses of the mass media greatly increase opportunities to manipulate citizens' thinking and reduce their autonomy of decision making. The traditional institutions of representative democracy have become a barrier for the development of new forms of direct democracy.

On the other hand, from the very beginning and still within the framework of feudal

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society, certain immanent characteristics of capitalism have always set the boundaries of every striving toward human emancipation. Capitalism will retain its place in human history as a system which made possible the fastest possible material growth, the most efficient exploitation of the natural environment, and the most rapid development of individual needs. [Of course, all these benefits exacted their price, e.g. the pollution of the environment, the privatization of the individual, the reduction of sensuality and creativity to ownership and consumerism.] Yet capitalism was able to realize the historical possibility of expansionism and individuality by liberating the individual from the social constraints of feudalism; by demarcating the political sphere (in which a minimum of sociability is indispensable) from the economic sphere (which fosters extreme individualism); by encouraging all forms of entrepreneurialism and competition; by endorsing full economic egoism; by affirming the principle of survival of the fittest; by justifying colonial conquests and the unlimited exploitation of the peoples that they subjected.

Socialist revolutions eliminated the capitalist class; abolished private ownership of the means of production and the private character of social institutions; limited the regulative role of the market in the production process; guaranteed the right to work; made education, health, and social security a matter of general concern; and undertook massive efforts to raise the cultural standards of the whole population. However, just as the civil liberties of bourgeois society have become little more than abstract rights of the egoistic individual in conditions of economic reification, so the economic freedom and social justice proclaimed by socialist revolutions in the transition to communism have not progressed further than a reified authoritarian collectivism.

The power of the capitalists was replaced with a state and party bureaucracy. Private property was turned into state property with many elements of private arbitrariness and autocracy. The market, a blind, irrational heteronomous force, was replaced by the state plan, an apparently more rational but equally external and heteronomous force. The worker, the seller of his labor, was transformed into a hireling of the state. The worker's right to work enabled the bureaucracy to dictate the type of work and work conditions. A free education did not carry with it the freedom to choose its content. Because of considerable investment, general cultural standards have been greatly improved and a real breakthrough has been achieved in natural sciences and technology. However, in most socialist countries, the social sciences experienced a catastrophic stagnation. The human spirit does not grow in conditions of censorship, ideological indoctrination, and blacklisting. Together with the great efforts in transferring classical traditional culture and creating the widespread need for culture, socialist societies denied modern culture by suppressing that sensibility, that spirit of free experimentation, which is indispensible for real development. Therefore, a new socialist culture has yet to be created. We can only ask how, without it, socialism can be built at all.

The issue of human rights emerged historically in an open conflict between the revolutionary bourgeoisie and state absolutism. Only then did the contradiction between Law and the State become apparent. In that conflict Law emerged as the guarantor of freedom against arbitrary state power; Law expressed the citizen's resistance to oppression. [Thus, historically,] emancipation has meant that the state as *public* power may not be used for the *private* goals of its rulers or its functionaries.

It is hardly controversial that, since Marx, the whole idea of political emancipation, of civil liberty, has its class limitations. But what makes this area so controversial today

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is the stubborn rejection of political emancipation *in toto* by the official Marxism of the socialist countries. Behind the dogmatic theory about the incompatibility of bourgeois and socialist democracy is a long history of the drastic suppression of human rights in the revival of state absolutism. How can an absolutist state, even when it calls itself socialist, claim to be historically superior to a liberal, representative democracy? If political emancipation is a phase of the universal process of human emancipation, then socialism cannot ignore it or reject it without jeopardizing the very reason of its existence and the legitimacy of its ultimate goals. Socialist society may transcend political emancipation but it may not repudiate it.

Despite its intention of eliminating the contradiction between the forms and the content of democracy, the 1918 Constitution of the Russian Federal Socialist Republic negated political emancipation in several ways. First, the very proclamation of "the dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasants" deprived a certain category of the population—the previous ruling classes—of their political rights. Second, Soviet legal theory of that period defined the dictatorship of the proletariat as a power "which exercises coercion over the bourgeoisie and in doing so is not constrained by any law." Rather than being a revolution in the Law in the transition period by "revolutionary expedience," it justified the complete subordination of law to politics. Thus, it [was really a regression from bourgeois political emancipation]. Furthermore, the danger of bureaucratization was completely overlooked. According to the official Soviet ideology, it was "ridiculous, absurd, and nonsense" to compare the dicatatorship of the masses to the dictatorship of the leaders. It was "an elementary truth" that the relation between the leaders, the party, and the class was "ordinary, normal, and simple." But, in reality, the dictatorship of the class was reduced to that of the party, which, in turn, degenerated into the dictatorship of a single leader. After the critical year 1921, the view prevailed in the Bolshevik leadership that the party of the proletariat could maintain its leading position only through monolithic unity. That meant the complete elimination not only of all other parties—even socialist parties—but also of any organized groups and factions within the Bolshevik Party itself. The dictatorship of the proletariat turned out to be incompatible with political democracy. Bourgeois fetishism of the Law was replaced by bureaucratic fetishism of politics. The vague concept of "revolutionary expediency" was eventually transformed into the cynical justification of "State reason."

In this new system there was no place for the associations of citizens and producers that Marx spoke about. Indeed, there was no place for any organization that rests on the self-determination and the self-initiative of liberated individuals. Duties prevailed over rights, prohibitions and sanctions prevailed over liberties. The legitimacy for an utterly voluntaristic state praxis was sought by assuming reified, suprahistorical, suprahuman "objective laws" of socialism which act independently of the consciousness of actual living people. What began as a Marxist critique of bourgeois law ended up as a conservative justification of political Caesarism.

What remains of the constitutional freedoms of conscience, thought, education, and organization is mere caricature. Citizens are free to think but they must prove that their thinking is "constructive." They are free to elect representatives who have previously been chosen by the Party. They are also free to join all those organizations and societies which undergo strict and permanent Party control. "Real" education has been subordinated to the pragmatism of daily politics and the imperatives of a thoroughgoing pseudo-revolutionary indoctrination: Citizens are not even aware of

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their right to know what the state does in their name and how it spends the surplus product of their labor. Even the most naive citizens hardly believe that all those articles of the Constitution which guarantee their freedom of conscience, thought, speech, publication and organization were really written for them. They know they could be held responsible for a crime "against the people and the state" or end up in a psychiatric hospital if they took the Constitution seriously and behaved "constitutionally." And it is precisely the alleged "ruling class" that is oppressed, for workers do not even have the traditional rights which they had in capitalist society: the right to form trade unions and the right to strike. This form of compulsory work, based on the political dependency of the producers, cannot be considered a historical alternative to the politically free labor on which capitalism rests. Rather, it represents a pre-capitalist socio-political arrangement. To criticize capitalism from that standpoint can be only a pseudo-revolutionary act.

But, the limitations of bourgeois society cannot be transcended by an eclectic combination of economic liberalism and authoritarian politics. Socialist emancipation cannot be derived from free market competition. When production takes place in atomized enterprises, without democratic integration and coordination, the whole public sphere remains outside the reach of producers' collectives and citizens' communities. Public life remains the private property of bureaucratic power. A really new, more free, more just society presupposes both political and economic emancipation. What lies beyond both an authoritarian state and a reified market is a democratic socialism in which all public power remains in the hands of self-governing councils and associations of the citizens and of the producers.

How is it possible to criticize positive law and yet avoid idealistic transcendentalism? How can we hold that law is historically conditioned and open to development, and yet avoid an eclectic relativism? [The source of Law—the most basic source of human rights—must be located in a conception of purposeful human activity, which can only emerge and evolve in response to specific human needs.] This is the conception of historical *praxis*, which involves the basic features of all life forms: genetic invariancy, self-regulation, and even "teleonomy," as Monod calls the unique primary life project of the survival and multiplication of the species. However, historical praxis vastly surpasses its biological ground. The plastic genetic material will be moulded in many different ways in the process of social interaction; self-regulation will become increasingly more conscious and autonomous; the conservative *telos* of species survival and multiplication will be replaced by an essentially new project—the creation of a natural environment which will be cultivated in many new ways and, at the same time, the creation of human beings whose capacities are increasingly articulated and whose needs are increasingly complex. [Such needs will combine individual fulfillment with communal identification.] Thus praxis includes both individual *self-affirmation* and concern for self-fulfillment by other individuals.

The idea of freedom which follows from the concept of praxis is much deeper and more comprehensive than the concept of liberty on which traditional bourgeois law rests. Either an individual or a collective subject may be regarded really free with respect to a social process only when their self-determination is a decisive condition of that process. This presupposes, *first*, that the objective situation allows at least two alternatives relevant to the intention of the subject; *second*, that the subject makes a conscious and autonomous choice among those alternatives; *third*, that the subject act according to choice; and, *fourth*, that the result of this action remains within the framework of prior expectations. While traditional liberalism distinguishes between

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freedom of thought (and conscience and will) and freedom of action, this idea of freedom presupposes the unity of thought and action. [Bourgeois society] tolerates the critical thought or the critical word but not the deed that follows from such a critical consciousness. Once the revolutionary bourgeoisie was transformed into a ruling class, the right to revolutionary activity which had been recognized by Locke, Rousseau, and Jefferson disappeared from bourgeois law. A century and a half later, when the revolutionary Bolshevik Party was transformed into a ruling party this occurred again. Moreover, the abolition of freedom of speech and organization in society and in the party as well is symptomatic of the instability and alienation of the ruling elite. When we overcome the narrow, static bourgeois conception of freedom, and interpret freedom as a historical process of increasing practical self-determination, we become aware of certain human rights which have neither been realized nor recognized in either capitalism or bureaucratic socialism.

The current struggle for the practical realization of civil and human rights represents a new dimension of emancipatory aspirations. To the extent to which it can cease being a mere phase of the perennial confrontation between governments and ideological camps, and develop into a mass movement, it will contribute to the breakdown of barriers to human freedom and social justice. Of course, in different societies this struggle will assume different forms and priorities. In the countries of developed capitalism, it may be possible to use the already achieved level of political liberties in order to abolish economic exploitation and social oppression. In the countries of state socialism, the first step is to overcome state absolutism with a thoroughgoing political democratization. In the countries of the Third World, it is essential to create the basic material and cultural preconditions for the implementation of human rights, to avoid the growth of oppressive institutions and mechanisms adopted from modern industrial society, and to try to preserve those industrial forms of human solidarity and autonomy which still exist. In none of these contexts will a higher level of human rights and liberties emerge spontaneously; nor will it be granted to a society by its government. It will be achieved only through the resolute struggle of various emancipatory movements. Even in the most difficult conditions, even without political organization, strong and fearless individuals and groups may keep alive the great emancipatory ideas of the past. By their own example they can contribute to the awakening of an elementary civil consciousness.

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BENJAMIN'S AMBIVALENCE

by John Fekete

It is fairly well established that there are several Walter Benjamins and it follows that his work embodies ambivalence and tension rather than coherence and identity. There is the apocalyptic Benjamin of Talmudic and cabbalistic inspiration; the libertarian Benjamin, claimed by the Frankfurt School, who defends particulars against the usurpations of universalizing systems; and the politicizing Benjamin, associated with Brecht, whose thinking explores more orthodox strategies in those two well-known essays of the mid-1930s, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" and "Author as Producer." Each of these strains provides brilliant insights in aesthetics, social theory and philosophy of history. Yet, each is also entangled with difficultites. Of course, the following does not aim at any definitive or exhaustive evaluation of Benjamin. It merely explores some of Benjamin's presuppositions in order to clarify the significance of some aspects of his work today. The major issues are: (1) Benjamin's interpretation of culture—his defense of particularity, resulting in an aphoristic form of expression (2) His theory of easthetics reception which attempts to come to terms with art as information, and with form-content relations in the age of mass media; and (3) Benjamin's theory that qualitative change can only be expected from a radical historical rupture.

Culture

Benjamin sought to become an exegete who would decipher the meanings of objects at all levels from times past and present. "All human knowledge must take the form of interpretation," he wrote in 1923, [1] and his devotion to that principle brings him close to the borad circle of modern hermeneutics, the New Critical tradition and structuralism. [2] At that time the great realist tradition in art lay in ruins and the gap between the individual subject and social movements grew wider, Benjamin was troubled by the status of the observer and tried to refine authorial subjectivity out of existence: to yield to the presence of the object. Adorno notes [3] that Benjamin's massive *Arcades* project—thousands of pages of which exist as fragments of a plan to interpret the nineteenth century call for the elimination of all commentary from disparate materials in order to protect the integrits of the particular from an imposed conceptual logic. Benjamin's dream was to compose his major work, the culmination of his anit-aubjectivism, entirely out of citations.

The resulting collage was to be protected from a factitious rationalist cohesion by an insistence on fragmentariness. This philosophy of fragments challenges the dominant totalitarian tendencies of the inter-war period. For emancipatory discourse, it may remain a valuable contribution toward a viable alternative to the totalitarian tendencies of our rationalist traditions. In line with Bloch's search for the utopian

1. Letter to F.C. Rang, Dec. 9, 1923.
2. For full-length discussion of the historical rise and ideological development of such object-centered literary-cultural interpretations, see John Fekete, *The Critical Twilight: Explorations in the Ideology of Anglo-American Literary Theory from Eliot to McLuhan* (London and Boston, 1978).
3. *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London, 1967), p. 239.

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dimension of all manifestations, Benjamin seeks a libertarian frame for those manifestations, free of authoritarian intervention. Yet, the position is ambivalent: the aspiration to an objective collage of objective fragments is reminiscent both of a crippling positivism and of dogmatic structuralist pretensions.

It is interesting that Benjamin should have sought for solutions in a Marxism providing the general principles connecting a multiplicity of related structures. In this, as in the predisposition toward discontinuity, the subordination of subjectivity, and the rhetorical cast of his writing, Benjamin appears as a forerunner of modern structuralism. Not surprisingly, therefore, his work shares the weakness of structural methodology: the inability to develop an adequate conception of the subject.

On the other hand, his prose yearns to respond to particularity, and in this he differs from contemporary structuralism. Benjamin did not aspire to a systematic theory of literature. His style incorporates the interval; he leaves spaces between one item and another—vacancies providing opportunity for reflection. Indeed, his aphoristic fragments express a methodological hostility to systems. The aphoristic fragment sets its own horizon.[4] It does not develop an epistemology of discontinuity. As a way of seeing the world, the aphorism both implies a greater whole and yet is complete as a fragment.

The aphorism was a characteristic device employed not only by Benjamin but by the Frankfurt School as well in this attempt to resist totalitarian discourse. World War One marked the end of the golden age of entrepreneurial capitalism and of its most radical negation, classical Marxism. The inter-war period saw a global social transition to systems of bureaucratic domination over all facets of life, the politicization of the economy, and the colonization of consciousness. The rise of fascism and the collapse of Left opposition meant not only the end of the fairy tale of an inevitably emancipatory socialist future, but also the eliination of the Lukácsian totalizing subject-object of history or any totalizing social agency. Macrological social theory itself had to be ruled out owing to the absence of an empirically or potentially appropriate collective epistemological grounding.

In this predicament, where the dominant tendencies sought to destroy all otherness in order to make possible the restructuring of capitalism, Aodrno and the Frankfurt theorists sought to preserve particularity and non-identity. In Piccone's reconstruction, in order to salvage revolutionary subjectivity at all, Adorno's social theory retreated to micrological levels where "analyses of the particular aphoristically provide glimpses of that "false totality" no longer immediately apprehensible through discredited traditional conceptual means. The aphorism retains its critical edge by escaping into a poetic mode of discourse."[5]

Although the aphoristic defense of non-identity may have been a necessary response, it was also a necessary evil. The relative protection that the mocrological fragment enjoys from the dangers of instrumentalization is also translated in the long run into a relative political impotence. It may be that the retreat of critical theory into a micrological sanctuary was an effective defense against an allegedly totally administered society, yet it becomes obsolete and ineffective once the merciless transition to advanced capitalism is achieved and overbureaucratization becomes counterproductive. At this point, the logic of one-dimensionality is slowly reversed in

4. See Maurice Blanchot, "Walter Benjamin: Reprises," *La Nouvelle Revue Francaise*, 93 (1960), pp. 475-83.

5. See Paul Piccone, "The Changing Function of Critical Theory," *New German Critique*, 12 (Fall 1977), p. 31.

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order artificially to generate institutional free spaces for recreation of the spontaneity negativity otherness non-identity that the administered society needs to instrumentalize as internal control mechanisms for stable growth (and which it had destroyed in the transition period).[6] The aphoristic fragments that once carried critical protest (Benjamin), today carry reconciliation (McLuhan).

In Benjamin's case, this problem is only compounded by the coexistence in his outlook of unregenerated macrological junk derived (via Brecht) from traditional Marxism.[7] Yet, owing to his concern with class politics, Benjamin was to make some of his most valuable contributions in the area of political communications theory, specifically around questions of aesthetic *information* and aesthetic *democratization*. Unlike either conservative or radical critics of mass media, Benjamin saw mass communications as holding great cultural possibilities.

Aesthetics

His chief aesthetic concern is the impact of the work of art in the world. thus, aesthetic reception is at the center of his philosophy of art. It is the deep ambivalence of aesthetic reception in today's world that is at the root of a fundamental ambivalence in Benjamin's aesthetics.[8] The problem that Benjamin raises is that the principle of a work's autonomy and integrity. Yet, this is in danger within the frame of contemporary reception. He attempts two kinds of intellectual strategies in response to this dilemma.

In the first model, he shows that even problematic reception becomes a formative principle of art so that the integrity of the work is preserved notwithstanding changes in the conditions of reception. It is in this crucial respect that Benjamin's aesthetic theory can be distinguished from conventional sociologies of art. He does not simply inquire into the *sociological fate* of work. In Benjamin's view, the effect of the work, its function, the reception it is expected to get, are among the deepest and most basic *formative* principles in the very composition or creation of the work of art. For example, in discussing Baudalaire, Benjamin cites the inattentive audience that the poet expected as one of the fundamental formal problems of Baudelaire's art, and he demonstrates that precisely this unfavorable atmosphere for poetic creation became the material basis for great poetry.[9] In other words, Benjamin deals with the conflict between integrity and reception by incorporating the end point of aesthetic communication within the starting point of aesthetic intention.

Benjamin's second model which is most explicit in the "Mechanical Reproduction" essay, follows the inverse strategy; here, he finds aesthetic integrity exhausted within the novelties of reception. In the case of film, regarded as a new art form with no tradition and totally at the mercy of modern forms of reception, Benjamin does not try to inquire into the possibilities and conditions of artistically great films. On the contrary, he explicitly argues that, in the period of mechanical reproduction of works of art, "the work of art becomes a creation with entirely new functions, among which

Ibid., pp. 33-37.

7. To "prefer Benjamin's politics to that of the Frankfurt School" is to introduce sectarian premises into an otherwise illuminating discussion. See Fredric Jameson, "Benjamin as Historian, or How to Write a Marxist Literary History," *Minnesota Review*, new series, 3 (Fall 1974), p. 116.

8. Cf. Sandor Radnoti, "A Filmhatas Ertelmezese Walter Benjamin Esztetikajaban" ("On the Interpretation of the Impact of Film in Walter Benjamin's Aesthetic Theory"). My comments on Benjamin's film aesthetic follow Radnoti's argument.

9. See "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," *Illuminations*, ed. with introduction by Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, 1968), pp. 157-202.

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the one we are conscious of, the artistic function, later may be recognized as incidental."[10]

Art is said to lose its autonomy, its aura; it becomes naked information available for political appropriation. Benjamin gives up on aesthetic form, in favor of a preoccupation with the utilization of aesthetic *content*. Put differently, he turns his attention to the technical medium as a political force in a social arena. In this context, cinematic technique designed for mass reception, and the effect of this technique on masses of people, become very important.

For Benjamin, film is important precisely because of its democratic character. Film is universally accessible, everyone is an expert, and criticism of film is one with enjoyment of film. Today, the art film and the mass entertainment film have separated into different categories, and, although the art film remains popular, it is no longer a democratic genre. Nevetheless, Benjamin's question remains: how is a democratic, collective reception of art possible? Benjamin's hopes are pinned on mass agitational film, and his answer is formulated in terms of reception tied to entertainment. He discovers a fundamental characteristic of modern reception: distracted apperception. Whereas concentration would lead *into* the work of art, the distracted mass consumes, absorbs, assimilates the work of art and makes immediate use of the film in the framework of every day life.

Architecture is the art that Benjamin offers as the prototype for this kind of reception. The analogy is revealing and opens Benjamin to Adorno's criticism that he reduces art to political utility. For architecture is uniquely that form of art whose practical utility is completely independent and separable from the aesthetic. Aesthetic formation in architecture, conversely, is tied to and cannot break away from the practical point of view. This principle, of the priority of the practical, and of the practical function of form, remains creative in architecture, but it is destructive of form in every other art. Yet, in so far as his theory of film is concerned, having chosen the effect of art as the key problem in his aesthetic, Benjamin stylizes this effect into pure ultility. Contrary to the utopian hopes of the film and aesthetic avant-garde, it was precisely the manipulative film industry with its offerings of pseudo-, or substitute-art, that made the most of film's very ability to have an immediately useable, instrumental impact on everyday life.

The whole question of *aura* hangs on the problem of utility and immediacy. In any case, Benjamin developed his view of modern media too narrowly from the visual arts, where aura may indeed be tied to the material uniqueness of the object. In effect, Benjamin does not consider the forms of mass communication to be aesthetic forms, and he consequently surrenders them to his naive political assumption that the mass movement which he expects to mobilize to defeat fascism (with the help of film) will also mean the end of the bourgeois world and hence open up a world of higher creative immediacy. But the world of domination has remained, while even the former audiences of the Brechtian epic theater and of the mass agitational film are gone. In such a context, it would be disastrous to embrace the disintegration of all aesthetic distance and aura, and to permit the reduction of all autonomous aesthetic transcendence to politically manipulable information.

but the paradoxes of the aura cut even deeper than that in the new world of advanced capitalism, one generation after Benjamin. Speaking of changes in aesthetics since the appearance of photo-mechanical procedures for transmitting

10. "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," *Illuminations, op.cit.*, p. 227.

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cultural messages, he argued that the loss of aura, of that distance that guaranteed originality and authenticity, altered aesthetic meaning—indeed that through the camera and the cinema art become information, de-ritualized, manipulable, and accessible to all. He attached his hopes for the rise of revolutionary subjectivity to the political organization of democratically accessible art information mechanically reproduced and appropriated by the oppressed masses. Cultural messages were to be instrumental in transcending the primary experience of the exploited in social production. But today that volume of information has increased dramatically to the point where the production, movement, and appropriation of information has become our *dominant* social preoccupation. The staggering complexity of such a cultural experience calls for a new type of individuality, and a new type of community. If there is one thing that this situation rules out, it is an intervention conceived *simply* on the level of a unified apolitical mass supposedly generated out of the wage labor/capital dialectic.

The point is that we are not in adequate touch with this cultural process of the production and consumption of meaning and certainly not with its creative possibilities. Furthermore, the new multi-dimensional symbolic universes provide vast possibilities for artists, and all of us are bound to live more or less as artists. In other words, with the aid of our new technologies we may achieve richer freedoms, provided we create adequate forms. Today the very meaning of an object hardly seems any longer to be found in its material qualities in the context of a need to be satisfied; it has become arbitrary, indifferent to this need.[11] Its meaning is a function of the conceptual context within which it exists. It can then be consumed in its specificity only within this systematic conceptual framework that is internalized and manipulated. It is at this level that aura is again systematically reproduced. Aura is reborn in the distance between individual needs and the conceptual framework. Meaning is a result of the false aura constituted by the false totality. Autonomous subjectivity tends to retreat and decline.

Technology does not help solve this dilemma: the prolonged cybernetic coordination of information can only contribute to an overbureaucratization or decay. However, it seems that as everything is absorbed into the false totality, like light into a black hole, the resulting closed system enters into crisis. From the point of view of cultural adaptability, free spaces must open up for the very survival and recreation of the false totality itself. The false aura that developed by a usurpation of collective subjectivity may begin to yield to the spontaneity of autonomous subjective power in order to regenerate the kind of negativity that the labor totality no longer has. We are now on uncharted land: the terrain of philosophy of history.

Philosophy of History

Benjamin never wrote his major work; but the heterogeneous fragments he examines are organized by a messianic hope for an end of history. Benjamin develops a radical critique of "progress" in the name of which ideologues of administered society have legitimated technocratic rule and the sacrifice of the present to an abstract future. Thus, the *radical rupture* (in what he calls messianic time) that would explode the undesirable continuum of history, becomes a touchstone of his thought.[12] This

11. See especially Jean Baudrillard, *La société de consommation* (Paris, 1970); *Pour une critique de l'économie politique du signe* (Paris, 1972); *L'échange symbolique et la mort* (Paris, 1976).

12. See Bernd Witte, "Benjamin and Lukacs, Historical Notes on the Relationship between

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philosophy of history is ambivalent. It is a powerful antidote to evolutionism and the belief in universal history, yet it exacts a high price. The despair about the future is also projected backward. The Enlightenment is projected back to cover all of history. The consequence of such ontologization of the Enlightenment, typical of the Frankfurt School,[13] is translated into the aspiration to be liberated, not only from a transitional phase of recent history, but from history itself.[14]

Berger suggests that the awakened interest in Benjamin coincides with the ongoing re-examination of Marxism. Concerning this interregnum, he writes: "The interregnum exists in an indivisible world, where time is short, and where the immorality of the conviction that ends justify means lies in the arrogance of the assumption that time is always on one's own side and that, therefore, the present moment—the time of the Now, as Walter Benjamin called it—can be compromised or forgotten or denied."[15]

But Benjamin's philosophy of history is also problematic. In rejecting the homogeneous empty time of social democratic evolutionary theory, Benjamin has recourse to the revolutionary explosion of Messianic time that ruptures the fabric of history: "For every second of time (is) the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter."[16]

In order to protect the present moment, the time of the Now, as Benjamin would call it, from the syllogisms of rationalist deductivism and the imposition of the sterile claims of an abstractly deduced future, the future is closed off from any scrutiny at all, indeed from any projected, intended, or speculated connection with Now. This attempt to sustain the future as a radical alternative whose further determination is denied in order to keep it free, unsoiled by the past, and uninstrumentalized, produces *too* radical a discontinuity and becomes a transcendent conception that altogether occludes the question of historical subjectivity. For no future can be a human future, our future, if it is not conceived in the form of a "from now to the not-yet-now," i.e., in a form that includes a transition, some moments of continuity, some links between memory and intention. (Of course, Benjamin's extensive work on the 19th century testifies, in practice, to a desire to *preserve* some continuity.(Yet, in backing away from immanent determinism, Benjamin's theoretical conception in the end falls into the unknowns of transcendent determinations. Likewise, the allusion to instantaneous correlation and transformation of all aspects of human life (if only to blow everything out of the continuum of history) in the image of Messianic redemption, reintroduces that supra-historical logic of homogeneity that was to be cast out.

Curiously, Benjamin's critique of the transparent, homogeneous, empty time of rationalism arrives at its mirror image, the opaque, homogeneous, saturated time of irrationalism. This, too, is part of its current appeal. Both conceptions are equally totalitarian in their references to both future and past. What they share is a belief in

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their Political and Aesthetic Theories," *New German Critique*, 5 (Spring 1975), pp. 16-17.

14. The distortion, necessarily, is pervasive: by correlation with the eruption of homogenized otherness that is expected in an indeterminate 'then' in the future, the 'not then' of present and past also become homogenized. For example, Benjamin comments: "There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to another. A historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from it as far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain." "Theses on the Philosophy of Historv," No. 7, *Illuminations*, p. 258.

15. "Antiquarian and Revolutionary," *New Society* (June 18, 1970), p. 1067.

16. "Theses on the Philosophy of History," No. 18, *Illuminations*, p. 266.

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the rationality of the present system of domination, whose continuation they either affirm or deny. Both permit the actual to usurp and exhaust the notion of the rational. To end the continuum, Benjamin abandons the dialogue with the future (in the sense of 'from now to the not-yet-now') and paints only an apocalyptic future (eschatological rupture). Correspondingly, he abandons dialogue with the past; the future is to be an absolute *novum*. It is this same dynamic that we found on the micrological level in his libertarian-objectivist conception of a composition of citations that denied the authority of the present to dialogue with the past and interrogate it according to its own rationality. He seeks to withdraw into particulars that are not dominated by the concept, that are not *rational*. In the end, the fear of rationalization entices the theorist into the mysticism of unreason. Walter Benjamin could not so transcend his time—the most barbaric of this century—as to leave us with a viable cultural model. Yet, precisely because he responded to his time—and because we can deal with his work in terms of a continuity between past, present, and future—the appropriation of his work promises, perhaps, quite valuable insights toward an emancipatory conception of reason and culture that may mediate our present toward a future that is—as Benjamin would have it—never deducible from immediacy.

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REVIEWS:

Paul Goodman. *Drawing the Line.* Taylor Stoehr, ed. New York: Free Life Editions, 1977.[1]

When I met Paul Goodman my political ideas were in critical transition. As a young radical in the 1930s, I had been drawn to the Communist movement, and there I learned what authoritarianism meant; I had encountered Emma Goldman's writings, and I had found an authentic revolutionary and libertarian spirit in the Spanish revolution and the CNT and among anarchists I came to know. But if, in 1946, after war-time prison, I was still an anarchist, I saw that 19th-century watchwords no longer fit. Anarchist values, anarchist criticisms, these were right; but what could be done? On point after point I found Paul Goodman's ideas challenging. Although reliant on a psychoanalytic perspective that was strange to me, his "millenarian" anarchism agreed largely with the directions of my own thinking and helped me reach conclusions that I had resisted. We differed, but not fundamentally.

I need not explain further, I imagine, why I should like now to sort through and reconsider Goodman's ideas, at this distance and in this retrospect. Happily, Taylor Stoehr has put together in *Drawing the Line* a fine and representative collection of Paul's political essays. Together with the volumes of psychological and literary essays that accompany it, *Drawing the Line* affords opportunity and stimulus for a backward look.[2]

I.

Goodman regarded his literary work as the center of his life. Certainly his occupation was writer or artist or, as he sometimes preferred, "man of letters." Theories, like people, interested him more for their aesthetic qualities than for their propositions. Yet it is my sense (and on this I seem to differ with Stoehr) that his true vocation, manifest in all his work, was that of teacher—a teacher worth hearing on many subjects, a teacher who applies the tests of an educated practical wisdom shrewdly and who always has advice ready. (A rabbi, perhaps?) Thus Goodman could discourse and write on psychology and on language, on education and on community planning, on technology and on literary theory, and, though never systematically, on the political animal, man.

He became known—but this is his lesser work, his writing and his thinking are often hasty—for the social criticism that occupied him during most of the decade and a half before his death in 1972. What he did was needed, unquestionably. In one context after another he picked out "the obvious," he asked questions that were going unasked. In *Growing Up Absurd* and its sequels he communicated and encouraged those habits, and if they are less rare now he had much to do with that.

Of criticism unaccompanied by solutions he always disapproved. "If a man cannot in fact invent a way out, what right has such a man to be libertarian on the issue at all? his negative criticism insults and disheartens the rest" (*Drawing the Line,* p. 37). He offered solutions; as he named it in a poem that Stoehr reprints (175), their principle

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1. Published as part of a three-volume set (with *Nature Heals* and *Creator Spirit Come!*) called "Weapons That Do Not Weigh One Down." My only critical comment about the editions concerns the sketches of Goodman on the dust-jackets. In my memories of him, he is usually smiling. Well, I do have a second, a lost cause: the absence of index.

2 In his introduction to this volume, Stoehr comments knowledgeably, thoughtfully, spiritedly on Goodman's life and politics

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was "chaos is order." Not chaos after destruction; spontaneous, surprising, adaptable order. He would usually mention that he was an anarchist and that his recommendations were just anarchist old hat but he did not argue for anarchism or talk about a free society; sometimes he called his program merely "decentralism." Because he left the background of his thinking undefined, his discourse often had the appearance of radical liberalism. More "political" anarchists who had never thought well of Goodman's anarchism now thought less; I was puzzled.

He was, without doubt, applying anarchist principles to cases, where "a case" could be as large as the Vietnam war or America's crazy technology. He advanced his proposals as plain good sense whose merits anyone could perceive. By showing how functional and sensible it is for the people involved in a given activity to take initiative and take charge, to size up and work out their problems, in short, to manage their own enterprise as a community, he was educating in anarchy, a common sense anarchy in the spirit of Kropotkin. Principles of decentralism are more widely understood now, and his writings and lectures must be one of the reasons.

But even his more modest proposals—how could it be otherwise?—threatened entrenched interests and challenged the operating principles of the "organized society." His applied anarchism was not going to be applied, except marginally by small groups. Worse yet, the "common sense" moves that he advocated—for example, prohibiting automobiles on Manhattan Island, which Stoehr praises and laments—were often remote from the felt needs, some media-created but others the products of rage at desperate life-conditions, of the people of the communities in behalf of which Goodman offered his advice. Despite himself he was utopian and a little out of touch.

Popular social criticism tends to be provocative rather than deep. Or am I saying that as professor extraordinary of continuing education Goodman was not a teacher for me? I reviewed only one book, *The Community of Scholars,* and although I agreed with it basically I did not find myself inspired. In rereading Goodman's essays now, I see, as I could have known, that the Goodman I want to re-explore is the author of the May Pamphlet of 1945, with which Stoehr's collection opens; there, Goodman was fully *within* the situation he wrote about. The situation was his, but not his alone.

II.

Some philosophical background first. Simplest and truest about Goodman is that he was a son of the 18th century who refused to buy the notions that his 20th-century contemporaries took for granted. "I dig the Enlightenment," says a late note from Paul, and it shows up everywhere if one knows to look.

The Enlightenment had its climax in Kant, and Goodman liked to call himself a Kantian. His insistence that there is a real "nature of things" might seem disloyal but this "nature" is Kant's phenomenal world in which Kantian and aristotelian realism coincide. Nature-romantic certainly not, Aristotelian he was, though not in the manner of the medieval schoolmen. Politics is the sphere of practical wisdom; its subject matter is animals with a social nature in an environment that has its nature.

Beyond philosophy there is religion; in the traditions that Goodman adopted one keeps those universes of discourse distinct. Creativity is the word, Creator Spirit is the symbol, the truth of things is anarchy (Taoism would be close enough), Lao-tzu's observations on the minimal "organization" of society hit the mark; for the rest one talks practically.

Save for Nietzsche's artist-philosophy (one should not be surprised), I doubt that

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Goodman found much substance in the novelties of 19th- and 20th-century philosophy. I would guess that he knew little Hegel and or that liked little (historicism, statism, anthropomorphism, willful unclarity). He had affinities with pragmatism, consistently enough because that is the only place to go from Kant's Transcendental Dialectic. (I copy here Goodman's style of flat assertionism.) But his pragmatism had nothing in common with Sidney Hook's power-apologetics, and despite the closeness of Dewey's ideal of face-to-face democracy to his own community-thinking, he had many criticisms of Dewey. About decentralism—political, economic, technological, demographic, and cultural—Dewey hadn't paid heed to Kropotkin. Dewey had faith in the problem-solving capabilities of social science and its monks; ultimately, contrary to himself, faith in technocracy. Goodman stayed with the 18th-century view that moral philosophy is the way to solve the "problems of men," and his moral philosophy called on us to struggle with the problems of our own communities. If there are differences within the community, then the anarchist method, affirmed by Goodman, is to persist to consensus (essay on unanimity, 36-45). If a community does not share aims that make consensus possible, which is the case, what good will sociologists do? They only know how to count.[3]

For Goodman the 18th century must have brimmed with possibility. It knew the sciences and mathematics; it was a climax of intellectual liberation from obscurantism; it had left scholastic metaphysics behind; it was developing a consciousness of history; it was looking toward liberation from political absolutism and statist mercantilism; and it had not lost touch with the nature of things, or with nature, or with things. Imagine a man of that century contemplating what happened once the Jacobins and Jacksonians and industrial capitalists took over. Disappearance of the potentialities Goodman refused to admit; for the reversal of that devolution he offered the anarchist principles at which the 18th century, with Godwin, had just begun to arrive. If told that the Enlightenment was the ideology of the rising bourgeoisie, he could have answered that it would be true in just (and only) the sense in which early 19th-century socialism, Marx's included, was the ideology of an intelligentsia that won power under "communism," as prophesied by Bakunin; the victory of the partisans of a strong nation-state who imposed their system on the early United States was not what he thought the good minds of the 18th century had desired. I would be more comfortable, however, if he had talked more of Tom Paine, that anti-authoritarian proto-anarchist (I don't recall a mention) and less of Jefferson.

Anyway, "middle class" had a somewhat more favorable sense for Goodman than for Marxists and most anarchists. Marxists were trying to persuade architects, engineers, scientists, technicians, that they were proletarians and should accept that reality. He saw them—his architect brother, for example—as persons who had assumed large responsibilities to which they should be faithful; they could be heroic types, stubborn to serve their communities, or else lackeys of the men of war and money. (See "The Duty of Professionals," 166-174.) As Goodman perceived this sector of the middle class, it might even be interpreted as something like the "universal class" that acts in behalf of the whole, for which Marx was looking and which he thought he found; but its role would be to incite and exemplify and do its job, not to take command and impose its rule even transitionally. I should not, however, leave the impression that Goodman was offering a formal "class analysis," Marxist or counter-Marxist.

3. See "Statistical Method in Sociology," in *Resistance,* December 1949.

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Goodman's philosophy—to resume my topic—was reflected in his dislike of abstract ideas and utopias and other total plans, and his lack of interest in great ideas like freedom or themes like "the Individual and Society." He did not talk about the state in the abstract way that anarchists often do. Decentralism he visualized and advocated but he did not speak of "abolishing" the state. Does one seriously wish it to disappear? Then decentralize, decentralize now—create some anarchy where you are—or don't kid yourself.

Of the great triad, *fraternité*—call it also mutual aid—seemed to take priority. The right kinds of liberty and equality would follow. "The Individual" would be a problem, I suppose, only if we were by nature asocial. Although ultra-individualist in his daily living, Goodman projected a vision of communities rooted in our social nature. The individualism returns, however: the community should not be a monotonous egalitarianism. Individual excellence, given (or appropriating) the space it needs, would constitute a "natural" (but not formal) aristocracy by which all would gain. "Mutual aid *and* individual excellence" (43-44); easy to say, not quite so easy to visualize without more clues.

This is a philosophy of freedom, certainly not existentialist. Goodman assumed that some simple acts of transformation, which we can readily envisage, are acts we can plausibly do, that we are free to initiate a chain of events in the midst of history, just from our clear perception of what is sensible, supported by harmony between our hypotheses for action and the needs of our nature. (As we can also war stupidly against our nature.) If we act against our true interests, the explanation will be psychological—we have hamstrung ourselves. Like Aristotle he did not seem to find our freedom puzzling enough to puzzle over. Anarchy, as he came to say, is in "the nature of things." One of several meanings would be that, although one recognizes a link, the triumph of the Jacobins and Jacksonians is not determined by the steam engine. Another would be that the workings of our best nature will seem like sheer confusion to people who can read fabulous equations yet fail to perceive living gestalts.

III.

The priority I have given here to philosophy would not have pleased Goodman at all. If we possess an adequate method, if philosophical perplexities are red herrings, if there are urgent things to be done, why philosophize? Since we know enough, "we don't know enough" is a cop-out. After Godwin, Stirner, and Proudhon, in fact, anarchists seldom indulge in philosophy, and the second of those philosophizers meant to destroy philosophies. Goodman's own theory and philosophy were, simply, the sum of a great cultural tradition in which he felt at home.

Evidently he was always, as he described himself in his last book on politics, a "neolithic conservative." (This is not to prejudge whether, like many older men, say Marx and Kropotkin, he became in other senses conservative.) With good reason, most anarchists have found the sources of their values in the past. Nation-state and industrialism appeared (so it is judged) as superimpositions upon a richer land-based and localistic life whose community aspect survived feudal society only to be undercut by enclosures and virtually destroyed by urbanism and the wage system. Hardly does the modern world suggest anarchism except as pure negation of it, and pure negation is dangerously open to all possibilities. In its rush into a new world, one can argue, Marxism preserves too little of the past, abandons the value-conservationism of Hegelian dialectic by the "syntheses" for which it opts; revival and protection of older and imperiled values need not signify a will to return to older social structures or even

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to a primarily agrarian life.

The roots of Goodman's thought, as I have indicated them, were of course far more intellectual, philosophical, and "cultural" than the roots of most anarchist thinking. Beginning with Proudhon even, anarchism has been chiefly the expression of currents of popular rebellion, of social movements that draw upon popular rather than intellectual traditions. (I believe it is because of these qualities in Proudhon's thinking that sophisticates label him *autodidacte*.) After the defeat of the Spanish revolution, those libertarian currents, of which Goodman acquired some feeling, had all but vanished. Who knows how to write the history of the ethics of the under-classes? What, to them, were the philosophies of nation-state over which the *philosophes* labored? Kropotkin, and also Tolstoy, tried to catch the threads.

Of Goodman it is clear that he did not take for granted our world order, the vectors that technology projects, or 20th-century goals (or inertias). He saw a society that had come to be organized in an ugly, inefficient, and stupid way, contradictory at many points to the purposes of social existence. Hardly a society that one would like to have much to do with.

What outraged him, what forced him out of his artist-intellectual private world and drove him to a "positive" political stance, was the war. He apparently discovered anarchism for himself as the logic of his own pacifism (World War II), as a program—Kropotkin's—for decentralism and community (*Communitas* belongs to that period), and as a politics without ideological constrictions and continuous with one's own life and work. My sense is, and this is important if I am right, that his true and primary political identity was pacifist: that like a goodly number of pacifists he saw the war-making state as no aberration at all, as of the essence of 20th-century society. He drew conclusions, pacifist and anarchist, that Kant, profoundly troubled by war, should have drawn. I do not mean that Goodman's position on the war—which one will decipher only by hard labor from the statement that he wrote for *Partisan Review* in 1942 (*Drawing the Line,* 106-110)—was "philosophical" only. He could not kill his brothers, he hated war, he would not be a soldier.

Well, what does a sane person do in a loony bin? In the context of his association with the New York anarchist group that published *Why?*, one of the few non-conforming publications of the war years, Goodman developed in the essays of the May Pamphlet, although in very loose form, his anarchist-pacifist position. (He did not stay long with our group but he continued to contribute essays, poems, reviews, notes, until *Resistance*, successor to *Why?*, ceased in 1954.) In a spirit kindred to that in which others were attempting the like, he reworked older anarchist principles and sought to redefine what it means to be revolutionary.

The May Pamphlet is about society—but the truth of this society, as the author tells it, is *war*. This is society with capital "S," the "System," which has become our world, a great world-system of war. This would, one feels, be the same war and the same mad enthusiasm for war that destroyed the world of the old Greeks, those "sons of the morning." Need I remind the reader that after 1945 the war went on? And what else, any anarchist will ask, are governments and laws but the peace of slaveries established by wars and conquests, modified, sometimes, by necessary concessions to rebellion? If one wonders why some few anarchists, not absolute pacifists, would not join the "war against fascism," the answer would be long and tortuous or else simple: war destroys everything except the edifices of power and domination. For some anarchists, the war in Spain had been one more terrible lesson.

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IV.

In Goodman's working-out of his anarchism, as I have anticipated, nature is a fundamental theme; not all its complexities surface explicitly in the May Pamphlet. To most anarchists, nature is what history is to Marxism. That anarchism is a simple-minded theory of "natural goodness" is a canard with as much substance as the accusation that Marx was a simple-minded economic determinist.

To condemn the existing society as "unnatural," as making "unnatural" demands by "unnatural coercion and violence"—and thereby dissolving its claims to our loyalty—must have amused the author, whose sexual preferences and habits were, in the conventional and scientific language of the day, "unnatural." In such a culture it might be just the one labeled "queer" who would be the natural authority on what is really queer and what is truly natural.

In the May Pamphlet there is a kind of definition of nature. The author has argued against "the personal" ("personal spontaneity," "free personality"). As Sullivanians and revisionist Freudians were using it, "person" was a baneful concept. "The fact is that at present it is exactly the aim of all the organs of publicity, entertainment, and education so to form the personality that a man performs by his subjective personal choice just what is objectively advantageous for the coercive corporation, of which further he feels himself to be a part" (19-20). After some years we hear these thoughts from others, not so simply or free from patronizing tone. Goodman goes on: "This kind of subjective personality is an effect of coercion, acting in the unconscious; it is not a causal principle of freedom. Going back to Rousseau, let me suggest the substitution of the word 'natural,' meaning those drives and forces, on both the animal and human level, which at present act themselves out in defiance of the conventions that we and our friends all agree to be outmoded and no longer 'natural conventions,' but which in a free society will be the motors of individual excellence and mutual aid." (20). The "substitution," of course, is not intended to preserve the original meaning, except in the speech of anarchists who have unwisely adopted an ambiguous vocabulary. The claim of "naturalness" is aggressive—let me call it not "persuasive definition" but "aggressive definition." "But it is not the case that out of day-to-day economic and domestic existence there arises any great thing without the imposition of a positive, naturally coercive, yes even aggressive, idea" (42).

The thesis that the "natural," the vital, the desirable, is to be looked for in what "at present act themselves out in defiance of the conventions" identifies a touchstone. We know, do we not, that the good acts of peace, of solidarity, of refusal to play the competitive game, of loving and being concerned, of embracing our friends sensually, and much more, are "in defiance of the convention" and even (some of them) prohibited by law? But notice the real "touchstone": that right action is one which would, in our imagination of a free society, be of the substance of "individual excellence and mutual aid." Of free society, presumably, we have a clear enough idea; and since we are not seeking to impose a utopia, we can test our ideas piecemeal, here and now, and correct them.[4]

Let me try to state briefly, not limiting myself to the text, what I think Goodman meant by nature. In general there is a nature of things; the use of our intelligence is to catch on to it and work with it. There is in principle a natural society, a backdrop of

4. In the passage quoted above, "outmoded and no longer 'natural conventions' " baffles me. I am sure that it is not just rhetoric—it would be bad rhetoric. When were they natural? The theme persists in *The New Reformation*, where the nation-state is allowed a legitimate past.

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custom and tradition and convention that enables us to use our powers for common benefit. But that society exists only fragmentarily, the actual society coerces us, even violently, into defeating our best nature. The primary needs of our nature are rather simple and tend to self-regulation, and when we lose touch with these, or complicate them unduly, we lose sense of what to choose. As the case is, we are trying to live as egos out of touch with the id—reasonably bright animals, we adapt too well (we had better stop it) to the demands of this social world. Even Freud, committed to an artificial civilization, knew the price it exacts. Cut off from sources of energy, from our own vitality, we don't know how to talk plainly, work at something earnestly, get along with our neighbor, or how to copulate pleasurably for the pleasure of it—the catalogue of disasters is heavy. Of course everything that happens is "natural" but in a more significant sense we act unnaturally when we act against our nature and confound our useful powers. It is not an imperative of our nature that we slaughter our brothers. Our deprivation of pleasure, of ordinary sensual pleasure in working and loving and learning and playing and singing—deprivation which is self-deprivation, produced by forcible internalization of anti-pleasure morality—makes us vulnerable to the appeals of war. Freud and Reich are the great diagnosticians, the latter gives reason for hope.

Ignoring or denying or just out of touch with our natural powers, we don't let our children grow and discover theirs; we try to "teach" them everything as though they are (naturally) nothing until we engineer them into shape; we try to suppress or divert their spontaneous sexuality, with profound consequences. Goodman liked to examine the assumption that reading and writing—anything, for that matter—have to be taught. How do we defeat, we should ask, a natural disposition to learn useful tools that are extensions of natural powers of speech? "An unnatural convention is one that prevents a human power from becoming a living act" (4). That's what our schooling is.[5]

Because we have a spontaneous nature, it needs space and encouragement, sometimes protection, sometimes natural coercion and even natural violence, to fulfill itself. This defines "natural" coercion and violence—not too well and not too clearly. I am frankly uncertain—and the text does not tell—whether "natural violence" can encompass grave physical harm or homicide. The examples are not of such, and I suspect that what Goodman had in mind was debates then current over Gandhi's principles, which so defined satyagraha as to exclude, as antithetical to love, even moral coercion. I think that Goodman believed, like Nietzsche, that withholding one's force is a serious mistake. The profound ethical questions about physical violence (short of war) are not confronted, and this is a lacuna.

Clear it is, that to plan our nature is absurd; growth is our reliance, is our nature. This will fit with the saying that anarchy is in the nature of things: one must be ready, open to one's growth, for the possibilities that will present themselves unchosen. "Right ethics is a flowering of the underlying nature," Goodman wrote several years later. "An ethics that would be in contradiction with the underlying nature must lead to frustration, repression, loss of love and spontaneity."[6] But he was not seeking a right ethical code: many sets of customs and traditions might be right enough, we

5. The killing of other persons, evidently, is not what we should mean by a human power (nor torturing, chaining, enslaving, etc.). I offer two reasons. First, "human powers" would be powers *by virtue of which* we are human. Second, one can distinguish between a power and its use: one can use one's power of communication to lie and deceive, one can use one's power of wielding instruments adroitly, to slay one's brother. But no *power* will be intrinsically harmful.

6 "The Food We Eat," in *Resistance*, May-June 1948.

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need to find a way to let one or more of these come to be.

This adds up to vindication of happiness, not in the Benthamite sense of maximized pleasure but in the Aristotelian sense of living according to our nature rightly. All will not be sweetness and light: conflict, suffering, jealousy, rivalry, hurt, tragedy, these will be energized, more acute and painful. But they will be real in experience, and worth enduring. We will cease to be boring to ourselves. That we live as we do is not in the nature of things. What we can count on is that by nature we are social even before we are aware of it, and before we are personal. But this too can become distorted. Although I do not notice where he wrote it, Goodman insisted many years ago on the importance of "welcoming" newborn children into the human family in the warmth of a home, as against the sterile childbirth of the hospitals. Finally the gravity of this is being understood. We destroy our social nature at its roots and then announce, as though it were a merit, that we have none.

V

I think it holds together. I take Goodman's talk of nature as a way of describing the recovery of a sense of ourselves as biological beings (Kropotkin, Freud, Reich) and as face-to-face social beings, a sense, once easy enough for Aristotle, that our venture into "civilization" has almost obliterated.

Our bodies exist for most of us as objects of medical concern. How are we to recover a whole-sense—and how do we expect to change the society without doing so concurrently? (Again lessons from Reich, *The Sexual Revolution.*) Goodman's "nature" provided a diagnosis of a culture, at a certain date, that set the Reichian themes—need for liberation of sexuality, acceptance of pleasure, de-moralization of the mores, liberation of childhood and adolescence and their sexuality—into an ethical-political libertarian context. Nowadays there is a great wandering in the wildernesses of therapies and mysteries; with exceptions, these are up-to-date means of adaptation to "unnatural society," they express lonely self-concern. So Goodman's was not just "diagnosis at a certain date."

He was expressing also, of course, a permanent and central theme of anarchism—that to work out patterns of cooperation we need no management imposed from above. We have the abilities required for voluntary cooperation. Does anything else work well for us? So freedom is not a step out of nature, out of the realm of necessity—a strange doctrine if one supposes that anarchy is in the nature of things.

Shall we, beyond that, take Goodman's "nature" seriously as a metaphysics? No point to it—go to the sources if that is what one needs. From a bio-social perspective he was trying to remind us of powers that human beings have displayed, ourselves too seldom but not never; to give us confidence that genuine social existence is possible; to encourage us to cooperate with the anarchic energies of fellow creatures and of the natural world more widely; to teach us to be skeptical of all schemes that order our existence on rational or bureaucratic models. Events have since forced some people to begin to think in these terms ("ecology," "natural foods," etc.) but not yet seriously enough. The teaching is moral, not metaphysical, its message is social. After all, Goodman was amazed by Kafka's style—who is not?—but he psychoanalyzed Kafka's existentialism.

VI.

What we want, says the May Pamphlet, is *natural* society. I take this as shorthand for "natural societies," existing in the same time and space, in neighborhood and

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workshop and townmarket and theater; constituting the sum of our cooperative activities; and joined by minimal, severely functional superstructures. A natural society would be anarchic and fraternal—somehow, for the natural does not conform to ideal patterns.

In the face of the actual society, what do we do? Goodman called his program millenarianism, the opposite of futurism or utopianism. It does not promise that the whole world is about to explode into a kingdom of ends—why believe, though, that it might not? The author speaks of a "revolutionary program," "revolutionary feelings," "revolutionary disruption"—but not in the usual sense. "The libertarian...does not look forward to a future state of things, which he tries to bring about by suspect means; but he draws now, so far as he can, on the natural force in him that is no different in kind from what it will be in a free society.... Merely by continuing to exist and act in nature and freedom, the libertarian wins the victory, establishes the society...."(3). Writers use words magically, and Goodman *was* a writer; he will solve problems with words, and the reader must quiet down the metaphors. But there is a plain meaning to it: the politics of our actions counts more than the politics of our advocacies; the politics of our lives is more real, and potentially more influential, than the politics of organizations and "the movement"; the power of great institutions derives from the renunciation of autonomy, of own-powers and own true interests, by subjects who endorse their own invalidation. There are jails, a fact that recommends prudence; but our renunciation of natural human being exceeds by far the demands of prudence. Millenarianism is doing, enacting, trying to do, living, affirming that which we find, perhaps through a hard struggle of self-examination, to be our animal and primary-social nature.

Such actions are moral ends as well as moral means. We do what is worth doing for its own sake. To begin, we declare conformity to unnatural society to be treason to "natural society," to which we have natural allegiance. We stop doing it. Somewhere we "draw a line" at what we will cooperate with and put up with; we have been inclined to quarrel with one another, we anarchists, about where the line should be drawn but what counts is the drawing of a line; experience will teach us whether we have drawn it imprudently or timidly, and we correct it. "Free action is to live in present society as though it were a natural society." Not always wholly prudent, that, so we press it as far as we can, draw upon our natural powers, try to be useful to ourselves and others. "The libertarian does not seek to influence people but to act in the natural groups essential to him"(3). We have here a kind of categorical imperative for living and acting in unjust society. Of course we hope that our actions, which must be in small groups, prove to be exemplary and have influence. But we take steps for their own sake; if *their* meaning goes unrecognized, what will be recognized? Propaganda of the deed, an old anarchist slogan, referred to symbolic public actions, usually violent acts symbolical of rebellion. If one alters the wording to "propaganda *in* the deed," one may express Goodman 's point: one has not chosen one's action *for* its virtue as propaganda, for its media-effectiveness.

VII.

Broadly, Goodman's program—but not the "free society," which is Kropotkinian —*is* classifiable as "communitarian individualism," differing from anarchist individualism proper by reason of Goodman's consistent emphasis on our social nature and the mutual aid that sustains even our solitary resolutions. Among those anarchists who regard anarchism as a kind of political rival of Marxism, Goodman's

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views were unacceptable.

I suppose that someone might see him as busy chiefly with framing a justification of his (successful) efforts to avoid military conscription and of his homosexuality; justification of the "treasonable" and "unnatural."[7] More generously, one might take him to be justifying an apolitical attitude, on the model of old Epicurus, as the only reasonable way of life in a crazy world. I don't read Goodman in these ways but I can't say that I know what Goodman "really" meant; never in his writings does the author make himself transparent. Well, I don't think that I have met more than one or two pure souls; honor virtue wherever it occurs, preserve the texts that say strong truths. But there are problems. Resistance is mentioned but the resistance spoken of is "passive" rather than militant; non-violent direct action, involving public law-breaking, a major part of the program of Paul's radical pacifist friends, is not part of his program, although he respected it. Paul was far from being a militant person, and he advocated only what he would do. (Later, in *Five Years,* in the midst of its seldom-relieved gloom, there is a nice passage that speaks for "preaching what one practices"—he persuades me that the converse is better morality than the original.) I suppose that his own risky-prudent cruising homosexuality *was* in some way a paradigm for his politics. Is this politics at all, then, even in the anarchist sense, which (differing from Goodman) I prefer to call anti-politics? I thought so and think so.

What is beautiful is that there is a revolutionary hypothesis here—the hypothesis that natural, non-manipulative, freely chosen, "direct" actions, not violent, not obsessively confrontational or openly civil disobedient, actions that follow from drawing a line beyond which one (and then many) will not go, may come to constitute a mighty force. "The action drawing on the most natural force will in fact establish itself" (3). What is beautiful is that so much of it came to pass; not to be sure because of its advocacy by anarchists, but that is unimportant. ("In principle it is unwise to reject any philosopher, for what they say comes to pass anyway" [43].)

When Rosa Parks of Montgomery, Ala., chose in 1956 to walk to work rather than to cooperate in the humiliation of herself and her people, her action was direct action of the purest sort, and millenarian. In a natural society, if there were no buses one could ride, and no other means of transportation, one would walk, no? This act, this fact, moved people. Not often does one person's action stir thousands, not to say millions; Thoreau's famous civil disobedience caused little commotion; one can appoint oneself catalyst, and nothing happens (but Thoreau had already "won," even though he let himself be ransomed out of jail); one does best not to worry whether one is a catalyst. By her action, I daresay, Rosa Parks established the spirit of the civil rights movement.

Now a less conventional example. Insofar as they represented a transvaluation of values—and to a point they did—the rebellions of middle-class youths in the 1960s were a walking-away from the institutions and their laws, to live in a state of nature. It wasn't, it happens, Goodman's idea of a state of nature, for they behaved more like Stirnerite individualists, gentleness was liberated and rip-off was liberated, but those young people won most of what they wanted: pot-freedom, sex-freedom, draft-freedom, barber-freedom, verbal freedom, such peer-community as they

7. Stoehr states flatly (p. xx) that the May Pamphlet "grew out of his need to justify his own draft-dodging. . . to his friends and fellow anarchists." But from his fellow anarchist he would have met no reproaches. Anarchist tradition, as opposed to the pacifist, is not a tradition of "witness." Let me hasten to add that Stoehr finds "the political ethics thoroughly convincing."

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desired, in short, the rights of youth. (These rights, and more, Goodman had claimed for them.) Mostly quietly and evasively, sometimes noisily, seldom violently, and rarely Gandhi-fashion, in full disregard for laws and rules and conventions, they accomplished what they wanted by doing it, by seizing it. If they didn't accomplish more, it might be because only a very small number, unfortunately, knew that they had a stake in something more.

Another case. Influential in determining withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia, I feel sure, was the sharply rising level of evasive non-fulfillment of orders to do earnest battle, an "action"—yes, these were actions—that must have been encouraged by large-scale evasion of the draft, even more, perhaps, than by demonstrations and courageous acts of public refusal. Those who evaded Selective Service went about their life and affairs as if in natural society. The evasively non-earnest soldiers (the climax came in the Laotian campaign) "drew a line"; what they could avoid they did avoid.[8]

In that same era, a massive, essentially non-violent and essentially extra-political rebellion of women began to take form, a rebellion against servile status, and the results of asserting, claiming, ignoring, doing, "drawing a line," have been profound. The style of the movement has been fundamentally anarchic and the movement therefore is not co-optable. And gay people, at first a few and then more and more, "drew a line" at conformity against their nature, ceased to deny their identity or to mock it, began to live as if in natural society where people follow their nature without shame.

On the essentially extra-political nature of these "movements," I want to insist. As always, laws and politics change only if there is a force that pushes. The real action was not in creating "alternative institutions," "counter-culture," talk with a Goodman-like ring that was, to my ear, mostly rhetoric. The action was a lot of people deciding individually not to betray their deepest impulses, their urge to exercise their human powers. (But that is too noble sounding; for what is unworthy about ducking one's head when guns are firing and there is no sense to it all?) If it turns out that what some people want is just to wear long hair and jeans, "do their own thing," and act out their impulses, then one had better not have entertained fantasies of recruiting them for a general social revolution. But other things of which I have spoken were more serious and I see no reason to think their potential to be exhausted. It is said, of course, that these movements were successful, in the degree that each was, only because they corresponded to changed needs of the system. The same could be argued, irrefutably, about every right or liberty ever won; but would the rights and liberties have been gained without rebellion?

I know that none of this touched the situation of the poor or the structures of power, profit, and militarism. In the economic field the movement of California agricultural workers, effective by its solidarity and by the loosely organized support of national boycott, is the only important analogy. (It is not natural to eat grapes or drink wine, splendid ceremonies of natural society, when the grapes have been grown under the shield of unnatural violence.) In general, workers have found nothing to express their

8. I do not mean to deprecate the acts of public refusal. Hardly, since in *Resistance* in 1949 Paul and I had exchanged views on this question. His half of the exchange, "To Young Resistors," in which he argued against "enlisting in jail," is reprinted by Stoehr, pp. 116-119. My own view was more mixed. I made no moral distinction between "conscientious objection" and "draft-dodging," but I thought that speaking one's truth, taking a stand as a means of speech, was also a millenarian action.

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resentments except sabotage of productivity. "Consider if several million persons quite apart from any 'political' intention, did only natural work that gave them full joy! The system of exploitation would disperse like fog in a hot wind." So said Goodman (3). Well, I suppose that some of the "malingerers" are accomplishing the negative side of that. But "the system" is not exactly a dispersable fog. The millenarian social-revolutionary action of anarchist tradition is neither seizure of power nor the famous general strike: it is the occupation and operation of the factories by the workers for the common good. Anyone can see that we are a long way from that; anyone can see that so long as white consciousness and white solidarity remain as they are, the central structures of power are unlikely to be shaken, and that is not the only obstacle. But anyone is free to say, if they can, given prevailing allegiances and faiths, and given the violence with which the black movements were confronted, how more could have been accomplished in the United States to open the way, to raise the level of ethical consciousness. (I am impressed by the level of discourse in present-day libertarian—not even strictly anarchist—circles. I take it as symptomatic of more potential than shows itself.) I do not know who, besides anarchists, thought that the actions of individuals really counted.

That such a politics will succeed on the larger scale—although Goodman seemed to claim it—cannot be asserted. To our world now there is a 1984 character—the solidified bureaucratic society of "capitalist" and "socialist" nations, barbaric military-colonial-transnational despotism outside (and not only outside) the "advanced" nations. Once again, after thousands of years, Persia, merely renamed, stands as model. Goodman counseled patience as almost the central anarchist virtue. I don't take that to mean that one ignores an opportunity, I take it to mean that issues cannot be forced without grave peril, and that despair is worthless.

VIII.

What happened to Paul Goodman? When the campus rebellions had followed upon the civil rights movement, and when anti-war actions began to spread, he could not but see all this as what he and his anarchist friends had advocated long before, and when the black flag of anarchy appeared in 1967 he claimed it. Naturally one had not pictured things just as they would be. He could not establish dialogue with the spontaneously anarchistic young any more than with the authoritarian. He didn't like what the latter said; the former wouldn't *say* anything; like Stirner a century earlier, they had concluded that ideas were all hype and shuck; Goodman didn't dig their aesthetics. This wasn't "ageism" or "generationism" on either side. It was "two cultures." Maybe, also, Goodman did not understand the dynamics of rebellion (spiritually he was not a rebel)—namely, that there must be a time of militancy of spirit, which entails angry rejection, refusal to listen to "reason" or to nice stories about the historical role of the university (from Goodman above all).

I am not much interested—it is more pertinent to biography—in the extent to which, and why, Goodman had modified his earlier views. The anarchist messages of the 1940s and 1950s had failed to reach a significant audience; those were the years of conformity. The optimism of Goodman's anarchism was based in good part on Reich; he found Freudian-Reichian theory to be too simplistic and became involved with Perls in the formulation of a post-psychoanalytic gestalt theory. With *Growing Up Absurd* he finally achieved recognition, and the trail from there led to a public role, of being of use. From his anarchism, if one loses hope, it is not difficult to recede to a merely critical liberalism—just as there are forms of revolutionary anarchism,

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especially some that claim the heritage of Bakunin, that flirt with and sometimes pass over a different boundary into dangerous country. Give liberalism its most favorable connotations (nothing to do with Americans for Democratic Action) and Goodman would not repudiate it.

He was still an anarchist in his own way—whether that way was "pure" anarchism I leave to sectarians to quarrel over. More than ever he was a political solitary. With the pacifists of the editorial group at *Liberation* he was for some while comfortable, but A. J. Muste's death, and the subsequent political changes, left him without a political home. (I, too, during that time was a contributor to *Liberation*, and found myself even sooner at odds with its drift, and unwelcome.) In the end I think it was with relief that he watched the de-escalation of a politics of confrontation, of internecine ideological warfare, built on loathing of Amerika. His 1968 analysis of those tendencies in "The Black Flag of Anarchy" (reprinted by Stoehr) had been prescient, and appreciated by the wrong people. The peaceful-anarchist types were not going to prevail; maybe there would be another time. Enough for the present that the war should be somehow, let it be by Nixon, brought to an end. Although I did not agree with these conclusions—I felt the same alienation but I did not want to yield to it—I am not sure that they were wrong judgments of historical possibilities.

IX.

There were, however, fundamental weaknesses in Goodman's perception, and therefore his politics. I am not thinking now of his later years specifically.

His anarchism derives from Kropotkin's but I recall no passages that manifest Kropotkin's emotion about the life of the working people and poor of his day. Did Kropotkin's aristocratic birth make this more natural to him? Goodman grew up poor, was not attached to the gadgety conveniences of 20th-century America or caught up in commodity fetishism. He lived for a long time very modestly in poor neighborhoods of New York while he pursued his literary work; his *Structure of Literature* had earned him the Ph.D. at the University of Chicago but (as he told it) for want of money to have it typed he could not get the degree (eventually the University of Chicago Press published the book). If he resented lack of recognition and fame—and he did—I doubt that he was bothered much by lack of the things money buys. But he did not seem to appreciate emotionally what it means to be poor *in*voluntarily. Scanning the forty-some pages of the May Pamphlet, I do not find the word 'justice' or any of its variants.

I remember how I listened speechlessly, struck dumb—this was at the time *The Empire City* was published in the late 1950s—when Paul told me out of the blue as a proposition to which he apparently expected assent, that except for the Cold War and racial segregation, and of course that we were not in a Golden Age, there wasn't much to get upset about in America. How could he think that? This is part of what I had in mind in characterizing him as primarily pacifist rather than anarchist. Anarchism is fundamentally, I believe, a response to a sense of being oppressed or a sympathetic response to the oppression of others. But Paul's "natural aristocracy" theory of individual excellence reflected his own "natural" elitism, his own sense of superiority. In a 1969 essay he wrote that "my homosexual needs have made me a nigger." But how he phrases it: "What makes me a nigger is that it is not taken for granted that my out-going impulse is my right."[9] Plainly, this is a very specialized sense of the term

9. *Nature Heals, op. cit.*, p. 216.

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'nigger' that would not be equivalent, not close to it, to being black in America, or oppressed. Paul had enough power and wit and self-confidence to disdain the "oppressors"—he knew he was better than they—and too little empathy, given his ego, to recognize (even) that being "queer" meant something else to other gay people. (His "Politics of Being Queer," quoted above, is about Paul Goodman.)

He *was* an anarchist but it seemed to be the forms, the way in which things were organized and done, that offended him, more than the lives lived within the forms. He was furious at the wars, about that he did not make aesthetic judgments; only by writing about the war-society could he rise above the war. For the rest his judgments strike me as mainly aesthetic—judgments of unloveliness, stupidity, gracelessness, lack of moral courage, inefficiency. No, I am not confusing categories. Inefficiency and stupidity are clumsy, make bad gestalts; lack of moral courage is soul without grace and harmony. This is all in Plato. The aesthetically ugly and the morally ugly do seem to come as twins. But aesthetic judgment (I will take a stab at it) becomes appropriate when things are *nearly* right and want fitness; with regard to degradation, brutal injustice, they are too cool. So the tones in which Goodman saw it and said it tended to distance it all; the aesthetic as well as the conceptual can abstract away from human reality. This might be the price of peering (as an artist) from the 18th century.

I have reserved all this for last, because I am talking now, not about what Paul said but about what is missing, about what he missed, and this is to talk of him as a person. I find it hard, and ungenerous, to regard us as responsible for what we are in consequence of early life-experiences. (Paul wrote in the May Pamphlet of the harm done by premature formation of a strong ego—he must have been writing about himself, consciously.) The not-very-humble phrase "but flawed human being" is currently haunting the literary magazines. If we were but flawed! For myself I find that to be a human being in our society is terribly difficult. Honor virtue wherever it occurs, preserve the strong truths. But Paul's teachings are not fully adequate, and it is important to know why.

He might not have despaired so bitterly at the end of his life about the futility of his teachings and preachings if he could have grasped the import of the feminist and lesbian rebellion that was already under way. Male-female was a dimension of "nature" that he did not understand at all; the family was the one institution to which he was bonded, and paterfamilias was his role. His image of community was the band of brothers—the fraternity was literally fraternity—those very brothers (I think) who, in *Totem and Taboo*, had eaten the father and were stuck with the consequences of the deed. The 18th century, it may be pertinent, was the century in which Man replaced God at the center of the firmament. The portrait of Man would of course be drawn from a male model. That he was a son of white European culture, of a far-from-universal culture that was essentially masculine, is a thought that Paul would, I am sure, have had great difficulty in thinking.

I don't know any white males who have not had similar difficulties. Even among anarchists the implications of Emma Goldman's feminism had not been fully recognized, not nearly, not by Emma herself (someone else with problems of ego); to berate Goodman for his masculine attitudes is not to the point. What interests me more is that both Freudian and Reichian psychology, upon which he had relied, totally misunderstood the center of the dynamics of human sexuality, and it was precisely sexuality upon which their theories focused. The libertarian inferences that Goodman drew from their psychologies might have been much more powerful if those corrections could have been made. (This may be why Reich has had a kind of revival.)

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Even before the father emerges as authority-figure in a child's consciousness, one's place in a caste system has already been learned

Goodman also did not show much perceptiveness of the depth of the racist evil in American society. He was anti-racist as a matter of course. But his remarks about "family slavery" ca. 1780 (178ff., dated 1964), although intended to make a contrast with the still worse that followed, are strangely placid remarks. He made little of his own Jewishness; so far as I can recall, his interest in Zionism was limited to its early socialist and libertarian idealism; he seems to have felt no more strongly about the fate of European Jews, or less, than about the fate of any other people who had been massacred systematically. This, I surmise, was part of the meaning of his attachment to Man. I have no criticism of it; unlike Marx, he did not tell Jews or anyone else to renounce their sectarian beliefs in order to become Man. But that same attachment probably made it difficult for him to understand what "slave" and "black" have meant in America and what black and white still mean. The politics of his later years shows a strong wish to be a patriot, in the non-chauvinistic sense of attachment to place, to a society, and concern about its well-being. The government was illegitimate, not "the country," and one might read this back as the ground of his earlier proclamation of allegiance to natural society. The deep-rootedness of American racism may have been more than he could accept as a reality. Those who wrote 'America' with a 'k' were making the same mistake as those a generation earlier who thought that the German Reich was unique in its evil; but if they had said, merely, there is a deep, deep sickness here, they would have been right.

Conspicuously absent from Goodman's anarchism, finally, is affirmation of ideal and faith. The faith that I mean visualizes peaceful and cooperative anarchy as a genuine human possibility, as a focusing of ideals of humanity and society, a possibility not refuted by whatever destiny the species turns out to have; it sees the present in the perspective of a future that might be realized, and for which it is not irrational to make sacrifices. (I hear of Julian Beck's latest act of political theater in Germany, and of his arrest, and I say to myself, "Julian has kept the faith." In fairness to Paul, I must add that Julian was influenced by him.) It is something like the faith that Goodman once had, from Jewish tradition, in the Messiah, interpreted humanly and socially; but I think he lost that faith. He complained that the young people of the 1960s lacked a sense of ideal values. Allegiance to moral values and classical traditions may have been sufficient for an educated man in the 18th century; I doubt that it is sufficient to sustain anarchism as a meaningful social current.

If one rejects the methods of power and violence, of conventional politics, because an "anarchy" produced by those means would be named falsely, then "millenarianism" may be the right direction—and one does have to choose some direction. I don't tend to use the term but I suppose that my anarchism is (broadly) millenarian. It does not mean "all or nothing." We declare "the natural society"—or call it what one will, metaphors are replaceable—in every vacant lot of the old. (I appropriate the slogan of the Vacant Lots Press in Baltimore: "We are building the new society in the vacant lots of the old.") But we should know that for a long time to come, whenever we make headway toward fundamental economic change, no "liberal" state will remain liberal. We should know that revolutionaries do not make authentic popular revolutions. Revolutionaries are those who prepare a way by patient teachings and (certain ones) by exemplary lives; who encourage all those drawings of a line that can break forth as one "liberation" or another; who prepare a way for what people in large numbers will have to desire for themselves if it is to be realized. To sustain one in such

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a path requires, I think, a sense of ideal community, a faith, a powerful idealism, a sense of tradition. If Goodman did not believe in that—even though I picked up from him the saying that "some day the good people will win"—it will be absurd to reproach him for disbelief.

I shall not reiterate what I perceive as strengths of Goodman's anarchism; my judgments must be obvious. That the actions of individuals—the "non-actions" too, the drawing of lines—are what counts, is at the core of that anarchism which is not a politics of mass-collectivities. Goodman says this well. In my view, Paul Goodman's was not a "complete" anarchism; not merely as "theory" but as emotion and perspective. That incompleteness is not terribly important, however, because anarchism has existed historically as multiplicity, as complementarity of diversity. At its best it is a "fraternal"—perhaps "comradely" is the word to substitute—association of many currents and takes life-form in many practical efforts, some of which are bound not to be well-chosen, to create or prepare free social existence. Anarchists read many authors (or should), the tradition is (or should be) cumulative. As the Marxist-Leninist illusions that revived a decade ago have begun to fade, and as the worse-than-futility of terrorist warfare becomes increasingly obvious, anarchism—as no-state, no-power, no-terror, "my Black Flag the sovereignty of no man or law!"—is the camp of dissent and ideal that remains. To building its tradition Paul Goodman gave a hand, in a bad time.

David Wieck

Stefan Breuer. *Die Krise der Revolutionstheorie.* Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat Autoren und Verlaggesellschaft, 1977.

The merit of Breuer's book lies primarily in his locating *Revolutionstheorie* within the problematic of the search for the True Subject. Breuer's point of departure is Foucault's observation (following Nietzsche) that Man is a recent invention. Rather than assume *humanity* as the *subject* of a humanist history, we have to consider that "History might not be the history of a lost and regained origin as the 'transcendental Narcissism' of Western thought would have it; it may be without a center, without a goal, determined by systems, relations and combinations that unfold without being based on the functions of an original subject, and that further refuse all attempts at totalization."[1] In short, the estranged subjectivity at the heart of revolutionary theory is put into question.

Breuer's doubts are hardly ahistorical. On the contrary, the burden he carries is the history of critical theory that shows how the materialist dialectic makes it impossible to achieve a revolution that would restore humanity to man. Marcuse's thesis of one-dimensionality credits advanced industrial society with the unique ability to assimilate all incipient negativity, any and all attempts to open up a revolutionary alternative that would restore "human essence" to "alienated man." Breuer yields to most of Marcuse's argument, but begrudges Marcuse his nostalgic attachment to the now obsolete humanistic categories with which he sings the one-dimensional lament. In place of mankind it is now capital and capital alone that answers the casting call for the True Subject. If you thought Marcuse was pessimistic, try Breuer.

Breuer's book is not to be dismissed as too horrible to be true. Neither is it to be

1. Breuer is here quoting Foucault, *Von der Subversion des Wissens* (Munich, 1974), p. 16.

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embraced as horrible enough to be true. Optimism and pessimism are not arguments. Instead, the discipline of detail is as much Breuer's strength as the breadth of his vision. He does not stoop to doom for the sake of sensationalism; he simply finds doom at the end of a long and patient search.

The search begins with a setting of the stage. The first of the book's three parts makes almost no mention of Marcuse. Instead Breuer sketches the *"Spätkultur"* in which "latecomers" like Thomas Mann, Max Weber, Heidegger, Simmel, Scheler, Adorno and Marcuse found themselves. They had all read Nietzsche, whom Breuer quotes often. Positivism, nihilism, the "disenchantment of the world," dehumanization—these were the concerns of the time. *Verdinglichung* recurs often, from the title of Part One and throughout its development. The latecomers' complaint is both theoretical and every bit as immediate and existential as the more recent protest: "don't fold, bend or spindle me!"—a protest against being turned into a *thing*, a mere appendage of a computer, one more card to be shuffled in the pointless game of the totally administered society.

Weber's analysis of the spread of rationalization through bureaucracy was a warning against the totally administered personality. Was the warning sufficient? Is man's thingification a reversible process? Rather than leave the answer up to the latecomers, Breuer interrupts his setting of the stage to return to the earlier criticisms developed by Marx and his materialist followers. "That technical-scientific civilization had lost all contact with any constituting subject, that it was ruled by 'thingification' and 'alienation,' was no unique discovery of the late bourgeois cultural criticism but belonged to the central themes of philosophy and economic theory since the beginning of the 19th century" (33). Why, then, were the earlier accounts insufficient? "The question: does the failure of materialistic critiques of thingification lie merely in the manner of their execution or is it more likely grounded in the very nature of the case—*in der Sache selbst?*" (32).

Breuer argues the latter. He interrupts his account of the bourgeois latecomers only to show why it was left to them to carry out the "self-criticism of bourgeois culture criticism." The kernel of Breuer's criticism lies in his elaboration of what Adorno first labelled the "metaphysics of labor," a metaphysics that reifies labor as the ahistorical motor of a teleologically conceived history (48-50). Breuer praises Marx for having criticized the metaphysics of the subject (i.e., the ahistorical assumption of active individuals who come on the scene fully formed like so many Robinson Crusoes) and for having seen through the assumptions of immediate *givens* where specific histories present us with mediated *results* (e.g., our socio-culturally specific concepts of property and value). Nevertheless, Breuer says, Marx's thought was itself "not completely free of the thought forms he had criticized" (49). Marx's metaphysics of labor implicitly sanctions as the performer of labor the very "subject" criticized in the ahistorical metaphysics of the subject: "a subject who either realizes his purposes in the realm of nature as a 'human architect,' or can be regarded as a 'force of nature' that busies itself in the metabolism (*Stoffwechsel*) between man and nature" (50). Within this initial ambiguity of the concept of the laborer, Breuer finds the two trends that characterize so much of later Marxism: the liberatory-historicist tradition follows the laborer as architect; the objectivist-economist tradition follows the laborer as *Naturmacht*—a force of nature. Because the metaphysics of labor accepts as immediate what is already mediated—the concept of labor—its contribution to the theory of revolution is a Trojan horse full of traitors. The critique of capitalism turns out to rely on an ahistorical theory of labor derived from the history of capitalism. Just

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at the moment when it appears that the battle may have been won, when the rebels are inside the gate, they turn out to be none other than the bearers of a more advanced capitalism. Or to state this cunning reversal in reverse, "The metaphysics of labor becomes the agent of capital in the encampment of anti-capitalism" (50).

Breuer follows in sufficient if not overrich detail the downward path from the sometimes self-conscious ambiguity in Marx to the increasingly positivistic certainty of his followers, especially Engels, Lenin and Hilferding. Of crucial importance was the simplification of the relation between exchange value and use value. According to the later materialist tradition, use value pertained "*only* to the *natural* character of a thing and therefore lay outside the object domain of political economy, which deals only with the economic side of the product; that is, its character as an embodiment of labor time. Unlike Marx, who had seen the task of political economy to lie in investigating the question of *why* this content should take on that form, why labor should represent itself in the form of *value*—an abstract economic relationship—Hilferding proceeds from precisely this abstract relationship as if it were a positive quality and then conceives economics, irrespective of its historical development, as a transcendental 'unity' " (56).

I quote at length to capture three related themes of Breuer's argument and my own: first, the distinction between use value and exchange value, whose conceptual clarity obscures the historical reversal of exchange values becoming use values in the age of conspicuous consumption, while use values are themselves manipulated by the system of exchange, whose demand for expanded markets requires the creation of new "needs" with their corresponding "use values." Second, Breuer's attack on Hilferding contains an example of the recurrent motif of subjectivity: the 'transcendental' unity ascribed to the economic order is precisely the structure that Kant and the idealist tradition of so-called bourgeois subjectivists ascribed to subjective consciousness. Like Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and most of the other agents promoting their favorite actors at the casting call for the True Subject of History, Hilferding simply assumes that some ahistorical ground of unity is necessary "for experience to be possible" (the famous formula of all transcendental arguments for the *a priori*). Hilferding differs from Kant only in that he locates the transcendental unity of subjectivity in the market rather than in individual consciousness. Third, I quote Breuer at length for my own purposes: to show how he clearly identifies the hidden subjectivism in materialist dialectics. The concluding section of this essay will develop an immanent critique of Breuer's final pessimism. The critique can claim the devastating finality of *immanent* critique only if it is demonstrated that the crucial premises are indeed present in Breuer's argument.

Having shown how its ahistorical metaphysic of labor made 19th-century Marxism *necessarily* incapable of an adequate critique of the thingification of bourgeois man, Breuer returns to the criticism that bourgeois *Spätkultur* turned upon itself. Husserl and Heidegger appear in cameo roles that contribute to Breuer's overall script: the successive stages of the cunning of transcendental idealism. Without entering into a polemic with those who stress Husserl's increasing sensitivity to history in his later work, Breuer quotes from the *Krisis* to show Husserl's abiding conviction that the fundamental structures of the human situation are "essentially the same. . . today and always;" that this invariance makes it possible to have a "pure doctrine of essence" (*reine Wesenslehre*) (70).[2] Breuer neglects the historical moment of the *Krisis* in order

2. Breuer cites Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transcendentale*

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to stress the vestiges of its contrary moment, "that the natural objective lifeworld is only a special mode of the constant, world-constituting of transcendental life." Breuer regards this quotation from the *Krisis* as "a patent paraphrase of the fundamental idealistic theme that the world is only a representation of the subject." In Heidegger, of course, the recognition of historicity is unavoidable. But when confronted with the thingification of man, Heidegger's appeal is not to an ahistorical essence whose character has been alienated. Instead, "Heidegger's fundamental ontology marked idealism's turn into absolute thingification: since idealism with its hypostatization of the concept of Spirit had referred each and every being (*Seiende*) back to the subject and reduced it to pure identity, it had at the same time denied also that difference to the Other which was constitutive for that very identity: only in the domain of determinations of difference was it finally possible to speak of a subject at all" (76-77). The Other for Heidegger was no longer Kant's noumenon, but the existential Other: death. Hence Breuer's interpretation of Heidegger as marking idealism's turn into absolute thingification.

Breuer admits he is indebted to Adorno for his interpretation of Heidegger (255, n. 49). Unfortunately, Breuer borrows from Adorno not only the often insightful critique of the "jargon of authenticity";[3] he borrows also Adorno's misinterpretation of Hegelian idealism. Throughout the Frankfurt School, from Horkheimer and Adorno and on into Habermas, the epithet of *Identitätsphilosophie* is consistently misplaced from Fichte and Schelling—where it belongs—onto Hegel, for whom the dialectic of identity explicitly resolves into an identity of identity and difference.[4] The meaning of this understandably misunderstood phrase does not entail the reduction of difference to identity. On the contrary, just as the dialectic of the infinite rejects a bad infinite that would be limited by its difference from finitude,[5] just as dialectically developed infinitude must honor and comprehend finitude, so the identity of "Substance become Subject"[6] in Hegel is not the bad identity that the Frankfurt School would ascribe to Hegel. Instead, the subjectivity of Spirit lies precisely in its self-unfolding, in which difference is an essential and never disappearing moment. The naive sense of immediate difference disappears. Difference, like identity, is mediated. But the moment of otherness, throughout all mediations, remains "present as a fact."[7]

I stress this regrettably formal point before dealing with Breuer's exposition of Marcuse because the point is crucial to the interpretation of idealism and subjectivity that runs through Breuer's argument. Breuer wants to claim that the crisis of revolutionary theory lies in a hidden idealism at the heart of that theory. His *use* of the

Phänomenologie (Den Haag, 1969), pp. 386 and 144.

3. Cf. Adorno, *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit* (Frankfurt, 1969).

4. Cf. Horkheimer, "Hegel und die Metaphysik," in *Festschrift für Carl Grünberg: Zum 70 Geburtstag* (Leipzig, 1932); Adorno, *Drei Studien zu Hegel* (Frankfurt am Main, 1963), esp. pp. 20ff, 102ff; Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, Chapter 1. The same mistake is made by others, e.g., Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (1969), p. 81; Kojève's confusion of abstract identity for concrete identity in difference is criticized in a study that has application to the Frankfurt School as well: Tran Duc Thao's review of Kojève's lectures in *Telos*, 8 (Summer 1971), pp. 91-110. Martin Jay repeatedly notes and apparently concurs with the critique of Hegelian *Identitätsphilosophie* as a guiding theme in the foundation of the Frankfurt School; cf. *The Dialectical Imagination* (Boston, 1973), Chapter 2, pp. 47, 67, 70.

5. Cf. Hegel, *Science of Logic* (New York, 1969), pp. 116-156 and *Phenomenology of the Mind*, Baillie translation (New York, 1949), pp. 207-210.

6. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, pp. 80ff.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

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terms, as I have tried to point out, shows that he understands 'idealism' as a kind of shuffling subjectivism—shuffling because the *locus* of subjectivity shifts: from an uncritical identification with the human ego to a more refined identification with the epistemological ego—Kant's transcendental unity of apperception—and thence to the practical ego, the noumenal self of Kant's second *Critique*, the personal *agent*, and on to the impersonal agency of the economic market. Breuer credits the latecomers with locating subjectivity in the broader base of a transcendental *Lebenswelt* as opposed to a narrow economism. But not until the Adornoesque critique of Heidegger do we discover that the essential criteria for subjectivity include *not only* the capacity to function as a transcendental repository for *a priori* determinations of experience, *but also* as an *identity* determined by difference from an immediate Other: *an identity that can brook no mediations of that difference lest the integrity of the subject be challenged by a loss of its Other.*

The importance of this identity criterion for subjectivity is obvious for any consideration of Marcuse's philosophy: Marcuse's thesis of one-dimensionality claims the overcoming of otherness. If the survival of subjectivity requires immediate otherness—say in the forms of immediate distinctions between state and society, proletariat and ruling class, subject and object, etc.—then the historical mediations of these theoretical distinctions can only mean the death of subjectivity if the immediate identity of the subject should become infected with mediation. If, on the contrary, immediate identity is not a criterion of subjectivity; if subjectivity is understood primarily in terms of its Husserlian function of constitutive intentionality and without anxiety over the pristine purity of its unmediated identity; if subjectivity is not a clearly "separable," thus spatially conceived *locus,* but a function of mediation in *time*, then the mediations of advanced industrial society do not pose quite the threat to subjectivity imagined by Breuer. This is not to say that subjectivity is not threatened. But the logic of the threat, as described by Marcuse and extended by Breuer, may have been misconstrued by the appropriation of an undialectical identity as a criterion for subjectivity.

According to Breuer, Marcuse's strengths as well as his weaknesses derive from his status as a paradigm case. The exposition of Marcuse's works takes up almost two-thirds of the book—a figure that accurately conveys Breuer's strategy: neither to write a book merely about Marcuse, nor to write a book about Marxism in general, but a book that argues a general conclusion about Marxism by following a specific and representative example. While one could argue whether Marcuse is in fact a representative case, the point is a moot one. Let us proceed, then, to look at Breuer's specific arguments.

The exposition of Marcuse is by and large judicious. I shall not attempt to review it *in toto*. Instead I shall follow the red threads of idealism and subjectivity, the central and hardly arbitrarily chosen strands of Breuer's exposition. The advantage of Breuer's historical introduction lies in the fact that Heideggerean influence, so important for the young Marcuse, emerges as less of a scandal than it might otherwise appear. Breuer shows why it was not surprising for a young Marxist to turn from the mechanism of the Second International and seek concreteness through the insights of non-Marxist latecomers. Lukács did it. So too Marcuse. Breuer follows the phenomenological vicissitudes of Marcuse's early work with a steady eye on the attempt to make the transcendental *a priori* historical and concrete. For a time it seemed to Marcuse that Heidegger's emphasis upon thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) and situatedness (*Befindlichkeit*) might provide the perfect answer to Husserl's and

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Dilthey's quest for an Archimedean point of transcendental subjectivity, an answer that would be perfect precisely for its historicity, its respect for the concrete, and its potentially revolutionary appreciation of the importance of real possibilities. According to Breuer, Marcuse misread Heidegger's ontological difference as a historicized version of the difference between fallen existence and *essence*. By giving a more precise definition of historicized essence, Marcuse could then enlist fundamental ontology into revolutionary theory. He could overcome Heideggerean quietism by founding human essence upon *Arbeit* (labor) in the good old Hegelian Marxist tradition (112). *Arbeit* becomes the self-creation of man by man, thus man's historical essence. Unfortunately, the attempt is not only a misreading of Heidegger but a further step in the earlier criticized path of *Arbeitsmetaphysik*. Breuer thus appeals to Marx's Introduction to the *Grundrisse* in order to recall the various historical meanings of *Arbeit*.

But more important than the fall back into an abstract *Arbeitsmetaphysik* is the recapitulation of "the classical form of *Ursprungsphilosophie*" (116), that form of philosophizing that would reduce all phenomena to appearances or epiphenomenal predicates of an original, essential subject. Making abstract labor absolute was no mere "mistake" but "ratified what was from the begining a consequence of the idealistic movement of thought. . . the subjection of each and every entity under an absolute subject" (117).

Now, the irony of Breuer's critique lies in the accuracy with which he aims his improperly loaded rifle. The ammunition is Adorno's, as he once again notes in his accusation of *Ursprungsphilosophie* (116, n. 80). Yet, the target is the right one. Curiously, Breuer all but ignores Marcuse's 1936 essay on "The Concept of Essence." Marcuse's early preoccupation with essence lends support to Breuer's later arguments against the replacement of *Arbeit* by *instinct* in the role of essence. Marcuse's turn to Freud cries out to be interpreted as yet another attempt at *Ursprungsphilosophie* with instinct now playing the role of *Ursprung* or origin. By historicizing Freud's description of human essence, Marcuse hoped to satisfy by yet another strategy the demand for a doctrine of essence that would restore intelligibility to the concept of alienation as a falling away from essence, while at the same time acknowledging the historicity of human essence. But Breuer's critique misfires to the extent that he relies on Adorno's misdirected critique of *Identitätsphilosophie*. Breuer concludes his first major section on Marcuse by quoting Adorno on Fichte: "what had always haunted ontology as constitutive principle, as subject of activity, was now only a shadow of its former self, a 'subjectless subject' similar to the 'beheaded absolute ego of Fichte's' (Adorno), which, robbed of its difference from an Other, shrank to the mere tautology A equals A" (118). According to Breuer, Marcuse's appeal to *Arbeit* similarly desubjectivized the subject. No longer Ego equals Ego, but *Arbeit* equals *Arbeit*, and without the historical specificity that Marx insisted upon in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse*.

The crucial phrase in the above quotation is, of course, "robbed of its difference from an other." Yes, Marcuse may have fallen into the errors of an ahistorical *Arbeitsmetaphysik*. And surely Marcuse's entire career shows a series of attempts to locate an essence that would provide a historicized fulcrum for critical theory—first *Arbeit*, then the Freudian theory of instincts, finally the power of art. But in none of these cases can Marcuse be faulted for Fichtean errors. He is too Hegelian. But neither Adorno nor Breuer sees the difference. They are convinced that all idealism is subjective idealism, albeit with certain substitutions in the role of constitutive subject.

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Hence Breuer misses the moment of otherness that persists throughout Marcuse's thought. Perhaps the moment of otherness sometimes rests on shaky foundations, e.g., the ontological differences in Heidegger, or the doubling of categories in *Eros and Civilization*, or the absurdity of the Great Refusal in *One Dimensional Man*, or the desperate utopianism of *An Essay On Liberation*, but that moment of otherness abides. It is "present as a fact" in all of Marcuse's writings. So the charge against Marcuse ought not be: "your theory desubjectivizes the subject by robbing it of its Other." Rather, it should be: "You fail to see how subjectivity can maintain itself through the mediations with that Other." But Breuer cannot make the latter critique. That, like an improperly loaded rifle, would backfire. Breuer himself is unable to see how subjectivity can survive the mediations of capital, the most recent and all-comprehensive subject that overcomes even the otherness between use-value and exchange-value. But let me defer the report on the final backfire until later.

For now, the point is to see how Breuer's development of this critique merely misfires. In his exposition of Marcuse's writings on Hegel, Breuer develops the critique of Marcuse as desubjectivizing the subject by robbing it of its other. The proximate target, Marcuse, falls as if hit dead center. Breuer is right to accuse Marcuse of carrying the torch for the true Subject, "the *hypokeimenon*, the essence lying behind the appearances" (136). From beginning to end, Marcuse's writings constitute a quest for the true center of *logocentrism* (Derrida's term—familiar to Breuer [78]—for the preoccupation in Western traditions with finding a substantial subject to play the role of ontological center).[8] Breuer's attack misfires in the sense that he mistakes Hegel, the ultimate target, as having merely substituted Spirit for humanity in the role of *hypokeimenon* or subject as substratum, bearer, *Träger* of history.

Now, it is precisely this concept of an immediate substratum that has always tempted materialists. One wants to talk about the universal bedrock, that which *everything* is (ontologically) precisely because it *is* (predicationally) *nothing in particular*. But Hegel saw through the conceptual legerdemain, the taking with the right hand what was given with the left. Chapter One of the *Phenomenology* argues that the effort to denote the self-identical substratum, the This, Here, Now of sense-certainty, inevitably invokes not a sensuous immediacy but the emptiest of abstractions, a universal "which is neither this nor that, which is a not-this, and with equal indifference this as well as that."[9] What is more, Hegel sees how the materialist temptation is at work in the hypostatization of the immediate identity of the subjective "I." The same dialectic that demonstrates the universality of the purportedly particular This, Here and Now also demonstrates the empty universality of the purportedly particular, unmediated, self-identical 'I.' Having demonstrated the emptiness of the 'I' as conceived according to the materialist dialectic of sensuous immediacy, having seen through the pretensions of unmediated identity, Hegel can hardly be claiming *Geist* as a spiritual *hypokeimenon* when he speaks of Substance becoming Subject. Precisely to the contrary, he is calling for a subjectivity that is achieved as a result of mediations.

Marx understood the resulting mediated character of Hegelian *Geist*, and that understanding created an antinomy as long as Marx remained under the sway of a Feuerbachian materialism of sensuous immediacy. On the one hand, Marx appreciated "The greatness of Hegel's *Phenomenology*" as resting upon Hegel's

8. Cf. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore, 1976), esp. pp. 49, 90, 283, 285.
9. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, p. 152.

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conception of "the self-genesis of man as a process...as the outcome of man's own labor."[10] On the other hand, Marx's residual Feuerbachianism led him, in 1844, to insist upon the need for a *hypokeimenon* and therefore to criticize Hegel for allowing the Subject to emerge as a result: "the process [of self-genesis] must have a bearer, a subject. But the subject first emerges as a result. This result—the subject knowing itself as absolute self-consciousness—is therefore God—absolute Spirit—the self-knowing and self-manifesting Idea. Real man and real nature become mere predicates—symbols of this esoteric, unreal man and of this unreal nature. Subject and predicate are therefore related to each other in absolute inversion—a mystical subject-Object or a subjectivity reaching beyond the object—the absolute subject as a process, as subject alienating itself and returning from alienation into itself."[11] The two sides of this antinomy—the first a pro-Hegelian appreciation of human subjectivity as the result of human activity, the second an anti-Hegelian requirement for a *hypokeimenon* as passive bearer or substratum for the process—become resolved once Marx thinks through Feuerbachian materialism. Both the objective and subjective versions of the *hypokeimenon* come under attack in the Theses on Feuerbach. As for the objective: "The chief defect of all previous materialism (including Feuerbach's) is that the object, actuality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or perception (*Anschauung*), but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively."[12] As for the subjective *hypokeimenon* conceived of as an abiding human nature underlying historical change: "the essence of man is no abstraction inhering in each individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relationships," relationships that change with history, thus historicizing Feuerbach's ahistorical tendency "to view the essence of man merely as 'species,' as the inner, dumb generality which unites the many individuals naturally."[13] The antinomy is thus resolved in favor of Hegel. Human essence emerges as a result of historical mediations, the activities of social ensembles. It is the *structure* of these activities rather than their passive, underlying sensuous substratum that more and more concerns the mature Marx. His materialism is no longer Feuerbachian, no longer preoccupied with the passive *hypokeimenon*.

The foregoing argument is lost on Breuer, who conflates the several senses of 'subject.' While he is brilliant at interpreting both Marxists and non-Marxists alike as carrying on the logocentric tradition of locating a single source (*Ursprung*) of transcendental subjectivity, he himself fails to distinguish between identity on the one hand and spontaneity or agency on the other as possible criteria for subjectivity. Consequently, the historical mediations accomplished by locating subjectivity in social ensembles, such as the market, the state, culture, cannot help but appear as desubjectivizing to the extent that they mediate that purportedly immediate identity that is supposed to characterize subjectivity. That the concept of *identity* is that of an *immediate* identity we see from the Adornoesque critique of Hegel. That the concept of *subjectivity* is that of an immediate *identity* we see from the use of *hypokeimenon*. That such ammunition must backfire we will now see in Breuer's final critique of Marcuse.

Marcuse shows how human subjectivity mediates itself through the development of institutions, even to the extent that the institutions become transpersonal "subjects"

10. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow, 1961), p. 151.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
12. Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*, in Easton and Guddat, *op. cit.*, (1) p. 400.
13. *Ibid.*, (6) p. 402.

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mediating themselves through the inhuman use of human beings. Further, Marcuse describes the historical challenges to the moment of otherness that would distinguish institutional purposes from human purposes. Efficiency, law and order, the several species of "irrational rationality" tend to subvert human spontaneity, not simply by forbidding it, but more subtly and completely by allowing it and assimilating it into the increasingly comprehensive totalization of advanced industrial society. Negativity is co-opted. Breuer sees that Marcuse's analysis involves much more than the substitution of 'the primacy of politics' for 'the primacy of economics' that rules mechanical Marxism (170-174). Breuer appreciates the overcoming of negativity in the de-politicization of politics as politics itself becomes a species of technology (179ff.). But then who could fail to grant Marcuse's contributions to critical theory as it confronts advanced industrial society? As much if not more than any other thinker, Marcuse has taught us to beware of artificial negativity, and Breuer knows it: "Whatever still exists as apparently personal, particular and immediate functions only as a lubricant in the creaking gears of the machinery of exploitation, as pseudo-concretion that makes the unbearable still bearable" (209). This Marcuse recognizes. What then is Breuer's final complaint? He objects to Marcuse's ambivalence, his refusal to succumb to the pessimism of *One-Dimensional Man*. Breuer protests that the "new subject" of Marcuse's utopian turn in *The Essay on Liberation* is "in reality a prisoner with his back to the wall. Without claiming to exhaustively explain a phenomenon as complex as the student movement, let it be clear that at least in its German version its actions were in every respect only reactions, helpless gestures of defense against a development whose ineluctability one suspected in private" (214). Thus Marcuse's least glimmer of hope appears as dependent upon a relapse into the myths of bourgeois subjectivity that first tempted him toward Heidegger's phenomenology. He should, according to Breuer, know better.

But Breuer's uncompromising despair has all the earmarks of the logocentrism he condemns in others. His pessimism gains its strength from the conceptual elegance of subjective idealism, only now the ultimate subject, the *hypokeimenon*, is capital. In place of Ego equals Ego or *Arbeit* equals *Arbeit* Breuer argues that bourgeois subjectivity becomes a mere epiphenomenon in the circulation of capital: capital equals capital. Breuer's claim depends on the thesis that the distinction between use value and exchange value has disappeared with the progressive mediation of use value by exchange value (220-244). Once the concept of use value has been contaminated by mediations relating it to exchange value, then use value can no longer function as an extra-economic fulcrum for criticizing the productivity of the economic order as a whole. The production of capital becomes the ultimate criterion once use value itself has been assimilated within the economic domain. What is useful is what is productive of capital. Precisely in order to avoid the assimilation of use value within economics, Marcuse seeks recourse in psychology and aesthetics. There he hopes to secure a foundation for a doctrine of "true needs" that are *other than* the needs of capital. But Breuer claims that Marcuse's efforts require a reversion to the earlier rejected forms of *Ursprungsphilosophie*.[14]

There can be little doubt that Breuer's critique of Marcuse hits the mark more than a few times. Marcuse's "biologism," his call for a "new anthropology" (218), can hardly help but arouse suspicions of a "quest for a new substitute for the lost subject of

14. Cf. Breuer, pp. 213 and 219, for his catalogue of *Zurück-zu-Formulierungen* from Marcuse's later writings.

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the revolution" (236). Yet Breuer's critique is weakened by his failure to distinguish between the different types of subjectivity that might play the role of revolutionary subject. Thus he overstates his case against Marcuse by attributing to Marcuse a form of idealism that Breuer himself, following Adorno, fails to understand: "in the place of abstract Spirit (*Geist*) he has set a no less abstract nature; in place of early bourgeois *Identitätsphilosophie*, its late bourgeois reprise" (237). While I am not eager to defend Marcuse against all the details of Breuer's critique, I am prepared to argue that Breuer's own (mis)understanding of mediation and identity distorts his reading of the fundamental strategy of Marcuse's work, a strategy which suffers from its formulation in the language of an essentialist, logocentric tradition; but a strategy, nonetheless, that might admit of a dialectical reconstruction that frees itself from an undialectical understanding of subjective identity.

A satisfactory reconstruction of Marcuse's strategy requires an appreciation for the dialectic of the "disappearing moment." Given any pair of dialectically related terms—individuality-collectivity, subject-object, nature-culture, etc.—their dialectical development should demonstrate their inseparability. That is, either moment "disappears" when utterly divorced from the other. To the extent that 'nature' derives its meaning from a syntactic opposition to 'culture' and not from a semantic reference to some domain utterly unmediated by culture, Marcuse's use of 'natural' and its cognates need not presuppose access to some ahistorical, naturalistic essence. His interest in transcendent beauty and transcendental instincts need not hypostatize as *hypokeimenon* some unmediated *Ursprünge*. Instead the *meaning* of nature is mediated by the meaning of 'culture' much as the meaning of 'up' is mediated by the meaning of 'down.' 'Up' does not depend for its meaning on some real place called Up towards which we point with finger raised. Rather, our gesture is at once a negation of 'down.' In short, these terms are relative in the sense of being mutually mediating for one another's meanings. But this is just the point at which Breuer and Adorno misunderstand the heart of the dialectic, for on their reading only the *unmediated* can truly claim *identity*. Granted, both realize that there must be an Other for there to be a subject, but the difference between the two cannot be mediated without robbing the subject of its Other, and therefore the subject of its subjectivity. Difference must be immediate difference, without any mediating identity between the extremes; hence the extremes themselves become immediate identities devoid of internal difference, as is clear in the critique of *Identitätsphilosophie*. For Breuer and Adorno the mediated subject is therefore a desubjectivized subject. They therefore reify as immediate precisely those extremes that Hegel (and a reconstructed Marcuse) regard as abstract or disappearing. Here "reify" does not mean 'remove from history,' but instead, 'remove from dialectical co-determination.' For Breuer and Adorno it is just the mediated rather than the immediate that disappears—namely, 'subjectivity,' 'the natural,' and 'use value.' Unless these terms denote pure, unmediated identities sustained by a pure unmediated difference between them, their reference, according to Breuer and Adorno, disappears.

Consider the import of the dialectic of disappearing individual subjectivity for the thesis of one-dimensionality. If only the unmediated extremes have concrete identity, then the socio-economic mediations of advanced industrial society *must* represent the disappearance of individual subjectivity. My actions are not *mine,* but are instead mere eddies in the socio-economic stream. If, in a dialectically reconstructed theory, immediate identity is *not* the criterion for concrete subjectivity, then attributions of subjectivity will have nothing to do with localizing utterly unconditioned

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agencies—those metaphysical anomalies Spinoza ridiculed as kingdoms within the kingdom of causality. Instead attributions of subjectivity will depend upon distinguishing *some* structures of mediating conditions from *other* structures of mediating conditions—for the notion of *no* mediating conditions represents a disappearing extreme.

We shall regard as subjective those structures that appear to have "minds of their own," whether they be individuals, social ensembles, collective agencies, or general constructs, such as bureaucracy or technology. In each case the attribution of subjectivity will not depend upon the localization of some unconditioned autonomy, but upon the ever-conditioned capacity to enact self-furthering intentions. When history, for example, exhibits a certain cunning, we are then justified in attributing rationality to the real, *not* because we claim to have located a transpersonal Ego playing the role of *hypokeimenon* for history, but on the basis of interpretations of history that are at once most parsimonious and comprehensive of detail when they are structurally similar to the interpretations we would use to distinguish human action from mechanical behavior.[15]

Given a dialectical reconstruction of subjectivity, the thesis of one-dimensionality takes on a meaning not fully articulated by Marcuse. In Marcuse's formulations the threat to subjectivity derives from those mediations that remove the distance between essentialist extremes—thus the critique of a hyphenated Time-style that joins together what should be distinguished, or Marcuse's critique of an operationalism that reduces essence to appearance. The reading I am proposing would stress those aspects of Marcuse's argument that articulate the defeat of specifically human intentions, e.g., Marcuse's eminently dialectical coinage, "irrational rationality": the self-serving rationality of efficiency and bureaucracy that is, however rational and subjective in *structure*, nonetheless contrary to the interests of *human* subjects.

Now, the decisive feature of the dialectical reconstruction of subjectivity is its capacity to handle the question of whether human interests can retain any degree of specificity over and against the interests of bureaucracy, technology, and the state. Unreconstructed subjectivity cannot retain specificity without reverting either to an ahistorical naturalism depending on reified extremes, or to the mysticism of a totally unconditioned autonomy.[16] Without dialectical reconstruction, human subjectivity remains trapped within a neo-Kantian antinomy between biologistic determinism and a freedom that cannot give an account of itself since it foreswears all conditions that would constitute an account. Given a dialectical reconstruction of subjectivity, however, one can account for freedom as the capacity to enact intentions that are not predictable solely on the basis of conditioning. According to the unreconstructed thesis of one-dimensionality, on the other hand, subjectivity disappears because human interests lose their specific human identity. Human needs are modified to serve the interests of capital; therefore human subjectivity drops out as what Wittgenstein would call an "unnecessary shuffle." Further, whatever appears to be a resurgence of specifically human needs, whatever appears to negate the hegemony of capital, turns out to be only artificial negativity. Why "artificial"? Because the genius of advanced industrial society consists in its ability to use such negativity to its own ends. (Note the

15. For the sorts of criteria one may use to distinguish intentional action from mechanical behavior, one can do worse than refer to some contemporary writings in the philosophy of mind, e.g., G.E.M. Anscombe, *Intention* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963); Stuart Hampshire, *Thought and Action* (New York, 1959); Charles Taylor, *The Explanation of Behavior* (New York, 1964).

16. Cf. Paul Ricoeur, "The Question of the Subject: The Challenge of Semiology," in *The*

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attribution of subjectivity to the construct "advanced industrial society.") Could there be any negativity that is not artificial? If the agent or subject of negativity has utterly disappeared through mediation, then all apparent negativity is epiphenomenal—purely apparent. But the claim to the disappearance of the agent of negativity is itself just a restatement of the thesis of one-dimensionality in its unreconstructed form, namely, that since human action is historically mediated by political-economics, capital is now the real *hypokeimenon*, the subjective substratum to which all other pseudo-subjects have become mere predicates. But note the implicit monism of this unreconstructed formulation: as if there can be only *one* true subject! This monism is the legacy of Feuerbachian materialism as well as Fichtean idealism. Both philosophies start out from the question: what is it that everything else reduces to? But such philosophies, whether they issue in materialism or subjective idealism, nevertheless succumb to a similar formalism: this substratum, whatever it was *meant* to be, ends up as an empty form utterly devoid of all specific determination, an empty abstraction that follows a thought process of telling us less and less about more and more until we have learned nothing about everything.

By dialectically reconstructing the concept of subjectivity we avoid the temptation to formalism. Because mediation in terms of explicit contents constitutes the structure of subjectivity rather than its disappearance-by-definition, it is perfectly possible to admit a plurality of subjects, both human and otherwise. What, concretely, does this mean for artificial negativity? Consider life in a small town: The unreconstructed thesis of one-dimensionality would cite empirical evidence to support its formal claim: contamination by TV, McDonalds, the universal reach of modern banking, and so on will all serve the claim that any pretensions to autonomy are self-delusions. Plato in the drugstore bookrack is Plato robbed of Otherness. The sickness of sameness is epidemic. Even in a relatively isolated small town, everything has been infiltrated. The vandalism and rebellion of a few local youths becomes emblematic of more sophisticated attempts at negativity: insults to authority only reinforce a general consciousness of what is proper and what is not. According to the unreconstructed thesis of one-dimensionality, all phenomena of small town life—not only the empirically most plausible—will be *interpreted* as predicates of the universal subject, Advanced Industrial Society. But once we dialectically reconstruct the concept of subjectivity then the specific interests in a small town are not *automatically* and *formally* defined out of subjectivity by virtue of their empirical mediations with modernity. Quite the contrary; to the extent that the game is purely formal, it can be played in reverse, and with a great deal of phenomenological support: the infection of sameness becomes Smalltown's sameness. Smalltown is the Subject, and every intrusion from the outside becomes totally assimilated: the local McDonalds is not just any McDonalds, but Smalltown's McDonalds. The TV shows are discussed over coffee in the shop on Main Street, assimilated and neutralized within the overpowering traditions of Smalltown's ethos. And if there be those who deny Smalltown's capacity for resistance to outside influences, I can only conclude that they have not lived in a small town.

In fact, I do not think Smalltown is utterly invulnerable, nor do I believe that small towns represent the only pockets of resistance to modernity. I merely suggest the assimilating and neutralizing capacity of a small town as an *example* of the interpretations possible when one *formalizes* the unreconstructed thesis of one-dimensionality and takes the small town as *hypokeimenon*. The example recommends itself for demonstrating the possibility of resistance against a universal

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homogeneous state *without* reverting to myths of autonomous individuality. Precisely the sediments of small town culture *condition* its individual members to neutralize potentially negative messages from the "outside world." But as we know, the conditioning sometimes fails. Sometimes the kids come down off the farm, and sometimes they don't come home.

The same is true of that other pretender for the role of ultimate Subject. Not every child of advanced industrial society is its permanent predicate. Nor are all rebellions assimilated. To think that they *must be* is to buy certainty at the price of possibility, and pessimism at the price of empirical content. The pure formalism of the unreconstructed thesis of one-dimensionality has the conceptual elegance of all reductionistic schemes, but the confidence and certainty of pessimism are hardly worth the cost: an inability to entertain specific possibilities for human subjectivity. By dialectically reconstructing subjectivity in such a way that no subjectivity is *guaranteed* (by the mere presence of an appropriate *hypokeimenon*) but a plurality of subjectivities are *possible* (as self-furthering structures of intentions), critical theory opens the door to concrete considerations of specific intentions in specific circumstances.

James A. Ogilvy

Christopher Lasch. *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Beseiged.* New York: Basic Books, 1977. 230 pages. $12.95.

What do the folowing have in common: advertising, social science, feminism, the health industry, social pathologists, Talcott Parsons, the Chicago School of sociology, R.D. Laing and Gregory Bateson, conjoint family therapy, social workers, marriage counselors, flappers, child development specialists, Margaret Mead, the youth culture of the 1960s and the capitalist system? The answer given in Christopher Lasch's new book is that they all promote in varying degrees a democratic view of domestic life and permissive child rearing; they all attack sexual repression; and they seek to make family members more responsive to each others needs. It is the thesis of *Haven in a Heartless World* that the consequences of their apparently benevolent intentions has been to destroy the family.

Lasch's vision of family history is bleak indeed. In the 19th century, the American bourgeois family protected its members from the corruption of a commodity economy. In the warmth provided by the family, people enjoyed humane relations that were lacking in the cold, wider world. The family instilled a sense of autonomy in children; it provided them with the emotional strength to resist unwarranted state authority, to imagine transcendent ideals and to control the barbarous impulses that are man's natural inheritance and burden. For Lasch, the bourgeois family was the last hope for a better world, the last line of resistance against creeping capitalism, the last gasp of civilization in face of the destructive tendencies of the bureaucratic state.

And then it all ended. Starting in the 1920s, a relentless attack on the family was initiated that has still not abated. Lasch's apparent intention is to assist in calling a halt to this dangerous trend and to indicate to the reader where its source is. But his anger against the betrayers of the family is greater than his hope for change. Today the cozy family is gone, supplanted by indifferent parents, interfering professionals,

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encroaching capitalism and irresponsible feminists. Today, in Lasch's curious picture of reality, friends willingly share the sexual favors of their women, people participate improperly in oral sex and homosexuality, parents relinquish their duty to discipline their children, divorce and abortion are carelessly undertaken, families are broken up and those still intact no longer provide the "emotional intensity," the nurturing soil, in which children flourish.

Two tendencies pervade Lasch's perspective on the family. One is a moralist's lament over contemporary standards and behavior. Some will regard Lasch's portrait of the modern family as civilized and courageous; others will see it as neurotic and frightened. His bleak perceptions often do distort his account, but I will not deal with this aspect of his book. The other, more challenging, tendency lies in his effort to provide a Freudo-Marxist analysis of the family, a hazardous task that has shipwrecked many others. Lasch's Marxism is simple and undeveloped: capitalism has taken from the family many functions that earlier helped to hold the family together. Production, education, religion have all been removed from the province of the family by a combination of economic and political forces. The family, for Marxism, reproduces labor power, and for Lasch, this means that it socializes its children. The family today can barely accomplish this last function and is deteriorating quickly.

But it is Freud more than Marx who provides the key categories and impulses for Lasch's analysis. And the book's deficiencies can be traced in large part to the uncritical application of psychoanalytic categories to the study of the family. Lasch is an orthodox Freudian and as such he injects the ideological elements in Freud's thought into his account of family history. He overlooks those aspects of psychoanalysis that directly conflict with Marxism and he fails to transform Freudian concepts into instruments of critical thought.

To begin with, Lasch correctly characterizes psychoanalysis as a theory of the transformation of individuals from a state of nature into one of culture. Thus he berates revisionist Freudians like Horney, Erikson and Fromm for defusing the tension in Freud between instinctual demands and the requirements of civilization. Without this tension, Freudianism becomes psychology that merely reconciles individuals to a bad social order. Whatever value there is in Lasch's critique of the neo-Freudians does not mitigate the contradiction between orthodox Freudianism and Marx. For Marx, human beings are social in essence; natural man is a fiction, inasmuch as there is no way to distinguish the biological-natural from the social-cultural. Contradictions derive not from an alleged conflict between the natural and the cultural, but from the very forms of social organization themselves. Classes are in opposition to each other not because one is more natural than the other but because one dominates the other through control of the means of production. Social domination is the source of conflict, and this is just what Freud's dualism obscures. Lasch is oblivious to this fundamental disagreement between Marxian and Freudian thought.

Moreover, Freud's position derives from the liberal view of Locke and others, who justify capitalism as the completion or fulfillment of nature through the mechanism of the contract. It does not matter that for Freud the shift from nature to capitalist society upholds a certain tension and leads to a degree of unhappiness (from which Freud sees no escape). he basic issues remains: the notion of the state of nature implies that individuals exist prior to society and whatever conflict liberal theory allows will always be atrributed to the natural condition of nature, hence unresolvable by capitalist society. The tension in Freud's thought, so valued by Lasch as a basis for a radical critique, is fundamentally a conservative axiom that obscures the social basis of

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conflict and prevents any criticism of the social system. Since Lasch wants to preserve the bourgeois family (just as Freud did), it is not surprising that his account does not provide us with the categories to unveil its hidden forms of domination.

Lasch develops the argument over the shift from nature to culture in Freudian terms applied to the fantasy life of the child. The question is this: are the rages and dreams of children universal aspects of growing up, of becoming social beings, or do they depend on the family structure in which each child develops? The Freudian-Laschian position is clear: the child's fantasy life is independent of social conditions. Certain family patterns may promote a healthier type of dealing with the fantasies than others, but all children are subject to the same fantasies, anxieties and rages. In Lasch's somewhat Kleinian version of Freud, the two main fantasies experienced by all children are rage against the mother and fear of the father.[1]

The specific insights Freud gained about the fantasy life of children apply perfectly only to the bourgeois family in its classical period. It is not that Freud was limited by his age. The problem is that his categories, like the Oedipus complex and the super-ego, do not illuminate earlier periods. The child's psychic structure, as outlined by Freud, can be traced easily enough to the pattern of love and authority that the child experiences in the bourgeois family during the first three stages of life. While it is true that all children undergo psychic transformations during the early years and that these changes result in an adult personality structure, the particular pattern unveiled by Freud illuminates only one specific family structure. Freud—and Lasch—take the emotional pattern generated by the bourgeois family and universalize it. Lasch goes even further and ends up in a contradiction when he argues at the same time that fantasies are independent of society and that the bourgeois family is the only one suited to the child's fantasies. But if fantasy life is independent of society, it should not matter what family structure the child encounters. This confusion, not unusual among psychoanalysts, is responsible for the reactionary glorification of the bourgeois family in Lasch's book. Even on the face of it, one would find it most unlikely that the bourgeois family of the late 19th century—with its patriarchy, its obsession with property, its isolation from networks of sociability, its neurotic concerns with cleanliness and with the denial of sexuality—should offer an ideal context for all humanity.

According to Lasch, the bourgeois family is indispensible because of the following arguments. Children grow up best under conditions of "intense emotional involvement" (p. 123). This argument is simply asserted without a shred of supporting evidence. One may question what is meant by "growing up best." Lasch's criteria may be different from those of others. And even if "intense emotional envolvement"—which Lasch sees as provided only by the pre-1920 bourgeois family—is desirable, one may imagine family patterns very different from those of our past that provide greater emotional involvement. In the eyes of many psychologists, the contemporary family, which Lasch rejects as emotionally bland, is regarded as too intense.

The second argument made by Lasch in favor of the bourgeois family is that it alone provides children with a union of love and discipline, both embodied in the same persons, which allows children to struggle with universal ambivalent emotions. But this is really a question of the chicken and the egg. Is it the case that children

1. The elaborate detail that Klein provides of the fantasy life of 1- and 2-year-old children can only be attributed to projection on her part. But aside from this the mail Freudian argument remains.

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experience ambivalent emotions and then play them out in relation to bourgeois parents, or rather is it that the peculiar environment of children secluded in the privacy of the Victorian bourgeois home, confronted only by their parents during the early years, *elicits* ambivalent emotions. It is my conviction that when a restricted group of adults provides a great deal of affection for the child and at the same time constitutes the only authority figures, it is inevitable that the child will develop deep feelings of both love and hate toward them. The fact is that the bourgeois family, like no family pattern before it, generates ambivalence as the normal characteristic of emotional life. Thus it cannot be regarded as a virtue that the nuclear family provides an outlet for ambivalence, inasmuch as it is the very source of the ambivalence in the first place.

Lasch, on the contrary, views the rage against the mother and the fear of the father as natural and finds the bourgeois family an ideal situation in which the child can work through these feelings, overcome them by internalizing them, and, in consequence, develop a strong sense of independence. Thus the great advantage of the bourgeois family for Lasch is that it develops autonomous subjects (p. 124). I would suggest instead that it develops a life-long subjugation of the individual to internalized, emotional representations of the parents in the form of the super-ego, preventing rather than furthering the development of true individuality. The classical bourgeois family creates in the child a sense of emotional scarcity, a fear of his own emotions and a dependence not upon others but upon internalized parental standards. To glorify the old bourgeois family is to idealize the men and women who dominated society during the heroic age of capitalism. These people may have accomplished a great deal, but they do not provide models of personality that can transform corporate capitalism into libertarian socialism.

Haven in a Heartless World provides a detailed history, not of the family, but of the social sciences that conceptualize and study the family. There are illuminating accounts of several sociological, psychological and anthropological schools and individuals. Discussions deal with major figures such as Talcott Parsons and Bronislaw Malinowski and with minor figures such as Carle Zimmerman and Willard Waller. The basic theme, though, remains the same, Overwhelmingly, social science favors the destructive tendency to "democratize" the family. Lasch, of course, is not the first to note and lament the apparent equality of women and children in the American family. At least since De Tocqueville's time this has been a standard observation by foreign visitors and Americans alike. Among Marxists or radicals, however, Lasch may be the first to deplore the anti-patriarchal trend.

Three important questions can be raised against Lasch's thesis. First, Lasch dates the decline into the democratic family from 1920. Numerous observers, however, have noted an egalitarian trend in the family from as early as the 19th or even the 18th century. Lasch provides no evidence to support his own timetable. One is left with the suspicion that Lasch is romanticizing the family of pre-1920, albeit from his own peculiar perspective. He does relate some facts and figures on the rising divorce rate and the like. But he does not present a detailed analysis of the everyday life of the 19th century family that would show just how authority was upheld by the parents and how this produced healtheir psyches among the children. To my knowledge, it has never been argued that the 19th century bourgeois was a more admirable character than his 20th century counterpart. Thus the lament over the "fatherless society" of the 20th century remains nothing more than an impressionistic observation.

Second, Lasch attributes to social science and to the "helping professions" that rely

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on the conceptions of social science a degree of influence over the family that perhaps they would like to have, but for which there is little evidence. It is doubtful that parents treat their children with respect rather than with stern authority because they read Dr. Spock or because Talcott Parsons wishes it so. It is much more likely that the social sciences and their helping professionals responded to trends already established within the family. Most helping professions, such as the Family Services Association of America, are extremely conservative institutions which do what they can to preserve the family, not destroy it. If these pillars of the establishment are recommending more egalitarian relations between marriage partners and between parents and children it is surely because that is the only way they see to preserve these relations at all. If the nuclear family is in trouble today, the fault certainly does not lie where Lasch places it but rather with the inadequacy of the nuclear family itself.

This brings us to the third objection: Lasch's failure to distinguish between reactionary and progressive trends. It is a weird world indeed where feminism and Parsonian sociology inhabit the same political house. Lasch is simply incapable of demarcating liberal and radical strategies toward the family. Because he does not see the inadequacies of the traditional bourgeois family in providing avenues for the amotional and intellectual needs of its members, he cannot distinguish between those thinkers and movements that seek to preserve the institution and those that wish to transform it. The underlying difficulty with Lasch's perspective is that it does not account for the inherent domination in the bourgeois family form. As long as parents have considerable authority over children during their first five years, the family remains an authoritarian institution with respect to parent-child relations. Freud himself recognized this. It does not matter if the parents treat their children with force or with kindness: to the child these big people remain terrifying authorities.

Lasch's lament about the democracy in the family is thus empty. The family of the past was by no means a haven in a heartless world, at least not for women and children. The only way to insure democracy for children is to provide them with a wide circle of adults to identify with, the ability to select their sources of identification, and a separation between authority figures and nurturing figures.

The same can be said for women. The bourgeois family is suited to a patriarchal system. Women were to stay in the souse and out of politics and the economy. Today the family is in trouble because women are demanding rights to participate in the economy and politics and are rejecting a purely maternal role. The problem rests not with women but with the family form. Lasch laments the decline of the family but he should celebrate the demise of authoritarian patriarchy, aid those who are pursuing this end, and seek ways to constitute new family forms that take into account not only the wishes of the fathers but the desires of women and children as well.

Humane relationships are difficult in an age dominated by the commodity form. All too humanly, many seek the gratifications in private life that they are deprived of in work. But the family registers public discontent and cannot function as a haven. Many who are disillusioned with public authority begin to question authority in the family. Feminists, gay liberationists and others have initiated a progressive, public discussion of forms of domination hitherto considered unassailable. The role of critical theory, however painful it may be, must be to assist in these efforts rather than hiding behind comforting myths of cozy hearths and warm feelings.

Mark Poster

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E.P. Thompson. *William Morris, Romantic to Revolutionary*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1977. 829 pages. $17.95.

Thompson wrote the 1955 version of *William Morris* as a member of the communist Party. Shortly thereafter he left the party, was instrumental in forming the *New Left Review*, and began to write about British history in extremely interesting ways. *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963), despite its problems, is a ground-breaking study that continues to generate exciting insights. [1] In the mid-1960s, Thompson argued with the dominant tendency of *New Left Review*, which, under the leadership of Tom Nairn and Perry Anderson, was looking for (and, unfortunately, often finding) *truly* revolutionary traditions and critiques outside of Britain, which was contemptuously dismissed as lacking in any radical traditions worthy of the name. Thompson, however, claimed that they had not looked hard or close enough into British history, which, for Thompson, was rich with revolutionary tradition.[2] Indeed, Thompson's work in history and even the new edition of *William Morris* have to be seen, in part, as a polemical gesture against *New Left Review* Marxism.[3] Thompson goes another round with the *NLR* crowd in a 1976 essay, which, in a slightly altered form, is the "Postscript" to the new edition of *William Morris*. At the end of that essay, he takes apart Terry Eagleton's so-called critique of Raymond Williams and once again insists upon a native revolutionary tradition of anti-capitalism. Although Eagleton can find in 19th century romanticism only a petty bourgeois individualism, Thompson rightly defends Raymond Williams who discovers instead a critical opponent of industrial capitalism in this same romanticism. [4] In defending Williams, Thompson of course is defending his own position on romanticism, and especially the decision to reissue *William Morris*.

Taking *William Morris* out of the British context, however, one finds many flaws that one does not notice if the quality of the work is contrasted with the feeble intellectual activity practiced by Thompson's opponents. I suppose that since Terry Eagleton is taken seriously as a literary critic, since Anderson, Althusser, and the Communist Party still exert considerable influence, I should simply praise Thompson's more libertarian, critical, and undogmatic Marxism. But there are serious problems with *William Morris* that have to be criticized because its overall sloppiness, poor literary criticsm, inadequate psychological anaylsis, bias against anarchism, distorted historiography, and mechanistic Marxist theory will not go away.

If Thompson's new edition of *William Morris* will encourage more people to study one of the most interesting individuals in the 19th century, then we can be grategul. William Morris was a poet, pre-Raphaelite painter, designer, social critic, translator,

1. Cornelius Castoriadis' "On the History of the Workers' Movement," *Telos*, 30 (Winter 1976-77), and John Zerzan's writings are informed by Thompson's historical writings to a certain extent. Zerzan's essays, some of which first appeared in *Telos*, are collected in *Creation and Its Enemies: "The Revolt Against Work"* (Rochester, 1977).

2. E. P. Thompson, "The Peculiarities of the English," *The Socialist Register* (New York, 1965), pp. 311-59.

3. *Telos* readers will be familiar with the vagaries of British Marxism and the *NLR* from Paul Piccone's review of books by Anderson and Timpanaro and the subsequent uproar in issues 30, 32 and 33.

4. E. P. Thompson, "Romanticism, Moralism and Utopianism: The Case of William Morris," *New Left Review*, 99 (Sept.-Oct. 1976), pp. 83-111. The issue of romanticism and revolution is suggestively developed in a recent issue of *Studies in Romanticism*, 16:4 (Fall 1977), which is devoted to Marxism and Romanticism.

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medievalist, utopian, novelist, socialist agitator and artist-craftsman skilled in mural decoration, calligraphy, illumination, embroidery, dyeing, and weaving. Furthermore, his social criticism, as Asa Briggs points out, provides "the materials for a critique of 20th century Socialism (and Communism) as much as for a critique of 19th century capitalism."[5] No one, including Thompson, has fully investigated this line of inquiry suggested by Briggs. One wishes that Thompson had *really* revised the 1955 edition of *William Morris*—that is, rethought and rewritten it—because this so-called "massively revised" version is practically the same text as the previous one. The new *William Morris* is slightly shorter (828 pages, compared to 908), with all the remnants of Thompson's former Stalinism removed. It is only in the "Postscript: 1976" that some new material surfaces. After reading the "Postscript," however, where Thompson concedes so many errors of method and substance in the text he has just revised, one either has to marvel at such intellectual honesty or is forced to disapprove of such brazen sloppiness. The author of *The Making of the English Working Class* has a reputation so secure that I suppose he can afford to be sloppy—at $17.95 a copy—and few will make a fuss about it. But however much I have learned from Thompson's historical writings, I cannot avoid calling this new book what it is: a bad book. Furthermore, I cannot defend the book simply because its Marxism is more humanistic than the varieties of Marxism practiced by his opponents. A book has to stand or fall on its own merits, not its political context or its author's reputation.

The 1955 book was important because it directed attention to Morris when he was being ignored and it dispelled numerous sentimental myths about him when few saw him as the revolutionary socialist that he was.[6] But in 21 years, Thompson should have learned more than knowing when to excise politically embarrassing passages. And it is clear from the "Postscript" and the entire book that Thompson's Marxism, despite its flight from Stalinism, is still fairly conventional. Indeed, it is appropriate that so little has changed from the first to the present edition.

Whereas many shortcomings of the 1955 book can be shrugged off as unimportant in a pioneering study or overlooked as the product of Stalinism, these same inadequacies cannot be excused now. One such inadequacy is Thompson's view of Romantic poetry, which is crude and simplistic (not, of course, as crude as Cauldwell's or Eagleton's). Attached to an altogether valid insistence upon the social context in which the Romantics wrote—an insistence, by the way shared now by even conservative academic critics such as M.H. Abrams—is a notion of poetry few poets could ever accept. Although the section on Romantic poetry is much shorter in the new edition, its importance is underscored by numerous references to it throughout the book. Keats, according to Thompson, escaped a reality of suffering into the dreamworld of Poesy because Keats had no hope in social revolution. That Keats' suffering could have had sources other than an inability to relate to a mass movement does not occur to Thompson, who sees poetry as either retreating from, or leading the attack on, society. In the "Postscript" Thompson agrees with Miguel Abensour that utopian writing need not be considered in terms of retreating from or attacking society, but as "educating desire" (p. 798). But Thompson does not infer from this that Romantic poetry, too, need not be confined within a simplisitc dichotomy such as this.

Not even Sartre, in *What is Literature?* thought poetry should be *engagé*.[7] The

5. Asa Briggs, ed. *William Morris, Selected Writings and Designs* (Baltimore, 1962), p. 17.

6. Even fairly recent academic critics are capable of distorting Morris' socialism into a namby-pamby kind of reformism; see Donald Egbert, *Social Radicalism and the Arts* (New York, 1970), p. 428.

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Keats analysis is central to the thesis of the entire book because, as Thompson argues, when Morris finally has social hope, he abandons the "dreamworld" or Poesy for socialism. Thus the value of his early poetry and of Romantic poetry in general in prefigurative, valuable only insofar as it is subsumed dialectically by socialism. That there might be something *intrinsically* valuable in poetry and aesthetic experience never penetrates Thompson's Marxism. Furthermore, even as a socialist, Morris wrote prose romances that only the most dogmatic of critics could relate to the socialist movement; and he, as a socialist, maintained a passionate interest in medieval Romance, Icelandic saga, Chaucer, *Beowulf*, and Ruskin. Thompson has to account for this as a reaction against the factional squabbles in the socialist movement; like Keats, Morris was escaping painful reality for the dreamworld of Poesy and art.

Morris, however, had no trouble accounting for his aesthetic and political interests in a different way: "the study of history and the love and practice of art forced me into a hatred of...civilization."[8] And even more eloquently, he said, "Apart from the desire to produce beautiful things, the leading passion of my life has been and is hatred of modern civilization."[9] His hatred of civilization grew out of his aesthetic experiences, and preceded his political activism, his reading of *Capital*, his membership in the Social Democratic Federation and the socialist League. Since Morris never stopped creating and loving art, it is preposterous to see art as in any meaningful sense a strategy of retreat. He entered the socialist movement in order to express and translate in political terms the aesthetic values he had always believed in and lived by. Thompson, however, creates an artificial boundary between the pre-socialist Morris and Morris the agitator; he also implies that by becoming politically involved, Morris took the step that conferred importance on all his prior activities. If Morris had not joined the Social Democratic Federation, he would have remained, like Swinburne, outside the "historical moment," a mere artist, unable to "heal" the "romantic breach between aspiration and action" (p. 273). If, after reading Thompson's account of the socialist movement of the 1880s and 1890s, anyone still thinks that *any* kind of breach has been healed, it certainly cannot be the gap between aspiration and action, unless aspiration is totally politicized into meaninglessness. As is clear from even Thompson's account, Morris derived very little personal pleasure or satisfaction from the socialist movement.

Another problem is Thompson's psychological analysis. The treatment of Morris's personal life is reticent and inadequate in ways that affect an interpretation of Morris' aesthetic and political life. Although Thompson praises Morris' liberal forebearance with his wife, who was having a close, probably sexual relationship with Dante Rossetti, one wonders whether praise is appropriate since such forebearance entailed so much misery for Morris. By not leaving his wife or finding someone else, he succumbed to the dubious virtues of Victorian self-denial and self-control. Morris' attraction to the stoic heroes of Icelandic saga can, in part, be traced back to this act of suppression he inflicted upon himself. If Morris' poetry were to mature beyond the derivative influences of Scott, Keats, Tennyson, Browning and medieval Romance, it would have to become introspective; but introspection was so painful that one of his best poems, "Why Dost Thou Struggle?" which is clearly about his wife, is

7. For an interesting critique of the idea of *engagé* literature, see T. W. Adorno, "Commitment," *New Left Review*, 87-88 (1974).
8. Briggs, p. 37.
9. Briggs, p. 36.

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unfinished.[10]

If one insists upon the terminology of retreat, then it is truer to say politics was an escape from the painful reality of introspective poetry and an examination of his personal life. By denying himself something so fundamental as a happy sexual relationship, Morris prepared himself to make other kinds of sacrifices, and even political compromises. Although Morris rejected Fabian reformism and was impatient with the more militant reformism of Hyndman's Social Democrats, he could not wholeheatedly identify with the Anarchists either; anarchism, at least in theory, called into question any kind of mediation, reformism, or gradualism, and at least implicitly would view with great suspicion his decision to endure stoically a bad marriage. After he and the anarchists had parted ways in the Socialist League, Morris half-heartedly returned to socialist reformism, unable to see any alternative between a dangerous anarchism and social democracy. Revolution, for Morris, becomes finally an event which will happen only in the future, precipitated by the economic collapse of capitalism. The unsatisfactory compromise in his personal life prepares the way for accepting a similarly bad compromise in politics, although Thompson himself sees this same compromise as an exemplary rejection of anarchistic purism. Although Morris was a perceptive critic of reformism's tendency to produce a welfare state and a state socialism hardly distinguishable from capitalism, his economistic sense of revolution tied him to reformism, whether he liked it or not. Had he forgotten Marxist political economy, pursued his insights into aesthetic experience more rigorously, and been less willing to accept personal unhappiness, perhaps he could have developed a concept of praxis that did not depend so much on mediation, self-denial, and historical evolution (especially the economistic "crash" theory which Morris never questioned).

Thompson himself concedes in the "Postscript" that his book slights the important influence on Morris of Peter Kropotkin and other Communist-Anarchists (772-773).[11] Why he did not bother to correct this bias in the revised edition he neglects to say. But it is clear that he wants to place anarchism as far in the background as possible in order to keep Morris in the Marxist tradition. Once there, however, Morris does not fit very well, as a glimpse of the socialist factionalism will indicate. He joined the Democratic Federation (soon to become the Social Democratic Federation) in 1883, but Morris, along with most of the other creative people in the Federation, could not tolerate Hyndman's dictatorial leadership, theoretical obtuseness, and blatant opportunism.

In 1884 Morris and others resigned from the SDF and formed the Socialist League, which soon afterward also split, this time over the question of parliamentary participation. At this point Thompson chides Morris for his "purism" and endorses the reformist politics of the Bloomsbury Branch of the Socialist League, which broke away in 1888 and which included such notables as Eleanor Marx and Edward Aveling. Morris' anti-parliamentary position was shared for the most part, by working-class anarchists, and the Socialist League became a more or less anarchist organization. Morris opposed parliamentary politics and traditional trade-unionism because they were both so civilized, representing the kind of utilitarian, compromising rationalism

10. A good selection of William Morris' poetry is by Goeffrey Grigson, ed., *A Choice of William Morris's Verse* (London, 1969).

11. Attempts to situate Morris firmly within the anarchist tradition are also unconvincing; e.g., George Woodcock, *Anarchism, A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements* (Cleveland, 1962), pp. 441-43; Woodcock nevertheless has an excellent account of British anarchism between 1880 and 1900, pp. 439-52.

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against which he had struggled his entire life. Furthermore, he argued that a few reforms would not bring society any closer to revolution, but could instead strengthen the entire established order whose ability to improve would lend it legitimacy; also, by creating a larger middle class as a buffer between the workers and the capitalists, reformism simply delays the moment when the classes must conflict. And to the very end, even after he had resigned from the Socialist League, he never ceased to insist that truly liberating socialism could only come as a result of class struggle, that although reformism could be used to improve conditions here and there, it could never produce a socialist society.

The mainstream of Marxism, as represented by the Second International, Hyndman, Engels, Eleanor Marx, Aveling, and Social Democracy, never appealed to Morris because it was so much a part of the age that Morris hated: mechanistic, political, utilitarian, economistic. Between the reformism of the Fabians and the Social Democrats there was a difference, but Thompson greatly exaggerates that difference. Although Marx clearly had an impact on Morris' thinking, that impact never approximated the influence of Ruskin or Morris' aesthetic background. Morris does not fit well in the Marxist tradition despite the efforts by Thompson and Paul Meier (Paris, 1972). That Morris is not easily assimilated is clear from Stanly Pierson's *Marxism and the Origins of British Socialism* (Ithaca & London, 1973), which banishes Morris to the Marxist purgatory of regressive, subjectivist, idealist utopianism, from which Marx, so Pierson says, attempted to rescue us ("Postscript," p. 778).[12]

If Morris is to be placed in a tradition, I think Raymond Williams is much closer to the mark in *Culture and Society* (New York, 1958); there, Williams identifies Morris as part of an aesthetically based tradition of anti-capitalism and anti-utilitarianism. I would add to Williams' account that Morris' social and aesthetic ideas have a parallel, if independent, existence in the work of Kropotkin, whose *The Conquest of Bread* (1892) and even more, *Fields, Factories and Workshops* (1899), echo Morris' own ideas. I will not pursue all the parallels or suggest the different lines of influence, but essentially both men thought of the worker as a potential artist-craftsman, who ought to live in a society with an ecologically sound balance of town and country, cultivating a variety of interesting skills—both manual and intellectual. Both wrote of the evils of the bureaucratic state at a time when most socialists were far more interested in winning elections. The Marxist tradition, for the most part, has always relegated these kinds of concerns to the dustbin of tuopianism, petty bourgeois neo-medievalism, backward Luddism, and so on. Although Thompson does not practice this kind of ideological terrorism, he nevertheless fails to emphasize sufficiently that the pleasure Morris derived from his own creative work was the basis from which he criticized alienated labor, and so he saw technology as eliminating the tedious aspects of work, not as the creator of magical post-scarcity situation. Morris' insistence upon pleasure, happiness, beauty, the creative process, human scale, ecological balance, and craftsmanship is, to say the least, a minor trend in Marxism, and Morris did not find it

12. Paul Breines divides Marxism into two traditions, one romantic-libertarian, the other utilitarian-economistic, both being present in Marx's own work. "Marxism, Romanticism and the Case of Georg Lukacs: Notes on Some Recent Sources and Situations," *Studies in Romanticism*, 16:4 (Fall 1977), pp. 473-89. This is an interesting notion, but when Morris was acquainted with Marxism, only the utilitarian tradition was visible. I am not doubting the existence of a Marxism other than the kind that was current in England, 1880-1900; but for Morris, there was no other kind.

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at all in the Marxism of his day.

The bias against anarchism is also present in Thompson's account of the Second International where, predictably, it is the anarchists' bad manners that caused all the trouble. Perhaps because of this same bias Thompson does not deal adequately with the international socialist movement of the 1880s and 1890s. The Paris Commune of 1871 is cited as though it were a Marxist uprising when in fact the Marxists were a tiny sect far outnumbered by the Mutualists (followers of Proudhon) and the Blanquists. The Marx-Bakunin struggle in the First International, especially after the Commune, and the circumstances leading to the presence of so many foreign revolutionaries in London would have been appropriate topics for a book like this.[13] But to have dealt with these issues in any depth would have raised some difficult questions for Thomspon better left unexamined. Thompson's evasions help conceal the fact that in the last three decades of the 19th century, Marxism was becoming an essentially conservative force, bureaucratic, reformist, and conciliatory, as well as increasingly economistic; in contrast, anarchism, syndicalism and individualistic kinds of rebellion were insurrectionary and embodied the kind of radical hope that characterized an earlier Marxism.[14] Morris exists between these two trends, neither wholly in the one or the other; by emphasizing only one trend—Marxism—Thompson distorts Morris' actual situation.

Also *as history, William Morris* is marred because the narrative does not present events as they would have felt to Morris, who was living through them. *The Making of the English Working Class* is such a superb piece of historical prose because Thompson so sensitively restores the subjective factor. The issues that Morris dealt with, however, are probably too close to Thompson for comfort; therefore the disinterested historian can no longer hold the pen. As Morris traverses the factional fights of the socialist movement, Thompson is not primarily interested in how Morris himself experienced these, but more concerned in showing that, despite appearances, he was never *really* sympathetic to anarchism, that his purism was not as wise as the unionist parliamentarism of Eleanor Marx, that ultimately Morris was a Marxist anyway. This is bad history; Thompson is perhaps anxious that the reader might draw the wrong conclusions, so he is unable to depict fully the situations as they actually happened.

Behind the bad history is an equally dubious theory, implicit throughout the narrative, finally explicit in the "Postscript." Although Thompson disagrees with dogmatic marxists like Meier and Pierson, and is attracted by the more adventursome Marxism of Abensour, he essentially repeats the formula of 1955: Necessity and Desire. Ruling over Necessity is a hard-nosed concern with *Realpolitik*, elections, unions, reforms, and revolutionary tactics; Desire, cultivated by utopian literature, is important for other reasons, namely, for *after* the revolution. When the capitalist system crashes, Desire will be able to inform us what to do next. Thompson does not even suggest a dialectical interaction between the two realms: "there is a sense in which Morris, as a Utopian and Moralist, can never be assimilated to Marxism, not

13. An excellent discussion of the Marx-Bakunin conflict is by John P. Clark, "Marx, Bakunin, and the Problem of Social Transformation," a paper delivered at the American Political Science Association, September, 1977.

14. By an earlier Marxism, I am referring to the "1844 Manuscripts" and Marx's revolutionary activities that forced him to take up exile in London. I am inclined to believe that Marx grew more conservative with age, although clearly the issue is not simply one of years. Even though the non-Marxist ultra-left of the 1880-1900 period seems much more interesting and relevant than the Marxism of the same period, I am not denying the many problems that existed with the ultra-left movement; these problems, too, need to be examined.

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because of any contradiction of purposes but because one may not assimilate desire to knowledge, and because the attempt to do so is to confuse two different operative principles of culture" (p. 807).

It is precisely this same kind of splitting of reality that has caused so much damage in revolutionary theory and praxis, from the Jacobins to the Maoists. While science takes care of the real business, desire can do what it likes, because it has no power anyway. This is a way of keeping utopianism while making it ineffectual and bringing it under control. It is also a way of protecting Marxism from truly critical, revolutionary kinds of thinking because one can always relocate such tendencies into the Desire side of things, Of course the Marxist "head" will overrule the utopian "heart" whenever a conflict between the two arises, regardless of the sentimental nonsense about Morris' "greatness," "stature," and "moral realism" (p. 717). In the last paragraph of the "Postscript," Thompson claims that a Marx-Morris argument exists within himself and led him, Thompson, to take leave of orthodox Marxism. Thompson still has a long way to go if he is to engage the thought of Morris in a serious way.

Finally, I cannot avoid reflecting of *The Making of the English Working Class,* whose theoretical implications are far more conventional than I had thought before. Although Thompson tells the story of the Luddites, utilitarian reformists, and trade unionists with fairness and sympathy, he does not like to evaluate the various tendencies. Such an omission seems wise and libertarian until one realizes that by treating each tendency equally, not endorsing any one, Thompson in fact endorses what finally emerges as dominant, namely, unionist reformism. Luddism is dialectically subsumed under reformism as an earlier, more heroic, but nenetheless unworkable mode of working-class consciousness, when in fact Luddism was an is inconsistent with reformism. John and Paula Zerzan write of another, similar difficulty in Thompson's historiography. "Thompson recognized the essentially 'repressive and disabling' discipline of industrialization and yet, as if remembering that he is a Marxist historian, somehow finds the process good and inevitable. How could the Industrial Revolution have happened without this discipline, he asks, and in fact finds that in the production of 'sober and disciplined' workers, 'this growth in self-respect (!) and political consciousness' to have been 'one real gain' of the transformation of society."[15]

However thankful one has to be for Thompson's pioneering work with Morris and working-class history, one cannot be blind to his limitations, which need to be frankly and openly discussed.

Michael Scrivener

15. John and Paula Zerzan, "Industrialism and Domestication," *Fifth Estate* (Oct.-Nov. 1977), p. 15.

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Andras Hegedüs, Agnes Heller, Maria Markus, Mihaly Vajda. *The Humanization of Socialism: Writings of the Budapest School.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976. 177 pages.

In a letter to the *Times Literary Supplement* of February 15, 1971, Lukács drew attention to "The Budapest School of Marxism," whose leading members (except Ferenc Feher and György Markus) have essays in this collection. Lukács expressed theoretical and political solidarity with this group of students and colleagues, who, he said, go beyond "the neo-positivist spiritual manipulation of the American way of life" and "the deformed Stalinist interpretation of Marxism." Shortly thereafter Lukács died, thus removing a major protective buffer between the Hungarian bureaucracy and the members of the Budapest School.

Even in 1968, when Lukács was alive, the authors of these essays had been expelled from the Hungarian Communist Party. Hegedüs was also at that time removed from his position as director of the Sociological Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Szeleny has suggested that from 1960 to 1965, the "Budapest School" was "his majesty's opposition," accompanied by literary awards and high academic positions.[1] The 1965-1973 period was one of growing and open conflict between these intellectuals and the bureaucracy, highlighted by Heller's public denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Czeckoslovakia at the Korcula conferènce in 1968, and ending with the firing of all of the authors in this collection from their research positions. From 1973 to 1977 the authors lived on royalties from publications in the West and translations. This period of intensified repression did not, however result in the School's physical dispersion. As an inspiring and courageous community of left-wing dissidents living in Budapest, the Budapest School ceased to exist in 1977 when Heller and Feher accepted academic positions in Australia and Gyôrgy and Maria Markus and Vajda did the same in West Germany. Of the authors of this collection, only Hegedüs remains in Budapest. The Budapest School now joins a distinguished tradition of dissident (Marxist) intellectual communities in emigration. When reading these essays, which focus so much on the theme of community, it is important to deep in mind that this particular community is in the midst of a diaspora whose end is not in sight. The essays in this volume go a long way toward explaining why the Hungarian authorities caused this particular dispersion in the first place.

The essays were written between 1967 and 1972 and outline a critique of the state socialist societies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The jailing, emigration or harrassment of practically every important Marxist critic of East European and Soviet society in recent years has understandably produced two responses. The first, most clearly evident in Rudolf Bahro's recent attack on Eact German bureaucratic domination, sees the increased repression as confirmation of an "authentic" Marxist analysis.[2] The second type of response evident in recent controversies in *Telos*, has been to separate a vision of anti-authoritarian communism from Marxism, which it is claimed is now primarily or even exclusively a legitimating ideology of domination. Perhaps communists will, at some point no longer be Marxists—just as critical

1. See Ivan Szelenyi, "Notes on the 'Budapest School' " in *Critique*, 8 (Summer 1977), pp. 61-67.

2. See Rudolph Bahro, "The Alternative in Eastern Europe" in *New Left Review* 106, November-December, 1977, pp. 3-39. This article summarizes the main themes of Bahro's recent work, *Zur Kritik des realexisterienden Sozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main, 1977). Bahro is now in jail as a result of this book.

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Marxists have insisted that communists are no longer "authentic" Marxists. There is probably no conclusive answer to the question: "are we still Marxists?" Perhaps an answer isn't even desirable. Long after we have decisively confirmed or refuted this or that "authentic" Marxist theory or concluded that the whole thing must be rejected, this collection of essays will remain important for its spirit: a spirit composed of uncompromising anti-authoritarianism and "civic courage."[3]

The themes of these essays are familiar:[4] realization of the individual in the community; transformation of human needs as an inseparable part of anti-authoritarian social-political transformation; the ethical and philosophical choice of values as a precondition for a revolutionary movement; critique of the (capitalist) division of labor as it exists in "socialist" societies; and leisure time and family relations as important loci of both socialist and feminist transformations of consciousness. Four members of the Budapest School, Andras Hegedüs, Agnes Heller, Maria Markus and Mihaly Vajda, have essays in this volume. Unfortunately, Lukács' letter to the *Times Liberary Supplement*, published as an introduction to the German edition of this collection, as well as Ferenc Feher's "Is the Novel Problematic? A Contribution to the heory of the Novel" and György Markus' "Man as Natural, social and Conscious Being," also published in that edition, are not part of this collection.

In "Communism and the Family" (previously published in *Telos* 7, Spring 1971), Heller and Vajda link transformation of the bourgeois family structure oriented around patriarchy, and possession to transformations of property and class relations. The end of private property and the state are basic preconditions for humanizing human relations. They must, however, be accompanied by a "revolution in everyday life," in this case the family, so that new types of individuals desiring autonomy and equality are produced and reproduced. Recalling Reich's analysis of the family and fascism, Heller and Vajda, see in the "freely chosen community" of the commune (20) —here the influence of the American and German New Left is apparent) a form of practice that comes to grips with authoritarianism and possessiveness in social and political life.

The centrality of conscious, ethical claims in Heller's work (and the relative lack of focus on the unconscious) is apparent in her essay "The Future of the Relations Between the Sexes," in which she discusses the impact of "a life oriented toward possession" (29) on sexual relations. She contrasts the "particularist personality" (31)

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3. By "civic courage," Heller means, as the American sociologist C. Wright Mills did, that "one should think and act as if one were in a real democracy" even if, in fact, one lives in an undemocratic environment" (53).

4. The essay "Family Structure and Communism" by Agnes Heller and Mihaly Vajda appeared in *Telos*, 7 (Spring 1971), pp. 99-111. A version of "The Role of Values in Long Range Planning of Distribution and Consumption" by Andras Hegedüs and Maria Markus was published with the title "Modernization and the Alternatives of Social Progress," in *Telos*, 17 (Fall 1973), pp. 145-57. Other essays by these authors published in *Telos* but not in this collection include: Agnes Heller; "On the New Adventures of the Dialectic" *Telos*, 31 (Spring 1977), pp. 134-43; a review of Perry Anderson's *Lineages of the Absolutist State* and *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* in *Telos*, 33 (Fall 1977;, pp. 202-210; Hellerand Feher, "Forms of Equality," *Telos*, 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 6-26.; Ferenc Feher: "Is the Novel Problematic?" *Telos*, 15 (Spring 1973), pp. 47-74; with Heller, Feher, G. Markus and Mihaly Vajda, "On Lukacs' Ontology," *Telos* 29 (Fall 1976), pp. 160-81; Mihaly Vajda, "The Rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany," *Telos*, 12 (Summer 1972), pp. 3-26; "On Fascism" *Telos*, 8 (Summer 1971), pp. 43-63; "Marxism, Existentialism and Phenomenology" *Telos* 7 (Spring 1971), pp. 3-29; with Agnes Heller, "Family Structure and Communism, *op. cit.*; Georgy Markus, "The Young Lukacs and the Problem of Culture," *Telos* 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 95-116.

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concerned with possession of things and other people as things to individuals who consciously choose to act in their social and sexual lives on the basis of non-possessive values. Possessiveness invades the psychological dimension. "There are sexual variants of sadism and masochism officially labeled as sexual perversions which are in reality simply an outlet for the particularist desire for possession" (32). The absence of possessiveness would transform human relationships. "If life in general no longer revolves around property, possessiveness will disappear from relationships between the sexes... In the relationship of really free individuals the other is always an end in his or herself" (37). The humanization of individual drives and feelings rather than their suppression is a prerequisite of a humanized society.

Heller expands on the contrast between the particularist possessive individual and the individual guided by a consciously chosen set of values in "Marx's Theory of Revolution and the Revolution in Everyday Life." The particular person unconsciously accepts given social conditions and values and acts on the basis of momentary interests, self-preservation and comfort (50). The fully realized individual, by contrast, guides his everyday life with "philosophical ethical concepts" (49); he "defetishizes the world; his *Weltanschauung* is choice and this choice signifies precisely that he decides on a community" (50). Communist revolutionizing of the objective basis of alienation can be carried out only if the subjective dimensions of alienation can be surmounted in communities "which will add meaning to our lives and at the same time will set an example" (50). The communist movement must be one which (unlike the existing party bureaucracy) points to a "new way of life," one that makes possible individual self-realization in the context of community. Neither possessive individualism nor authoritarian collectivism is compatible with these goals.

In "Theory and Practice from the Viewpoint of Human Needs," Heller emphasizes that both the Social Democratic and Leninist variants of Marxism succumbed to the "bourgeois structure of theory and practice." Capitalism promotes the expansion of quantitative, alienated needs over qualitative (non-alienated) needs. Thus, only a theory or variant of a theory that express these alienated needs finds its way into practice in capitalist society. Social Democracy and Leninism express but do not surmount this bourgeois structure of theory and practice. Heller's analysis of needs is the cornerstone of her explanation of the impotence of critical Marxism and the success of mechanistic variants of Marxism. She returns to a conception of total social revolution" that is rooted in Marx and which demands changing the existing structure of needs before seizing power. The development of "radical needs" (73) can only develop in a new way of life, a way of life that must be incorporated into the "revolution of everyday life." The "community" merges with the "movement" in order to overcome "the dualism between the educator and educated, elite and mass, citizen and bourgeois, theory and practice, which have all developed in bourgeois society" (74-75).

A full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this review.[5] What is striking in both Heller's and Lukács' work is the conscious, ethical rationalism that informs it. Paradoxically, while it calls for a fusion of the personal and political, transformation of the community and the individual, it lacks a fully developed psychological dimension, a recognition of the role that unconscious drives and feelings play in any

5. Jean Cohen's provacative review essay of Heller's *The Theory of Need in Marx* in *Telos* 33 (Fall 1977), pp. 170-84, contains a very useful discussion of the implications of Heller's analysis of needs.

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revolution of everyday life. This absense is one of the major differences between "Budapest" and "Frankfurt" Marxism. No doubt, possessiveness finds fertile soil in bourgeois society but to see it as one, or even the major, cause of sadism risks missing the distinction between the social and the unconscious and personal. For some,[6] the missing psychological dimension in the Budapest School means that it is "thrown back" (unlike the Frankfurt School) to a purely moral and philosophical standpoint. Yet, no genuinely radical social theory is without a moral and philosophical dimension. The charge of "idealism" or neo-Platonism seems less compelling than the following: The hostility to psychology (perhaps an inheritance from Lukács) as an integral part of radical theory conflicts with the goal of a community open to expression of individual thought and feeling. Can "radical needs" be awakened by appeal to a Western tradition of philosophical rationalism alone? Isn't it precisely in the awakening of new needs that psychology and psychoanalysis play a crucial role? How can a radical demand for total social revolution—with the accompanying appeals for new types of individuals—aoivd the moralizing, repressive, ersatz collectivism that seeks to drown the individual in a false totality?[7] If a total social revolution is not to become a regression behind the accomplishments of (possessive) individualism, a philosophical defense of individual autonomy and rationality should be accompanied by a psychological grasp of the depths of fear and repression left by existing social relations. Nevertheless, Heller's analysis of needs remains a provocative and important analysis of the relation between Marxism, philosophy cna practice.

The receptivity of the Western new left and feminism that is so evident in Heller's work appears also in Maria Markus' "Women and Work: Emancipation at a Dead End," in which she presents evidence that equality for women has yet to be achieved in Eastern Europe. She argues, in contrast to earlier Marxist conceptions that stressed female participation in the labor force as the crux of women's emancipation, that the movement for women's emancipation has reached an impasse because insufficient attention has been devoted to patriarchal relations that define housework and child rearing. Moreover, women's entry into the work force will not lead to emancipation as long as work remains alienated. Thus, "female emancipation is not possible without human emancipation" (90). While this is hardly news to socialist feminists in the West, such receptivity to feminism is probably rare even in dissident Marxist circles in Eastern Europe.

In "Community and Individuality," Markus and Hegedüs attack two myths of Russian and East European socialism. The first, the "peculiar myth of collectivity" i.e., the "collectivizing community," became predominant in the Soviet Union due to the difficult conditions of the early years of the revolution (civil war, encirclement, etc.) as well as the absence of bourgeois economic and cultural development. Collectivization not only "failed to further the development of the individual personality but also described it as being opposed to the common interest. A

6. The role of psychology in critical theory has been a subject of some controversy and discussion among *Telos* contributors. See Russell Jacoby's *Social Amnesia* (Boston, 1974); Erica Sherover's review of Joel Kovel's *A Complete Guide to Therapy*, *Telos*, 33 (Fall 1977), pp. 185-202; Jessica Benjamin's "The End of Internalization: Adorno's Social Psychology" *Telos*, 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 42-64; Helmut Dahmer, "Psychoanalysis as Social Theory" *Telos*, 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 27-41; and Joel Kovel, "Therapy in Late Capitalism" *Telos*, 30 (Summer 1977).

7. For an excellent discussion of this issue as it relates to contemporary China see Sarel Lee "Subterranean Individualism: Contradictions of Politicization" in *Telos*, 33 (Fall 1977), pp. 5-26.

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monolithically interpreted type of socialist man was turned into a principle" (94-95). The second myth was that the end of private ownership of the means of production in itself created a basis for "social integration" and "growth of communal man," which would "automatically transform organization at work into communities" (96). Instead of the technocratic reform proposals current in the 1960s, Hegedüs and Markus call for "humanizing communities" at the workplace that are not subjected to the requirements of "socialist competition" and which foster real collective control over the organization of work.

In "Free Time and the Division of Labor" Markus and Hegedüs expand on the theme of individual development and the division of labor. They call for "overtraining," that is, universal access to general higher education so that people will develop abilities, skills and knowledge that will prevent them from being locked into a particular position in the organization of work. Expanding and raising the cultural level of the work force by education multiplies aspirations and intellectual grasp of political realities thus fostering resistance to the stifling effects of the existing division of labor. In "Tendencies in Marxist Sociology in the Socialist Societies" and "The Role of Values in Long Range Planning the same authors discuss Marxism as a critical theory of society and as a science of legitimation, i.e., "hismat." The "Modernization" of "hismat" to serve as an effective contemporary obfuscation involves separating sociology from any ethical orientation and then carrying out empirical studies within a larger framework built on the following three assumptions. First, alienation does not exist in socialist societies except as a relic of capitalism. Second, the abolition of private property eradicates alienation. Third, is the "Hegelian illusion" that every institution in socialist societies serves common interests; that is, classes, or divergent interests, no longer exist. Critical Marxism, on the other hand, seeks to find the structural roots of continued alienation and class division in socialist societies, punctures the myth that the Party and the State represent general rather than particular interests, and "formulates hypotheses" concerning possible future lines of development grounded in consciously-chosen values. Only this "chosen system of values" allows socialist planning to do more than project past social trends into the future or retroactively impose the experience of the more advanced (capitalist) societies as a model. The absence of such values in long range planning in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has allowed "objectives of economic optimization" to take precedence over or be equated with "those (objectives) aimed at humanisation of social life" (148). In such a context, dissatisfaction with socialist societies often takes the consumption pattern of the West as a liberalizing alternative. Thus a "differentiated structure of consumption," not modeled on that of the West and oriented instead to awakening of new needs, is necessary. Hegedüs and Markus link transforming the consumption structure to "mutually reinforcing" proposals for expanded worker control and access to education.

Finally, in his 1967 essay, "The Self Criticism of Socialist Society: A Reality and a Necessity," Hegedüs combines a questionable analysis of the limits on internal criticism in the early years of the Russian Revolution with an interesting (and probably autobiographical) discussion of the conditions which now make internal criticism possible and necessary. Hegedüs argues that at the time the suppression of the Kronstadt revolt (164) and similar restrictions of criticism and democratic rights "had a real raison d'etre in serving to defend the system" and "up to a certain point, can hardly be seen as anything other than the historically necessary form of the defense of new social relations under extraordinarily difficult conditions" (165). The necessary

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"illusion" that defense of the embattled revolution demanded self-sacrifice (and self-denial) turned later into an apology for submitting to Stalinism—"a tragic change of role which often occurs within a single generation" (165-66). By 1967 the imminent danger of counter-revolution had long since past and thus the actual historical ground for suppression of internal criticism had also been superseded. Thus, internal criticism could and should be restored. Hegedüs emerges as the most Bolshevik of the Budapest School, yet, he undermines his own efforts towards a Marxist analysis of state socialism by apparently accepting the necessity of suppressing internal criticism in the early years of the revolution. This view smacks too much of the "illusions" he is criticizing. None of these illusions is, as Kolakowski has repeatedly emphasized, more pernicious than that which turns to a supposed historical necessity to justify what invariably is political expediency. With this caveat in mind, Hegedüs's essay remains a useful analysis of the historical context of criticism and repression in Eastern Europe.

In short, this collection is an important document of the relationship between Marxism and philosophy, and between history, politics and consciousness in Eastern Europe in the last decade. It is a tantalizing appetizer that should encourage the reader to move on to the main course of the Marxism of the Budapest School. Fortunately the main course is becoming available in English and it is hoped that it will have a continuing influence on Western social theory.[8]

Jeff Herf

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8. The following is a selected bibliography of the publications of the Budapest School available in English *not* including articles published in *Telos*: Ferenc Feher; "Negative Philosophy of Music—Positive Results" *New German Critique*, 4 (Winter 1975), pp. 99—111; "The Last Phase of Romantic Anti-Capitalism—Lukács' Response to the War" *New German Critique*, 10 (Winter, 1977), pp. 139-54; Andras Hegedus and Maria Markus, "Hierarchy and the Performance Principle" *International Review of Sociology*, 3 (1974); Agnes Heller: *The Theory of Need in Marx* (London, 1976); *Towards a Marxist Theory of Value, Kinesis*, 1972, pp. 7-76; *Renaissance Man*, Routledge and Kegan-Paul, London (forthcoming); "Towards a Sociology of Knowledge of Everyday Life" *Cultural Hermeneutics*, 1, 1975, pp. 7-18; Agnes Heller, "Individual and Community" *Social Praxis*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 11-22; Georgy Markus: "The Marxian Concept of Consciousness," *Cultural Hermeneutics*, 1, 1975, pp. 19-28; "Marxist Humanism," *Science and Society* (Summer, 1966); *Natural Science, World View, Philosophy*, Annales University Budapestiensis, Vol LV, 1965; "The Epistemology of the Young Marx" in *Contemporary East European Philosophy*, Vol. I, Spartacus Books, 1970; "Marxism and Anthropology," *International Journal of Sociology* (Spring, 1974); Maria Markus: "Changes in the Function of Socialization and Models of the Family," *International Review of Sociology* (December 1975); Mihaly Vajda: "Truth or Truths?" *Cultural Hermeneutics*, 1975; "Karl Korsch—Marxism and Philosophy" in Dick Howard and Karl Klare (eds.), *The Unknown Dimension* (New York, 1971); *Fascism as a Mass Movement* (London, 1976).

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Karel Kosik. *Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World.* Translated by Karel Kovanda and James Schmidt. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1976. 158 pages.

In this volume, Karel Kosik criticizes reductive Marxism, from the perspective of existential phenomenology and phemenology from the perspective of Hegelian Marxism. His Hegelian Marxism brings his thought closer, in certain respects, to Heidegger than to Husserl. In the end, however, Kosik's amalgam achieves a deepened reading of Marxism and a devastating critique of Heidegger.

The rallying cry of Husserlian phenomenology was "back to the things themselves." Kosik begins and ends *Dialectics of the Concrete* with the question: "what is the thing itself?" It is not the inaccessible Kantian *Ding-an-sich,* but the Husserlian thing itself (*die Sache selbst*) intentionally constituted and knowable through the fulfillment of its essence. Kosik insists that essence, in its static aspect, is generated temporally as the interrelation of whole and part, and is operative in both nature and history. In *Ideas,* Husserl correlates the static dimension of essence, constituted as a noematic nucleus, with our sense of past and future. According to Husserl, the disclosure of the thing itself fulfills a noematic nucleus, which is intentionally constituted as repeatedly identifiable in temporally discontinuous contexts. It is in terms of the identification of something as the same—its essence—that man is open to a world (of things) and to history. The idea of the thing itself is a Kantian schema, allowing us to anticipate the future and remember the past, and thus grounding the conception of truth itself, which informs science and reason as the very telos of humanity. In his later work, Husserl claims that the sense of the thing, though presupposed by science, is practically and socially constituted in the *Lebenswelt.* But Husserl's position remains unchanged regarding the founding sense of the thing as the ground of rationality as well as science. For Kosik, too, the sense of the thing is practically and socially constituted in the *Lebenswelt* and presupposed by science and rationality itself. But Kosik singles out work as that uniquely human activity that first opens man to the thing.

Nonetheless, Kosik insists that the thing itself is not immediately given through work. The thing itself—as its essence—is accessible only dialectically. "To grasp it calls not only for a certain effort but also for a detour." Kosik distinguishes the mere representation of the thing as our familiar understanding of it, and the concept of the thing, which is its dialectically grasped essence. A familiar understanding reaches only a false concreteness in that the thing itself is both concealed as well as revealed. Yet, it is only through the false concrete that initial access to the thing itself is gained. The grasp of the thing itself, as the grasp of its essence, is the full reality of the thing itself: its *being as generated* in contrast to its everyday *appearance.* Thus, essence is not merely intentionally constituted. The essence of the thing is also the form governing its genesis. Kosik insists, however, that the *reality* of the thing itself cannot be given to mere contemplative thought. A grasp of the reality of the thing can be achieved, at least initially, only by *practical* activity. Praxis, says Kosik, is man's opening to Being.

But man as open to Being is precisely Heidegger's *Dasein.* Not only does Kosik identify man as Heidegger's *Dasein*; he also shares Heidegger's sense of the everyday world as both concealing and revealing. According to Kosik, the very sense of reality is constituted through ordinary practical activity. This practical activity achieves an unmediated showing of the thing itself as partial, as a representation setting the limits of reality and of possible activity. Practical everyday activity cannot avoid selective

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focus and insofar as this focus is not criticized, it remains frozen in its representation of reality, which is mistaken as Being or world.

Kosik describes the world of practical activity as a world of tools, instrumental things, means to the satisfaction of needs. Clearly, this is the everyday world of things, accessible to us, according to Heidegger, only in terms of the 'hermeneutic-as' as the pre-predicative, practical understanding of things—as opposed to what he calls the 'apophantic-as'—the predicative, or categorical understanding of things—amounts to a critique of a central thrust of Husserl's phenomenology. For it is Heidegger's claim that the 'apophantic-as,' equivalent to *theoria*, cannot reach the reality of the thing itself. The 'apophantic-as' attributes predicates to things, taken as subjects for predication. Heidegger claims that the predicative experience loses the experience of the *thingness* of things. More specifically, the experience of things as *things* is inseparable from our dealings with them in a context of concern. But this sort of disclosure of things does not attribute predicates independent of the knower's relation to what is known. Hence, according to Heidegger, *essence cannot grasp reality*. Only the hermeneutic-as, caught in the context of involved doing, can reach the thingness of the thing, which is presupposed by the theoretical and, hence, disengaged 'apophantic-as.' The 'hermeneutic-as,' though presupposed by the 'apophantic-as,' is inaccessible from the standpoint of apophantic predication, precisely because the latter abstracts from concern. Practice is the setting for theory, not the reverse. Furthermore, practical knowing does not separate value from fact. According to Heidegger, the sense of fact is itself a matter of value. The theoretical standpoint, as self-founded, cannot regain that sense of value. Though Husserl recognizes in *The Crisis* that the *Lebenswelt* is socially and practically constituted, he nevertheless insists on its rational social *telos*. Heidegger, on the other hand, limits rationality as the limit of the reach of theory.

Heidegger's entire work constitutes a critique of rationality. His critique of the reach of the 'apophantic-as' amounts to a critique of the possibility of objectivity, of truth as an ideal that can serve as a basis for criticism of what is held to be true. If truth is immersed in praxis, how can truth serve as a critique of praxis? A critique of belief must be a critique of the disclosure of reality. But according to Heidegger, theory is itself dependent on a presupposed though hidden sense of reality as Being. Only through a reappropriation of the tradition in which we live can we be open to a fresh disclosure of reality. Husserl, on the other hand, remains in the Greek-rooted Western tradition which holds open—indeed, demands—criticism of what is held to be true in terms of what is True. Truth becomes for Husserl (as it is for Kant) a regulative ideal, however distant we may be from its attainment—an orientation that Kosik shares.

From the standpoint of phenomenology, Kosik seeks to save the Husserlian project of truth as a rational social *telos* grounded in Heidegger's 'hermeneutic-as.' Kosik retains Husserl's concept of essence as both the aim of knowledge and as the thing itself, but essence is now a hidden essence which can only be grasped dialectically. Kosik draws on the *real dialectical disunity* of our everyday lives as the basis of a rational critique of everyday intentionality. This dialectical disunity is lived as social conflict—between master and slave, exploiter and exploited, manipulator and manipulated, and as the split between man and nature, subject and object, freedom and necessity. The very *disunity* has unity as its *telos*, but a unity that is a merely implicit horizonal totality. Partial disclosure founds a claim to truth which itself demands question and criticism in terms of a larger relevant totality. Both Heidegger and Husserl attribute to Western civilization a unified *telos* in terms of a disclosure of

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Being by virtue of which we *are* a community. Kosik, on the other hand, takes us to be divided by the hierarchical organization of our work-mediated relation to nature. It is only through historical dialectical struggle that the essence of being human is realized. But dialectical historical struggle is only another instance of that dialectical mediation of whole and part, which governs the realization of essence in nature as well.

Though Kosik begins with the methodological problem of access to essence, it is because essence is itself dialectically constituted that access to essence requires a detour. He accepts Heidegger's conception of a hidden though prevailing historical unity of meaning; that is, of a hidden unity of Being that our everyday lives disclose in a fragmented, partial way. But in contrast to Heidegger, this unity of meaning, our root conception of reality, has been and is to be practically worked out, developed *humanly* in the world as a real resolution of dialectically related splits. This unity of meaning is our conception of reality, to which we are opened through our work, and which is developed and explicated as art, as philosophy and as a critique of our everyday understanding precisely by aiming at the resolution of lived dialectical splits.

Our conception of reality is itself a social construct. Man makes his world, which is *conceptualized* as reality. But to grasp what is real is to go beyond what is present in terms of a *telos*—a direction. Our very conception of reality is the *telos* in terms of which we live. Our conception of reality opens the future as a relevant possibility for our lives. Yet, to grasp what is as real is also to place that which is in the context of only an *implicit* totality, making our very conception of reality a merely partial grasp of the totality. Thus, the basis of critique of our everyday lives is rooted in the dialectic of our *conception of reality* as a cognitive moment and lived *reality* as its existential counterpart.

The Husserlian sense of truth as more than what is, as a *telos* relative to intentionality that goes beyond itself to its fulfillment, is retained. But it is retained as Heidegger's sense of world as totalizing and hidden Being. Truth is uncovering. Moreover, for both Kosik and Heidegger, the everyday world is disclosed through our mode of work. It is just at this point, however, that Kosik decisively breaks with Heidegger's thought. According to Heidegger, our mode of work is informed by an implicit disclosure of Being. Fundamentally, this disclosure of Being is a *poetic* grasp of totality, disclosing the Being of things as it opens a socially shared future for those who hear its message. Kosik rejects this analysis as a bit of contemporary romanticism, reminiscent of Schelling's denigration of work as dirty. In a work-world organized along bureaucratic lines, in which social relations are manipulated and dominated by a technology that most of us do not understand, we feel incapable of doing anything about our situation. So according to Kosik, Heidegger's analysis of the everyday world as a world in which we live *without initiative* is of a piece with his conception of *Dasein* as the place of the granted self-disclosure of Being. Man is taken as essentially *passive*. Kosik, on the contrary, takes our conception of reality to be relative to a world made by man through work and creatively elucidated as reality or Being through art, philosophy, religion, etc. The possibility of science itself is grounded in that opening to the Being of things which arises with work. Indeed, according to Kosik, scientific truth duplicates the very genesis of things, a project to which man is disposed, by virtue of being a working or making creature. Work is thus given not only the epistemological importance of the 'hermeneutic-as,' but the ontological importance of separating man from Nature, and originating the dialectical splits of whose resolution in the real world is our *telos*.

According to Kosik, work as world-making is already totalizing. Work is not simply

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informed by a totalizing disclosure of Being, as Heidegger would have it; it is what gives rise to our totalizing grasp of reality as Being. Work itself, as world-making, opens man to Being as a totalizing grasp of reality. By splitting man from nature, work grounds that claim to truth in which we live, and which has, as its moments, the thing itself as transcendent power and, also, our partial knowledge of its being. The totalizing grasp of reality is itself a problematic resolution of the dialectical split from nature that work originates. The resolution of this split requires a creative integration of nature and history, as Being, in terms of which man's future is opened as a *telos* to be realized.

In his "Letter on Humanism,"[1] Heidegger notes that Marx uncovered an essential aspect of history and that the reply to Marx has not yet been made. Since *Being and Time* is written as an ontology of the human life world, the essential place given to work as constitutive of the everyday world reveals work as an *ontological* dimension of men. The "hermeneutic-as" is rooted in man's Being. In other words, work belongs to man as *Dasein*.

Kosik's conception of work as an ontological dimension is also a central theme in Heidegger.[2] Heidegger pushes the analysis of work back to a presupposed disclosure of Being as the ground of *Dasein*'s Being-in-the-world and Being with others. Being is primordially disclosed as language. *Being and Time* thus becomes an implicit critique of Marx, who (according to the critique) uncovered an essential dimension of man, but did not plumb its depths. What Marx analyzes as successive historical epochs—ancient, medieval and modern—in terms of successive forms of organization of social relations and modes of production, Heidegger analyzes as a history—or rather a destiny—of the disclosure of Being.

One wonders to what extent *Dialectics of the Concrete* is undertaken as a critique of

1. Martin Heidegger, "A Letter on Humanism," trans. Edgar Lohner, in Henry Aiken and William Barrett, eds., *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, Volume II (New York, 1962).

2. Although Husserl took the *Lebenswelt* to be socially constituted—i.e., essentially intersubjective in its constitutive intentionality—he continued to insist on the possibility of an *individual* critique of that lifeworld without an analysis of the structure of the social constitution of that intentionality. Once intentionality is recognized as socially constituted, a Marxist analysis is clearly relevant. In *Being and Time,* the everyday world is described as a world of things disclosed through our dealings with them. Things thus disclosed are taken as related to each other in a world, as made by others, and as humanly usable. Thus through work, our world is disclosed as both social and practical. Yet our immersion in this world *hides* the presupposition of Being that informs our work. This presupposition of Being is precisely the world as Being-Sein-Dasein's home or dwelling which is to be built. Immersed in this work world, we become anonymous, replaceable; shared opinion is taken for granted and unquestioned. To recover authenticity—which is precisely our sense of Being—we must distance ourselves from this everyday world, not by distancing ourselves from this or that end, but by recovering ourselves as Being-in-the-world. But this recovery of personal authenticity only returns us to this same everyday world as our situation, handed down to us in terms of a tradition. Authenticity opens up historical perspective.

Thinking in this sense is so close to poetry that its distinction from poetry is problematic. For example, the essay "The Thing," in Martin Heideger, *Poetry, Language, Thought,* trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York, 1971), on the primordial nature of things, is an essay on a clay pot. The pot, in its every being, *as made and as used*, is analyzed as referring to sky, earth, mortals and gods, and as world-making, that is, *in* the world, *through* its reference to sky, earth, etc. In that same essay, Heidegger characterizes our age as one that has, with its technology, destroyed things, having lost the sense of things. According to Heidegger, poetic thought recovers the sense of the individuality of things as gifts for reverent use. Called to Care, we are concerned about things. And Heidegger's repeated emphasis on the connection between the Greek verb, 'to make' (*poiein*) and the Greek noun for poetry (*poiesis*), indicates the kind of making he intends, and coincidentally, the inseparability of doing and interpreting. Thus, his latter essays develop a different mode of work than the one in which we are caught.

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Heidegger. Certainly Kosik has to develop this critique, since his interpretation of Marx draws so heavily on Heideggerian themes. Both Heidegger and Marx are cited as among the few great philosophers who share a correct conception of knowledge as the transformation of the ordinary, the taken for granted; an activity, according to Kosik, of the highest order which does *violence* to immediacy. Kosik picks up Heidegger's concern with temporality and authenticity, but claims that Heidegger has failed to recognize praxis as the primoridal determination of man, in which *temporality itself is grounded*. Kosik argues that Care [3] conceals the authentic character of time. As caring, the person lives in a future which never comes. Such a future is nothing for it can only nihilate the present. According to Kosik, to describe man and his everyday world in terms of Care, as Heidegger does, is to take man in terms of a world in which technology and its control are beyond our ordinary capabilities. Such a world elicits a restless concern as its predominant mood, for we are deprived of any effective activity beyond the manipulation of others or of finished things. Labor is restricted to the preconceived participation in a larger process of which only the executive has an overview. In this sort of world we are unable to assume personal responsibility. At one stroke, both Heidegger's characterization of *das Man* as anonymous, and impotently devoid of responsibility, and Heidegger's call to *letting-be* as a more primordial covered-over relation to Being, have been relativized to our times. Though technology is beyond our control it is itself man-made. It is just this man-made aspect of technology that is covered over by taking our impotence to be essential.

Yet, in his section of everydayness, Kosik draws on aspects of Heidegger's account of *das Man* to characterize the everydayness of *any* epoche. Everydayness is such by virtue of being lived ahistorically in terms of what is taken for granted, familiar and unquestioned, a conception virtually indistinguishable from Heidegger's. In a footnote, (87) in the same section, Kosik acknowledges that existentialist terminology, however idealist and romantic, amounts to a concealed and dramatized description of revolutionary and materialist concepts. Indeed, he continues, that is the key to a fruitful dialogue between Marxism and existentialism. What is perhaps even more telling is the place he gives to everydayness as the falsely concrete. According to Kosik, the truly concrete recovers the lived, everyday world in terms of a critical perspective that grasps the dialectical unity of everydayness in a totality. Like Heidegger, Kosik's concrete moves from the everyday back to the everyday through access to its hidden relation to totality.

According to Kosik, by working, man transforms nature, and it is through this transformation that he gains the necessary distance from nature to permit its objectification and knowledge. The very possibility of science is grounded in this distancing. Kosik's claim is that any conception of man and his world that ignores the role of work in transforming that world is a mystification, an inauthentic romanticization.[4]

3. For Heidegger, Care is an essential dimension of human being as Dasein. Care is taken as inseparable from language, which allows the pre-conception of beings.

4. Heidegger's concept of work, like Schelling's, subordinates work to art. So Kosik's criticism of Schelling could be extended for Heidegger, for whom it is the *poetic* disclosure of Being that primordially informs work grounding its possibility. Thus what is for Heidegger *authentic* disclosure is for Kosik *inauthentic*. Indeed, Kosik points out, work is the basis for temporality, man's sense of future and past. As Hegel and Marx had recognized, work in its dialectical relation to nature, is inseparable from Nature. But it is through work that man achieves this dialectical relation to nature. Praxis, says Kosik, is the opening of man to Being but praxis is the dialectically achieved unity of work and its subjective moments: temporality, anxiety, joy, language. Man

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Kosik, however, does little to argue the ontic relation of work to temporality. Of course, all work involves a sense of future. But Kosik's claim is that man's sense of future is rooted in the very working relation to the object. Work creates an object to endure. For Kosik as well as for Heidegger, work generates the sense of environment as home, and thus humanizes the world.

Perhaps Kosik says so little about the relation of work and temporality because he simply presupposes the Hegelian analysis of the relation of work to temporality through deferred desire. In the Master-Slave relation, work is set in the context of a transformation of desire. Work satisfied deferred desire; the possibility of work depends on the possibility of deferring desire, on the possibility of waiting. For Hegel, this desire can be deferred only by force, the threat of the master. Thus in the *Phenomenology* work appears in the context of a Master-Slave dialectic as a power struggle. What is more serious is that Kosik fails to take due account of the close relation of work to language. Work as the transformation of things is thought informed. The object as the product of work involves a sense of future as the possible object which is not now, but is to be made. The possible object as the object to be made is absent. Reference to an absent object is precisely what language achieves.

Hence, work and language belong together. It is plausible to suppose that reference to an absent object evolves along with the capacity to use tools, all in an essentially social context. It is, of course, not impossible that in the prehistory of man, the dominant ape, under threat of force, induced others to hunt for him. But dominance does not yet imply that sense of the future which the Hegelian Master-Slave relation establishes only through work. Submission under threat remains at the level of merely animal (or natural) effort. According to Hegel, it is because the slave works, embodying his intent in the object that he develops that sense of himself as free, which is the origin of his demand for equality—a point that Kosik tends to confuse in his analysis of Hegel's Master-Slave dialectic (137ff.).

Work to transform the object in terms of intent introduces the possibility of a future different from the present. If the future object is *imagined,* the discrepancy between the object, as it is imagined and as it is must be recognized. Otherwise imagination degenerates into fantasy. A working relation to the object sets the object against what it may be. But this is precisely thought. Though the point of Hegel's analysis is that work itself is primordial thought, surely thought does not develop without language.

Language informs imagination to make the future and the past present to us in terms of socially shared concepts of reality Only if the past and future can be differentiated from the present can the past be remembered rather than lived and the future anticipated rather than fantasized. It is this opening to the future and to the past that constitutes man's temporality in terms of the discrepancy between anticipation and memory, on the one hand, and what is now the case, on the other. Just as language recovers our past and opens the future, it is also the condition of our sense of temporality, as an inevitable passing away.

Language of this sort is no more poetic than prosaic. Language that refers to what is absent can be traced back to the mutuality of intersubjective human address. That *opening* to Being of which Kosik and Heidegger both speak is also the mutual

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makes himself as he makes his world. And economy is the totalized integration of work, as the region of necessity, with art as the region of freedom. According to Heidegger, primordial poetry itself founds tradition by establishing man's relation to Being through a thinking remembrance of man's dwelling, man's *building* activity. It is poetry that converts animal nest-building into work as world-making.

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opening of person to person in terms of the potentiality for speech.

The Hegelian Master-Slave dialectic that Kosik draws upon is, however, a relation of mutual opposition: dominance and submission. According to Hegel, this mutual opposition is grounded in a demand for mutual recognition, which is achieved only if the Slave is ready to die in the fight. Thus for Hegel, dialogue is achieved in the context of a serious power struggle. If, however, the Master-Slave relationship originates in a demand for mutual recognition, the potentiality for dialogue (and, therefore, the mutual opening of one consciousness to another) lies at the basis of the Master-Slave relationship as well.[5] In effect, it is the *contradiction* between equality, which stems from mutual opening, to dialogue, and the dominance-submission of the Master-Slave relation that moves the Master-Slave relation beyond itself.

The necessary condition of freedom (as freedom from necessity) is speech (or the potehtiality for speech), though speech itself is not sufficient to overcome domination. But speech is closer to play than to work. Speech, like play, disengages from the real. Speech moves in a space in which biological survival is not at stake. Therefore, speech allows the play of imagination. The potentiality for speech is inseparable from the potentiality for reflective disengagement. Though Hegel clearly recognizes that work and thought go together and that thought is inseparable from the human demand for equality, Hegel grounds the bare freedom from nature primordially in the Greek courage to die. Surely this is not enough. Since work implies thought, it also implies speech. The demand for recognition that Hegel grounds in the *telos* of the absolute idea is itself implicit in speech.

Nevertheless, the difference between work and wpeech is crucial. Insofar as we are open to dialogue with each other, we let each other be. To be open to *things*, however, in terms of *work*, is to be open to their *possible transformation*. The transformation of things opens us to their causal relations. The transformation of nature requires the intelligent use of natural resources, which requires bodily effort and social organization. Furthermore, speech itself is hardly enough to overcome domination. Our modes of working together as our mode of relating to nature are embedded in the dual necessities of natural and socially organized forces. By virtue of the *transformation of the thing* man relates to what is, as a power on which he is dependent and knowledge of which is decisive for his survival. It is interesting to note that what Heidegger terms merely 'categorical' thought limits and opens up the *possible transformation* of *things*. (So a thing must be some color, some shape, some size, etc.). Work is not only constitutive of the 'hermeneutic-as' it is also constitutive of the 'apophantic-as.'

Kosik, by taking work as our primordial opening to the thing itself is able to bridge the gap between meaning and causality which neither Husserl nor Heidegger could manage. Husserl emphasizes perception as the basic mode of access to reality. Heidegger emphasizes language. Neither Husserl nor Heidegger has any place for the reality of things as a power on which we are dependent and of which we can nevertheless have knowledge. Kosik, by taking work as the ground of perception and language, rather than the reverse, emphasizes our active, bodily relation to the thing in terms of its categorical possibilities.

Kosik's inversion of Heidegger enables him to appropriate Heidegger in such a way

5. However, if work is inseparable from language, the potentiality for work is tied to the potentiality for dialogue. The dominance-submission moment of the master-slave dialectic is then no longer essentially embedded in the development of workIn effect, the Hegelian treatment of the relation of social force to work loses its ontological status.

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that our cultural superstructures find firm root without being reduced. In the first place, everyday experience assumes a decisive mediating role in the generation of false consciousness. Our everyday experience is informed by shared social structures that are generated by praxis. But access to these structures is not given immediately by our everyday experience. Insofar as we are taken up by that experience and on the basis of that experience limit our own possibilities, we are caught in false consciousness. To get at the hidden essence of our everyday experience, to understand its reality, we must get at the relations of everyday experience to the structures of our society that are generated by praxis. Then we see truly. If, as Husserl says in *The Crisis*, our intentionality is developed in a social context, then that social context must be recaptured to develop a critique—indeed, a knowledge—of our experience itself. Husserl's project of genetic phenomenology requires a detour through totalization, and a central dimension of this detour is work as the very opening of man to Being. Kosik takes ultimate totality as an integration of nature and history, which man himself must develop. This integration opens up man's future as a meaningful *telos* continuous with the past. Totality is thus nothing less than man's *achieved* relation to nature and history, which work renders problematic by splitting man from nature.

Totality is Being, reality—the thing itself—as our relation to history and nature which work as the primordial origin of dialectic opens as a problem. This totalizing relation to history and to nature is both real and meant. Our very concept of reality is an achievement brought by man to nature and history as their meaning, and demanding real fulfillment by social praxis.

A conception of Being that opens our future as a *telos* to be lived amounts to a mode of living desire, which integrates thought and desire. What then is the status of objective knowledge? Ultimate totality is *never* known. Whatever knowledge we may achieve of structures—whether of things or of society—is *partial*.

Kosik demands that every integrative totalization be tested in terms of its implications for its relevant parts. In particular, a totalization must be able to account for the genesis of the parts totalized. Vague though this criterion may be, it can be worked out and Kosik does provide suggestive instances of its use in the most diverse applications.

With respect to everyday life, a totalizing grasp of relevant structures brings us back to our everyday situation with a *conscious* relation to totality. Through a de-reifying grasp of the genesis of our everyday life, we gain insight into our world as humanly made and therefore possibly otherwise. Despite the mediating role of totality, Kosik, like Husserl, insists that rationality is essentially *individual* insight. So insight into the genesis of our everyday life should recover the authentic sense of ourselves as makers, and the recovery of our authentic being as the correlate of an informed sensitivity opening us to aspects of our situation to which we would otherwise be blind.

Kosik's concept of totality, as an account of the *genesis* of its parts, goes far beyond Husserl's concept of totality as the constitution of a merely *meant* identifiable unity. Kosik takes objective knowledge to be a spiritual reproduction of the genesis of what is real. Just as work is making, so knowledge is making, insofar as it reproduces the *real* making—or genesis—of things.

Kosik claims that it is social praxis—in particular work—that opens man to the universe and, incidentally, to objective knowledge. Indeed, he appears to interpret objective knowledge as belonging to our authentic mode of being open to the universe, with virtually no further exploration of the relation of praxis to knowledge. But objective knowledge as knowledge of the *making* of things enhances our power to

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transform them. The projected transformation of things and the paradigm projected as scientific or objective knowledge are clearly interrelated. Moreover an essential aspect of science is the advance of *techniques* of *disclosure*, which are dependent on the *transformation* of things into research tools. The criteria of objectivity cannot be separated from our mode of working together. In this connection it is important to take note of Kosik's hierarchical classification of totalities. Kosik classifies totalities as going from mechanism to chemism and finally teleology—obviously drawing from Hegel's own typology. The ultimate teleological totality is man's own relation to nature and history, generated by man himself. Science's relation to praxis amounts to the relation of objective knowledge to ultimate teleological totality. Nevertheless, Kosik appears to envision man as authentically—and unproblematically—open to his future in terms of a relation to nature (and history) that science can fully disclose.

Kosik's view of the relation between science and praxis is clarified if we recognize the importance of his concept of nature as *natura naturans*. Man himself is a maker who belongs to nature as *naturans*. The recovery of knowledge of the genesis of things relates man *intellectually* to nature as *natura naturans* and so belongs to a recovery of man's own authentic nature as creative. Although in *Dialectics of the Concrete*, Kosik does not specify such a relation between the scientific knowledge of nature and the recovery of man's own essential Being, it is implicit in his concept of objective knowledge as a recovery of the genesis of things and of his claim that man loses a revitalizing aspect of his own Being without the sense of himself as natural. In effect, the scientific grasp of nature as *Naturans* allows us to appropriate our own bodies as natural by integrating desire and intellect.

Clearly, Kosik retains Husserl's strong sense of the self-determination of man. For Kosik, man is primordially free as making himself. Indeed, it is by virtue of making himself by *making his world* (the richest meaning of work) that man is open to Being. But Husserl gains the self-determination of man by insisting on an idealism whereby nothing comes into our world from the outside. [6] For Kosik, however, things are out there, independently real, with a nature to be known. It is not an exaggeration to characterize Husserl's own concept of human freedom as self-determination in terms of individual insight into essence. At bottom, Kosik retains this Husserlian sense of freedom (adding to it, as even more fundamental, the dimension of human making). Nevertheless, making and rationality as insight into essence belong together. The possibility of acting, on the basis of objective knowledge, is an essential aspect of human freedom. Human action—praxis,—itself implies the ongoing possibility of the development of rational critique.

Kosik's concept of objective knowledge shares many of the aims of Husserlian genetic phenomenology, including the recovery of the constitution of essence—although Kosik projects this into the regional idea of the things themselves, as the genesis of their Being. In this deciphering of the nature of things, totality enters as that in terms of which they are deciphered. Everything that is is part of a whole. But it is part of a whole as *natura naturans*, nature creating itself. Though a considerable improvement over the Husserlian position, Kosik barely develops the implications of his position in *Dialectics of the Concrete*. Kosik's apparent vision of man as making his world by virtue of being a creature belonging to *natura naturans* lends itself to an over-simplification of the relationship of teleological totality to objective knowledge. Even if desire is taken on the Hegelian model of the "felt contradiction"

6. Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague, 1969), pp. 232ff.

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overcoming itself, desire is not reducible to objective knowledge; objective knowledge is rather the (dialectically mediated) realization of desire. Ultimate teleological totality is inextricably involved in our Being-in-the-world as a shared *telos* whose achievement is inseparable from our personal (and social) integrity. Teleological totalization structures possibility as a promise of our future. Our totalizing *telos* is itself to be achieved as a demand of our own Being-in-the-world.

On the other hand, the critique of any known or assumed teleological totalization remains implicit as a possibility of our personal identity by virtue of man's split from nature. Indeed, to be split from nature through work implies that our *telos* is structured in terms of objects in a world to which we are open through work (and language). Being human, our *telos* is inseparable from our world. Hence to live humanly implies that the *telos* in terms of which we live is *amenable* to critique in terms of objective knowledge. To live humanly is to live in terms of a *telos* which achieves our integration with a world as the *indeterminate possibility of beings.* Although Kosik's position thus implies a *dialectical* relation between desire and rationality, he regrettably does not develop this point.

At just this point Kosik's concept of a generative part-whole relation can ground a concept of rationality. The genius of science lies in an ongoing process of imaginative synthesis and analysis which respects both technique and, as Kosik points out, detail. In this process, the isolation of relevant parts is no less creative than their synthetic integration. Analysis sets constitutive parts in the context of alternative possibilities. It breaks up integration and allows—indeed demands— imaginative re-integration. The transcendental possibility of rationality is that man is indeed open to Being. Any totalization is thus amenable to critique, not only in terms of its implications with respect to its relevant parts, but as a structure in relation to totality that remains open as the indeterminate possibility of beings.

Although Kosik tells us far too little about the complex mediating aspects of the dialectic between praxis and knowledge, he is attempting something rare in Western philosophy—an ambitious philosophical synthesis that presumes to achieve an overarching conception of Being rich enough to inform the *telos* of contemporary man, a conception that recovers our relation to *natura naturans,* as creating itself through the dialectical interpretation of parts in an integrative whole. What Heidegger talks about as the self-disclosure of Being, Kosik, the rational philosopher, attempts *to achieve* through a reflective integration of nature, man and history. Man, though he belongs to nature, is not simply determined. He is creative. But human creativity is itself informed by a split from nature which makes rationality relevant. Human creativity that does not acknowledge rational critique can be demonic. At best it remains blind.

Ultimately, however, Kosik's conception of totality—as man's relation to history and to nature, our limit by virtue of which our future opens as a *telos* to be lived—is itself problematic. It entails an ongoing dialectical relation between the *telos* in terms of which we live, on the one hand, and nature, on the other. Our dialectical split with nature primordially opens up history—or, rather, temporality—as a dimension of human existence and is resolved historically through our *telos.* But every dialectical resolution remains problematic precisely by virtue of its implicit totalization as Being. History itself is constituted by our living out our *relationship* to nature in terms of a *telos,* grounded in a conception of Being that resolves that split with nature originated by work.

Mildred Bakan

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SHORT JOURNAL REVIEWS:*

ALTERNATIVE, No. 116 (October 1977)

1 Berlin, Postfach 150 230, West Germany. Annual Subscription: 25 DM. This special issue on the "New Philosophy" begins with an editorial stating that the new philosophers not only offer nothing new, but are, in fact, objectively reactionary. REGIS DEBRAY, *"Auf den Schultern Solshenizyns."* The English translation of this was in *Telos* 33. The following four texts are samples from the writings of the new philosophers: ANDRE GLUCKSMANN, *"Die Denk-Herren."* An excerpt from Glucksmann's *Les maitres penseurs.* Glucksmann decries the dependence of 'radical' thought on epistemology, which ends up reproducing the division between the dominators and the dominated. JEAN-PAUL DOLLE, *"Hass auf das Denken."* An excerpt from *Haine de la pensée.* An epistemological dissection of idealist thought, which, despite rumors to the contrary, also includes Marxism. Dollé points out the rationalist criterion of representation, i.e., subject-object equivalence, as the structural feature of thinking that grants it a divine status. In contradistinction to 'knowledge,' Dollé identifies art not as any particular artistic activity, such as painting or literature, but as a qualitatively different mode of time perception, as that sphere open to an apprehension of realities that are inaccessible to identitarian thought. MICHEL GUERIN, *"Zuruck zu den Ursprungen: Kunst."* An excerpt from *Lettres à Wolfou La répétition."* Using Don Quixote as a paradigm, Guerin's piece is a poetic indictment of the limits of rationalism. BERNARD-HENRI LEVY, *"Der Intellektuelle als Anti-Barbar."* A statement of the new tasks of intellectuals who reject the constantly abused proposition that their thinking is of significance if and only if it serves the proverbial interests of the masses. OSKAR NEGT, *"Intellektueller Abgesang."* An interview with Negt in which he categorizes the New Philosophy as a symptom of an intellectual moodiness that lacks any constructive element. Though he concedes that the moodiness has its underpinnings in the structural weaknesses of Marxist theory, especially the lack of a mediated conception of subjectivity, the absence of any positive input condemns the whole group to the status of a temporary fad. Negt's argument makes sense, but only if one accepts the tautology that if all problems had their solutions, then there would be no need to raise any. ETIENNE BALIBAR, *"Marxismus, Rationalismus, Irrationalismus."* Balibar rejects the notion that Marxism belongs to the rationalist tradition. Historical materialism has to be understood as qualitatively different mode of knowledge going beyond the antithesis of rationalism and irrationalism. All forms of rationalism—Balibar is especially interested in positivism—necessarily posit a residual space that is the sphere of irrationalism—e.g., religion and anarchism. What Balibar seems to be saying is that Marxism, properly interpreted, is capable of eliminating such residues. WS

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. XXII (1977-78)

Sociology Department, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. PAUL PICCONE, *"Labriola and the Roots of Eurocommunism."* Beginning with Labriola's introduction of Marxism into Italy in the late 19th century, Piccone's account argues that Italian Marxism not only dealt with most of the problems that were subsequently rediscovered by Lukács and the Frankfurt School, but in the process developed a sophisticated pedagogical theory as well. This partly accounts for the fact that Eurocommunism is able to develop in such a way that it provides a viable alternative to both Marxism-Leninism and social democracy. RUTH MILKMAN, *"Apartheid, Economic Growth and U.S. Foreign Policy in South Africa."* An analysis of the relation between apartheid and industrialization that attempts to "account for the successful perpetuation of the structure" of apartheid. This socio-historical account of South Africa's "racial capitalism" emphasizes the importance of the internal class struggles among the whites and the importance of foreign capital and imported technology in maintaining the apartheid industrialization process. Despite the effort to advance a theory of racial capitalism, the article gets side-tracked time and again by the felt need to give a general background of South African society, which detracts from the theory. A fuller account of the systematic prevention of African urbanization by all white governments and of the development of the migrant labor system would have enhanced this particular theory. THEDA SKOCPOL, ELLEN KAY TRIMBERGER, *"Revolutions and the World-Historical Development of Capitalism."* This is a bold attempt to "arrive at an analytic emphasis that can help make sense of the entire context within which the causes and outcomes of revolutions have been shaped and their consequences determined." The conceptions of the state,

*This section has been compiled by John Fekete, Department of English, Trent University, Peterborough, Ont. K9J FB1, Canada. The following have contributed reviews: John Fekete, Humphrey Glass, Susan C. Hegger, Harold K. Jordan, Peter Murphy, Greg Renault, Brian Singer, Maryska Suda, Wodek Szemberg, Susan Wheeler, Nancy Wood.

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revolutions from above and the critique of "Marx's original typology of revolution" (!) are unconvincing and hinder the project. The article purports to be about a theory of revolutions "in relation to the world-historical development of capitalism," yet it lacks any understanding of revolutionary theory. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, *"The Authenticity of Neocolonialism. Ideology and Class Struggle in Zaire."* The ideology of authentic African values and institutions is being used today to establish a new African bourgeois legitimacy among the masses. This ideology seeks to overcome the real class differences in neocolonial Africa by emphasizing common unity against foreign economic, political and cultural domination without politicizing the passive masses. In analyzing Zaire, it is argued that such hegemony could only be successfully implemented by first uniting the regionally fragmented bourgeoisie behind the army. For people interested in Africa it is time that these questions concerning the success of these counter-revolutionary strategies should be raised. ALBERT SZYMANSKI, *"Soviet Social Imperialism, Myth or Reality: An Empirical Examination of the Chinese Thesis."* Within a narrow Leninist conception of imperialism, Szymanski proves that in generating investment markets and in exporting and importing goods, the Soviet Union is not imperialist. The narrow focus on economic data in the article detracts from the broad political repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The approach leads to such statements as "Soviet economic integration with Eastern Europe is mutually beneficial to all parties and participated in freely by the Eastern European countries." All in all, a glowing account of the Soviet Union. MARGARET CERULLO, JUDITH STACEY, WINI BREINES, *"On Feminism, Biosociology and Parenting: Alice Rossi's Sociobiology and Anti-Feminist Backlash."* Rossi is one of many representatives of contemporary conservative thinking on women's position in families; her position recycles the arguments of Social Darwinism under the names of bioevolutionary theory and neuroendocrinology. A socio-historical understanding of family social roles is used to criticize Rossi, who "mistakes society-become-second-nature for biological nature itself." It is successfully argued that Rossi's methodology is flawed. NANCY CHODOROW, *"Considerations on a Biosocial Perspective on Parenting."* Chodorow also evaluates and rejects Rossi's biological claims for maternity, arguing that the "biology Rossi presumes is never demonstrated." HG

CINEASTE, VIII:2

333 Sixth Avenue, New York, NY 10014. $4 per year (4 issues). *"Organizing the Screen Writers Guild."* An interview with the late John Howard Lawson, former screenwriter and a major figure on the Hollywood Left during the 1930s and 1940s. *"Art is Born at the Frontiers of Taboo."* An interview with Nilgot Sjöman, Swedish director of "I Am Curious—Yellow" and "Taboo." Sjöman speaks of the need to integrate sex into the portrayal of human beings. Focusing on sexual minorities, "Taboo" seeks to expose the hypocrisy and contradictions latent in a particular leftist attitude toward sexual liberation. VILGOT SJOMAN, *"An Egret in the Porno Swamp, Notes on Sex in the Cinema."* An illuminating attempt to define the central issues underlying censorship, sexual liberalism, voyeurism, and exhibitionism in the cinema. *"I Let the Audiences Feel and Think."* An interview with Rainer Werner Fassbinder. Fassbinder's choice of melodramatic structure is linked to his desire to create a self-reflexive emotional experience. RUTH McCORMICK, *"Fassbinder and the Politics of Everyday Life."* The New German Cinema, despite financial and distribution difficulties, indicates a resurrection of a radical film style and sensibility. Fassbinder, one of the best known and most controversial directors to emerge, seeks to create a critical and subversive cinema for a mass audience while remaining within the bounds of realism. His central themes of internalized domination and social interdependency are realized through a form and structure that reveals both Brechtian and Sirkian influences. EDUARDO CEADA, *"The Politics of Porno in Portugal."* The flood of pornographic films on the Portuguese cinema circuit after the overthrow of the dictatorship indicates the continued dominance of a hypocritical bourgeois morality. LENNY RUBENSTEIN, *"Where Have all the Nazis Gone?"* Past and present Hollywood treatment of war-time Germany obscures the ideological dynamics of Nazism and lapses into stereotyped character portrayals. *"Composing for Films. An Interview with John Addison."* *"Beyond the Black Film."* An interview with Gordon Parks, director of "Leadbelly." JAMES MONACO, *"Gordon Parks' 'Leadbelly'."* Film reviews, book reviews. NW

CINE-TRACTS, I:1 (Spring 1977)

4227 Esplanade Ave., Montreal, Que. H2W 1T1, Canada. $8 per year (4 issues). A journal of film, communications, culture and politics. RON BURNETT, *"Film, Technology, Ideology."* The implicit rules adhered to in cinematic production mask the ideological determinants of filmic creation. To reveal these inscribed processes of signification, it is necessary to examine the camera's technological basis and its capacity to exploit this basis to construct and mediate the filmic

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experience. JOHN BERGER, *"On 'Middle of the Earth'."* Two letters by co-script writer John Berger to the principal actors in "Middle of the Earth" exploring the nature of sexual passion. The letters reveal elements of the process of film production. STEPHEN HEATH, *"Screen-Images-Film Memory."* Heath parallels the psychoanalytic and cinematic task of utilizing memory as a reconstructive device to demonstrate the process of subject formation. MARINA HECK, *"The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages."* The semiological method is employed as a means of locating ideology in the way language and communication is structured and produced. *"Makavejev: In Conversation."* Yugoslav filmmaker Dusan Makavejev discusses the value of the documentary tradition and the dynamics of capitalist and socialist film production. HART COHEN, *"Ethno-Hermeneutics: Ethnography as Anomaly."* ERIC RODIE, *"A History of Cinema."* Review. NW

CRITIQUE No. 8 (Summer 1977)

31 Clevedon Road, Glasgow G12 OPH, Scotland. BERTELL OLLMAN, *"Marx's Vision of Communism."* In his attempt to reconstruct the visionary content of Marx's work, Ollman is clearly furthering the cause of his interpretation of Marxism as a philosophy of internal relations. Thanks to his forthright style and relatively uncomplicated conceptual framework, Ollman succeeds in explicating the notion of communist society in a manner that is unintentionally appropriate to the undialectical epistemological structure of Marxian utopia, i.e., a perfectly interdependent system within which any particular moment is a true, unproblematic manifestation of the whole. Ollman outlines an image of an essentially flawless society freed from any structural tensions, devoid of any hostile otherness, pure in its intention, efficient in the execution of its aims, and liberated from the materialist burden of living the separation of subject and object. In other words, he describes a fully transparent society, which, having exploded the shackles of antinomic existence, does nothing but experience continuously a climax of ultimate unification. In presenting such an image, Ollman remains faithful to the Marxist heritage as the culmination of idealist thought. PAUL PICCONE, *"Czech Marxism: Karel Kosik."* Piccone's sympathetic treatment of Kosik is especially valuable in respect of his interpretation of the political significance of Kosik's epistemological reflections. While defending the existentialist twist of Kosik's reformulation of Marxism by seeing it as a necessary reflection of the authoritarian reality of Eastern Europe, Piccone criticizes Kosik for the remnants of 'objectivism' in his book *Dialectic of the Concrete*. J. TOMLINSON, *"Hillel Ticktin and Professor Bettelheim."* A reply to Ticktin's critique of Bettelheim (in *Critique* No. 6). This is yet another version of the holier-than-thou Marxist argument. I. SZELENY, *"Notes on the Budapest School."* The author sees the Budapest circle as moving away from the humanism of the early Marx to return to a more seroius concern with the economic and institutional foundations of East European societies. B. KOSKI, *"The Situation of Women in Poland."* GREGOR BENTON, *"The Factional Struggles in the Chinese Communist Party."* Despite some solid empirical grounding, this analysis of the political developments in China suffocates under the weight of the author's wishful thinking. WS

JUMP CUT, Nos. 12-13

P.O. Box 865, Berkeley, CA 94701. $4 per year (6 issues). ERNEST LARSON, *"Beyond Love and Money in Southern California."* Although "Lifeguard" aspires to pose moral and social alternatives to lower middle-class youth, it remains firmly attached to the values of a competitive capitalist ethos. REYNOLD HUMPHRIES, GENEVIEVE SUZZONI, *"Anarchism vs. Reality."* "La Cecilia," a film depicting the creation of a commune by Italian anarchists in 19th-century Brazil, highlights important contradictions inherent in anarchist theory and experience. GEORGE LIPSITZ, *"Rank and File Fantasy in Films of the Forties."* Hollywood films of the 1940s present contradictory images of workers and work—reflecting and reinforcing popular attitudes at one level, yet inadvertently subverting ideological hegemony at another. ARTHUR NOLLETTI JR., *"Male Companionship Movies and the Great American Cool."* Emerging as a distinct screen trend, male companionship films largely shirk the responsibility of developing positive male relationships, in favor of a non-involved and individualistic heroism. GEOFFREY NOWELL-SMITH, *"Moving on from Metz."* Metz's *Language and Cinema* addresses the semiotic problematic and specifically the socially instituted process of signification in film. Rejecting any simple analogy between structural linguistics and cinema, Metz proposes a film semiotics that concerns itself with the conditions permitting cinematic interpretation. However, he fails to tackle the role of production in the exchange of cinematic signs. JUDITH MAYNE, *"S-Z and Film Criticism."* Because of the close ties between cinematic and literary realism, Barthes' analysis of Balzac's novel *Sarrassine* has implications for a critique of the realist attitude in cinematic discourse. Barthes outlines a literary

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interpretation in which the reader interrogates the production of meaning within the text, thereby challenging dominant modes of perception. E. ANN KAPLAN, *"Aspects of British Feminist Film Theory."* In asserting that feminist cinema should be counter-cinema, i.e., a challenge to the representations of reality within cinematic structure, Claire Johnston and Pam Cook exclude those films whose political value stems from their unconventional reordering of women as signs. While insights from Freud, Lacan and Lévi-Strauss aid these feminists in their analysis of the image of women in a discourse established and maintained by men, the theoretical premises for this effort are not formulated adequately. MARTIN WALSH, *"Straub-Huillet's Schoenberg."* Straub-Huillet's film "Moses and Aaron," based on Schoenberg's libretto, utilizes Brechtian devices to reveal its concern for the ideology of representation and to renovate the normative concept of opera. NW

LIBRE, No. 2 (1977)

Editions Payot, 106, Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris 75006, France. The first four articles must be placed in the context of Pierre Clastres' work on political anthropology, *La société contre l'Etat,* which seeks to analyze the emergence in society of the state as a separate instance of authority that is both above society and which divides society into the rulers and the ruled, or, more precisely, which examines the institutional mechanisms by which primitive societies prevented the emergence of such a division. MARCEL GAUCHET, *"La dette du sens et les racines de l'Etat: Politique de la religion primitive."* This extremely dense article analyzes religion in primitive society not as a constraint (either internal to the evolution of the psyche or external, i.e., in nature), but as a specific and active mode of social institution. By the very radicality of the division it institutes between the visible and the invisible by its placing the source of all knowledge of and power over society beyond the grasp of men and on the side of the invisible, primitive religion neutralizes the emergence of a division between men whereby certain men can claim to mediate the powers of the invisible on the basis of special knowledge. Not only is the emergence of the state avoided by the institution of an almost total religious alienation, but also the division between society and an imaginary Other is a necessary precondition for the emergence of a division between men as demonstrated by the later history of the coexistence of the state and the religious illusion. The project of total statization presented by totalitarian powers, while being secular in nature (though only by occupying the position of total knowledge and power formerly relegated to the invisible), seeks to deny the division between men that made such a project possible in the first place, and dreams of a fully unified and homogeneous society without any "outside." ALFRED ADLER, *"Faiseurs de pluie, faiseurs d'ordre."* Despite the author's complaints that functionalist and Marxist analysis tend to reduce power to an imaginary duplication of social relations, he is too theoretically timid to do real justice to the wealth of ethnographical material he presents in this examination of the rainmaker's role in traditional African society, where the rainmaker, in spite of or because of his supposed power over nature, is submitted to the strictest possible control by the community. PIERRE CLASTRES, *"Malheur du guerrier sauvage."* Although war is endemic to primitive societies (cf. Clastres' article in the preceding issue), in only a few of these societies is it valued so highly that a division of labor emerges and the "warrior" becomes a full-time occupation. The problem then arises as to how the community can prevent such a group from constituting itself as an authority over and above the society—a threat that can become real once the community becomes dependent on the warrior for economic subsistence. The author argues that by compelling the warrior to undertake increasingly foolhardy acts of individual heroism in order to maintain his social status, the community eventually condemns him to death. JACQUES LIZOT, *"Population, ressources et guerre chez les Yanomani."* This article in ethnological terms is unexceptionable, but in theoretical terms is quite light-weight. It attacks a typical aberration of American pop anthropology. The target in question is Marvin Harris (*Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches*), who, extending ecological arguments *ad absurdum,* holds that war among the Yanomani Indians is the result of protein scarcities. MICHEL HELLER, *"Lénine et la Vetchéka ou le vrai Lénine."* In its desire for political legitimacy, the KGB has recently come out with an anthology of formerly unpublished texts by Lenin outlining his role in the formation of the original secret police, the Vetcheka. Reviewing the evidence, Heller concludes that the KGB does indeed have a right to its claim to be the legitimate heir to the Leninist tradition. JEAN-PIERRE MOREL, JEAN-FRANCOIS PEYTET, *"Les Soviets moins l'eccentricité."* The purpose of this article is to demonstrate, following Lefort's analysis in *Un homme en trop,* the formation of a totalitarian discourse by analyzing Bolshevik policy toward artistic and literary production during the 1920s. The analysis focuses on the submission of diverse and autonomous sources of art to a single perspective that condenses knowledge, power and the law into one and the same discourse. GLADYS SWAIN, *"D'une rupture dans l'abord de la folie."* Continuing the analysis of changes in

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the conception of madness in the early 19th century begun in the previous issue, the author covers much of the same ground, this time examining developments within the field of medicine instead of philosophy. BS

L76, No. 6

Johannes-Dech-Str. 20, 5000 Cologne 60, West Germany. 50 DM per year. HEINRICH BOELL, HANS-PETER REISE, *"Schriftsteller in diese Republik."* An interview with Böll on the subject of the present political and cultural crisis in West Germany. URSULA KRECHEL, *"Verbotene Utopien."* Author's personal account of the ambiguities of feminist thought. HANS-HEINRICH BAUMANN, *"Brasilienvertrag unbedenklich."* On the basis of an analysis of the way in which the West German press reported and analyzed the controversial sale of an atomic power plant by West Germany to Brazil, Baumann attempts to show the uncritical nature of that medium. HEINZ ABOSH, *"Machtwechsel in Frankreich."* An insightful analysis of the potential of the Socialist Party to govern without the support of French Communists. GUNTER BERGHAHN, RUDI DUTSCHKE, *"Ueber die allgemeine reale Staatssklaverei."* Dutschke continues his research into the historical conditions that allowed the Russian Revolution to fail. He locates the key to the understanding of the development of state slavery in the invasion of Russia by the Mongolian tribes of Gengis Khan in the 13th century. HORST HEIMANN, *"Der Revisionismus und die Zukunft des demokratischen Sozialismus."* Yet another version of the age-old search for the unity of theory and praxis. This time it pertains to the failure of the social-democratic movement to develop a distinctive theory of democratic socialism. Heimann points to Bernstein, the subject of a great deal of discussion now in West Germany, as having initiated the necessary revision of Marxism in order to locate the appropriate historical constellation of the relation between theory and praxis. WS

MARXIST PERSPECTIVES 1:1 (Spring 1978)

420 West End Ave., NY, NY 10024. $15 per year. *Marxist Perspectives* is a new journal whose purpose is "to work toward an analysis of the larger cultural and political malaise at the heart of the general crisis in Western thought." In their editorial statement, the editors stress the journal's independence from any political faction, sect or party in this country or abroad. Instead, the emphasis is on "many Marxisms" and on the commitment to scholarly debate within a Marxist framework. The journal's format reflects this open approach. Regular features in the journal will include "International Dialogue," an article devoted to providing information and stimulating discussion on both current developments and theoretical reflections on these trends outside of the U.S., and "From the Other Shore," a section allowing non-Marxists to critique Marxist theory in general or specific topics in Marxist thought. ERIC HOBSBAWM, *"Religion and the Rise of Socialism."* This article connects the secularism and anti-clericalism of early socialist movements with the rise of bourgeois rationalism. He claims that secularism (as an outgrowth of the 19th-century concept of progress) is an inevitable component of early socialist thought and its movements, because religion was associated with conservative social forces such as the aristocracy. Conversely, as religion has declined as a political and social force, the Left no longer needs to be radically anti-clerical. Unfortunately, Hobsbawm does not expand this discussion to include a critique of the new theology of liberation. Rather, he concludes his argument with a reiteration of the basic conservatism of religion. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, *"The Flight From Feeling: Sociopsychology of Sexual Conflict."* In his characteristically penetrating fashion, Lasch demonstrates that the current obsession with interpersonal relationships and intimacy is the manifestation of its opposite—a flight from feeling and the inability to conduct fully human relationships. With considerable insight, he argues that certain segments of the feminist movement (proponents of matriarchy, separatism and promiscuity) actually accomodate rather than oppose the system. Lasch believes that a certain degree of sexual tension is inevitable. Thus, he concludes that the complete abolition of sexual tensions may not be a desirable or even possible goal. In other words, the full equality of women does not demand an androgynous society. LEONARD QUART, *"On Altman: Image as Essence."* Quart expounds on something most leftist movie buffs have already recognized: While Altman is certainly one of the most provocative American directors, he has little social or political vision. His images while dazzling have the same effect as a Chinese dinner—two hours later one is hungry for something with substance. The article contains brief but interesting reviews of Altman's major films. UMBERTO CERRONI, *"Italian Communism's Historic Compromise."* A sympathetic and intelligent look at the PCI. Cerroni enumerates the theoretical assumptions of the PCI (advanced capitalism is not collapsing, bourgeois democracy must be preserved and expanded, a new historic bloc to counter bourgeois hegemony is necessary, etc.), explains these as stemming from specific historical conditions in Italy (fascism, the Church,

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Italian working class movements), and then validates the Historic Compromise as the logical outcome. STANLEY ENGERMAN, *"Marxist Economic Studies of the Slave South."* In this non-Marxist contribution, Engerman tries too hard to smooth over conflicts. He maintains that there really is not too much difference between Marxist and non-Marxist studies of the South; both agree that planters were motivated by profit and both agree that society is more than the maximization of profit. With all this agreement coupled with a minimizing of the differences that do exist, it is not surprising that Engerman concludes by noting that Marxism has "yielded little uniquely Marxist with respect to economic issues." He calls for more information in order to facilitate the "testing" of contending theories. SCH

OUR GENERATION, 12:2

3934 rue St. Urbain, Montreal, Que. Canada. $7 for 4 issues. ABE LIMONCHIK, *"The Colonization of the Urban Economy: Montreal."* Urban development in Montreal: the decision-makers and the beneficiaries. JACQUES DOFNY, *"The P.Q.: Year One."* A balance sheet of the Party Quebecois' first year in power: its external constraints (federal Canadian and American) and its ideological consolidation as a reformist, neo-capitalist party. Dofny outlines the party's dilemma: it must simultaneously succeed in its dealings with the federal government (to demonstrate its administrative efficiency as the future ruling party of an independent Quebec) and at the same time must fail in its dealings with the federal government (to demonstrate the intransigence of the government in Ottawa, thus showing the necessity of independence for Quebec). HENRY MILNER, *"The Marxist-Leninist Left in Quebec."* A superficial description of the recent history of the Quebec Left from the early 1960s to the present: its activities, splits, regroupments and political evolution. The relative strength of the Marxist-Leninist Left (compared to some non-Leninist alternative) is mentioned, but no explanation for the success of the ML groups is offered. Even so, the evidence cited about the ML groups will serve to indicate to the *Telos* reader the workings of evil incarnate. CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS, *"From Bolshevism to Bureaucracy."* Castoriadis argues that Bolshevik ideology as well as some aspects of Marxism underlying it, were decisive factors in the development of the Russian bureaucracy. He argues strongly against the "external factors" cited by apologists and states that the goal of the Bolshevik party was specifically to encourage the development of a managerial and administrative stratum. ANDRE LIEBICH, *"Socialisme ou Barbarie: A Radical Critique of Bureaucracy."* A broad overview of the process that took Castoriadis and Lefort from the repudiation of orthodox Trotskyism in the name of Marxism to a critique of Leninism and finally to a rejection of Marxism. This article explores the evolution of their ideas as well as the differences between Castoriadis and Lefort with regard to questions of political organization, the nature of political activity, the possibility of defining socialism, the possibility of a radical break between past and future (revolution), the critique of an objectively defined revolutionary subject, modern bureaucratic society's imperviousness to attack, and their analysis of May-June 1968 in France. WALTER JOHNSON, Review of *Strike* by Walter Stewart, and *The Education of Everett Richardson: The Nova Scotia Fishermen's Strike, 1970-71*, by Silver Donald Cameron. ROBERT SILVERMAN, Review of *Energy and Equity*, by Ivan Illich. SW

POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 7:1 (1977)

Geron-X Inc., Box 1108, Los Altos, CA 94022. $9.50 for 4 issues. RICHARD B. DUBOFF, *"Full Employment: The History of a Receding Target."* Part of a larger study of the history of unemployment in the U.S. The focus here is on the deteriorating employment rate over the last three decades. The evolution of the "full employment" definition since World War II and the more recent "explanations" of excess unemployment and the setting from which they have emerged are examined at length. JEFF LUSTIG, *"On Organization: The Question of the Leninist Party."* In a comparison of the "new Leninists" with the "old Leninists," and the "realists" with the "sentimentalists," the dispute is not seen as being between those who emphasize the party at the expense of the movement, and those who stress the reverse, but between people who hold different ideas about the kind of party, the kind of movement, and the kind of revolution that is worth fighting for. ROBERT M. RAKOFF, *"Ideology in Everyday Life: The Meaning of the House."* The concern here is with the relationship between people's thinking about houses and the objective, social and cultural institutions that construct both houses and their meanings. Not just a commodity or a physical place, the house is a meaningful cultural artifact whose meanings are both privately experienced and collectively determined. PAUL JOSEPH, *"The Politics of 'Good' and 'Bad' Information: The National Security Bureaucracy and the Vietnam War."* Using materials from the crisis period of August 1967 through to the end of March 1968, the quality of intelligence information and assessments regarding the success and failure of U.S. intervention in Vietnam is

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examined. This analysis of the problem of the quality of information given to policy makers during the Vietnam War is presented as a way of assessing the cogency of the "quagmire" theory (held by those who maintain U.S. intervention in Vietnam was an accident) and Marxist interpretations of the war. PFM

RADICAL AMERICA, 11:5 (September-October 1977)

P.O. Box B.N., Cambridge, MA 02104. $8 for 4 issues. JOHN LIPPERT, *"Fleetwood Wildcat."* This personal description of participating in the 1976 wildcat strike at the GM Fleetwood plant in Detroit emphasizes the declining shop-floor strength of the UAW and the inability of leftists to gain support for reforming the union. Providing evidence of how important direct action is to the workers themselves, Lippert suggests that traditional leftist wisdom about understanding and organizing militant workplace protest may be unreliable. FRANCES FOX PIVEN, RICHARD CLOWARD, *"Dilemmas of Organization Building: The Case of Welfare Rights."* Adapted from their book, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed and How They Fail*, this history of the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) suggests that the nature of the bureaucratic organization itself helped to defeat the growth of its militancy. They argue that leftists should have organized themselves and attempted to support and mobilize local disruption efforts rather than attempting to create a mass-membership, structured organization. Instead of concentrating energy on lobbying for welfare law reform, organizers should have put their efforts into getting as many people as possible on the welfare rolls. MARTY JEZER, *"The Socialist Potential of the No-Nuke Movement."* Written by a participant in the organizing efforts, this article discusses the broader issues raised by the organizational activity. The movement of the Clamshell Alliance away from the liberal environmentalism to a more leftist perspective is examined by way of focusing on four basic political issues: collectivity vs. individualism, confrontation vs. building a base, environmentalism vs. economic issues, and the single vs. the multi-issue focus. The article stresses that a real opportunity exists for socialists to work in the rapidly growing anti-nuclear movement. PFM

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, XLI:3 (Fall 1977)

Room 4331, John Jay College, CUNY, 445 W. 59th Street, New York, NY 10019. $8 per year. M. MARK MASSACHI, *"On Contradiction in Dialectical Materialism."* Another naive and scientistic attempt to provide an unshakable ontological foundation for Marxism. For Massachia, the basic presuppositions of this ontology are: a crude theory of reflection (all theories of reflection are crude) and the notion that "the existence of the world is independent of the human mind." After an attempt to synthesize Mao's ridiculous "ideas" on the notion of contradiction and formal logic, Massachia concludes that "empirical contradictions are defined as functionally interdependent, conflicting or mutually opposing elements or processes having nothing to do with logical contradictions." Another "metaphysical" tirade, of the Diamat variety, against the supposed evils of philosophical idealism. JOHN WEEKS, *"The Sphere of Production and the Analysis of Crisis in Capitalism."* ROBERT FILNER, *"The Social Relations of Science Movement and J.B.S. Haldane."* SUSAN KAPLOW, *"The Mudfish and the Crocodile: Underdevelopment of a West African Bourgeoisie."* This article assesses the factors that contributed to the rise and fall of a domestic bourgeoisie in the Gold Coast regions of Africa in the 19th century. Kaplow argues that during the "pause" between the industrial revolution and imperialist expansion, European capital encouraged the growth of an African merchant group to serve as a temporary intermediary in the exchange of raw materials and European manufactures. Though these middlemen attempted to establish themselves as a permanent "race of native capitalists," their economic and political ascendancy was undermined by the increasing integration of the world system under monopoly capital. Kaplow concludes that by helping the monopolies accumulate capital these African merchants contributed not only to their demise and political isolation, but also to the establishment of colonial political authority in the 20th century. AL SZYMANSKI, *"Socialism or Capitalism in the USSR?"* A more accurate title would be "The Battle among the Stalinists." This review essay amounts to nothing more than a Stalinist critique of a Stalinist argument. In this article, Szymanski reviews two recent pamphlets on the USSR: Nicolaus' *The Restoration of Capitalism in the USSR* and the RCP's *How Capitalism Has Been Restored in the Soviet Union and What This Means for the World Struggle*. These pamphlets simply parrot the infamous Chinese "Krushchev's Revisionism" thesis and conclude that capitalism has been restored in the USSR because labor-power has become a commodity and the working classes do not control the state. Szymanski counters these theses by informing the world that, much to our surprise, "there is broad and authentic participation of the people in decision-making and control bodies in the Soviet Union" and that "workers participate in public debate about virtually all aspects of Soviet society." He

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concludes that "the Soviet Union, both domestically and internationally, remains at core both a friend to progressive peoples around the world and a laboratory from which we can learn many lessons about socialist transformation." Though one can understand why, in the heat of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese would come up with all kinds of ridiculous propaganda statements about the USSR, there is ultimately no excuse for American Marxists to parrot this line and take it seriously. The line put forth in the two pamphlets ends up absolving the Stalinist state apparatus of all blame. On the other hand, Szymanski's "refutation," by asserting that the USSR is a democracy, is an even greater affront to the Left since it de facto legitimates the Soviet social system as it exists today. It is a sad commentary on the state of the Western Left that these arguments still have to be refuted; one would have hoped that the Left would have moved beyond this level of discourse by 1978. The Szymanski-RCP-Nicolaus debate is an obstacle to serious consideration of real issues. A far more satisfactory account of the problems of bureaucratic-collectivist social formations is found in the articles by Feher and Arato in this issue of *Telos*. Some house-cleaning in the realm of ideas is long overdue. HKJ

SEMIOTEXT(E), 2:3 (1977)

522 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. $7.50 for 3 issues. Issue theme: *Anti-Oedipus*. Primarily translations of reactions to Deleuze and Guattari's book and elaborations of themes by the authors themselves. Of consistently good quality, though of varying stylistic density, the overall concern is with the critical development of Marxist-Freudian theoretical frameworks. SYLVERE LOTRINGER, *"Libido Unbound: The Politics of 'Schizophrenia'."* An explication of *Anti-Oedipus'* critique of the authoritarian tendencies inherent in the knowledge claims of psychoanalysis. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, *"Energemun Capitalism."* A focus on the anti-Marxist moment of *Anti-Oedipus*: Deleuze and Guattari are said to eliminate much of the cumbersome Marxist machinery in their analysis of capitalism. While Deleuze and Guattari recognize that striving for systematic theory imposes totality on fluid social reality, Lyotard questions the use of the apparatus of psychoanalytic theory to explore the tension between libidinal and political economies. JACQUES DONZELOT, *"An Anti-Sociology."* A 1972 review emphasizing the leftist, anti-psychoanalytical assumption-reversal in *Anti-Oedipus:* through a generalization of the unconscious and materialization of desire, schizo-analysis discloses what psychoanalysis hides. Thus transcending a simple Marx-Freud synthesis, Deleuze and Guattari provide the means for locating radical possibilities in the *strong* points of capitalism—the overflow of desire. JOHN RAJCHMAN, *"Analysis in Power: A Few Foucaultian Theses."* Though different from anti-psychiatry, the use of psychiatric diagnostic categories in "schizo-analysis" is problematic. Foucault's comments on the politics of epistemology are used to show that the overestimation of both Oedipus and schizophrenia results in an identitarian paradox at the heart of the schizo-analysis technique. ANTONIN ARTAUD, *"The Body is the Body." "To Have Done with the Judgment of God."* Two 1947 poems. FELIX GUATTARI, *"Mary Barnes' 'Trip'."* This 1973 review of Barnes' *Two Accounts of a Journey Through Madness* argues that it exposes the hidden (repressive) side of Anglo-Saxon psychiatry perpetuated in anti-psychiatry: familialism as an a-social assumption. FELIX GUATTARI, *"Freudo-Marxism."* This previously unpublished interview develops an immanent critique of attempts at synthesis, arguing for the need to treat the interface between libidinal economy and political economy. FELIX GUATTARI, *"Psychoanalysis and Schizo-Analysis: An Interview."* Elaborates the theory of "extraterritorial" social desire whose processes reveal revolutionary potential under schizo-analysis. FELIX GUATTARI, *"Everybody Wants to be a Fascist."* Explores the relationship between individual and social desire, micro- and macro-politics. Fascism is seen to differ significantly from Stalinism and authoritarian late capitalism inasmuch as it creates a new desiring machine, an abstract totality different from the "molecular fascism" prevalent today. GILLES DELEUZE, *"Three Group Problems."* Foreword to Guattari's *Psychoanalysis and Transversality* (1972), which focuses on three aspects of the encounter between psychoanalysis and radical politics: (1) social desire bridges the two realms of economic-political and individual-family, for political economy is unconsciously libidinal, while the libido is the subjectivity of political economy; (2) psychoanalysis can be utilized by militants organized as subject-groups, defined by non-hierarchical coefficients of transversality; (3) in specific therapeutic groups, analysis in action can release the hidden potentialities of desire—this latter aspect constitutes the move from psychoanalytic to schizo-analysis. GILLES DELEUZE, *" 'I Have Nothing to Admit'."* This letter to Michel Cressole, an appendix to Cressole's book on Deleuze, summarizes the development of Deleuze's work from *Difference and Repetition* through *The Logic of Sense* to *Anti-Oedipus*. GILLES DELEUZE, FELIX GUATTARI, *"Balance Sheet: Program for Desiring-Machines."* A 1973 article that utilizes the metaphor of "machine" (in contrast to "tool") to focus on the way heterogeneous elements such as man-nature, or culture-soma

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constitute a unity in practice—a "machinic phylum." The desiring-machine is conceived in relation to the social body, revealing the position of desire in the infrastructure itself. GILLES DELEUZE, FELIX GUATTARI, *"May 14, 1914. One or Several Wolves?"* Critique of identitarian reduction in Freud's wolf-man case study. The analysis should rather focus on the multiplicity of libidinal currents, the authors say. GUY HOCQUENGHEM, *"Family, Capitalism, Anus."* Chapter from Hocquenghem's book, *Homosexual Desire,* which focuses on the ideological function of heterosexual sublimation of anal sexuality, and the consequent repression and perversion of homosexual desire. R.A. BRINKLEY, ROBERT DYER, *"...returns home (Mythologies, Dialectics, Structures): Disruptions."* SYLVERE LOTRINGER, *"The Fiction of Analysis."* Deleuze and Guattari are used to show how psychoanalysis undermines its own insights.

GR

SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 3:1 (Autumn 1977)

The University of Chicago Press, 11030 Langley Ave., Chicago, IL 60628. Special issue: Women and National Development. This issue provides a modest beginning in the direction of exploring the particular historical, culture-specific roles of women in the Third World. Based on a conference on women and development June 2-6, 1976 at Wellesley College, the issue contains 29 of the papers presented at the conference, plus a listing (annotated with the authors' addresses) of the other 50-plus papers. Particularly interesting in attempting to pull these diverse researches into some kind of perspective is ESTER BOSERUP, *"Preface."* The issue concludes with five short "Reflections" by participants in the conference who each raise questions regarding this development approach (e.g., the very idea of holding a development conference in one of the developed countries; were Third World participants there to present more raw data for American researchers or to share experiences? the absence of analysts from developed socialist countries; the very fine line between imperialism and modernization; the relevance of Western feminism to these women).

SME

STUDIES IN ROMANTICISM, 16:4 (Fall 1977)

Subscription Dept., Boston University Scholarly Publications, 775 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, MA 02215. $2.50 per issue. Issue theme: Marxism and Romanticism. JACK ZIPES, *"The Revolutionary Rise of the Romantic Fairy Tale in Germany."* Excellent treatment of the radical cultural politics of German Romantics. The development of the modern written fairy tale from the older oral folk tale was a revolutionary process in form as well as content; Zipes is concerned to develop an approach that can grasp the historical relation between aesthetics and social significance in this form. He utilizes the work of August Nitschke on the importance of socialized perception and behavior (cultural configurations) to show that the shift to the fairy tale reveals changing attitudes within the same mode of production. This highlights the ambivalent position of the Romantic movement as an avant-garde whose utopian concerns arose out of an immanent critique of a betrayed Enlightenment. Like the bourgeois novel, the Romantic fairy tale was intended to question the state of the reader, to suggest a shift from participation to confrontation with established civil society. Zipes traces this concern through the three stages of Romanticism by examining selected tales. SUSAN KIRKPATRICK, *"Spanish Romanticism and the Liberal Project: The Crisis of Mariano Jose de Larra."* Romanticism is seen as an ambivalent critique that focuses on the rupture between the self and external world in capitalism, but from a standpoint that perpetuates bourgeois individualism. In Spain, the movement existed as part of an uneven development, expressing the disjuncture between the literary mode and "immature" socio-economic context. The resulting abstract utopian ideals led de Larra to an extreme subjectivism and despair. PAUL BREINES, *"Marxism, Romanticism and the Case of Georg Lukács: Notes on Some Recent Sources and Situations."* In its early stages, Marxism originally manifested a tension between its Romantic and Enlightenment-utilitarian moments, but the Romantic revolt was soon repressed in favor of the scientific outlook. Outrage against civil society continued in the neo-Romantic anti-capitalist cultural critique of market relations. The initial project of the young Lukacs is seen as an attempt to restore the lost Romantic moment. Breines discusses three components of Lukacs' attempt to integrate neo-Romanticism and Marxism: the theory of reification, the concept of totality, and the notion of total revolution. He argues that Lukacs' "hidden utopia" persisted even in his later work. LESLIE RABINE, *"Feminist Writers in French Romanticism."* Examination of three feminist writers whose work challenges the Romantic-realist narrative structure, concept of self, and values. LEONARD P. WESSELL JR., *"Marx's Romantic Poetry and the Crisis of Romantic Lyricism."* A must for the obsessive-compulsive Marxologist; a systematic examination of Marx's 1837 verse. "Lyrical" refers not to form but to poetic attitude, in this case an attempt to bridge the gap between subject and object. However, lyrical longing is self-defeating, producing a crisis in the project. Developed through

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systematic "ocean" symbolism, Marx's concern with the is-ought tension reflects this crisis in a threefold development: (1) Dionysian oneness with the cosmos gives way to (2) alienation of the lyrical self from an objective, repressive universe, which culminates in (3) an Apollonian revolt whose impulse informed Marx's subsequent thought on the problem of human emancipation. DAVID PUNTER, *"Blake: Creative and Uncreative Labor."* GR

TEL QUEL, Nos. 71-73 (Autumn 1977)

27 rue Jacob, Paris 6e. 127 francs per year (4 issues). J. KRISTEVA, M. PLAYNET, P. SOLLERS, *"Pourquoi les Etats Unis?"* Kristeva opens the discussion with reflections on her recent visit to the United States. Her interest in the latter was kindled, she says, by the same motives that resulted in her visit to China: the stagnation of French (European) society, attributable to the senility of Gaullism on the one hand, and to the rise of the petty bourgeois masses, on the other. Hence, she says, for one concerned with 'ruptures' in "history, culture and time, it became necessary to switch continents." It took her only five years or so to realize the bitter, neo-Stalinist truth about the land of little-red-book-toting robots. And so she sought out the promise of the New World, which she describes as the land of "polyvalence." The diversity of ethnic and social groups makes it, according to Kristeva, less subject to the totalitarian homogenization of society characteristic of other late and 'post' capitalist societies. If there is any hope for the West, it can only exist in a society that at least marginally escapes the stifling influence of tradition, which accounts for the moribund state of Western Europe. But Kristeva fails to emphasize the fact that the pronounced divisions in American society are at best a mixed blessing: in fact, the latter serve more to *prevent* the attainment of a unified consensus powerful enough to challenge the system in its entirety. They represent a 'token otherness' that merely enhances the system's pluralistic self-image. It lumbers on monolithically, unswerved, as the potentially radical demands of each separate interest group founder in factional strife. PHILIPPE SOLLERS, *"Entretien."* Sollers discusses, among other things, his current project, *Paradis*, an investigation of the Biblical tradition as "the mythologization of a sexual adventure" whose essential nature could only become manifest in the present age of disenchantment. In this work, Sollers has apparently liberated himself from the fetters of punctuation. PHILIPPE SOLLERS, *"Paradis."* An excerpt from the aforementioned work that makes Joyce's writing seem realistic in comparison. JULIA KRISTEVA, *"Actualité de Céline."* A lecture presented in the U.S. last year. Céline's language is the "discourse of modernity," expressing the fragmentation of subjective, urban and linguistic identities experienced by present-day capitalism. This is not the indication of crisis that has merely socio-political ramifications, but is a direct manifestation of the socio-political crisis itself, of the fact that certain fundamental institutions previously essential to the maintenance of social equilibrium have become severely dysfunctional—i.e., law, religion, aesthetics, etc. Céline's prose conveys the subjective and symbolic determinants of fascism. Yet, "the question of fascism is subsidiary: the state, the police, political persecution are only the institutional forms of a more profound problem, more profoundly inscribed in the relation of the subject to language, and which Céline. . . had the 'good fortune' to crystallize." Since the end of the 19th century, the various discourses of the avant-garde have all been thrown back upon a single discourse: that of the instinctual unconscious of each reader. The level of 'meaning' or sense is transcended. For behind all apparent meaning lies a 'triplicity': the *referent*, impossible to reach as such; and the *signified*, which designates it arbitrarily by way of the *signifier*, which is no less arbitrary. Hence, Céline's discourse represents the truth content of the structuralist critique of logico-positivist rationality, exposing the illusory nature of the latter's claim that meaning can be confined to a logically delimitable, closed totality. RW

WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW SOCIETY, IV:4 (Winter 1977)

Center for the Study of Public Policy, 123 Mt. Auburn St., Cambridge, MA 02138. $15 per year (6 issues). CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, *"Laissez-faire Economics and Repressive Politics."* A comparison of the anti-inflation policies of the Ford administration and the Chilean junta, stressing the importance of a democratic polity in mitigating the social costs of laissez-faire, which, Jencks argues, "has almost invariably been a façade for restrictive arrangements that benefit one class and of necessity disenfranchise the others." The U.S.-Chile contrast suggests that despite a nominal commitment to personal freedom, laissez-faire economic policies of the kind advocated by Friedman *et al.*, can only be implemented by destroying such freedom. PAUL STARR, *"A Coming Doctor Surplus?"* NICOLE BALL, *"Dependency and Natural Disasters."* Discusses how the economic dependence of disaster-prone Third World countries on the industrialized West has led to the progressive deterioration of Third World ecosystems. The kind of indigenous, self-reliant development exemplified by the People's Republic of China and Bangladesh, together with

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cooperation among Third World nations, is essential to coping with "natural" disasters and preventing further ecological breakdown. ANDREW KOPKIND, *"Fair Share's Ballot-Box Blues."* A cautionary tale of community organizing, business backlash, and statewide referenda. In effect, the Massachusetts Fair Share citizens' initiative was caught in a contradiction between the demands of a class-based organizing project and the demands of a statewide electoral campaign. GLADWIN HILL, *"Initiatives: A Scorecard."* Discusses the procedure and recent record of citizens' initiatives. Concludes that although the initiative is a fiscal wild card outside the realm of lobbying and other pressure points through which business tries to keep things on a stable, lucrative course, it nevertheless survives and flourishes as an avenue for ordinary citizens' innovative ideas to gain electoral attention; this despite an entrenched problem of inequality of financial resources. ROBERT L. BOROSAGE, *"What to do with the Intelligence Agencies."* A program of reform under which the intelligence agencies, which at present constitute the nether half of an evolving dual state, would be made subject to statutory law, forced to "doff the cloak" and "sheathe the dagger," and have their budgets, as well as U.S. foreign policy in general, made subject to public discussion. PAUL J. NYDEN, *"As the Coal Business Booms, Turmoil Hits the Mineworkers."* CAROL RICHARDS, JONATHAN ROWE, *"Restoring a City: Who Pays the Price?"* An analysis of Washington, D.C.'s real estate market: the well-to-do against the poor, with the city's elected council caught in the middle; the issues are not all black and white. GEORGE ROSS, *"Eurocommunism's Coalition Politics."* Good, concise analysis in which the Communists are seen as holding the keys to social reform in Southern Europe, while the North European social democrats think the Communists hold the key to Pandora's box. Discussion of possible future developments; includes a short note on bibliographical references. BOGDAN DENITCH, *"Western Europe's New Left Socialism."* A perhaps overly sanguine account of the potential impact on European social democracy of current New Left preoccupation with the "new working class" and "workers' control." Argues that France is now the only country in Europe with a viable Left majority that appears ready to move beyond traditional social democracy, unlike the confused Britons, the overly pragmatic Scandinavians, and the factionalized Germans. Stresses the Italian Left socialists' emphasis on social and cultural questions, and briefly discusses Belgium and the Dutch student "ginger groups." Concludes with a comprehensive laundry list of major left socialist ideological themes. Book reviews. MS

WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW SOCIETY, VI:1 (January-February 1978)

Andrew Kopkind, *"Carter to Cities: Play Dead."* Critique of Carter's urban policy as warmed-over social liberalism that is unlikely to institute any of the needed fundamental changes. MARY JO BANE, *"The Politics of Family Impact Analysis."* Argues that family emphasis, as an approach to social reform, currently enjoys a good deal of political acceptance and hence is worth a try. TEMMA KAPLAN, JON WIENER, *"The Spanish Left; Divided but Surprisingly Strong."* Informative, detailed analysis of communist-socialist relations, and prospects for left political activity in Spain. ROSS MILLOY, *"Is Carter Serious about Reorganizing the Government? Should He Be?"* Report and analysis of the problems involved. STEVEN A. SCHNEIDER, *"Common Sense about Energy."* First of a two-part analysis. *"Where Has All the Oil Gone?"* A political analysis aimed at answering the question: Granted that nuclear power and coal are risky solutions, so long as there is still plenty of oil in the world, why isn't it being produced? Bibliography included. ANDREW KOPKIND, *"What to do till the Movement Arrives?"* Overview and commentary on the history of Left activism in the U.S., as well as current movements in community organizing (ACORN, Fair Share, LISTEN) and would-be national organizations, particularly NAM; also the Hayden campaign, the "anti-nuke" movement, and Mobilization for Survival. Argues that, "In the end, the most important thing about a political project (among which Kopkind includes an amateur production of Shakespeare's "The Tempest" in rural Vermont) may be its approach to the sense of isolation that pervades the American Left since the disappearance of a cohesive movement sensibility." CAROL BRIGHTMAN, *"The Women of Williamsburg."* Report on neighborhood activism in Brooklyn. PAUL OSTERMAN *"Understanding Youth Unemployment."* Stresses the need for short-term measures as a critical supplement to existing structural approaches, given the peculiar nature of unemployment among American youth. KIRKPATRICK SALE, *"The Polis Perplexity: An Inquiry into the Size of Cities."* Lengthy, scholarly, well-written argument for government intervention to control the growth of cities and redistribute population. Plus book reviews and commentary. MS

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